Weatherburn and Comcare (Compensation) [2019] AATA 4196 (14 October 2019)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2017/3172; 2017/5860
Re:Jennifer Weatherburn
APPLICANT
AndComcare
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Deputy President Gary Humphries AO
Date:14 October 2019
Place:Canberra
The Tribunal sets aside the reviewable decisions dated 20 April 2017 and 4 September 2017 and finds in substitution that Miss Weatherburn is entitled to compensation under ss 16 and 20 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 for persistent depressive disorder.
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Deputy President Gary Humphries AOCatchwords
COMPENSATION – major depressive disorder – whether the applicant’s major depressive disorder remains contributed to, to a significant degree, by her former employment – multiple possible causes of applicant’s condition – whether Comcare has discharged the evidentiary burden required by Comcare v Power [2015] FCA 1502 – decisions under review set aside and substituted
Legislation
Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988
Cases
Australian Telecommunications Commission v Tzikas (1985) 5 AAR 173
Boyd v Australian Industry Development Corporation [1990] FCA 525
Comcare v Power [2015] FCA 1502
Plumb and Comcare [2004] AATA 999
Prain v Comcare [2017] FCAFC 143REASONS FOR DECISION
Deputy President Gary Humphries AO
14 October 2019BACKGROUND
Jennifer Weatherburn had been a public servant for many years when, in August 2012, she suffered a psychological injury while working at the (then) Department of Immigration and Citizenship. Her injury related to what she described as bullying and to an increasingly heavy workload in a small section tasked with producing information for new immigrants. She ceased working at that time, and was medically retired a year later. On 9 January 2013 Comcare accepted liability for a condition of Major Depressive Disorder, recurrent episode under s 14 of the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 (the Act).
Before the Tribunal in these proceedings were two reviewable decisions made by Comcare. They were:
(a)
a reviewable decision dated 20 April 2017, which affirmed an initial determination
dated 22 February 2017, in which Comcare decided that as of 22 February 2017 Miss Weatherburn had no present entitlement to compensation under ss 16 and 20 of the Act because she no longer suffered the effects of her accepted condition, and
(b)a reviewable decision dated 4 September 2017 by which Comcare made a determination of own motion deciding that Miss Weatherburn had no entitlement to compensation under s 20 of the Act for the period 21 February 2017 to 20 April 2017 because she not suffered the effects of the compensable condition during that period.
The second of these reviewable decisions appears to be substantially redundant, since it simply replicates the effect of the first reviewable decision.
The delegate making the reviewable decision of 20 April 2017 referred to Miss Weatherburn suffering from an underlying life-long psychiatric condition diagnosed as depressive disorder,[1] and that her present symptoms were due to that condition and not to the flare-up caused by workplace circumstances in 2012.
[1] The use of italicised text in this decision generally indicates direct quotation.
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- AGLC
- Weatherburn and Comcare (Compensation) [2019] AATA 4196
- Case
- [2019] AATA 4196
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the Tribunal were whether Miss Weatherburn's psychological condition was contributed to, to a significant degree, by her previous employment, and whether Comcare had discharged the evidentiary burden required by the principles established in *Comcare v Power* [2015] FCA 1502. This involved assessing the relative contributions of her employment and other life stressors to her persistent depressive disorder, considering the evidence of medical experts and Miss Weatherburn herself. The Tribunal also had to consider whether the situation was analogous to *Prain v Comcare* [2017] FCAFC 143, where subsequent destabilising events had pushed the employment factor into the background.
The Tribunal reasoned that determining the causation of a psychological condition is inherently subjective and relies heavily on the professional experience and judgment of medical experts, while also giving significant weight to the affected individual's perspective. It was uncontentious that Miss Weatherburn suffers from a lifelong depressive condition that has fluctuated and been impacted by family stressors. While her employment had aggravated this condition, leading to a compensable injury, the evidence regarding the ongoing significant contribution of that employment was ambivalent. The Tribunal found itself unable to conclude, on the balance of probabilities, whether her former employment continued to be a significant contributing factor.
Applying the authority of *Comcare v Power*, the Tribunal set aside the reviewable decisions made by Comcare on 20 April 2017 and 4 September 2017. In substitution, the Tribunal found that Miss Weatherburn remained entitled to compensation under sections 16 and 20 of the relevant Act for persistent depressive disorder. Comcare was ordered to pay Miss Weatherburn's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Psychologist Susan Pelengaris gave evidence at the hearing. A psychological report she authored dated 20 May 2019 was tendered. In it she said that Miss Weatherburn continued to suffer from what Dr Matias had diagnosed as Major Depressive Disorder and Anxiety (panic attacks). When asked if she still suffered from the workplace injury, she responded “Yes” in that she is in limbo in an unresolved situation and financially impinged. Ms Pelengaris noted in her evidence that Miss Weatherburn had experienced a re-aggravation of her condition as a result of Comcare terminating her eligibility for compensation in 2017. CONSIDERATION As already mentioned, the sole issue before the Tribunal is whether Miss Weatherburn’s former employment continues to make a contribution, to a significant degree, to her psychological condition. I find that that condition is best described as persistent depressive disorder (or dysthymia), that being the opinion of Drs Knox, Ventura and Lovell. In answering that question, the Tribunal is assisted by a number of facts which are either common ground between the parties or are so apparent on the evidence as to be incontrovertible. Those facts are:(a)Miss Weatherburn suffers a lifelong depressive condition;(b)That condition has fluctuated in acuity throughout her life;(c)Her employment at the Department aggravated that condition in the period leading up to August 2012, such that a compensable injury under the Act arose;(d)She continues to suffer from a depressive condition;(e)Stressors relating to her family have been factors impacting on her depressive condition both before and after August 2012;(f)She believes that factors relating to her former employment continue to impact on her depressive condition, although her belief as to the effect of her former employment on her condition is not determinative of that relationship; and(g)She was a witness of truth in these proceedings. One further fact should be accepted, despite it not being uncontested. That fact is that she is not presently fit for employment. With the exception of Dr Ventura, that was the unanimous opinion of the expert witnesses. By its nature, a question concerning the impact of certain factors on the course of a psychological condition is a matter lying substantially at the feet of medical experts. Clearly, there is no empirical test available to answer this question; rather, it will be one determined largely on the basis of applying professional experience and judgement to the available evidence. Such experience and judgement may, as the facts of this case illustrate, quite reasonably lead to strikingly-divergent conclusions as to the cause or causes of a condition, such is the subjectivity of the issue at hand. Of course, the views of a person affected by such a condition will be a seminal area of focus of that professional experience and judgement. That person is uniquely placed to reflect on what has upset their mental well-being. As already noted, however, that person’s views are not necessarily determinative of what factors have caused or contributed to their condition. Whereas one would accord considerable weight in respect of causation to the evidence of a person who, say, has lost a leg in an accident, the same weight cannot as readily be accorded to the evidence of a person who has lost their psychological equilibrium, particularly where that loss has occurred over an extended period.