Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 477

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – appeal from a decision of the Migration Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) – conceded that the Tribunal had erred in exercising its discretion to cancel a visa – where Tribunal’s decision a privative clause decision under s 474(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Court’s jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) is encumbered by the terms of s 474 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – whether the Court retains jurisdiction under s 39B of the Judiciary Act – Consideration of application of Hickman principles where Tribunal made jurisdictional error – whether the Tribunal made a bona fide attempt to exercise its power – whether s 474 operates in a case where the Tribunal merely purports to have made a decision but the decision was in fact void.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 116(1), 474, 475A, 476
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) s 39B

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu (1999) 197 CLR 611 referred to
R v Hickman; Ex parte Fox and Clinton (1945) 70 CLR 598 considered
R v Commonwealth Rent Controller; Ex parte National Mutual Life Association of Australia Ltd (1947) 75 CLR 361 cited
R v Murray; Ex parte Proctor (1949) 77 CLR 387 referred to
R v Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1967) 118 CLR 219 cited
R v Metal Trades Employers’ Association; Ex parte Amalgamated Engineering Union (1951) 82 CLR 208 cited
R v Members of the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board; Ex parte Maryborough Sugar Factory Ltd (1959) 101 CLR 246 cited
Coal Miners’ Industrial Union of Workers of Western Australia v Amalgamated Collieries of Western Australia Ltd (1960) 104 CLR 437 cited
R v Coldham; Ex parte Australian Workers Union (1983) 153 CLR 415 referred to
O’Toole v Charles David Pty Ltd (No 2) (1991) 171 CLR 232 referred to
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Richard Walter Pty Ltd (1995) 183 CLR 168 cited
Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (1998) 194 CLR 355 cited
Ratumaiwai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 311 cited
NAAX v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 263 followed
NABL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 102 referred to
NABE v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 281 followed
Boakye-Danquah v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002]
FCA 438 not followed
VBAH v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCA 388
cited
Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 167 cited

WANG V MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

N 11 of 2002

HILL J
17 APRIL 2002
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 11 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

JIA JING WANG
FIRST APPLICANT

RONG LIN
SECOND APPLICANT

MENG LING WANG
THIRD APPLICANT

AND:

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Details
Case
[2002] FCA 477
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the applicant, Wang, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The central dispute involved the legality of the Minister's decision to cancel Wang's visa and the scope of the privative clause in s 474 of the Act, which restricts the jurisdiction of the Court to review such decisions. The matter was heard in the Federal Court of Australia.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether the privative clause in s 474 of the Migration Act precludes the Court from reviewing decisions made by the Minister, even when those decisions are made on an entirely incorrect basis. Specifically, the Court needed to determine if the clause operates to deny judicial review to decisions that are void due to jurisdictional error. This interpretation raises significant constitutional questions about the balance between legislative intent and the judiciary's role in ensuring adherence to the rule of law.

The Court held that the privative clause in s 474 indeed precludes judicial review, including in cases where the decision is void due to jurisdictional error. The Court reasoned that if the clause were to exclude all void decisions from its purview, it would render the section largely ineffective, which was clearly not the intention of Parliament. The Court further noted that the clause must apply to all decisions made under the Act, regardless of whether they are void, to have any meaningful effect. This interpretation aligns with the broader principle that privative clauses can significantly limit the judiciary's ability to review administrative decisions, potentially undermining the rule of law. The Court dismissed Wang's application and ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. the application be dismissed.

2. the applicants pay the respondent minister’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

HILL J
Not without considerable doubt I am of the view that the provisions of s 474 preclude me from granting relief to the applicant. I realise that in reaching this conclusion I am accepting that Parliament by enacting a privative clause can denude of any real content the ability of Courts to grant relief by way of prerogative writ so that no remedy will be available to a person whose future may be greatly affected by a decision made on entirely the wrong basis. Only Chapter III of the Constitution stands in the way of the increasing use of privative clauses to subvert the adherence to law by Tribunals and other decision makers. SUBMISSION THREE: PURPORTED DECISIONS The third submission may be disposed of shortly. It seeks to rely upon comments by Gaudron and Gummow JJ in Darling Casino Ltd v NSW Casino Control Authority (1997) 191 CLR 602 at 635. Their Honours said:“There is one point we should add, because the Court of Appeal appears to have proceeded on a contrary view. It concerns the content of the phrase in s 155(1), “a decision of the Authority under this Act”. The phrase is not ‘under or purporting to be under this Act”. … Section 155 cannot fairly be construed as declaring an intention of the legislature that the Authority is empowered and protected in respect of determinations under s 18 reached other than upon satisfaction of the conditions which enliven its power. Those decisions would not have been made “under this Act”.” So, it is argued that s 474 only operates to include within the category of privative clause decisions, those decisions which are made, proposed to be made or required to be made under the Migration Act, but not decisions which merely purport to have been made under that Act but because the wrong issue was addressed were not validly made. Their Honours’ comments in that case, which are dicta, would seem inconsistent with the comments of Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ in O’Toole where their Honours made it clear that the privative clause in that case had to apply to at least some “purported” awards, otherwise the privative clause would have no real operation, see particularly at 286. Further it seems the matter was not argued in Darling Casino and the comments of Gaudron and Gummow JJ were not joined in by the other members of the Court. It can also be argued that the privative clause in that case can be distinguished, not only because it was contained in State legislation but also because it simply provided that the decision of the NSW Casino Control Authority was to be final and not subject to appeal or review. I think that s 474 cannot be interpreted as only protecting decisions not void, for if such decisions only were the subject of protection of the privative clause, then the section would have little work to do. It would apply only to cases not involving jurisdictional error. Clearly since the jurisdiction to grant prerogative relief largely turns upon the existence of jurisdictional error and jurisdictional error will almost invariably result in the decision being void, to exclude all void decisions from protection under s 474 would effectually render the section nugatory. It cannot be assumed that that was Parliament’s intention. Indeed, the contrary was the clearly the case. It may be noted that the same argument was rejected in Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCA 167, see at para 30.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: HILL J