Wang v Minister for Immigration

[2017] FCCA 1351

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WANG v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & ANOR [2017] FCCA 1351

Catchwords:
MIGRATION – Application for Partner (Temporary)(Class UK) visa – where Tribunal determined it could not be satisfied as to the applicant’s claim to be in a spouse relationship with her sponsor – where Tribunal determined requirements of s.5F of the Migration Act 1958 were met at the time of the application and at the time of the visa decision – whether the Tribunal’s decision was affected by jurisdictional error – no jurisdictional error – application dismissed.

Legislation:

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss.5F, 477(1), 477(2)

Migration Regulations 1994, cls. 820.211, 820.221

Cases cited:

Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16

Applicant: LI-YING WANG

First Respondent: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

Second Respondent: ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

File Number: BRG 729 of 2016

Judgment of: Judge Jarrett

Hearing date: 17 March 2017

Date of Last Submission: 17 March 2017

Delivered at: Brisbane

Delivered on: 22 June 2017

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Fronis

Solicitors for the Applicant: Aston Lawyers

Counsel for the First Respondent: Ms Slack

Solicitors for the First Respondent: Sparke Helmore

The Second Respondent entering a submitting appearance

ORDERS

1. The amended application filed on 25 November, 2016 be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs of and incidental to the amended application fixed in the sum of $7,206.

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT BRISBANE

BRG 729 of 2016

LI-YING WANG

Applicant

And

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & BORDER PROTECTION

First Respondent

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL

Second Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

1. By her amended application filed on 25 November, 2016, the applicant seeks an extension of time within which to commence an application for judicial review of a decision of the second respondent.  That decision affirmed a decision of a delegate of the first respondent not to grant her a Partner (Temporary)(Class UK) visa.  In her proposed application for review she seeks an order that the second respondent’s decision be set aside and that her application be returned to the second respondent to be determined by it according to law.

2. The applicant requires an extension of time for her application.  Her original application was filed on 8 August, 2016 and she needs an extension of 20 days. 

3. The first respondent opposes the extension of time application on the basis that the applicant’s proposed judicial review application is so devoid of merit that to grant an extension of time would be futile. Both parties have filed written submissions in accordance with the directions of the Court. 

Background

1. Li-Ying Wang was born on 27 August, 1973 in Taiwan and holds a Taiwanese passport.

2. On 19 December, 2011 an application for migration to Australia by a partner form was lodged in relation to the applicant.  In the application, the applicant stated that she and Yung-Chen Steven Su first met on 10 December, 2009 and that they commenced a relationship two months after they first met.  The applicant stated that she and her sponsor were married on 27 September, 2011.  The applicant also stated that her sponsor was granted Australian citizenship in November, 1991.

3. By email dated 15 July, 2013, the first respondent wrote to the applicant and requested further information in relation to the application.  Specifically, the first respondent requested that the applicant provide ‘evidence of your relationship/evidence of your relationship from date of lodgement until now.’  Attached to the email were the following documents: a request for current evidence of the relationship for the period 19 December, 2011 to ‘until present’, two current Form 888’s to be completed by supporting witnesses, and evidence of resident status of the Form 888 declarants. 

4. In that email, the first respondent advised the applicant that she must respond to the request within 28 days of the date of the email.

5. By an email dated 12 August, 2013, the date when the 28 day time period ended, the applicant’s migration agent requested an extension of time within which to respond to the request on the basis that he had been unable to locate or communicate with, either the applicant or the sponsor.  By return email on the same date, the first respondent refused the request for an extension of time and advised that it could receive information any time before a decision was made on the application.  The applicant did not provide any information prior to a delegate of the first respondent making the decision on the application.

6. In a decision dated 10 October, 2013, the delegate refused the application.  The application was refused on the basis that the applicant had not provided evidence that:

   a)she continued to be the partner of an Australian citizen, Australian permanent resident or eligible New Zealand citizen sponsor and, therefore concluded that she did not meet the requirements of subclause 820.221(1)(a) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994;

   b)the sponsor had died and, therefore concluded that the requirements of subclause 820.221(2) of the Regulations were not met;

   c)she had suffered family violence committed by the sponsor and, therefore concluded that she did not meet the requirements of subclause 820.221(3)(b)(i); and,

   d)there was a parenting order relating to an Australian citizen child with the sponsor and, therefore, was not satisfied that the requirements of subclause 820.221(3)(b)(ii) were met.

7. Accordingly, her visa application, assessed against all possible subclasses of Partner visa, was refused.  

8. The applicant lodged an application for review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal on 28 October, 2013.

9. On 12 October, 2015 the Tribunal invited the applicant to appear before it to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in her case. The applicant was advised that the hearing was scheduled on 5 November, 2015 but it was later rescheduled to 7 April, 2016.

10. On 3 November, 2015 a bundle of documents was submitted on behalf of the applicant to the Tribunal. Those documents included online accommodation booking confirmation forms dated 22 August, 2013 and a Qantas e-ticket itinerary dated 7 January, 2013.

11. The applicant appeared at the hearing on 7 April, 2016.  She was assisted by a migration agent.  She and the sponsor gave evidence to the Tribunal with the assistance of a Mandarin interpreter.

12. Following the hearing, in a letter dated 18 April, 2016 further submissions were made on behalf of the applicant to the Tribunal.  The following documents were also submitted to the Tribunal: reports of Dr Daphne Liu, general practitioner dated 12 April, 2016, tenancy agreements and bank account documents.

13. In its decision dated 15 June, 2016 the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the delegate to not grant the applicant a Partner (Temporary) (Class UK) visa.  In reaching its decision the Tribunal made the following findings of fact:

    a)the applicant and sponsor were married to each other under a marriage that was valid for the purposes of the Migration Act 1958;

    b)it was not satisfied that the bank statements provided by the applicant and her sponsor supported a finding that the sponsor was meeting the applicant’s living expenses from his carer’s pension and therefore, it found that the sponsor was not meeting all of the applicant’s living expenses;

    c)the applicant, the sponsor and the sponsor’s parents have a joint liability under a lease agreement but there was no evidence that the applicant and sponsor have joint ownership of real estate or other major assets;

    d)it was not satisfied that the applicant and sponsor “have ever lived together or that the applicant assists the sponsor in providing his mother’s care” because it did not accept that the applicant would forget where she lived after she got married and due to the inconsistent evidence relied on by the applicant to indicate where and when the applicant and sponsor claimed to have lived together;

    e)the applicant and sponsor were “known to each other and socialise together from time to time” and represented themselves to others as being a married couple but there was minimal information available in relation to “the nature of the parties’ relationship or the basis on which the persons plan and undertake joint social activities.”;

    f)the applicant’s lack of knowledge about “basic things in the sponsor [sic] life” caused the Tribunal to doubt whether the parties provided each other with the degree of companionship and emotional support as suggested by their evidence;

    g)when all of the evidence was weighed, the Tribunal was unable to be satisfied as to the applicant’s claim to be in a spousal relationship with the sponsor and was not satisfied that the requirements of s.5F were met at the time of application and at the time of the decision and therefore found that the applicant did not meet cl.820.211 or cl.820.221 of Schedule 2 to the Regulations.

14. The applicant filed an application for judicial review in this Court on 9 August, 2016 along with an affidavit of the applicant annexing various documents. The applicant filed an amended application on 25 November, 2016.

Extension of time application

1. By s.477(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth), the applicant must commence an application for judicial review within 35 days of the date of the decision to be challenged. The Court may extend that time if it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to do so: s.477(2) of the Act.

2. Here the applicant argues that it is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice to extend time within which to commence her application because if time was not extended, she will be denied the opportunity of agitating her application for judicial review which has, she argues, very good prospects of success.  She says that there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay in commencing the proceedings and there is no prejudice to be suffered by the first respondent if the extension is granted.

3. The applicant gives evidence that she was notified of the Tribunal’s decision on 17 June, 2016.  She gives evidence that she was advised by her migration agent that she could “appeal to the Federal Court” but her agent did not advise her of the time limits for doing so.  She argues that “the matter was not transferred from the migration agent to the applicant’s current solicitor until 25 July, 2016 and the application was filed on 8 August, 2016, being 14 days later.”

4. Whilst an explanation for the delay in commencing the proceedings is not an essential pre-condition to the making of an order to extend time, it is nonetheless a necessary consideration.  In the present case, there is nothing to suggest that the applicant has made any type of tactical decision or, cognisant of the time limit, has made a conscious decision to permit it to expire.  The expiry of the time limit seems to have come about because of the dilatory conduct of either her migration agent or her solicitors.  There is an explanation for her delay, albeit one which is not particularly satisfactory.

5. Of more moment is the question of merit in the proposed application for review.  On an application to extend time, the Court’s task is to assess the prospects of success of the applicant’s proposed application, but only at a relatively impressionistic level.  The requirement is for the Court to be satisfied that the applicant has reasonably arguable grounds of review. 

6. However, in the present application, both parties agreed that I should determine the application for the extension of time and then the applicant’s application for review if I conclude that time should be extended.  The applicant has made all of the submissions that she would wish to make on the application for review, should time be extended.  As the authorities point out, it is important not to conflate the two tasks.  Nonetheless, from a practical point of view a detailed review of the merits of the proposed application for review will serve both purposes.   

7. There are three proposed grounds of review advanced by the applicant.  I will deal with each of them in turn.

Ground One

1. The first is in the following terms:

   1. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by irrationally and/or illogically concluding that it was not satisfied that the sponsor is meeting all of the applicant’s living expenses.

   Particulars of Ground 1

   A. The Tribunal indicates at paragraph 13 of the decision record in the last sentence that the applicant claims that the sponsor meets all of her living expenses.

   B. The Tribunal indicates at paragraph 14 of the decision record that he is paid a carer’s pension into his personal account and this is transferred into the joint bank account to meet day to day living expenses.

   C. At Paragraphs 15 - 18 of the decision record the Tribunal found that the carer’s pension was transferred from the sponsor’s personal account into the joint bank account but then the funds were transferred from the joint bank account to an account ending in 0667. From there, funds were transferred back into the joint back account from the 0667 account. The Tribunal also accepted at paragraph 18 of the decision record that the joint bank account was used to fund living expenses including shopping at k mart, utility bills, eating out and groceries. The Tribunal considered though that because of the movement of the funds from the personal bank account to the joint bank account to the 0667 account then back to the joint bank account meant that it could not be satisfied the sponsor was meeting the expenses of the applicant from the carer’s pension and as a result was not satisfied that the sponsor was meeting the applicant’s expenses at all. The Tribunal’s reasoning was that it did not know who owned the 0667 account or what other deposits were made into it other than the carer’s pension.

   D. It is alleged this line of reasoning is irrational and illogical because:

   a. It is unreasonable to find that the applicant was not meeting the sponsor’s expenses from his carer’s pension because the carer’s pension may have been transferred into a bank account that included funds from other sources then back again. Moreover, the tribunal appeared to accept the main source of income for the applicant and sponsor was the carer’s pension and there is no evidence of any other income and in those circumstances that income must be being used to support the applicant and sponsor.

   b. It is unreasonable to find that the applicant was not meeting the sponsor’s expenses from his carer’s pension because the funds may have been transferred into an account of a different name and back again.

   c. It is unreasonable to classify certain money as a “carer’s pension” and then decide when it stops becoming the “carer’s pension” and becomes money from another source and use that to not accept the sponsor’s evidence that the funds were from his “carer’s pension” since it provides a far too narrow and unrealistic scope to his evidence to the point that it is illogical.

   E. It is alleged that this jurisdictional error taints the findings of the tribunal as a whole because a finding that the applicant was meeting the sponsor’s living expenses would be a relevant factor in whether the tribunal is satisfied that they were living together and had a mutual commitment to a shared life.

2. This ground takes issue with the Tribunal’s failure to be satisfied that the applicant’s sponsor was meeting all of her living expenses.  In paragraph 18 of its reasons the Tribunal said:

   18. The Tribunal acknowledges that the joint bank statements did indicate some living expenses were being met from funds in the joint bank account (for example Kmart, telephone bills, eating out and groceries). However those expenses were met from funds transferred into the joint account from, in general, an account ending in the numbers 0667. The corresponding bank statements for the other accounts – including the account ending in 0667 – were not provided to the Tribunal. That means the Tribunal does not know what name the bank account ending in 0667 is in or what other deposits are being made into that account. Based on the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the bank statements support a finding that the sponsor is meeting the applicant’s living expenses from his carer’s pension. The Tribunal is therefore not satisfied that the sponsor is meeting all the applicant’s living expenses.

3. The applicant argues that the Tribunal concluded that “it could not be satisfied that the sponsor was meeting the applicant’s living expenses from his carer’s pension and therefore could not be satisfied that the sponsor was meeting the applicant’s living expenses at all”.  However, that is not what the Tribunal concluded.  The Tribunal did not conclude that it could not be satisfied of those matters but rather it was not satisfied of those matters.  There is a difference.  The evidence before the Tribunal might have permitted of the finding that the sponsor was meeting the applicant’s living expenses from his carer’s pension and that the sponsor was meeting the applicant’s expenses in their entirety.  However, the Tribunal was not bound to reach that conclusion.  The applicant’s argument proceeds on a false premise and misunderstands the reasons and findings of the Tribunal.

4. To establish that the Tribunal’s alleged finding set out in ground 1, the applicant relies upon the statements of Crennan and Bell JJ in the Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS [2010] HCA 16 where at [130] their Honours said:

   In the context of the Tribunal’s decision here, “illogicality” or “irrationality” sufficient to give rise to jurisdictional error must mean the decision to which the Tribunal came, in relation to the state of satisfaction required under s 65, is one at which no rational or logical decision maker could arrive on the same evidence. In other words, accepting, for the sake of argument, that an allegation of illogicality or irrationality provides some distinct basis for seeking judicial review of a decision as to a jurisdictional fact, it is nevertheless an allegation of the same order as a complaint that a decision is “clearly unjust” or “arbitrary” or “capricious” or “unreasonable” in the sense that the state of satisfaction mandated by the statute imports a requirement that the opinion as to the state of satisfaction must be one that could be formed by a reasonable person. The same applies in the case of an opinion that a mandated state of satisfaction has not been reached. Not every lapse in logic will give rise to jurisdictional error. A court should be slow, although not unwilling, to interfere in an appropriate case.

5. The Tribunal, in determining that it was not satisfied that the applicant’s expenses were being met by her sponsor, considered the evidence that it had before it relating to banking accounts.  It carefully set out the accounts to which it had access, the further information that it required from the applicant and the further bank statements that she and her sponsor had produced after the hearing in response to the Tribunal’s requests.  The Tribunal analysed those statements and concluded that whilst there was evidence that the sponsor’s carers’ pension was being paid into a particular account, the evidence also suggested that it was being paid out of that account and into another unidentified account in respect of which bank statements had not been provided.  The Tribunal noted that funds were then paid back in from that account although the source of any other funds going into that account was not disclosed.  It might have been that the sponsor’s carer’s pension was the only money deposited to that account but it might have been that there were other funds as well.

1. In those circumstances, the Tribunal determined that it was not satisfied of the matters of which satisfaction was required.

2. In my view reasonable minds might differ in respect of the conclusions that might be drawn from the evidence that was before the Tribunal.  It is not the case that the evidence before the Tribunal could lead to one conclusion only.  The conclusion at which the Tribunal arrived was one possible conclusion that was open on the material before the Tribunal.  In those circumstances the Tribunal’s reasons do not reveal any illogicality or irrationality which in my view could amount to jurisdictional error.

Ground Two

2. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by illogically considering that medical evidence of who is meeting the sponsor’s mother’s caring requirements is a necessary pre-condition to finding that there was a spousal relationship.

Particulars of Ground 2

A. The tribunal at paragraph 29 of the decision record considered it would not be satisfied of a spousal relationship with the sponsor without “…medical evidence about the sponsor’s mother’s medical conditions, caring requirements and who is meeting those requirements.” The Tribunal was satisfied that there was medical evidence of the sponsor’s mother’s medical condition and caring requirements.  However, at paragraph 31 the tribunal indicates that the letter from Dr Liu only indicates that Dr Chen’s family cares for the mother and does not indicate who the individuals are and therefore it is not satisfied that the applicant is providing some of Mrs Chen’s care (despite evidence from the applicant to that effect).

B. It is alleged this is unreasonable and irrational because:

a. It sets the applicant up to fail with an impossible task because doctors would almost never have personal knowledge of seeing everyone who tends for a patient in the patient’s home.

b. It is impossible to obtain “medical evidence” of who is caring for a person because that is not a medical opinion but rather just direct evidence of what the witness sees. At best, the doctor could give hearsay evidence of what they have been told but it would also be illogical and irrational to require such hearsay evidence as a necessary pre-condition to being satisfied that there was a spousal relationship.

C. It is alleged that this jurisdictional error taints the findings of the tribunal as a whole because it has broad implications for all conclusions reached. This is evident in the tribunal’s reasons as follows:

a. The tribunal at paragraph 32 of the decision clearly implies that it considered that the issue of whether the applicant assists the sponsor with the care of the mother as being a factor that goes towards whether the applicant and sponsor have ever lived together (and if not it ought to have been a factor that is taken into account).

b. The factor is relevant for the social aspects of the relations the sponsor and applicant have to care for the mother almost then this explains why they have not engaged in social activities other than meeting with friends and explains why they have not gone on a holiday since 2013 or have not taken many photographs over the years. It is noted this was specifically claimed by the applicant and sponsor as stated at paragraphs 33 - 35 and 38 of the decision record.

c. A finding that the applicant does help in caring for the sponsor’s sick mother would indicate a commitment to the relationship by the applicant and goes towards showing a mutual commitment to a shared life.

1. Paragraph 29 of the Tribunal’s decision is in the following terms:

   29. The Tribunal put to the applicant that there was no medical evidence to support the submission that the sponsor’s mother requires full time care. The Tribunal deferred making its decision to enable the applicant to provide further evidence. The Tribunal explained to the applicant that what she provided to the Tribunal was a matter for her but that the Tribunal would not be satisfied that she was in a spousal relationship with the sponsor in the absence of, amongst other things, medical evidence about the sponsor’s mother’s medical conditions, caring requirements and who is meeting those requirements.

2. That paragraph was relevant to the Tribunal’s determination set out in paragraph 32 of its reasons as follows:

   The Tribunal accepts that - with the passage of time - details about where a person lived and for how long can be difficult to recall. However the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant would forget where she lived after she got married. Likewise the Tribunal does not accept that the applicant was confused between living with her in-laws after she got married and living close to her in-laws after she got married. Likewise the objective evidence of where and when the applicant and sponsor claim to have lived together is inconsistent. Based on the evidence before it the Tribunal is not satisfied that the applicant and sponsor have ever lived together or that the applicant assists the sponsor in providing his mother’s care.  

   (emphasis added)

3. The Tribunal’s determination that it was not satisfied that the applicant was providing care to her sponsor’s mother was one of the matters which the Tribunal took into account when it determined whether the applicant and her sponsor were living together, had ever lived together or that the applicant provided her sponsor with assistance to look after his mother.  The Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was providing some of her sponsor’s mother’s care because although there was medical evidence that indicated that she needed significant care, suffered from a number of medical conditions and that members of her family provided that care, the evidence did not name the individuals who were providing that care.  There was other evidence before the Tribunal from the applicant herself that she provided some of the care to her sponsor’s mother.

4. The applicant argues that by “requiring” medical evidence about who was meeting her sponsor’s mother’s caring requirements before being satisfied of a spousal relationship “and then not being satisfied that the applicant has not provided any care to” her sponsor’s mother the Tribunal reached a finding about its state of satisfaction about that issue that was illogical, irrational and unreasonable. 

5. However, contrary to the applicant’s submissions, the Tribunal did not require the applicant to provide “medical evidence of who” was caring for the sponsor’s mother.  What the Tribunal required was medical evidence that related to the sponsor’s mother’s health concerns and which indicated that she required care.  It also required evidence about the caring requirements and who was meeting those requirements.  The Tribunal recorded what it told the applicant about what she should provide in paragraph 29 that I have set out above.  The qualifier “medical evidence” in the last sentence of paragraph 29 relates to the requirement for evidence about the sponsor’s mother’s medical conditions.  It does not, as the applicant’s submissions might suggest, relate to the identity of those persons meeting those requirements.

6. The Tribunal’s determination concerning the care that the applicant gave to her sponsor’s mother was part of the finding that the Tribunal made about whether the applicant and her sponsor lived together as they had claimed.  That finding was plainly open to the Tribunal and is not the subject of attack in these proceedings.

7. In my view this ground reveals no jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.  The Tribunal’s reasons reveal that it made an assessment of the evidence before it and reached its findings on that assessment.  It did not require the applicant to place before it any particular evidence as the applicant suggests.

Ground Three

3. The Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error by unreasonably or irrationally finding that there was “minimal independent evidence of a relationship”.

Particulars of Ground 3

A. The tribunal repeatedly states throughout the decision record that there is a lack of “objective evidence” and concludes at paragraph 40 that there is “minimal independent evidence”.

B. The evidence the tribunal considered and specifically referred to in its decision record that could be described as independent of the applicant and sponsor’s oral or written evidence:

a. Bank statements of the joint bank account that the tribunal accepted showed that funds in that account were being used at kmart, on telephone bills, eating out and groceries (paragraph 18).

b. Bank statements from the Sponsor’s personal NAB account (paragraph 26)

c. Five statutory declarations from three different people (paragraph 36)

d. Two letters from Dr Liu (paragraph 30)

e. Tenancy agreements (paragraph 37)

f. Four bookings for travel/accommodation being to Cairns and Sydney (paragraph 36 - 37)

g. Utility bills and receipts (paragraph 40)

h. 17 Photographs (paragraph 37)

C. The tribunal’s reasoning is unreasonable and irrational because the provision of independent evidence of tenancy agreements showing the applicant and sponsor live together, statutory declarations from friends indicating they represent themselves as a couple, live together and socialise with them, bank statements indicating shared living expenses, utility bills and receipts, photographs, and travel arrangements for joint activities is in essence what could in a general sense be reasonably be expected of genuine couples in their circumstances and the evidence could not be reasonably described as “minimal”. This is effectively an unreasonable and illogical position by the tribunal of how much independent evidence is required for it to reach a state of satisfaction that there is a spousal relationship. The tribunal is unreasonably setting the bar so high as to make it impossible to overcome for most genuine couples.

1. This ground takes issue with the use by the Tribunal of the word “minimal” to qualify the phrase “independent evidence” where the Tribunal used that in paragraph 40 of its reasons as follows:

   40. The oral evidence and the applicant and sponsor’s written statements provided to the Tribunal was that the parties are committed to a long term relationship with each other. However, apart from the evidence of the parties themselves there is minimal independent evidence of a relationship that is claimed to have been ongoing for more than six years. The independent evidence consists of 17 photographs, Form 888s from a total of three people, tenancy agreements, bank account statements and some utilities bills and receipts. The bank statements do not support the applicant’s submission during the hearing that the sponsor provides all her financial needs. Likewise the Tribunal was not satisfied on the evidence before it that the applicant and sponsor had ever lived together or that the applicant assisted the sponsor in caring for his mother. (emphasis added)

2. The applicant argues the use of the word “minimal” and thereby the imposition of a quantitative requirement upon the evidence to be adduced by the applicant was in all of the circumstances, “illogical and/or irrational and/or unreasonable”.  The applicant submits for example that “it would not for instance be illogical for the Tribunal to reasonably conclude that it was not satisfied of the spousal relationship despite the independent evidence available, but to consider the evidence in this case was minimal is an irrational and unreasonable finding.”

3. In my view this ground reveals no irrationality or illogicality on the Tribunal’s part.  The use of the word “minimal” to describe the independent evidence was open to the Tribunal.  But whether the Tribunal described the independent evidence before it as minimal or by use of some other adjective is not to the point. 

4. There is no complaint by the applicant that the Tribunal did not consider any aspect of the “independent evidence” before it.  There is no complaint by the applicant that the Tribunal did not turn its mind to all of the evidence that she put before the Tribunal for the purposes of its determination.  The use of the word “minimal” by the Tribunal was just one means by which the Tribunal was communicating its determination that the evidence placed before it did not satisfy it of the matters about which satisfaction was necessary.

5. Moreover, the use of the word “minimal” in the context in which the Tribunal used it does not connote a finding by the Tribunal to that effect. 

6. No jurisdictional error is revealed by this ground.

Conclusion

1. In my view, the applicant does not establish that she has reasonable prospects, even at a reasonably impressionistic level, of demonstrating that the Tribunal’s decision is attended by jurisdictional error.  The grounds relied upon by her do not arguably raise a case of jurisdictional error. 

2. In those circumstances the application for the extension of time must be dismissed with costs.  

I certify that the preceding forty-six (46) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Jarrett delivered on 22 June, 2017.

Date: 22 June, 2017