Warne v GDK Financial Solutions; Peridon Village Nominees

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Limited
[2005] FCAFC 265

CORPORATIONS LAW – prospectus – disclosure – claim that the disclosures in a prospectus contravened s 728 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the Act’) – whether a subscribing shareholder is entitled to commence a proceeding under s 729(1) of the Act to recover from the company that issued the prospectus the loss suffered as a result of the subscription without rescinding the contract to acquire the shares – whether s 729(1) is subject to the rule in Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 563A, 728, 729

Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Limited [2005] FCA 1280 - overruled
Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317 - considered
Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd & Ors v The State of Victoria & Anor (1993) 179 CLR 15 - distinguished
State of Victoria v Hodgson & Ors [1992] 2 VR 613 - distinguished
Sons of Gwalia Limited (Administrator Appointed) (ACN 008 994 287) v Margaretic [2005] FCA 1305 - considered
Malika Holdings Pty Limited v Stretton (2001) 204 CLR 290 - cited
General Finance Corporation et al v Keystone Credit Corporationet al 50 F2d 872 (1981) - cited

CADENCE ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR CADENCE CAPITAL v CONCEPT SPORTS LIMITED AND OTHERS
VID 1209 OF 2005

MERKEL, WEINBERG AND KENNY JJ
16 DECEMBER 2005
MELBOURNE

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1209 OF 2005

On appeal from a single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

CADENCE ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
(ABN 68 106 551 062) as trustee for Cadence Capital
APPELLANT

AND:

CONCEPT SPORTS LIMITED (ACN 108 042 593)
FIRST RESPONDENT

GARY MARCH
SECOND RESPONDENT

LEON DAPHNE
THIRD RESPONDENT

JEFFREY TAYLOR
FOURTH RESPONDENT

STEVEN ROLTON
FIFTH RESPONDENT

DAVID CARTER
SIXTH RESPONDENT

JOHN MOORE
SEVENTH RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

MERKEL, WEINBERG AND KENNY JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

16 DECEMBER 2005

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.   The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge made on 20 September 2005, dismissing the appellant’s claim for damages under s 729(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and requiring the appellant to pay the respondents’ costs of the Subscription Claims, be set aside.

3.   The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the hearing before the primary judge and the appeal.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

VID 1209 OF 2005

On appeal from a single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia

BETWEEN:

CADENCE ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
(ABN 68 106 551 062) as trustee for Cadence Capital
APPELLANT

AND:

CONCEPT SPORTS LIMITED (ACN 108 042 593)
FIRST RESPONDENT

GARY MARCH
SECOND RESPONDENT

LEON DAPHNE
THIRD RESPONDENT

JEFFREY TAYLOR
FOURTH RESPONDENT

STEVEN ROLTON
FIFTH RESPONDENT

DAVID CARTER
SIXTH RESPONDENT

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Details
Case
[2005] FCAFC 265
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Warne v GDK Financial Solutions; Peridon Village Nominees involved a dispute regarding the recovery of losses by shareholders under s 729(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The appellant, Warne, had subscribed for shares in Concept Sports, a company that issued a prospectus. After purchasing the shares, Warne sold them at a loss and subsequently brought a class action against Concept Sports and its directors, claiming that they had suffered losses due to breaches of the Act. The primary judge dismissed Warne’s claim under s 729(1), holding that the rule in Houldsworth required rescission of the contract for share acquisition before a shareholder could recover losses, which Warne could no longer do having sold the shares. The primary judge’s decision was based on the premise that the appellant’s beneficial interest in the shares was sufficient to trigger the rule in Houldsworth.

The legal issue before the court was whether the statutory right of recovery for shareholders under s 729(1) is qualified by the rule in Houldsworth. The court noted that while the statutory regime under the Act had evolved significantly, particularly with the introduction of a statutory cause of action in favour of shareholders against the company issuing the prospectus, this did not necessarily imply an intent to overturn the rule in Houldsworth. The court considered the legislative history of s 729 and compared it to previous statutes and case law. The court concluded that the absence of explicit legislative language overturning the rule in Houldsworth, alongside the legislative intent observed in other provisions, suggested that Parliament did not intend to overturn the rule in this context.

The court held that the rule in Houldsworth remains applicable, and therefore, the appellant’s claim under s 729(1) was barred because Warne had not rescinded the contract to acquire the shares. However, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge’s orders, and directed that the respondents pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the hearing before the primary judge and the appeal. The court's decision underscores the importance of clear legislative language in altering established legal principles.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The orders of the primary judge made on 20 September 2005, dismissing the appellant’s claim for damages under s 729(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and requiring the appellant to pay the respondents’ costs of the Subscription Claims, be set aside.

3. The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the hearing before the primary judge and the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Applying the rule in Houldsworth, the primary judge concluded that a shareholder wishing to rely on s 729(1) of the Act to sue a company to recover loss suffered in its capacity as a shareholder must first rescind the contract to acquire the shares, which it can no longer do if the company is in liquidation or if the shares have been sold by the shareholder to a third party. Accordingly, the primary judge ordered that the claim for loss under s 729(1) made by the appellant be dismissed, because the appellant was a subscribing shareholder that had sold its shares and had not rescinded its contract to acquire the shares. The order was made on the basis of the pleading of the appellant’s claim, made pursuant to s 729(1), against the company issuing the prospectus. The order was therefore an interlocutory order but the Full Court granted the appellant leave to appeal.Background The first respondent (‘Concept Sports’) issued a prospectus offering 24 million shares at an issue price of $0.50 each. Pursuant to the offer contained in the prospectus, a company acting as trustee for the appellant subscribed for 100 000 shares in Concept Sports at $0.50 each. The shares were issued to the trustee on or about 7 June 2004. On 21 and 22 September 2004 the appellant sold the shares to a third party at an average price of 11.5 cents. Subsequently, the appellant commenced a group proceeding under Pt IVA of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) against Concept Sports and its directors. The appellant claims that it, and certain other shareholders in Concept Sports, suffered loss and damage as a result of contraventions of the Act in relation to the prospectus and seeks to recover that loss and damage pursuant to, inter alia, s 729(1) of the Act. The primary judge determined, as a preliminary issue, that the rule in Houldsworth barred the claims of the appellant as it was suing in its capacity as a subscribing shareholder. This is because it is suing for the recovery of its loss (being, in substance, the price paid on subscription less the price received on the sale of the shares) but has not rescinded, and can no longer rescind, the contract by which the shares were acquired. His Honour appears to have proceeded on the basis that the appellant’s beneficial interest in the shares was sufficient to make the rule in Houldsworth apply to it. In view of the conclusions we have reached, it is unnecessary for us to consider that aspect of his Honour’s decision. Forty one other persons, who also subscribed for shares in Concept Sports, are in the same position as the appellant. That is, having sold the shares for which they subscribed, they can no longer rescind the contract by which the shares were acquired. Accordingly, the claims made on their behalf as group members under s 729(1) will also fail if the statutory right of recovery is qualified by the rule in Houldsworth. Although the primary judge’s orders dismissed the appellant’s claims under s 729(1) and s 1317HA of the Act the appellant does not seek to appeal in relation to the dismissal of its claim under s 1317HA. Accordingly, the issue on the appeal is whether the statutory entitlement of a shareholder to recover compensation under s 729(1) of the Act in respect of the prospectus issued by Concept Sports is qualified by the rule in Houldsworth.The rule in Houldsworth

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

MERKEL, WEINBERG AND KENNY JJ (dissent)
Although the primary judge applied the reasoning in Webb and Hodgson to the appellant’s claims under s 729(1) of the Act, as was explained by the primary judge, the statutory regime under the Act differs in significant respects from the regime that applied in those cases. We will shortly turn to consider the present regime but the most significant change was the specific conferral in s 729(1) of a statutory cause of action in favour of shareholders, including subscribing shareholders, against a company that has failed to meet the Act’s requirements in respect of a prospectus. The primary judge’s decision The primary judge considered the legislative history of s 729 starting with s 3 of the Directors Liability Act 1890, 53 & 54 Vict c 64 which provided that, subject to certain exceptions, every director, promoter and other person who authorised the issue of a prospectus should be liable to pay damages that a subscriber has suffered ‘by reason of any untrue statement in the prospectus’. His Honour then noted the legislative changes that occurred in the early 1990s that led to legislatures in Australia expanding the persons who could be held accountable for false statements in a prospectus to include the company issuing the prospectus. His Honour stated at [17]:‘17.… Prior to 1991 the position in relation to prospectuses was covered by s 107 of the Companies Codes of the States. In all relevant respects s 107 was to the same effect as s 3 of the Directors Liability Act upon which it was based. In 1989 there was an unsuccessful attempt to expand the range of persons who could be held liable in damages for false statements in a prospectus. In that year the Commonwealth enacted a statute entitled the Corporations Act 1989 (Cth). By s 1006 of that Act, the persons who could be held accountable for false statements in a prospectus included not only, as in the past, the directors, promoters and those who had authorised the prospectus, but also those named in the prospectus as stockbrokers, sharebrokers or underwriters, auditors, bankers or solicitors, as well as the corporation itself. According to the Explanatory Memorandum to the Bill, the new provision “aim[ed] to make all persons involved in the preparation of a prospectus responsible for the prospectus” (at [2996]). However, many provisions in the Corporations Act were struck down for constitutional reasons: see New South Wales v Commonwealth (1990) 169 CLR 482. In due course the Act was replaced by the Corporations Law which came into operation on 1 January 1991. Section 1006 of the Corporations Law reproduced s 1006 of the Corporations Act. Section 729 of the current legislation is in similar terms.’ His Honour then said at [18]-[21]:‘18.The question then comes down to this. Did the introduction of the company that issued the prospectus as a possible defendant to a claim for damages under s 729 overturn the rule in Houldsworth’s case? 19.There are factors pointing both ways. Those that point in favour of overturning Houldsworth’s case are these. First, the cause of action conferred by s 729 against the company is remedial in nature and should therefore be given broad effect. Second, s 729 is in terms unrestricted, and to impose a limitation (that is the limitation set by Houldsworth’s case) would be inconsistent with the terms. Third, if the section has not overturned Houldsworth’s case, it would have a somewhat reduced scope. That is to say, if rescission is a necessary precondition to an action, a subscribing shareholder could only recover consequential or indirect damages in an action under s 729. 20.The factors that point the other way are these. First, Parliament could have but did not in terms overturn Houldsworth’s case. That is, Parliament could have but did not enact a provision similar to s 111A of the English Companies Act. Second, it is apparent that Parliament is aware of Houldsworth’s case and its consequence and when it wishes to do so it will overturn its effect and do so in clear language. Here I have in mind s 737 of the Corporations Act which was introduced into the Corporations Law by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth). The purpose of the new section was to provide additional remedies for a contravention of s 724 (the predecessor to s 728). One additional remedy was “the right to return the securities and have their application money repaid”. According to s 737(1) the right is available “even if the company that issued the securities is being wound up”. The only purpose for including these words is to reverse the combined effect of Houldsworth’s case and Oakes v Turquand namely that there can be no rescission after a winding up. Third, a similar argument made in relation to the operation of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), a “fundamental piece of remedial and protectionist legislation” (so described by McHugh J in Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v State of Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15, 41) was rejected by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in State of Victoria v Hodgson [1992] 2 VR 613. Justice Tadgell who delivered the leading judgment stated (at 631) that: “To hold otherwise would be to regard the Trade Practices Act as intending to overturn by implication a cardinal tenet of limited liability which has prevailed for 130 years. It would be surprising indeed if the Trade Practices Act had that intention or effect”. Fourth, if the submission were accepted it would produce an anomalous situation. I mentioned earlier that the rule in Houldsworth’s case has been given statutory effect when a company is in liquidation. If s 729 has overturned Houldsworth’s case, it could only have done so for an action against a company that is not in liquidation. Section 563A, which would preclude proof of claims when the company is being wound up, remains in place: Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v State of Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15. It would require a good reason indeed to impute to Parliament an intention to overturn Houldsworth’s case when the company is a going concern but not when it is being wound up. 21.It seems to me that the reasons for denying the plaintiff the relief that it seeks are to be preferred. Moreover, to hold otherwise would conflict with State of Victoria v Hodgson, a decision of an appellate court which I am required to follow. In any event, State of Victoria v Hodgson is correct, in my opinion.’The Corporations Act

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

His Honour then said at [18]-[21]:‘18.The question then comes down to this. Did the introduction of the company that issued the prospectus as a possible defendant to a claim for damages under s 729 overturn the rule in Houldsworth’s case? 19.There are factors pointing both ways. Those that point in favour of overturning Houldsworth’s case are these. First, the cause of action conferred by s 729 against the company is remedial in nature and should therefore be given broad effect. Second, s 729 is in terms unrestricted, and to impose a limitation (that is the limitation set by Houldsworth’s case) would be inconsistent with the terms. Third, if the section has not overturned Houldsworth’s case, it would have a somewhat reduced scope. That is to say, if rescission is a necessary precondition to an action, a subscribing shareholder could only recover consequential or indirect damages in an action under s 729. 20.The factors that point the other way are these. First, Parliament could have but did not in terms overturn Houldsworth’s case. That is, Parliament could have but did not enact a provision similar to s 111A of the English Companies Act. Second, it is apparent that Parliament is aware of Houldsworth’s case and its consequence and when it wishes to do so it will overturn its effect and do so in clear language. Here I have in mind s 737 of the Corporations Act which was introduced into the Corporations Law by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth). The purpose of the new section was to provide additional remedies for a contravention of s 724 (the predecessor to s 728). One additional remedy was “the right to return the securities and have their application money repaid”. According to s 737(1) the right is available “even if the company that issued the securities is being wound up”. The only purpose for including these words is to reverse the combined effect of Houldsworth’s case and Oakes v Turquand namely that there can be no rescission after a winding up. Third, a similar argument made in relation to the operation of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), a “fundamental piece of remedial and protectionist legislation” (so described by McHugh J in Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v State of Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15, 41) was rejected by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in State of Victoria v Hodgson [1992] 2 VR 613. Justice Tadgell who delivered the leading judgment stated (at 631) that: “To hold otherwise would be to regard the Trade Practices Act as intending to overturn by implication a cardinal tenet of limited liability which has prevailed for 130 years. It would be surprising indeed if the Trade Practices Act had that intention or effect”. Fourth, if the submission were accepted it would produce an anomalous situation. I mentioned earlier that the rule in Houldsworth’s case has been given statutory effect when a company is in liquidation. If s 729 has overturned Houldsworth’s case, it could only have done so for an action against a company that is not in liquidation. Section 563A, which would preclude proof of claims when the company is being wound up, remains in place: Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v State of Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15. It would require a good reason indeed to impute to Parliament an intention to overturn Houldsworth’s case when the company is a going concern but not when it is being wound up. 21.It seems to me that the reasons for denying the plaintiff the relief that it seeks are to be preferred. Moreover, to hold otherwise would conflict with State of Victoria v Hodgson, a decision of an appellate court which I am required to follow. In any event, State of Victoria v Hodgson is correct, in my opinion.’The Corporations Act