Watson, Jenny Marie v NSW BHP Steel Pty Ltd

[1998] FCA 597

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

INDUSTRIAL LAW - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT - review of decision of judicial registrar - complaints of sexual and other harassment - applicant’s resignation from her employment was voluntary though under pressure - employment not terminated at the initiative of the employer - United States doctrine of “actionable constructive discharge”

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth): s 170DF, s 170EDA(2), s 170CB

Burazin v Blacktown City Guardian Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 144, referred
Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200, applied
Grout v Gunnedah Shire Council (1994) 57 IR 243, referred
Gunnedah Shire Council v Grout (1995-6) 134 ALR 156, applied

Jackson & Wilson v Monadelphous Engineering Associates Pty Ltd (unrep, IRCA, 17/10/97), cons

JENNY MARIE WATSON v NSW BHP STEEL PTY LTD
NI 2181 of 1996

MADGWICK J
SYDNEY
1 JUNE 1998

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NI 2181  of   1996

BETWEEN:	JENNY MARIE WATSON APPLICANT
AND:	NSW BHP STEEL PTY LTD RESPONDENT
JUDGE:		MADGWICK J
DATE OF ORDER:		1 JUNE 1998
WHERE MADE:		SYDNEY

SHORT MINUTES OF ORDER

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1. The application is dismissed.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY	NI 2181 of 1996

BETWEEN:	JENNY MARIE WATSON APPLICANT
AND:	NSW BHP STEEL PTY LTD RESPONDENT
JUDGE:	MADGWICK J
DATE:	1 JUNE 1998
PLACE:	SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

HIS HONOUR: This matter was first heard by a judicial registrar, who dismissed the applicant’s application for relief on the ground that there was no termination of her employment at the initiative of her employer, the respondent. This is a review of that decision pursuant to s 377 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“the Act”).

Background
The applicant, Ms Watson, was employed as a clerk at the rolling mill operated by the respondent BHP at its complex at Rooty Hill.  She had been appointed permanently to that position on 5 September 1994 after completing several short term contracts, working as a secretary for various managers employed by BHP.  Her duties as a clerk involved performing a range of administrative tasks for about 15 senior staff, but she was directly responsible to Mr Dawson, the manager of the rolling mill. 

Following an incident which occurred on 23 August 1996, the applicant tendered her resignation to Mr Prestige, the manager of the Rooty Hill operation, on 3 September.  The applicant then lodged an application seeking reinstatement and compensation on the ground that she was unlawfully terminated from her employment.  In her application, the applicant stated that the reason for her termination was that:

“I felt compelled to resign as a result of: sexual harassment and mistreatment arising from a physical disability and temporary absence from work because of illness on Friday the 23/8/96.”

Claims of harassment
The applicant claimed that on a number of occasions when heavy items such as furniture or boxes needed to be moved, Mr Dawson would tell her to “use her feminine wiles” to get men to provide her with assistance.  On other occasions, Mr Hill, a supervisor, would make jokes at the applicant’s expense and would throw papers on her desk instead of handing them to her.  On one occasion in October 1995 Mr Hill abused her when she was working outside her office for not answering her telephone.  It was submitted that such incidents were indicative of a patronising attitude towards the applicant.  Unpleasant as such experiences may have been, they do not seem to have been relevant to the applicant’s decision to resign.

In about October 1994 the applicant and Mr Van Leeuwin were involved in a relationship.  Mr Van Leeuwin was a shift leader at the rolling mill.  The applicant then began receiving anonymous harassing telephone calls at home, and three months later received similar calls at work.  She also started to receive anonymous notes that were left on her car at work and at her home.  This continued for some months and in March 1995 the applicant made a complaint to Mr Walsh, the Human Resources Manager, and Ms Pigott, the Human Resource Officer.  Her complaint was supported by Mr Van Leeuwin who had also received anonymous letters.  Ms Pigott advised the applicant and Mr Van Leeuwin to report the matter to the police.  It was also suggested that the applicant and Mr Van Leeuwin prepare a statement about the harassment and give it to Ms Pigott for “safe keeping”.

The applicant made a number of complaints to the police and Telstra about the telephone calls, and also changed her address and telephone number several times, although it seems to no avail.

As a result of the continuing harassment and what the applicant perceived to be problems at work, the applicant felt very stressed and was later diagnosed as suffering from depression.

In late 1995, the applicant broke off her relationship with Mr Van Leeuwin and resumed a former relationship which she had had with another man.  Around April 1996, Mr Van Leeuwin, unwilling to accept his loss, became, the applicant describes, “increasingly obsessive” and would frequently telephone her, write her letters and interrupt her at work.  Mr Van Leeuwin’s behaviour became another source of anxiety for the applicant. This situation came to a head in June 1996.  Mr Van Leeuwin was waiting for the applicant at her desk one morning when she arrived at work.  The applicant refused to speak to him.  Mr Van Leeuwin telephoned her several times from his office but she again refused to speak to him.  Mr Van Leeuwin then approached the applicant and asked her to follow him to another office, which she did.  Mr Van Leeuwin dialled a telephone number and gave the receiver to the applicant to listen.  Mr Van Leeuwin had evidently dialled the applicant’s silent telephone number and her answering machine could be heard on the line.  Mr Van Leeuwin handed the applicant a piece of paper with her telephone number on it and told her that “there is no point changing your telephone number - I bought this off a friend of mine for $500”.  The applicant became very upset when Mr Van Leeuwin refused to leave.  The applicant rang for Mr Dawson’s assistance and then went home.

The next day, Mr Dawson spoke to two other employees about the relationship between the applicant and Mr Van Leeuwin.  They confirmed the applicant’s version of events. Mr Van Leeuwin was moved to another area away from the applicant.  Later that day, Mr Dawson told the applicant not to tell anyone about the incident, and “just continue to smile, be nice, act as if nothing has happened, you’ll have to continue to work with him and do his work”.  No further complaints were made by the applicant about Mr Van Leeuwin until the day of her resignation in September 1996.

The applicant’s medical condition
At the age of 15 the applicant had been diagnosed as suffering from endometriosis.  In January 1995 the applicant was absent from work for two weeks following an operation related to her condition.  She claims that during those two weeks Mr Dawson continually telephoned her to enquire when she would be returning to work.  She consulted a specialist about her condition and was required to take about two hours from work every four to six weeks to attend appointments.  The applicant claims that Mr Dawson would question her about these appointments and ask her improper personal questions about her condition.  She said that this continued for about six months until she was given an ultimatum to choose between attending the consultations or her work.  She did not attend any more appointments out of fear of losing her job.  Mr Dawson denies that he made such enquiries or ultimatums.  I do not doubt that Mr Dawson’s questions occasioned Ms Watson embarrassment and a degree of distress.  In my opinion, they were well-meant but proceeded from blundering insensitivity on Mr Dawson’s behalf rather than lewdness or any other improper motivation.

The applicant suffered from a virus during the week of 15 July 1996 and said that she was required to report via telephone to Mr Dawson every day.  She then took a weeks’ annual leave.  On her return on 30 July, she was called into Mr Dawson’s office.  My Dawson said words to the effect that some people would think that she was a hypochondriac and that she had a tendency to exaggerate.  The applicant says she felt guilty, as if by being ill she had done something wrong.  Mr Dawson then referred to a document which set out the amount of sick leave that the applicant had claimed and said “this seems to be a bit of a problem, what can we do to fix it?”  The applicant told him that she thought she had done the right thing by taking a week of her annual leave whilst she was ill, to which Mr Dawson replied that he thought that was a good idea.  

The August 23 incident
On Friday 23 August the applicant’s menstrual cycle began and, as a result of her endometriosis, she was in considerable pain.  The applicant’s clothes were soiled and she approached Mr Hill for permission to go home.  There was an emergency in the mill at that time and Mr Hill, being preoccupied with the urgent matter at hand, told the applicant that she could not go home.  The applicant went to the stores section and obtained a change of clothes.  Mr Kelly, an in-house accountant, was called and, on seeing that the applicant was not well and was distressed, told her that she should go home.  Ms Chapman, the clerk in the stores room, drove the applicant home.

Later that afternoon Mr Kelly spoke with Mr Hill about the incident, who did not remember it.  Mr Hill tried to telephone the applicant at home but was unable to find her current telephone number.  Mr Hill then told Mr Dawson that there had been an apparent misunderstanding between himself and the applicant and that she had gone home upset.

On Monday 26 August Mr Dawson spoke to Mr Kelly and Ms Chapman to ascertain what had happened.  Both of them told Mr Dawson that when they saw the applicant the previous Friday she was very upset and had told them that Mr Hill would not allow her to leave work.  Mr Dawson was concerned that an there was an implication that Mr Hill had kept the applicant at work, knowing the condition that she was in.  Mr Dawson wanted to ascertain what had happened and asked the applicant her version of events.  She told him that she understood Mr Hill was concerned about the emergency at the mill, and that it was a misunderstanding.  Mr Dawson commented that the applicant did not seem concerned about what had happened.  Mr Dawson then spoke to Mr Hill twice about the incident.  He denied that he had said anything to the applicant.  Mr Dawson again asked the applicant questions about what had happened, and, the applicant claims, also asked her inappropriate personal questions about her menstruation cycle.   Again, I think Mr Dawson may have displayed insensitivity, but not impropriety.

The next day, being satisfied that there had been a misunderstanding, Mr Dawson told the applicant that she should ensure that Ms Chapman did not retain any impression that Mr Hill had known about the applicant’s condition, when he had said that she could not go home.  As the applicant got up to leave, she claims that Mr Dawson said “you must have been a little embarrassed on Friday but you must really be embarrassed by now”.  The applicant says that she felt degraded and humiliated by the experience, that it arose out of something which she had not regarded as being important, and that Mr Dawson had caused the incident to be blown out of proportion.  That afternoon, the applicant telephoned the Anti-Discrimination Board.

Two days later, on Thursday 29 August, the applicant made a written complaint of sexual harassment against Mr Dawson and gave the complaint to Ms Pigott.  Ms Pigott told the applicant that there would need to be an investigation of the complaint and that she would speak to Mr Walsh about the appropriate steps to be taken.  On Mr Walsh’s advice, Ms Pigott told the applicant that she would contact each of the persons named in her complaint and explain to them the process involved in investigating the allegations.  Ms Pigott also told the applicant that she would need to review the allegations to ensure that she was satisfied that all issues had been covered, because once the investigation commenced no new allegations could be made.  The applicant was given a few days to work on her complaint. 

Ms Pigott then spoke to the people involved and informed Mr Dawson that the applicant had formally lodged a complaint against him.  Ms Pigott emphasised that he was not to talk to the applicant about the complaint and, if a situation arose where he needed to speak to her about any significant matter, Ms Pigott would act as a third party.

The applicant continued to work under Mr Dawson’s supervision for the rest of the week.

The resignation
On Monday, 2 September, the applicant arrived at work to find two notes on her desk.  One was a handwritten letter from Mr Van Leeuwin.  Although it is understandable that the applicant may have viewed that letter as constituting further unwanted attention from him, its terms are those of an apology and, from the tone of the letter, it seems genuine.  The other was a note from Mr Dawson asking about some furniture that he had requested some months ago but had since decided not to purchase.  The applicant took this letter as vindictive criticism of her, and decided that she had had enough and wrote out her resignation, giving one weeks’ notice.  That afternoon she handed her resignation to Mr Prestige together with the letter from Mr Van Leeuwin.

The next day, the applicant attended a meeting with Mr Prestige and Ms Pigott.  They asked if the applicant was happy with her decision, to which she said it would be “a relief”.  The applicant was invited to provide a further statement of allegations concerning her complaint about Mr Dawson so that the investigation could proceed.  The applicant never furnished any such statement.  Her last day of work was 6 September 1996.

Was the termination of the employment relationship at the initiative of the employer?
The applicant contends that the termination of her employment was in breach of subs 170DF(1)(a) and (f) of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“the Act”) which provides:

“An employer must not terminate an employee’s employment for any one or more of the following reasons, or for reasons including any one or more of the following reasons:
(a)      temporary absence from work because of illness or injury;
. . .
(f)       . . . physical or mental disability . . .”

Section 170EDA(2) provides that where an application alleges that a termination of an employee’s employment contravened s 170DF(1) for one of the reasons set out in that section, then the termination is taken to have contravened that section unless the employer can demonstrate to the contrary. However, the Court must first be satisfied that there was a “termination of employment”, within the context of the Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer (“the Convention”): s 170CB. For the purposes of the Convention, “termination of employment” means termination of employment at the initiative of the employer: Article 3.

The meaning of the phrase “at the initiative of the employer” is not further elucidated in the Convention, but was considered by the Full Court of the Industrial Relations Court in Mohazab v Dick Smith Electronics (No 2) (1995) 62 IR 200. The Court considered the meaning of that phrase in the context of the Convention and concluded (at 205-6):

“Viewed as a whole, the Convention is plainly intended to protect workers from termination by the employer unless there is a valid reason for the termination.  It addresses the termination of the employment relationship with the employer.  It accords with the purpose of the Convention to treat the expression ‘termination at the initiative of the employer’ as a reference to a termination that is brought about by an employer and which is not agreed to by the employee.  Consistent with the ordinary meaning of the expression in the Convention, a termination of employment at the initiative of the employer may be treated as a termination in which the action of the employer is the principal contributing factor which leads to the termination of the employment relationship.....plainly an important feature is that the act of the employer results directly or consequentially in the termination of the employment and the employment relationship is not voluntarily left by the employee.  That is, had the employer not taken the action it did, the employee would have remained in the employment relationship.”(emphasis added)

The onus lies on the applicant to show that her employment was terminated at the initiative of her employer:  Slifka v J W Sanders Pty Ltd (1995) 67 IR 316; Melide v Rethmann Australia Environmental Services (1997) 147 ALR 669.

The applicant’s written resignation does not necessarily mean that the termination of the employment relationship was not at the initiative of the respondent:  Grout v Gunnedah Shire Council (1994) 57 IR 243. The proper test has been discussed in a number of cases (see, for example, Siagan v Sanel Pty Ltd (1994) 54 IR 185 at 201-2 per Wilcox J; Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists & Managers Australia v Skilled Engineering Pty Ltd (1994) 54 IR 236 at 244-5 per Gray J) but, ultimately, the question to be answered is whether it can be said that any action (or inaction) of an agent of the respondent resulted in the termination of the employment relationship without the real and free consent of the applicant: see Mohazab at 205.

The incidents outlined prior to that which occurred on 23 August were not relied upon by the applicant other than to illustrate the background against which she made her complaint against Mr Dawson and the response that she could expect arising from that complaint.  However, those incidents do not, in my opinion, tend to support any conclusion that, having been given a reasonable opportunity to investigate the complaints, Ms Pigott or Mr Prestige would not have taken proper and effective action, if any such action was warranted.  There is no evidence to suggest that the respondent, as her employer, could have taken any positive steps to prevent the applicant from receiving the anonymous telephone calls and letters.  Those matters were, as Ms Pigott rightly advised the applicant, a matter for the police.  There was no absolute liability in the employer to provide a “harassment-free workplace” in respect of these calls and letters.  The employer had only to do what reasonably might be done.

As to the incidents concerning Mr Van Leeuwin’s behaviour, the steps taken by Mr Dawson, moving Mr Van Leeuwin to another area and issuing an appropriate warning, were effective in bringing that unsatisfactory situation to an end, at least until the applicant received the letter on the day of her resignation.  In any event, Mr Dawson’s handling of the situation does not suggest that the applicant’s subsequent complaint involving him would not have been handled appropriately by BHP.  If anything, the incident would indicate that the management personnel of the respondent were sensitive to such issues and willing to take action if so warranted.

As noted above, the particular incident which led the applicant to write the letter of resignation was Mr Dawson’s handling of the misunderstanding between the applicant and Mr Hill on 23 August.  In her written complaint to Ms Pigott, the applicant also complained about Mr Dawson’s questioning her about her medical condition and about her absences from work.

The applicant submits that, firstly, by placing her back at work with Mr Dawson after he had been informed of her complaint against him, and secondly, by requiring the applicant to provide further particulars before the investigation would proceed, it was unreasonable to expect her to continue in her employment, and that she had no alternative but to resign. 

In relation to the second matter, I do not consider that Ms Pigott’s actions indicated that she had no alternative to resignation except to provide a further statement about her allegations.  Such an interpretation of what Ms Pigott intended is, in my view, wrong.  It seems to me that Ms Pigott took the applicant’s complaint seriously, and consistently with that approach, Ms Pigott’s intention was probably to advise the applicant as to Ms Pigott’s conception of what was in the applicant’s best interests.  It remained within the power of the applicant simply to assert that she was happy with her complaint in its original form and to request that the investigation proceed.  It is not unreasonable to suggest that the applicant could have done this.  Indeed, the applicant had demonstrated her capacity for taking the initiative by contacting the Anti-Discrimination Board.

However, there is some question whether it was unreasonable to expect the applicant to continue working for the respondent if that necessitated working under the supervision of Mr Dawson, once he became aware of the complaint against him.  On 2 September when she gave Mr Prestige her resignation, the applicant asked him whether there was any alternative employment that could be arranged, and suggested several positions which she thought were available.  Mr Prestige told her that those positions had been filled and that there was nowhere to place the applicant outside the rolling mill.  Neither party raised the question of whether clerical work might be found for the applicant otherwise that in the western suburbs, elsewhere within the BHP group’s extensive operations.  That evidence nevertheless could suggest, on the face of it, that the applicant truly did not wish to resign and that Mr Prestige would have been aware of that fact.

However, there is no evidence to suggest that the applicant and Mr Dawson were unable to work in reasonable harmony, although of course their working relationship would have been strained.  Indeed, the applicant had continued to work with Mr Dawson for three days after the complaint was made, without incident.  If the applicant had felt that working under Mr Dawson’s supervision would be intolerable, it would have been open to her to raise her concerns when she first made the complaint or at any time thereafter, without tendering her resignation.  She did not do so.  Nor was there any objective basis for a complaint about Mr Dawson’s behaviour or conduct towards her after he became aware of the complaint, so there was no reason for the applicant to fear any repercussion.  The applicant did claim that Mr Dawson had, in effect, trumped-up a complaint about the late arrival of some office furniture.  I believe the applicant was sincere in so interpreting Mr Dawson’s note on the subject.  However, I think that Mr Dawson was not looking to lay a basis for fault-finding against the applicant and that there was a genuine misunderstanding on the applicant’s part about his intentions.  The applicant’s own evidence was that the aggravating factor which caused her to resign on the morning of 2 September was finding both letters on her desk.  It was not based on any inability to continue working with Mr Dawson.  At the meeting on 2 September, Mr Prestige asked the applicant if she was happy with her decision, to which she replied it would be a relief.  The applicant told Mr Prestige and Ms Pigott that she had discussed the matter with her family, and she had done so.  They went on to discuss the consequences in relation to the applicant’s BHP shares.  At the applicant’s request, no-one, including Mr Dawson, was told of the applicant’s resignation until she had gone.

The applicant also submitted that it was unreasonable for Mr Prestige to have accepted her resignation (c.f. Grout).  However, unlike the situation in Grout, the applicant gave reasonable notice of her intention to resign and continued to work to the end of the week without incident.  During her final week at work, the applicant at no stage sought to withdraw her resignation, nor did she indicate to Ms Pigott or Mr Prestige that she was reconsidering her decision.

In these circumstances, there can be no suggestion other than that the applicant’s decision to resign was voluntarily made.

The applicant had been treated with well-meant insensitivity by Mr Dawson, whom she would have seen as her “boss”. This had distressed her. When she complained through the respondent’s appropriate channels and was told that, pending investigation, she should continue to work with Mr Dawson, this was inappropriate. The applicant might within a reasonable period, say 24 hours, have made her view of its inappropriateness known to the respondent through those channels and might have asserted a claim to be permitted to work elsewhere pending the investigation or to be given leave with pay. The respondent would then have had a choice to make which might (I need not determine the matter) have had consequences for the operation of the Act. But the applicant did not force the issue, not even on the Monday following, 2 September until the very point of her resignation.

The applicant had a right, continuing after her complaint about Mr Dawson, to be treated in a way that would permit the employment contract to be maintained, that is not to be treated in such a way as to seriously damage or destroy mutual trust and confidence as between the parties unless there was reasonable cause for it:  Burazin v Blacktown City Guardian Pty Ltd (1996) 142 ALR 144; see also my decision at first instance (16/11/1995, IRCA, unrep.). That right and the employer’s corresponding duty may well have extended to affording her a reasonable degree of special care and protection after the making of a complaint, the bona fides of which there was no reason to suspect, of sexual harassment. But there are some contractual terms the content of which cannot be crystallised until the facts are known to both parties. In the case of the implied contractual term in question here, its actual content cannot be divorced from a consideration of the employee’s subjective reaction to the circumstances said to enliven the duty. Unless, therefore, the employee sufficiently makes his/her own reaction to those circumstances clear to the employer, or there is only one subjective reaction reasonably likely, the employer cannot be said to be in breach of the term. The applicant did not make her reaction to being asked to continue working with Mr Dawson clear before she resigned. Her subjective reaction was not the only one that a person in her position could reasonably be thought to have. Besides, the employer is only obliged to act reasonably.

That the applicant be separated from working with Mr Dawson, while desirable, might or might not have been a reasonable request in all the circumstances.  It does not necessarily flow, even if usually it would, from any contractual or other obligation of an employer that an employee complaining of sexual harassment must be forthwith separated from the person complained of, when that person is the complainant’s immediate supervisor.  Cases will differ.  This is one in which, in my opinion, the employer did not behave unreasonably, given the lack of assertion by the applicant of what she wanted.

In any case, at best there were two reasons for her resignation.  One was her disquiet at continuing to work with Mr Dawson.  The other was Mr Van Leeuwin’s continued unwelcome expression of interest in her.  It could hardly be suggested that the employer was obliged to the applicant to dismiss Mr Van Leeuwin.  Insofar as the reason for termination of the applicant’s employment might be traced to his letter, that causative factor was not attainable to the initiative of the employer.  It is by no means clear to me that that factor may not have been more significant in the applicant’s mind than her difficulties with Mr Dawson.

It is clear that the applicant felt under some pressure from her work circumstances.  Some of those circumstances were apt to cause her to feel pressure and were the consequence of decisions of the employer’s managers.  But a fairly voluntary resignation does not cease to be voluntary because it was made under some pressure: Gunnedah Shire Council v Grout (1995-6) 134 ALR 156 at 166-7. The applicant had some hours to consider the matter before she made her decision. That was time enough for her to consult, as she did, members of her family. There was no employer-imposed limit, far less an unreasonably short one, on the amount of time available to her to consider that matter. The pressure did not operate to prevent her applying her own free will and choice to the decision that she made.

I have looked at the United States authorities referred to by Moore J in Jackson & Wilson v Monadelphous Engineering Associates Pty Ltd (Industrial Relations Court of Australia, 17 October 1997, unreported) concerning the doctrine, there developed, of “actionable constructive discharge”. It appears to me that such thinking is of value to the development of the common law in Australia concerning wrongful dismissal. But the Act and the Convention provide their own regime. They do not require, and may not permit, the importation of such doctrine. In any case, proof is required under that doctrine that, whether or not the employer intended the employee to resign, the employer deliberately made an employee’s working conditions so intolerable that the employee was forced into an involuntary resignation: ibid.  That is, at least in the case such as the present, not much different from proving that the employer has, without reasonable cause, conducted itself in a manner likely to damage or destroy the relationship of confidence and trust between the parties, contrary to the term to be implied forbidding such conduct, and entitling an employee to regard such a breach of contract as repudiatory:  Burazin.  However the matter be precisely formulated, in my view such proof is lacking in this case.  The applicant was not forced into an involuntary resignation.  It is not shown that the employer acted without reasonable cause.  Its conduct was not such as would so damage the employer-employee relationship as to justify the applicant in treating the contract as at an end.

Accordingly, I find that there was no termination of the applicant’s employment at the initiative of the respondent and I dismiss the application.

I certify that this and the preceding twelve (12) pages are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Madgwick

Associate:
Dated:             1 June 1998

Counsel for the Applicant:	J Keys
Solicitor for the Applicant:	Stormers
Solicitor for the Respondent:	Blake Dawson Waldron
Date of Hearing:	13 August 1997
Date of Judgment:	1 June 1998