FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ward v State of Western Australia (No 3) [2015] FCA 658
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 658
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court held that the grant of the oil licence did not extinguish the claimants' native title rights but rather regulated how those rights could be exercised. The court applied the inconsistency of rights test to determine whether there was an inconsistency between the oil licence and the claimants' native title rights. The court found that there was no inconsistency that would lead to the extinguishment of native title because the oil licence did not have permanent consequences adverse to the existence of the claimants' right to land. The court held that only a law or act which had the effect of totally replacing native title by completely nullifying it would extinguish native title. Since the oil licence did not fully eclipse the claimants' native title rights, the native title rights continued to exist.
As a result of the court's decision, the matter was listed for further directions to hear from the parties as to the further disposition of the proceeding. The claimants had previously indicated that if the court found that one or more of the licence or permits to explore relied upon by the respondents did extinguish exclusive native title rights within the claim area, they would accept that the remaining (non-exclusive) native title rights and interests were validly extinguished by the vesting of the Gibson Desert Nature Reserve. In such circumstances, their entitlement to compensation would be an entitlement under section 45 of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Question 1 is answered "yes".
2. Question 2 is answered "yes".
3. It is, in the circumstances, unnecessary to answer Question 3.
4. The matter be listed for further directions.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Finally, the Commonwealth, in oral submissions, took issue with the claimants’ reliance on Akiba, contending that Akiba considered the native title right to take resources, not to control access to land, and the reasoning is not applicable in cases where there has been a grant of right to an individual, rather than the regulation by legislation of existing rights of a particular kind.Consideration In Ward, the Ward claimants (as they were referred to in the judgment of the plurality of Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ) contended that the native title of the claimants was a communal right to land and not a mere bundle of rights, and so was not amenable to partial extinguishment. Accordingly, unless a law or executive act struck at the community title, all rights derived from it would continue. Individual grants of interests to third parties, for example, would constitute mere regulation of native title or operate to curtail its enjoyment or to suspend native title rights. The result, those claimants contended, was that there was no extinguishment of their native title unless the grant was of a fee simple, or such other grant that exhibited that degree of permanence and impossibility of coexistence with their native title that satisfied the clear and plain intention test for extinguishment laid down in Mabo v Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1; [1992] HCA 23. In many respects, the argument put on behalf of those claimants reflected the “adverse dominion” test which had been suggested in the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1993) 104 DLR (4th) 470 at 670-672 (Lambert JA). In Ward v State of Western Australia & Ors (1998) 159 ALR 483; [1998] FCA 1478 at first instance, the trial judge (Lee J) described that test at 508 in the following terms:First, that there be a clear and plain expression of intention by Parliament to bring about extinguishment in that manner; secondly, that there be an act authorised by the legislation which demonstrates the exercise of permanent adverse dominion as contemplated by the legislation; and thirdly, unless the legislation provides the extinguishment arises on the creation of the tenure inconsistent with an Aboriginal right, there must be actual use made of the land by the holder of the tenure which is permanently inconsistent with the continued existence of Aboriginal title or right and not merely a temporary suspension thereof. In the Full Court, in Ward FC, at [684], North J in dissent suggested that there may be “inconsistency between the rights and interests created by the law or act [in question] and native title” but “that native title will continue where the degree of inconsistency is not sufficient to extinguish native title” (emphasis added). North J added, at [689], that:A minor or insignificant inconsistency between the rights or interests created and native title could not lead to such a far‑reaching consequence as total abrogation of native title. There must be proportionality between the impact of the law or the act and the effect on native title. Only a law or act which has the effect of totally replacing native title by completely nullifying it will result in extinguishment of native title. The inconsistency between the law or act must be total, fundamental or absolute to effect extinguishment. Thus, where native title is a permanent right to land, only a law or act which has permanent consequences adverse to the existence of the right to land will extinguish native title. Such a law or act must give rise to rights which fully eclipse native title. Where the inconsistency is not total or absolute it is not necessary that native title be abolished in order to allow the unfettered exercise of inconsistent rights or interests. It is only necessary that the enjoyment of the rights and interests dependent upon the holding of native title is held in abeyance for the duration of the existence of the inconsistent rights or interests. As long as the exercise of the rights or interests dependent on native title is suspended, the exercise of inconsistent rights or interests is not impeded.