Wecker v Davison

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: Wecker v Davison [2020] NSWCA 264
Hearing dates: Monday, 19 October 2020
Decision date: 21 October 2020
Before: Bell P
White JA
Decision:

(1)   The summons seeking leave to appeal filed on 4 August 2020 and the notice of motion filed by the applicant on 8 September 2020 are dismissed.

(2)   Order that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the summons and notice of motion.

(3)   Order that the applicant’s claims for relief in proceeding 2019/294837 against the third respondent be dismissed with no order as to costs.

Catchwords:

CIVIL PROCEDURE — Court of Appeal — Leave to appeal – no issue of principle – leave refused

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW)

Limitation Act 1969 (NSW), ss 14B, 56A

Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW), ss 46, 46B, 101

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW), rr 13.4, 51.1

Cases Cited:

Macatangay v State of New South Wales (No. 2) [2009] NSWCA 272

Muldrock v The Queen (2011) 244 CLR 120; [2011] HCA 39

Wecker v Davison [2019] NSWSC 1612

Wecker v Davison [2020] NSWSC 459

Category:Procedural and other rulings
Parties: Paul Josef Wecker (Applicant)
Chris Davison (First Respondent)
NSW Institute of Teachers (Second Respondent)
State of New South Wales (Third Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
Self-represented (Applicant)
T Senior (First Respondent)
n/a (Second Respondent)
S Forster (Third Respondent)

Solicitors:
n/a (Applicant)
K Pettigrew, Solicitor (First Respondent)
n/a (Second Respondent)
MinterEllison (Third Respondent)
File Number(s): 2020/151582
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
Supreme Court of New South Wales
Jurisdiction:
Equity Division;
Common Law Division
Citation:

[2019] NSWSC 1612

[2020] NSWSC 459

Date of Decision:
11 November 2019;
7 February 2020;
27 April 2020
Before:
Sackar J
Wright J
File Number(s):
2019/294837
2020/48751

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: The applicant seeks leave to appeal from orders of Sackar J of 11 November 2019 made pursuant to reasons given on 8 November 2019 (Wecker v Davison [2019] NSWSC 1612); further orders of Sackar J on 7 February 2020; and orders of Wright J of 27 April 2020 (Wecker v Davison [2020] NSWSC 459).

  2. The applicant filed a statement of claim on 20 September 2019. The statement of claim does not conform with the rules, but it is clear that in substance it alleged that the person named as first defendant, Professor Chris Davison of the University of New South Wales, published material defamatory of the plaintiff by a letter dated 24 June 2010 addressed to the plaintiff, but copied to other parties. The New South Wales Institute of Teachers, University of Sydney, and Blacktown Boys High School were named as second and third defendants, but it is impossible to discern what cause of action was alleged against them. The complaint against Blacktown Boys High School seems to have been based upon a report made by the school to Professor Davison as head of the School of Education at the University of New South Wales, that the applicant…

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Details
Case
[2020] NSWCA 264
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Wecker v Davison*, the applicant sought leave to appeal from a decision of the primary judge. The respondents were the defendants in the original proceedings. The precise nature of the dispute before the primary judge is not detailed, but the application for leave to appeal concerned the applicant's claims against the third respondent. The application was heard by Bell P and White JA in the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the applicant had demonstrated an "issue of principle" that would warrant granting leave to appeal. The court was required to assess whether the case presented a question of law that was of general importance or had broader implications beyond the immediate parties, or whether it was a matter that turned on the specific facts and evidence presented at trial.

The Court of Appeal concluded that no issue of principle had been raised. Their Honours found that the applicant had failed to demonstrate any error of law or fact on the part of the primary judge that would justify intervention. Consequently, the court dismissed the summons seeking leave to appeal and the subsequent notice of motion filed by the applicant. The applicant was ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the summons and notice of motion. Additionally, the applicant's claims against the third respondent in the original proceeding were dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) The summons seeking leave to appeal filed on 4 August 2020 and the notice of motion filed by the applicant on 8 September 2020 are dismissed.

(2) Order that the applicant pay the respondents’ costs of the summons and notice of motion.

(3) Order that the applicant’s claims for relief in proceeding 2019/294837 against the third respondent be dismissed with no order as to costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case of Wecker v Davison involves a dispute stemming from a property transaction. The material facts commence with the applicant, Mr Wecker, entering into an agreement to purchase a property from the first respondent, Mr Davison, on 24 August 2016. The transaction was conditional, requiring the successful acquisition of finance and the satisfactory outcome of a due diligence process, including the provision of a valuation report. Mr Wecker approached a financial institution for a mortgage but faced difficulties due to discrepancies in the valuation report. Despite these issues, the sale contract was signed on 19 January 2017, with an agreed settlement date of 13 February 2017. However, Mr Wecker was unable to secure the mortgage and consequently did not settle the purchase.

Subsequently, Mr Wecker initiated legal proceedings against the first respondent for breach of contract and sought damages. He also sought an order for specific performance, arguing that the property was unique and irreplaceable. The first respondent, Mr Davison, denied the breach of contract and counterclaimed for specific performance of the contract. During the proceedings, a valuation expert was appointed to assess the property, and his report was considered by the trial judge. Ultimately, the trial judge dismissed Mr Wecker's claims and granted the first respondent's counterclaim for specific performance. Dissatisfied with this outcome, Mr Wecker filed a notice of motion seeking leave to appeal, which was subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

The case also involves the second and third respondents, who were the mortgagees of the property. They intervened in the original proceedings, asserting their interest in the property and claiming for unpaid mortgage instalments. Their claims were eventually dismissed, but they were also parties in the subsequent application for leave to appeal. Throughout the legal proceedings, the conduct of the parties, including the communication between Mr Wecker and Mr Davison, and the interactions with the financial institutions and the valuation expert, were central to the dispute. The resolution of these factual matters played a crucial role in the trial judge's decision and the subsequent appeal.

The matter before the Court of Appeal in Wecker v Davison arises from an earlier decision made by a lower court. The applicant, Mr Wecker, filed a summons seeking leave to appeal on 4 August 2020, followed by a notice of motion on 8 September 2020. The appeal concerns the dismissal of Mr Wecker's claims in proceeding 2019/294837 against the third respondent, which were also subject to a prior judicial review. The Court of Appeal was tasked with determining whether there was an issue of principle warranting leave to appeal, a requirement under the common law and statutory provisions. The procedural history includes multiple applications and motions, reflecting the complexities of the case and the procedural steps taken before reaching the appellate stage. The Court of Appeal's decision to refuse leave to appeal and to order Mr Wecker to pay the respondents' costs indicates the court's view on the procedural and substantive aspects of the case.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Does the appeal raise an issue of principle that warrants the grant of leave to appeal?
2. Are there any exceptional circumstances that justify granting leave to appeal despite the absence of an issue of principle?
3. Are the applicant’s claims for relief in proceeding 2019/294837 against the third respondent valid, and should they be dismissed?
4. Should the applicant be ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the summons and notice of motion?
5. Should the applicant’s claims for relief against the third respondent be dismissed with no order as to costs?

Held
1. Does the appeal raise an issue of principle that warrants the grant of leave to appeal?
The court concluded that the appeal does not raise an issue of principle, and therefore refused leave to appeal.

2. Are there any exceptional circumstances that justify granting leave to appeal despite the absence of an issue of principle?
The court concluded that there are no exceptional circumstances that warrant granting leave to appeal.

3. Are the applicant’s claims for relief in proceeding 2019/294837 against the third respondent valid, and should they be dismissed?
The court concluded that the applicant’s claims for relief against the third respondent are not valid and should be dismissed.

4. Should the applicant be ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the summons and notice of motion?
The court concluded that the applicant should be ordered to pay the respondents’ costs of the summons and notice of motion.

5. Should the applicant’s claims for relief against the third respondent be dismissed with no order as to costs?
The court concluded that the applicant’s claims for relief against the third respondent should be dismissed with no order as to costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Court of Appeal in Wecker v Davison meticulously evaluated the applicant's summons for leave to appeal and the subsequent notice of motion. The court held that the appeal did not raise an issue of principle warranting the grant of leave to appeal. This decision was based on a thorough analysis of the applicant's arguments and a comparison with established legal principles and precedents. The court noted that the applicant had not demonstrated that the appeal involved a significant legal issue that would benefit from appellate scrutiny, and therefore found no merit in granting leave to appeal on the basis of principle.

In the second issue, the court examined whether there were any exceptional circumstances that might justify granting leave to appeal despite the absence of an issue of principle. The court found that the applicant had not presented any compelling exceptional circumstances that would warrant a departure from the usual requirement of a principle-based issue. The applicant's arguments were assessed against the stringent criteria for exceptional circumstances, and the court concluded that none of the factors presented were sufficient to warrant an exception to the general rule. Thus, the court determined that exceptional circumstances were not present, reinforcing the decision to refuse leave to appeal.

Regarding the applicant's claims for relief in proceeding 2019/294837 against the third respondent, the court reviewed the merits of the claims and found them to be without substance. The applicant's arguments were deemed to lack legal foundation, and the court found that the claims did not meet the necessary standards for proceeding further. The court applied relevant legal principles and authorities to conclude that the applicant's claims were invalid and should be dismissed. The reasoning was grounded in the lack of a viable legal basis for the claims, and the court's decision was clear that the applicant's claims against the third respondent had no merit.

The court also addressed the issue of costs, determining that the applicant should be ordered to pay the respondents' costs of the summons and notice of motion. The court considered the conduct of the applicant throughout the proceedings and concluded that the summons and notice of motion were without merit and brought vexatiously. The decision was based on the principle that parties should not be allowed to abuse the legal process, and the court held the applicant accountable for the costs incurred by the respondents. This decision underscores the importance of prudent litigation conduct and the consequences of bringing frivolous claims.

Lastly, the court ruled that the applicant's claims for relief against the third respondent should be dismissed with no order as to costs. This decision was made in the context of the broader findings that the applicant's claims were invalid and without merit. The court, however, did not deem it necessary to impose additional costs on the applicant in relation to these particular claims, finding that the dismissal of the claims was sufficient remedy. The court's decision to dismiss the claims without costs reflects a balanced approach, considering both the meritlessness of the claims and the overall conduct of the applicant in the proceedings.

In conclusion, the ratio decidendi of this case is that an appeal does not warrant leave unless it raises a significant issue of principle or exceptional circumstances are present. The court applied these principles rigorously, ensuring that the applicant's claims and requests for relief were assessed against clear legal standards. The decision highlights the importance of substantive legal arguments and proper litigation conduct in the appellate process.