Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards Regulator v Renaissance Traditional Bathrooms Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards Regulator v Renaissance Traditional Bathrooms Pty Ltd [2020] FCA 1757  

File number(s): ACD 42 of 2019
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 13 November 2020
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to proceed nunc pro tunc under s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) against two corporate respondents in liquidation – where four corporate respondents allegedly contravened ss 33 and 34 of the Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards Act 2005 (Cth) on multiple occasions and sole director and shareholder of corporate respondents alleged to have contravened Act as an accessory – where regulator seeks civil penalties and declarations – where liquidator without sufficient funds to investigate or defend allegations made by regulator – where condition of leave that regulator will not enforce penalties or costs orders against insolvent respondents without seeking leave of Court – where alleged contraventions occurred in names of insolvent corporations – whether justiciable controversy or useful purpose in Court making findings of contravention against insolvent corporation – public interest in making of declarations and effect on regulatory scheme of prosecuting non-compliance – Held: in public interest to grant leave to proceed

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – costs of application for leave to proceed nunc pro tunc under s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – where liquidator unsuccessfully opposed application funded by alleged accessory – whether alleged accessory should pay costs – Held: both liquidator and sole director and shareholder liable for costs of opposing application

Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 491, 500(2), 545, 601AB

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Sch 2, ss 70-55, 75-40

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), s 37N

Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards Act 2005 (Cth), ss 18, 33, 34, 44M, 44N, 44Q

Insolvency Practice Rules (Corporations) 2016, rr 70-15(2)(d), 70-55

Cases cited:

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Link Solutions Pty Ltd [2008] FCA 1790

Gardner v Dairy Industry Authority of New South Wales (1977) 18 ALR 55

In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts (1921) 29 CLR 257

Phoenix Institute of Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2017] FCAFC 155

The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, Ex parte 2 HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45

Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd (No 3) (1991) 33 FCR 382

Yorke v Lucas (1985) 158 CLR 661

Division: General Division
Registry: Australian Capital Territory
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Number of paragraphs: 57
Date of hearing: 13 November 2020
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr T Begbie QC
Solicitor for the Applicant: Australian Government Solicitor
Counsel for the First, Fourth and Fifth Respondents: Mr P Ward
Solicitor for the First, Fourth and Fifth Respondents: Nova Legal
Counsel for the Second and Third Respondents: Mr J Garas
Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: HWL Ebsworth

ORDERS

ACD 42 of 2019
BETWEEN:

WATER EFFICIENCY LABELLING AND STANDARDS REGULATOR

Applicant

AND:

RENAISSANCE TRADITIONAL BATHROOMS PTY LTD

First Respondent

TRADITIONAL TAPS.COM.AU PTY…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 1757
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards Regulator, Mary Colreavy, brought proceedings against Renaissance Traditional Bathrooms Pty Ltd and three other companies, alleging contraventions of the Water Efficiency Labelling and Standards Act 2005 (Cth). The companies were in liquidation, and their liquidator, Mr Rocke, stated that there were no funds available to investigate or defend the allegations. The Regulator sought declarations, civil penalties and costs against the companies and their sole director and shareholder, Mr Shaw, who was alleged to be an accessory to the contraventions. The court had to decide whether it should grant leave to proceed nunc pro tunc against the companies in liquidation and, if so, who should bear the costs of the application.

The court held that there was a public interest in allowing the proceedings to continue against the insolvent companies. The court noted that the Regulator was a statutory body seeking to enforce compliance with the WELS Act. The public interest in making findings of contravention against the insolvent corporations and the effect on the regulatory scheme of prosecuting non-compliance were relevant considerations. The court also held that both the liquidator and Mr Shaw were liable for the costs of opposing the application, as Mr Shaw had funded the liquidator in resisting the application. The court found that the liquidator and Mr Shaw were jointly and severally liable for the costs.

The court granted leave to proceed nunc pro tunc against the two insolvent companies and ordered that the liquidator and Mr Shaw pay the costs of the application. The court found that the public interest in allowing the proceedings to continue against the insolvent companies outweighed the fact that the companies would not be able to defend themselves. The court also found that the Regulator was entitled to seek declarations and civil penalties against the insolvent companies, as they were appropriate remedies for contraventions of the WELS Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 500(2) of the Corporations Act 2001, the applicant have leave to proceed nunc pro tunc against the second and third respondents.

2. The liquidator of each of the second and third respondents and the fifth respondent pay the applicant’s costs of the interlocutory application filed on 15 June 2016.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Regulator alleged that Mr Shaw contravened s 44M(1)(b) of the WELS Act as an accessory by aiding and abetting each of the contraventions alleged against each of the four companies. Background This is the first occasion since the enactment of the Act in 2005 that the Regulator has brought proceedings for civil penalties. The Regulator herself, Mary Colreavy, made an affidavit on 22 June 2020 in which she explained that the existence of non‑compliant suppliers operating in the market harmed industry confidence in the scheme to which the Act, and legislative instruments under it, gave effect. She said that this would occur particularly if there were a perception that the legislative requirements were not being consistently enforced or that instances of non‑compliance were not being adequately addressed. She said that a loss of industry confidence would result in lower compliance rates and less access for consumers to reliable water efficiency information. Mr Rocke said in his affidavit of 13 August 2020 that the creditors of each of Traditional Taps and Castironbaths had resolved under s 75-40 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) in Sch 2 of the Corporations Act that his remuneration from the time of his appointment should be approved in a sum capped at $20,000 plus GST for each company. He said that at the date of his affidavit his expenses exceeded $30,000 for each of Traditional Taps and Castironbaths and that each company had just under $20,000 in its bank account. He formed the view that while the two companies may have incurred debts when each was insolvent, the value of any claim, if established, either against Mr Shaw or the holding company, would be negligible, if not nil, and that it would be uncommercial to pursue or continue any investigation of such a claim in the absence of funding. He said that the only creditors of the companies that he had identified were the Commissioner of Taxation and the companies’ related entities. He said that, accordingly, there was no prospect of any distribution being made to creditors of either Traditional Taps or Castironbaths. He also asserted that if the current application were refused, he would proceed to finalise the winding up of each company and use the funds in its bank account to pay his costs and expenses, so that it would then be deregistered under s 601AB of the Corporations Act. Mr Rocke said that as the funds available to meet his expenses in the winding up were limited, he had not investigated whether or not either company had engaged in any conduct that might have contravened the Act and was not in a position to do so. He also said that he understood s 33(5) provided that each company would bear an evidential onus in relation to whether the WELS products in question were registered at the time of the alleged contraventions of s 33. He said that if leave to proceed were granted, he would not have access to funds to enable him to cause the companies to discharge that evidential burden, nor would he be able to participate meaningfully in their defences of the proceeding by undertaking such expensive actions as giving discovery, preparing and filing evidence, considering the Regulator’s evidence, obtaining legal advice, and retaining lawyers to defend the proceedings because, he said, “There are simply no assets available to fund the Companies’ participation in the proceedings”.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

However, that view leaves out of account what Lee J explained in the Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd (No 3) (1991) 33 FCR 382 at 388. There, his Honour refused the Commission leave to discontinue against a company that had gone into liquidation during the trial. Lee J said:The trading entity with which the public has been involved is Manfal. Any judgment against the individual respondents is unlikely to convey to the public that errant behaviour on the part of Manfal has been duly identified and redressed and only those with special knowledge of the matter would be aware that discontinuance against the corporation was not a finding or representation of belief that Manfal’s conduct was acceptable and not a contravention of s 52A of the Act as previously alleged. The proceedings are entirely grounded upon the allegation of the contravention of the Act by Manfal and in no sense can it be said the joinder of Manfal has become inappropriate. (emphasis added) Each case involving the Court making a determination of whether or not to grant leave to proceed against a company in liquidation turns upon its own particular facts. In exercising its powers under the Corporations Act to grant leave to proceed, the Court is able to take into account any matters that it considers to be relevant subject to the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act as a whole: The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, Ex parte 2 HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45 at 49 per Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ. The scheme of the Corporations Act reflects the prima facie position that an insolvent company in liquidation should be wound up and its assets distributed to its creditors and, if sufficient, in accordance with the statutory priorities and order of payment. Regulatory proceedings for recovery of civil or criminal penalties fall outside the ordinary scope of a winding up in the sense that, ordinarily, they focus upon past conduct of a corporation when it was trading and any civil penalties or fines imposed on it are not provable debts. Ordinarily, the public interest will be a significant consideration in the exercise of the Court’s discretion to grant leave to proceed against an insolvent corporation that is otherwise entitled to a stay or prohibition of proceedings under a provision such as s 500(2). The identity of a party seeking such leave may be important, particularly if it is a Government or statutory regulator seeking to establish an entitlement to civil penalty or other enforcement relief. However, such a party is not entitled as of right to a grant of leave. In Phoenix Institute of Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2017] FCAFC 155 at [154], Perram, Yates and Wigney JJ said: The respondents’ claims of misleading or deceptive conduct, and of unconscionable conduct, raise complex questions of fact and evaluation that are appropriate for determination by the Court rather than under a proof of debt procedure. Indeed, this is necessarily so in light of the fact that declarations of contravention and pecuniary penalties are sought. Only the Court can grant that relief. It follows, inexorably, that the respondents’ claims must be determined by the Court. This stands as a cogent reason why leave to proceed should be granted.(emphasis added)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

He argued that there was no substantive public interest in leave being granted so that the proceeding could continue against the two companies in liquidation. Mr Shaw contended that this was because the companies would not be able to defend themselves and would therefore be at greater risk of being found liable without ever having actively participated in opposing the Regulator’s claims. Mr Shaw’s counsel said that, although his client was funding the liquidator in resisting this application, his instructions were that Mr Shaw had no intention to fund the liquidator were leave to proceed granted. Mr Shaw argued that there would be no foreseeable consequences for the parties from the grant of leave and relied on the remarks of Mason J, with whom Jacobs and Murphy JJ agreed, in Gardner v Dairy Industry Authority of New South Wales (1977) 18 ALR 55 at 69. Consideration Mr Shaw has been sued as an accessory to each of the same contraventions that the Regulator has alleged against each of his four companies, including Traditional Taps and Castironbaths. If that liability of Mr Shaw were established at the trial, on one view such a finding could achieve a greater deterrent effect on directors and others involved in the operations of a contravener or company subject to the WELS Act’s regulatory scope than the determination of contraventions and civil penalties against the two hopelessly insolvent corporations that could not meet the liability. However, that view leaves out of account what Lee J explained in the Trade Practices Commission v Manfal Pty Ltd (No 3) (1991) 33 FCR 382 at 388. There, his Honour refused the Commission leave to discontinue against a company that had gone into liquidation during the trial. Lee J said:The trading entity with which the public has been involved is Manfal. Any judgment against the individual respondents is unlikely to convey to the public that errant behaviour on the part of Manfal has been duly identified and redressed and only those with special knowledge of the matter would be aware that discontinuance against the corporation was not a finding or representation of belief that Manfal’s conduct was acceptable and not a contravention of s 52A of the Act as previously alleged. The proceedings are entirely grounded upon the allegation of the contravention of the Act by Manfal and in no sense can it be said the joinder of Manfal has become inappropriate. (emphasis added) Each case involving the Court making a determination of whether or not to grant leave to proceed against a company in liquidation turns upon its own particular facts. In exercising its powers under the Corporations Act to grant leave to proceed, the Court is able to take into account any matters that it considers to be relevant subject to the subject-matter, scope and purpose of the Act as a whole: The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal, Ex parte 2 HD Pty Ltd (1979) 144 CLR 45 at 49 per Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ. The scheme of the Corporations Act reflects the prima facie position that an insolvent company in liquidation should be wound up and its assets distributed to its creditors and, if sufficient, in accordance with the statutory priorities and order of payment. Regulatory proceedings for recovery of civil or criminal penalties fall outside the ordinary scope of a winding up in the sense that, ordinarily, they focus upon past conduct of a corporation when it was trading and any civil penalties or fines imposed on it are not provable debts.