WAYLAND v TONKIN
[2001] SASC 96Civil
Leave to Appeal1................ Gray J This is an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order of a District Court judge.
Heading
2 In 1989 WAG No 2 Pty Ltd ("WAG") borrowed $442,500.00 from Mutual Community Friendly Society of South Australia ("MCFSSA"). Mr Wayland, Mr McCulloch and Mr Tonkin granted MCFSSA a deed of guarantee and indemnity. In September 1991 WAG borrowed a further $600,000.00 from MCFSSA. Mr Wayland, Mr McCulloch and Mr Tonkin granted MCFSSA a further deed of guarantee and indemnity. MCFSSA assigned its interest in the mortgages and deeds of guarantee and indemnity to National Mutual Health Insurance Pty Ltd ("National Mutual").
3 WAG defaulted. The monies secured by the mortgages and the guarantees became due and payable. National Mutual exercised its powers and entered into possession of the mortgaged land.
4 On 24 November 1997 a deed was entered into between National Mutual, WAG, Mr Wayland, Mr McCulloch and Mr Tonkin. Pursuant to the deed, National Mutual covenanted and agreed, that upon receipt of $235,000.00 from Mr Tonkin it would release:
-....... WAG from its obligations under the security instruments.
-....... the guarantors from their obligations under the guarantees.
5 In consideration of the sale of the land and the payment by Mr Tonkin, National Mutual released and discharged WAG and the guarantors from all liability.
Plaintiff's Case before the District Court
6 Mr Tonkin instituted proceedings in the District Court claiming (partly by amendment) a right of contribution from Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch as co-guarantors and co-indemnifiers in respect of the payment of $235,000.00.
7 Alternatively, Mr Tonkin claims that if the right to contribution has been extinguished by reason of the terms of the deed, Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch are liable to him pursuant to his right of contribution as a co-surety. They remain liable to contribute as co-indemnifiers.
8 In the further alternative, it is said that an estoppel arises. It is claimed by reason of Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch's conduct, Mr Tonkin was allowed to act to their benefit and to his detriment in circumstances that were unconscionable. It is alleged that Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch will be unjustly enriched unless they are estopped from claiming that the deed barred Mr Tonkin's rights to contribution.
9 Finally it is pleaded that the conduct of Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch was misleading and deceptive contrary to s 56 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA).
Defendant's Case before the District Court
10 Mr Wayland raised a number of defences. These included pleas that Mr Tonkin acted in breach of fiduciary duty and was negligent. It is said that the principal debt is unenforceable. The defence also pleads:
"In further answer to the whole of the Statement of Claim, the first defendant says that any right of contribution which the plaintiff might otherwise have had against the first defendant was extinguished as a consequence of the terms of a certain deed…
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- Case
- [2001] SASC 96
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court's reasoning was based on the principles that courts have been slow to make orders for the trial of preliminary issues of fact or points of law raised by the pleadings, and that attempts to pick out propositions of law first generally entail more expense and delay. The court noted that deciding the point raised without the question of fact first being resolved raised the possibility that the decision would be made hypothetically. The court concluded that a point of sufficient importance in the proceedings had not been raised and that the issue did not warrant review before final judgment. The matter should proceed to trial on the date fixed.
Background
Background to the litigation
Mr Tonkin instituted proceedings in the District Court, claiming a right of contribution from Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch as co-guarantors and co-indemnifiers in respect of the payment of $235,000.00. Alternatively, Mr Tonkin claimed that if the right to contribution had been extinguished by reason of the terms of the deed, Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch were liable to him pursuant to his right of contribution as a co-surety. They remained liable to contribute as co-indemnifiers. In the further alternative, it was claimed that an estoppel arose. It was alleged that Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch's conduct allowed Mr Tonkin to act to their benefit and to his detriment in circumstances that were unconscionable, and that it would be unjust for Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch to be estopped from claiming that the deed barred Mr Tonkin's rights to contribution. Finally, it was pleaded that the conduct of Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch was misleading and deceptive contrary to s 56 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA). Mr Wayland raised a number of defences, including pleas that Mr Tonkin acted in breach of fiduciary duty and was negligent. It was also said that the principal debt was unenforceable. Mr Wayland submitted that any right of contribution which Mr Tonkin might otherwise have had was extinguished as a consequence of the terms of the deed of release. Mr Wayland applied to a master of the District Court for an order dismissing Mr Tonkin's claim, but the application was dismissed. Mr Wayland then appealed to a District Court judge, but the appeal was dismissed. Mr Wayland sought leave to appeal against the order of the District Court judge, but leave was refused.
This case, Wayland v Tonkin, is an application for leave to appeal an interlocutory order made by a District Court judge. The matter arose from a dispute between co-guarantors of a debt originally owed by WAG No 2 Pty Ltd to the Mutual Community Friendly Society of South Australia. The plaintiff, Mr Tonkin, sought a right of contribution from the other guarantors, Mr Wayland and Mr McCulloch, after National Mutual released WAG and the guarantors from liability. The guarantors, in turn, argued that their rights of contribution were extinguished by a deed of release executed in 1997. The matter proceeded to the District Court where Mr Wayland sought an order dismissing the claim via an application to a master, which was dismissed. Mr Wayland appealed the dismissal to a District Court judge who also dismissed the appeal. This interlocutory order is now the subject of the application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of South Australia. The application for leave to appeal was initially filed ex parte but later proceeded inter partes after notice was given to the plaintiff. The applicant argued that the release of the debtor discharged all rights of contribution between the guarantors, while the respondent contended that the issue was not settled law. The court found that the matter should proceed to trial, as the issue of the effect of the deed of release on the rights of contribution was not one of settled law and no clear and uncontroverted factual situation existed to consider the issue. The court also noted the potential for increased expense and delay if the application were to proceed.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the release and discharge of the debtor by the creditor operates to discharge all rights of contribution between the guarantors.
2. Whether the rights of contribution between the guarantors were expressly reserved in the deed of release.
3. Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to prevent the guarantors from claiming that the deed of release bars the plaintiff's rights to contribution.
4. Whether the conduct of the guarantors was misleading and deceptive in contravention of s 56 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA).
5. Whether the guarantors are liable for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.
6. Whether the principal debt is enforceable.
Held
1. Whether the release and discharge of the debtor by the creditor operates to discharge all rights of contribution between the guarantors.
The court concluded that the issue is not settled and requires further examination at trial.
2. Whether the rights of contribution between the guarantors were expressly reserved in the deed of release.
The court concluded that the issue is not settled and requires further examination at trial.
3. Whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies to prevent the guarantors from claiming that the deed of release bars the plaintiff's rights to contribution.
The court concluded that the issue is not settled and requires further examination at trial.
4. Whether the conduct of the guarantors was misleading and deceptive in contravention of s 56 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA).
The court concluded that the issue is not settled and requires further examination at trial.
5. Whether the guarantors are liable for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.
The court concluded that the issue is not settled and requires further examination at trial.
6. Whether the principal debt is enforceable.
The court concluded that the issue is not settled and requires further examination at trial.
Leave to appeal was refused.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Supreme Court of South Australia, in Wayland v Tonkin, examined an application for leave to appeal against an interlocutory order dismissing a motion for summary judgment in a complex commercial dispute. The court addressed multiple issues concerning the enforceability and implications of a deed of release executed among several parties, including a debtor, creditor, and guarantors. The central issue was whether the release and discharge of the debtor by the creditor, as stipulated in the deed, operated to discharge all rights of contribution between the guarantors.
The applicant argued that settled law indicated the release and discharge of the debtor by the creditor discharged all rights of contribution between the guarantors, unless expressly reserved. The applicant cited a Canadian decision, Griffith v Wade, and passages from The Modern Contract of Guarantee to support this proposition. However, the respondent contested this, asserting that the matter was not settled and cited various Australian authorities suggesting otherwise. The court recognized the complexity of the issue and the lack of clear, uncontroverted facts to resolve it definitively.
The court further considered whether the rights of contribution were expressly reserved in the deed of release. Given the absence of explicit reservation language in the deed, the court found it inappropriate to make a definitive ruling on this point without further factual clarification and judicial deliberation.
The court also examined whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel could prevent the guarantors from claiming that the deed of release barred the plaintiff's rights to contribution. The court noted that for equitable estoppel to apply, there must be misleading or deceptive conduct that induces reliance and results in detriment. However, the court found that the issue of estoppel was contingent on the outcome of other unresolved factual disputes, making it premature to apply the doctrine.
Additionally, the court deliberated on whether the conduct of the guarantors was misleading and deceptive in contravention of s 56 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (SA). The court indicated that this would require a determination of whether there was indeed misleading or deceptive conduct, which again hinged on unresolved factual issues.
The court also considered whether the guarantors were liable for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence. However, the court determined that these issues also depended on factual findings yet to be made, thus precluding a definitive legal ruling at the interlocutory stage.
Finally, the court touched upon the enforceability of the principal debt. However, the court found that this too was contingent on factual determinations that had not yet been made.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court of South Australia refused leave to appeal, emphasizing the need for the matter to proceed to trial to resolve the complex factual and legal issues involved. The court underscored the importance of not deciding hypothetical points of law prematurely, which could lead to unnecessary expense and delay, and potentially fragment the trial process.