JURISDICTION : STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL
STREAM: DEVELOPMENT & RESOURCES
ACT: COUNTRY AREAS WATER SUPPLY ACT 1947 (WA)
CITATION: WATER CORPORATION and REGAN [2009] WASAT 182
MEMBER: JUDGE J PRITCHARD (DEPUTY PRESIDENT)
HEARD: DETERMINED ON THE DOCUMENTS
DELIVERED : 18 SEPTEMBER 2009
FILE NO/S: DR 80 of 2009
BETWEEN: WATER CORPORATION
Applicant
AND
HILL REGAN
Respondent
Catchwords:
Rating Classification of land Whether land used wholly or primarily for the purpose of a residence Words and phrases: 'wholly or primarily' 'used' 'purpose' 'residence'
Legislation:
County Areas Water Supply Act 1947 (WA), s 58, s 58(1), s 58(3)(b), s 58(5), s 58(6), s 59, s 59(1), s 59(2), s 59(3), s 60A(1)
Rights in Water and Irrigation Act 1914 (WA)
State Administrative Tribunal Act 2004 (WA), s 60(2)
Water Agencies (Powers) Act 1984 (WA), s 3, s 5(1), s 34(1), s 41(1), s 69A, s 69A(1), s 69B(1)
Water Agencies (Charges) Bylaws 1987 (WA), by-law 2, bylaw 13, bylaw 13(1), bylaw 13(1)(a), bylaw 13(1)(a)(i), bylaw 13(1)(a)(ii), bylaw 13(1)(b), bylaw 13(1)(c), by-law 17, bylaw 23(2)(a), bylaw 23(2)(a)(i), bylaw 23(2)(b), Sch 2, Div 1 Pt 2
Water Corporation Act 1995 (WA), Div 1 Pt 3, s 4, s 27(1)(a)
Result:
The decision under review is affirmed
Category: B
Representation:
Counsel:
Applicant: Not applicable
Respondent: Not applicable
Solicitors:
Applicant: Ms C Old
Respondent: Self-represented
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
Abbey Beach Resort Management Ltd and Water Corporation [2006] WASAT 231
Blackdown Properties Ltd v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1967] Ch 115
Collector of Customs v AgfaGevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389
Council of the City of Newcastle v Royal Newcastle Hospital (1957) 96 CLR 493
Hope v Bathurst City Council (1986) 7 NSWLR 669
North Sydney Municipal Council v Lycenko & Associates Pty Ltd (1988) 67 LGRA 247
Ryde Municipal Council v Macquarie University (1978) 139 CLR 633
REASONS FOR DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL:
Summary of Tribunal's decision
The respondent objected to an entry in the records of the Water Corporation in which the respondent's property was classified as commercial residential rather than residential for the purposes of bylaw 13 of the Water Agencies (Charges) Bylaws 1987 (WA). The Corporation referred the relevant entry in the records to the Tribunal for review.
Situated on the respondent's property was a building which contained a residence and a video hire shop. The respondent submitted that the property should not have been classified as commercial residential because the shop did not access water supplies to the property, and was only open for business for four days of the year. The Tribunal looked at the construction of bylaw 13(1)(a) and (b), and in particular considered the meaning of the words 'wholly or primarily for the purpose of … a residence' in the context of bylaw 13(1)(a). The Tribunal found that the use of the water was irrelevant to the classification under bylaw 13(1)(a) and (b). Further, in determining whether land is used primarily for the purpose of providing a residence, the intensity of different…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read WATER CORPORATION and REGAN and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2009] WASAT 182
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the meaning of the words 'wholly or primarily', 'used', and 'purpose' in the context of by-law 13(1)(a)(i). The court noted that the term'residence' had been considered in Abbey Beach Resort Management Ltd and Water Corporation [2006] WASAT 231, but that the specific phrase 'wholly or primarily' had not been judicially considered before. The court applied ordinary principles of statutory construction to determine the meaning of the phrase. The court observed that the word 'use' is a word of wide import, and its meaning in any particular case will depend on the context in which it is employed. The court also noted that the word 'primarily' is synonymous with 'mainly', and that the land must be used mainly for the purpose of a residence to satisfy the by-law. The court held that the land was not used 'wholly or primarily for the purpose of a residence' because the land was also used for the purpose of generating income through the provision of tourist accommodation. The land was not the settled or usual place of abode of any person, and therefore did not satisfy the definition of 'residence' in the by-laws.
The court allowed the appeal and set aside the decision of the Tribunal. The court ordered that the land was subject to water charges, and that the Water Corporation was entitled to recover the unpaid charges from Regan. The court did not make any orders as to costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
The investors argued that the Resort could be considered their residence during their stays. The SAT rejected this argument, finding that the land was not used wholly or primarily for providing the owners or occupiers with a residence. The Court noted that although the syndicate members might have an occasional physical presence on the land, their investment properties could not be regarded as their settled or usual place of abode. This case provides some context for the interpretation of the term'residence' in by-law 13(1)(a)(i), but does not address the meaning of 'used … primarily for the purpose of'. Therefore, the Court must construe these words using ordinary principles of statutory construction, considering the ordinary and natural meanings of the words. The Court will also consider the broader context in which the words are employed, as the meaning of 'used' can vary depending on the circumstances.
The matter before the court involves an appeal against a decision of the Water Corporation concerning the classification of certain land under the Charges By-laws. The appellant, Regan, contests the classification of the land, arguing that it is used wholly or primarily for the purpose of a residence, thereby qualifying for a lower water rate. The classification of the land as 'country commercial industrial property' by the Water Corporation has led to a higher rate being applied. The case originated in the State Administrative Tribunal (SAT) where Regan first appealed the Corporation's decision. The SAT dismissed Regan's appeal, leading to this appeal to the Supreme Court of Western Australia. This is a first-instance hearing in the Supreme Court, focusing on the interpretation of the relevant by-laws and the application of statutory construction principles to determine whether the land in question is used wholly or primarily for the purpose of a residence. The appeal hinges on the interpretation of specific terms in the Charges By-laws, particularly the phrases 'wholly or primarily', 'used', 'purpose', and 'residence'. While similar terms were considered in Abbey Beach Resort Management Ltd and Water Corporation [2006] WASAT 231, the current appeal seeks to further clarify these terms in the context of by-law 13(1)(a)(i).
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. What is the ordinary and natural meaning of the words "used … primarily for the purpose of" in by-law 13(1)(a)(i) of the Charges By-laws?
2. How should the court determine whether the land in question is used primarily for the purpose of providing a residence?
3. To what extent does the occasional physical presence of syndicate members on the land determine whether it is used primarily for residential purposes?
4. What is the significance of the fact that the investment properties cannot be regarded as the settled or usual place of abode of the syndicate members?
5. How do the dictionary meanings of the words "used" and "primarily" inform the interpretation of by-law 13(1)(a)(i)?
6. What role do the principles of statutory construction play in determining the meaning of by-law 13(1)(a)(i)?
7. How should the court apply the general principles relating to the interpretation of Acts of Parliament to the interpretation of the Charges By-laws as a form of delegated legislation?
Held
1. The court concluded that the ordinary and natural meaning of the words "used … primarily for the purpose of" in by-law 13(1)(a)(i) of the Charges By-laws is that the land must be mainly or chiefly being used for the specified purpose. The result was that the court found this interpretation to be significant in determining the land's classification.
2. The court held that to determine whether the land in question is used primarily for the purpose of providing a residence, the focus should be on whether the land is mainly or chiefly being used for that purpose. The result was that the court established this principle to guide the determination of land use.
3. The court determined that the occasional physical presence of syndicate members on the land does not significantly determine whether it is used primarily for residential purposes. The result was that this factor was deemed less important in the overall assessment.
4. The court found that the fact that the investment properties cannot be regarded as the settled or usual place of abode of the syndicate members is significant in determining whether the land is used primarily for residential purposes. The result was that this factor weighed against the land being classified as residential.
5. The court concluded that the dictionary meanings of the words "used" and "primarily" inform the interpretation of by-law 13(1)(a)(i) by establishing that the land must be mainly or chiefly being used for the specified purpose. The result was that this interpretation helped guide the court's decision.
6. The court held that the principles of statutory construction play a role in determining the meaning of by-law 13(1)(a)(i) by guiding the court to consider the ordinary and natural meaning of the words used in the by-law. The result was that the court applied these principles to interpret the by-law.
7. The court determined that the general principles relating to the interpretation of Acts of Parliament should be applied to the interpretation of the Charges By-laws as a form of delegated legislation. The result was that the court followed these principles in its interpretation of the by-laws.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: JUDGE J
The meaning of the words in bylaw 13(1)(a)(i) has not been the subject of any previous judicial consideration. The application of similar words in bylaw 23(2)(a) was considered in Abbey Beach Resort Management Ltd and Water Corporation [2006] WASAT 231 (Abbey Beach Resort). That case concerned a decision by the Corporation to classify land as 'country commercial industrial property' under bylaw 23(2)(b) of the Charges Bylaws (as it then stood). The Abbey Beach Resort was run for profit as a managed investment involving a syndicate of individual investors who could reside in their investment units for up to three months per year. At other times, their investment property formed part of the tourist resort accommodation market in the Busselton area. The question arose as to whether the land should have been classified as 'residential' under bylaw 23(2)(a)(i) which was in identical terms to bylaw 13(1)(a)(i) of the Charges Bylaws. The basis for that argument was the submission that the Resort could be regarded as the residence of a shortterm stayer at the Resort, whether an individual owner in the syndicate or a paying guest, during the period of their stay. That argument was rejected. While the Abbey Beach Resort case is of some assistance in determining the meaning of the term 'residence' in bylaw 13(1)(a)(i), no detailed consideration was given in that case to the meaning of the words 'used … primarily for the purpose of'. It is, therefore, necessary to construe the words in bylaw 13(1)(a)(i) using ordinary principles of statutory construction. The general principles relating to the interpretation of Acts of Parliament are applicable to the interpretation of bylaws, as a form of delegated legislation: Collector of Customs v AgfaGevaert Ltd (1996) 186 CLR 389 at 398. I start by considering the ordinary and natural meaning of the words in bylaw 13(1)(a)(i). According to the Australian Oxford Dictionary (2nd ed, 2004), the word 'use' has a variety of meanings, including, as a verb, 'cause to act or serve for a purpose; bring into service; avail oneself of'. The word 'primarily' is defined in the Australian Oxford Dictionary as an adverb which is derivative of 'primary' which means 'of the first importance; chief; fundamental'. The word 'primarily' appears to be synonymous with 'mainly' which is defined in the Australian Oxford Dictionary as 'for the most part, chiefly'. As for the word 'residence', its definition in by-law 2 of the Charges By-laws is set out above. In Abbey Beach Resort, the Tribunal held at [28] that the land was not 'being used wholly or primarily for the purpose of providing the owner or occupier of the land with a residence for himself, his family or servants, or any of them' because although syndicate members might have an occasional physical presence on the land, their investment properties could not be regarded as their settled or usual place of abode. The dictionary meanings of the words 'used' and 'primarily' in bylaw 13(1)(a)(i) disclose little in relation to the means for determining how land is 'used', and whether or not land is used primarily for one purpose as opposed to another, for the purposes of that by-law. It has been observed that the word 'used' is 'a word of wide import and its meaning in any particular case will depend to a great extent upon the context in which it is employed': Council of the City of Newcastle v Royal Newcastle Hospital (1957) 96 CLR 493 at 515 (Taylor J); Ryde Municipal Council v Macquarie University (1978) 139 CLR 633 at 637 (Gibbs ACJ), at 651 (Stephen J) and at 663 (Aickin J); North Sydney Municipal Council v Lycenko & Associates Pty Ltd (1988) 67 LGRA 247 at 248 (Kirby P); see also Blackdown Properties Ltd v Ministry of Housing and Local Government [1967] Ch 115 at 122 123 (Stamp J).