FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Limited
[2005] FCAFC 265CORPORATIONS LAW – prospectus – disclosure – claim that the disclosures in a prospectus contravened s 728 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (‘the Act’) – whether a subscribing shareholder is entitled to commence a proceeding under s 729(1) of the Act to recover from the company that issued the prospectus the loss suffered as a result of the subscription without rescinding the contract to acquire the shares – whether s 729(1) is subject to the rule in Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 563A, 728, 729
Cadence Asset Management Pty Ltd v Concept Sports Limited [2005] FCA 1280 - overruled
Houldsworth v City of Glasgow Bank (1880) 5 App Cas 317 - considered
Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd & Ors v The State of Victoria & Anor (1993) 179 CLR 15 - distinguished
State of Victoria v Hodgson & Ors [1992] 2 VR 613 - distinguished
Sons of Gwalia Limited (Administrator Appointed) (ACN 008 994 287) v Margaretic [2005] FCA 1305 - considered
Malika Holdings Pty Limited v Stretton (2001) 204 CLR 290 - cited
General Finance Corporation et al v Keystone Credit Corporationet al 50 F2d 872 (1981) - citedCADENCE ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD AS TRUSTEE FOR CADENCE CAPITAL v CONCEPT SPORTS LIMITED AND OTHERS
VID 1209 OF 2005MERKEL, WEINBERG AND KENNY JJ
16 DECEMBER 2005
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 1209 OF 2005
On appeal from a single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia
BETWEEN:
CADENCE ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
(ABN 68 106 551 062) as trustee for Cadence Capital
APPELLANTAND:
CONCEPT SPORTS LIMITED (ACN 108 042 593)
FIRST RESPONDENTGARY MARCH
SECOND RESPONDENTLEON DAPHNE
THIRD RESPONDENTJEFFREY TAYLOR
FOURTH RESPONDENTSTEVEN ROLTON
FIFTH RESPONDENTDAVID CARTER
SIXTH RESPONDENTJOHN MOORE
SEVENTH RESPONDENTJUDGES:
MERKEL, WEINBERG AND KENNY JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
16 DECEMBER 2005
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the primary judge made on 20 September 2005, dismissing the appellant’s claim for damages under s 729(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and requiring the appellant to pay the respondents’ costs of the Subscription Claims, be set aside.
3. The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the hearing before the primary judge and the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
VID 1209 OF 2005
On appeal from a single Judge of the Federal Court of Australia
BETWEEN:
CADENCE ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD
(ABN 68 106 551 062) as trustee for Cadence Capital
APPELLANTAND:
CONCEPT SPORTS LIMITED (ACN 108 042 593)
FIRST RESPONDENTGARY MARCH
SECOND RESPONDENTLEON DAPHNE
THIRD RESPONDENTJEFFREY TAYLOR
FOURTH RESPONDENTSTEVEN ROLTON
FIFTH RESPONDENTDAVID CARTER
SIXTH RESPONDENT
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Warne v GDK Financial Solutions; Peridon Village Nominees and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2005] FCAFC 265
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issue before the court was whether the statutory right of recovery for shareholders under s 729(1) is qualified by the rule in Houldsworth. The court noted that while the statutory regime under the Act had evolved significantly, particularly with the introduction of a statutory cause of action in favour of shareholders against the company issuing the prospectus, this did not necessarily imply an intent to overturn the rule in Houldsworth. The court considered the legislative history of s 729 and compared it to previous statutes and case law. The court concluded that the absence of explicit legislative language overturning the rule in Houldsworth, alongside the legislative intent observed in other provisions, suggested that Parliament did not intend to overturn the rule in this context.
The court held that the rule in Houldsworth remains applicable, and therefore, the appellant’s claim under s 729(1) was barred because Warne had not rescinded the contract to acquire the shares. However, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the primary judge’s orders, and directed that the respondents pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the hearing before the primary judge and the appeal. The court's decision underscores the importance of clear legislative language in altering established legal principles.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The orders of the primary judge made on 20 September 2005, dismissing the appellant’s claim for damages under s 729(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and requiring the appellant to pay the respondents’ costs of the Subscription Claims, be set aside.
3. The respondents pay the appellant’s costs of and incidental to the hearing before the primary judge and the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
His Honour then said at [18]-[21]:‘18.The question then comes down to this. Did the introduction of the company that issued the prospectus as a possible defendant to a claim for damages under s 729 overturn the rule in Houldsworth’s case? 19.There are factors pointing both ways. Those that point in favour of overturning Houldsworth’s case are these. First, the cause of action conferred by s 729 against the company is remedial in nature and should therefore be given broad effect. Second, s 729 is in terms unrestricted, and to impose a limitation (that is the limitation set by Houldsworth’s case) would be inconsistent with the terms. Third, if the section has not overturned Houldsworth’s case, it would have a somewhat reduced scope. That is to say, if rescission is a necessary precondition to an action, a subscribing shareholder could only recover consequential or indirect damages in an action under s 729. 20.The factors that point the other way are these. First, Parliament could have but did not in terms overturn Houldsworth’s case. That is, Parliament could have but did not enact a provision similar to s 111A of the English Companies Act. Second, it is apparent that Parliament is aware of Houldsworth’s case and its consequence and when it wishes to do so it will overturn its effect and do so in clear language. Here I have in mind s 737 of the Corporations Act which was introduced into the Corporations Law by the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program Act 1999 (Cth). The purpose of the new section was to provide additional remedies for a contravention of s 724 (the predecessor to s 728). One additional remedy was “the right to return the securities and have their application money repaid”. According to s 737(1) the right is available “even if the company that issued the securities is being wound up”. The only purpose for including these words is to reverse the combined effect of Houldsworth’s case and Oakes v Turquand namely that there can be no rescission after a winding up. Third, a similar argument made in relation to the operation of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), a “fundamental piece of remedial and protectionist legislation” (so described by McHugh J in Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v State of Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15, 41) was rejected by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Victoria in State of Victoria v Hodgson [1992] 2 VR 613. Justice Tadgell who delivered the leading judgment stated (at 631) that: “To hold otherwise would be to regard the Trade Practices Act as intending to overturn by implication a cardinal tenet of limited liability which has prevailed for 130 years. It would be surprising indeed if the Trade Practices Act had that intention or effect”. Fourth, if the submission were accepted it would produce an anomalous situation. I mentioned earlier that the rule in Houldsworth’s case has been given statutory effect when a company is in liquidation. If s 729 has overturned Houldsworth’s case, it could only have done so for an action against a company that is not in liquidation. Section 563A, which would preclude proof of claims when the company is being wound up, remains in place: Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v State of Victoria (1993) 179 CLR 15. It would require a good reason indeed to impute to Parliament an intention to overturn Houldsworth’s case when the company is a going concern but not when it is being wound up. 21.It seems to me that the reasons for denying the plaintiff the relief that it seeks are to be preferred. Moreover, to hold otherwise would conflict with State of Victoria v Hodgson, a decision of an appellate court which I am required to follow. In any event, State of Victoria v Hodgson is correct, in my opinion.’The Corporations Act