Weaver v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)

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QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:

Weaver v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2021] QIRC 413

PARTIES:

Weaver, Paul
(Applicant)

v

State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services)
(Respondent)

CASE NO:

TD/2020/81

PROCEEDING:

Application for reinstatement

DELIVERED ON:

6 December 2021
HEARING DATES: 

23-25 June 2021 inclusive
18 and 19 August 2021

MEMBER:

HEARD AT:

McLennan IC

Brisbane

ORDERS:

1. Pursuant to s 321(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), Mr Weaver is to be reinstated to his former position on conditions at least as favourable as the conditions on which he was employed immediately before dismissal.

2. Pursuant to s 321(4)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), Mr Weaver’s continuity of employment shall be maintained between the date his dismissal took effect on 5 August 2020 and the date of reinstatement (the relevant period).

3. 

(a) Pursuant to s 321(4)(b), (c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the Respondent shall pay to Mr Weaver:

  i.        the remuneration lost, or likely to have been lost, by Mr Weaver because of the dismissal in the relevant period;

Less:

  ii.       the monies earnt by Mr Weaver in the relevant period; and

  iii.        the monies paid by the Respondent to Mr Weaver, by way of notice upon the termination of his employment; and

  iv.        any monies paid by the Respondent to Mr Weaver for any accrued entitlements upon the termination of his employment (provided those accrued entitlements are now to be reinstated).

(b)    The gross amount shall be taxed according to Australian Law.

(c)     Should the parties, within 21 days of date of reinstatement, be unable to agree on the amount of remuneration lost, either party has liberty to notify the Registrar and I will list the matter for further Directions to determine the amount of remuneration lost.           

4.       Mr Weaver is to be reinstated within 22 days of the release of the date of this Order.

CATCHWORDS:

INDUSTRIAL LAW - OTHER MATTERS - APPLICATION FOR REINSTATEMENT - unfair dismissal - where the applicant was asleep on duty - whether the applicant engaged in the conduct subject of the allegations - whether conduct gave rise to fair and reasonable disciplinary finding - whether the applicant's behaviour amounts to dereliction of duty - whether the applicant's behaviour amounts to misconduct - consideration of procedural fairness - whether the termination of employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable – whether there was a loss of trust and confidence – order for reinstatement

LEGISLATION:

CASES:

Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) s 7

Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 316,
s 317, s 319, s 320, s 321, s 322, s 531

Public Service Act 2008 (Qld) s 187, s 188

Antony Mundy v MSS Security Pty Ltd T/A MSS Security [2015] FWC 3226

Ball v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) [2021] QIRC 116

Barclay v Nylex Corporation Pty Ltd [2003] AIRC 593

Bostik (Australia) Pty Ltd v Gorgevski (No 1) (1992) 36 FCR 20

Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336

Byrne & Frew v…

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Details
Case
[2021] QIRC 413
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Weaver v State of Queensland (Queensland Corrective Services) involved an application for reinstatement by the applicant, Weaver, who claimed unfair dismissal after being found asleep on duty. The court had to determine whether Weaver was indeed asleep on duty, whether his conduct warranted a fair and reasonable disciplinary finding, and if his termination was harsh, unjust, or unreasonable. Additionally, the court had to consider whether Weaver's conduct constituted dereliction of duty or misconduct, the fairness of the procedural steps taken, and whether there was a loss of trust and confidence in Weaver’s ability to perform his duties.

The court examined the evidence presented, including Weaver's admission that he might have dozed off, and considered the respondent's argument that Weaver's wife had warned a colleague about his tendency to fall asleep. The court held that an adverse inference under the rule in Jones v Dunkel should not be drawn against Weaver for not calling his wife as a witness, as the circumstances did not warrant such an inference. The court also acknowledged its power under the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) to depart from strict evidence rules but found no reason to do so in this instance.

After considering all evidence and arguments, the court found that Weaver's dismissal was unjust and unreasonable. The court ordered his reinstatement to his former position with continuity of employment, and directed the respondent to compensate Weaver for lost remuneration, subject to deductions for earnings and payments made during the termination period. The court also set a timeline for Weaver's reinstatement within 22 days of the order's release.

The court ordered that Weaver be reinstated to his former position within 22 days of the order's release. The respondent was also required to compensate Weaver for lost remuneration, subject to deductions for any earnings and payments made during the termination period. If the parties could not agree on the amount of remuneration lost within 21 days of reinstatement, either party could notify the Registrar for further directions to determine the amount.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 321(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), Mr Weaver is to be reinstated to his former position on conditions at least as favourable as the conditions on which he was employed immediately before dismissal.

2. Pursuant to s 321(4)(a) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), Mr Weaver’s continuity of employment shall be maintained between the date his dismissal took effect on 5 August 2020 and the date of reinstatement (the relevant period).

3.

(a) Pursuant to s 321(4)(b), (c) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the Respondent shall pay to Mr Weaver:

i. the remuneration lost, or likely to have been lost, by Mr Weaver because of the dismissal in the relevant period;

Less:

ii. the monies earnt by Mr Weaver in the relevant period; and

iii. the monies paid by the Respondent to Mr Weaver, by way of notice upon the termination of his employment; and

iv. any monies paid by the Respondent to Mr Weaver for any accrued entitlements upon the termination of his employment (provided those accrued entitlements are now to be reinstated).

(b) The gross amount shall be taxed according to Australian Law.

(c) Should the parties, within 21 days of date of reinstatement, be unable to agree on the amount of remuneration lost, either party has liberty to notify the Registrar and I will list the matter for further Directions to determine the amount of remuneration lost.

4. Mr Weaver is to be reinstated within 22 days of the release of the date of this Order.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Though the rules of evidence do not strictly apply,[42] it has been said that:The Evidence Act 1977 deals with the competency and compellability of spouses in criminal and civil proceedings. Section 7(2) of the Act applies in civil proceedings and provides that a husband or wife of a person who is a party to a proceeding, or on whose behalf a proceeding is brought or defended, is both competent and compellable to give evidence for any of the parties to the proceeding.[43][42] Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 531(2). [43] Office of the Queensland Parliamentary Counsel, 'Principles of good legislation: OQPC guide to FLPs' (2013) 1, 10 [27]. At [35] above, I outlined that the Respondent submitted that "…the applicant accepted in cross-examination that his wife told CCO Singh that he 'tends to doze off'" and that Mrs Weaver's evidence would be relevant to whether "the applicant was aware of his tendency to fall asleep". However, my review of the transcript does not reveal that Mr Weaver accepted his wife made that comment to CCO Singh,[44] the exchange instead was:Dr Brooks:And I suggest to you that at that point she says "Can you keep an eye on him because he tends to doze off", or words along those lines. Do you accept that it's possible she said that to him?Mr Weaver:It's possible. I don't recall it being said.[45][44] Applicant's Reply Submissions, 6 December 2021, 4 [26].[45] T 2-89, ll 1-4. The Applicant's closing submissions did not address me as to the relevance of Jones v Dunkel to this matter, with respect to any potential witness not called to give evidence. However, the Respondent's closing submissions did so, with respect to both Mrs Weaver and Mr Speck, in the terms I have reproduced in this section of my Decision. I have considered that an adverse inference should not be drawn against Mr Weaver in circumstances where he did not call Mrs Weaver as a witness, in accordance with the rule in Jones v Dunkel.[46] This rule operates where there is an unexplained failure by a party to give evidence. In appropriate circumstances, this may lead to an inference that the uncalled evidence would not have assisted the party. However, unless the appropriate circumstances are present, the Commission will not be bound to draw the adverse inference. Moreover, where the inference is drawn, the rule cannot be used to fill gaps in the evidence or to connect conjecture into suspicion.[47] Importantly, such an inference "cannot fairly be made except upon certain conditions; and they are also open always to explanation by circumstances which made some other hypothesis a more natural one than the party's fear of exposure".[48] The question of whether any such inference should be drawn in the circumstances is best answered after considering all the other evidence in the matter.[46] Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298.[47] J D Heydon AC, Cross on Evidence (LexisNexis, 10th ed, 2014) [1215].[48] Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298, 320-321. This Commission is empowered to depart from rigid application of the rules of evidence by s 531 of the IR Act, though only in particular circumstances such as to allow the recall of witnesses where the rule in Browne v Dunn is concerned.[49] In this instance, where both parties were represented, I see no reason for a departure from the rule in Jones v Dunkel on the basis of s 531. [49] Power v Torres Strait Island Regional Council [2011] ICQ 7, cited in Guymer v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2018] ICQ 009.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established