Walterson and Walterson

[2019] FamCA 1034

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WALTERSON & WALTERSON [2019] FamCA 1034

FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – Application by wife seeking a division of property owned by the parties whereby she would receive 85 per cent and the husband received 15 per cent – Where substantial contributions were made by the wife – Orders made where the Court is satisfied that it represented a just and equitable division of property owned by the parties

Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 106 and 117

PBF as Child Representative for AF (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania) & Ors [2005] FamCA 158
Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403

APPLICANT: Ms Walterson

RESPONDENT: Mr Walterson

FILE NUMBER: HBC 793 of 2019

DATE DELIVERED: 20 November 2019

PLACE DELIVERED: Hobart

PLACE HEARD: Hobart

JUDGMENT OF: Benjamin J

HEARING DATE: 20 November 2019

REPRESENTATION

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANT: Ms K Foale

SOLICITOR FOR THE APPLICANT: Simmons Wolfhagen

COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: No appearance

SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT:

ORDERS

1. Within thirty (30) days of the date of this order the respondent transfer to the applicant (“the transfer”) all his right title and interest in the real property situate at D Street, Suburb E in Tasmania and more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume …  (“the property”).

2. Contemporaneously with the transfer referred to in order 1 herein, the applicant discharge the mortgage secured over the property, Mortgage No. … (the mortgage”) registered on the title of the property and procure a release in favour of the respondent from any liability outstanding in respect of the mortgage.  The applicant indemnify the respondent against all payments and liabilities pursuant to the mortgage and all rates, taxes and outgoings of or with respect to the property of whatsoever nature and kind.

3. Subject to the terms of this order the respondent shall relinquish in favour of the applicant any claim he may otherwise have to an interest in the following:-

   a.any savings, money in the bank or investments of the applicant;

   b.any furniture, household effects, or any items of personalty in the possession of the applicant;

   c.any entitlement of the applicant to any superannuation whether by way of lump sum, pension or otherwise; and

   d.any motor vehicles in the possession of the applicant.

4. Subject to the terms of this order the applicant shall relinquish in favour of the respondent any claim she may otherwise have to an interest in the following:-

   a.any savings, money in the bank or investments of the respondent;

   b.any furniture, household effects, or any items of personalty in the possession of the respondent;

   c.any entitlement of the respondent to any superannuation whether by way of lump sum, pension or otherwise; and

   d.any motor vehicles in the possession of the respondent.

5. Unless otherwise specified in these orders and except for the purposes of enforcing payment of any money due under these or any subsequent orders, each party is solely entitled to all property and financial resources (and choses in action) in their possession on the date of these orders to the exclusion of the other. For the purposes of this order:-

   a.banking and other accounts are deemed to be in the possession of the person whose name appears on the records of the relevant financial institution;

   b.insurance policies are deemed to be in the possession of the policy holder named in the policy;

   c.superannuation entitlements are deemed to be in the possession of the person named as the worker whose age or working future provides the conditions for payment out of such entitlements; and

   d.each party is solely liable for and indemnifies the other against any liability encumbering any item of property or financial resource to which that party is entitled under these orders.

6. Each of the parties be liable for any debt in his or her own name and shall at all times indemnify the other party in relation thereto.

7. Neither the applicant nor the respondent shall incur in the name of the other any account debt or any other liability and subject to the provisions of this order each shall pay or discharge all accounts debts and other liabilities presently standing in their respective names or hereinafter incurred by either of them and shall at all times keep the other indemnified therefrom and from all claims actions and other expenses in connection therewith.

8. Each of the parties do all such acts and things and execute all such documents as he or she may be required to do and execute to give effect to the terms of this order, within seven (7) business days of a request made in writing to the parties’ last known postal address AND IT IS NOTED the respondent’s last known postal address and place of service of pleadings in this matter is F Street, Suburb E in Tasmania.

9. Pursuant to s 106A(1)(b) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the Registrar of the Family Court at Hobart is appointed to do all such things and execute all such documents in the name of the respondent, to give validity and operation to order 1 and 2 herein, including but not limited to the signing of mortgage discharge authority documentation and real property transfer documentation.

IT IS DIRECTED

1. The exhibits remain on the Court file.

2. The solicitor for the applicant wife forward to my administrative associate, if she has not already done so, the form of her case outline in Word format.

3. All extant applications be dismissed.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED

1. The husband shall pay to the wife costs in the sum of three thousand eight hundred and eighteen dollars ($3,818) within twenty eight (28) days from the date of this order.

2. In the event the husband does not pay that sum as set out in order 14 above, the wife is authorised to sell the Motor Vehicle 1 (“the vehicle”) for $9,600 or if unable to obtain that value for the vehicle, the vehicle should be sold at auction at B Business at Hobart and she can deduct from the proceeds of sale the sum of $3,818 and must account to the husband for the balance.

3. In the event that the husband pays the said sum of $3,818 within twenty eight (28) days of the date of this order, or such other period agreed in writing between the parties, the wife shall, upon such payment, do all acts and sign all documents to transfer the registration of that vehicle and ownership of that vehicle to the husband at the husband’s expense.

IT IS CERTIFIED

1. Pursuant to Rule 19.50 of the Family Law Rules 2004 it was reasonable to engage counsel to attend.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry of the order in the Court’s records.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this court under the pseudonym Walterson & Walterson has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for Judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).

FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT HOBART

FILE NUMBER: HBC 793 of 2019

Ms Walterson

Applicant

And

Mr Walterson

Respondent

EX TEMPORE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT 

INTRODUCTION

1. These are proceedings between Ms Walterson (‘the wife’) and Mr Walterson (‘the husband’).  The wife seeks a division of the property on the basis of, essentially, 85 per cent to her and 15 per cent to the husband.

2. It is being treated by the wife as an application to retain: the property in her possession, which is the former matrimonial home; her superannuation entitlements; her furniture; furnishings; and car.  This would leave the husband with his car with a value of about $9,600, his half-interest in a boat of about $7,000 and his tools of trade which are about $2,000, plus his superannuation of $56,380.

3. These proceedings commenced on 2 September 2019. 

4. The issues are first whether the proceedings should commence and be dealt with on an undefended basis, and, if that is to be the case, the adjustment of the property pursuant to s 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’).

5. Before me I have the following documents:-

   (1)the Initiating Application commencing the proceedings filed 2 September 2019;

   (2)the wife’s Financial Statement dated 2 September 2019;

   (3)a copy of Police Family Violence Order made on 8 February 2019, which will be Exhibit 1;

   (4)a copy of a Family Violence Order made in the Tasmania Magistrates Court on 27 February 2019, which is Exhibit 2;

   (5)the Affidavit of the wife filed 19 November 2019;

   (6)the Case Outline prepared by the wife’s solicitor filed 19 November 2019, which is Exhibit 3; and

   (7)an Affidavit of Service of the Initiating Application, being an affidavit of Ms C filed 14 October 2019.

Background

1. The wife is aged 43 and is an administrator.  She earns about $42,000 per annum, plus she receives some Centrelink benefits.  The wife asserts that the husband is aged 38, that he is a tradesman by occupation and that he earns somewhere between $60,000 and $70,000 per year.

2. She deposes in her affidavit that he pays no child support.  There are two children of the marriage: X, aged six, and Y, aged three (collectively ‘the children’).

3. The wife asserts, and it is not challenged by the husband, that she purchased a property in 2008.  It is clear on her evidence that the value of that property at the commencement of the relationship was some $88,000 which the wife put into the joint family funds.

4. The parties commenced cohabitation in 2011 and they married in 2014.  In July 2016, or July 2017, it is not entirely clear which, the wife received a redundancy payment of $55,000.  She applied $8,000 of this towards some wedding expenses and $21,000 of this by way of a loan to the husband to enable him to buy a new motor vehicle.  The wife asserts that this was on the basis that he would refinance.  The husband has not done so, the car is in the wife’s possession and she is content that the husband retain ownership of it, subject to him paying the wife’s costs of these proceedings.  

5. The parties separated on 8 February 2019 in circumstances of family violence.  I note the contents of the Police Family Violence Order and the subsequent Magistrates Family Violence Order.

6. The evidence of the wife is that the husband spends time with the children from time to time, but that he is not significantly involved in their lives.

Undefended Hearing

1. These proceedings were commenced by the Initiating Application filed 2 September 2019.  The wife deposes in her affidavit as to the difficulties in relation to service of documents on the husband.  She contends that he evaded service and eventually a mutual friend of theirs served the documents on the husband.

2. It is significant that the husband did not attend at the Case Assessment Conference, but the wife deposes that he did verbally abuse her over the fact that she commenced proceedings to finalise the matter, making “irrational comments in saying that he would call the police against me”.

3. Given that evidence, and the evidence of Ms C, I am satisfied that the husband was served with the Initiating Application and the wife’s Financial Statement.  I am satisfied that he had taken a positive step not to attend at the Case Assessment Conference and that he has not engaged in these proceedings.

4. After the Case Assessment Conference the matter was adjourned to another date, and on 18 October 2019 the wife’s solicitors wrote to the husband informing him of orders made in the Case Assessment Conference.  He was ordered to file a Response and a Financial Statement, and that the matter would be listed for an undefended hearing if he did not do so.  A copy of that letter was annexed to the wife’s trial affidavit, that being Annexure D.

5. The matter came back before the Registrar on 17 October 2019, and the husband did not appear and did not comply with the Registrar’s directions to file material. As such, the Registrar referred the matter for a possible undefended hearing before me today.

6. The wife’s solicitors caused a letter to be sent to the husband from the Court, informing him that the matter was listed for possible undefended hearing today.  The notification letters are Annexure E to the wife’s affidavit.

7. Having regard to all of that period, I am satisfied that not only did the husband have notice of the proceedings, he had notice that it was to be heard today.

8. The husband was called outside the courtroom on the day of the hearing at about 10:20am and there was no appearance by him. 

9. I am satisfied that he is aware of the proceedings and has chosen not to become involved in the proceedings.  As such, I will proceed to the hearing on an undefended basis.

THE LAW AS TO PROPERTY

1. The approach of the High Court in Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 is that the Court, having determined the legal and equitable interests of the parties in, needs to consider whether there ought to be property orders at all given the parties’ particular circumstances.

2. The wife has given evidence of family violence during the relationship and family violence at the time of separation.  That violence, in the terms of verbal abuse, seems to be continuing.

3. I am satisfied that it is appropriate for me to consider an order for adjustment of property as between these parties, having regard to the comments of the High Court in Stanford & Stanford (supra) and given the circumstances of these parties, their relationship, their contributions as I have addressed them in these reasons, and the way their property including superannuation is distributed at the present time.  I am satisfied that it is appropriate for the Court to exercise jurisdiction and exercise its power to make adjustment of property as between the parties.

The property of the parties

1. The wife has set out the property of the parties in her affidavit and in her Case Outline, exhibit 3 or 4, the property of the parties.  I will go through it now.

2. The parties own a home at Suburb E, which the wife asserts has a value of some $360,000.  In that regard, the wife implicitly expressed that sum in her Financial Statement where she said she owned 75 per cent of the property and it had a value of some $270,000.  It makes the total value of that property, on her assessment, at $360,000.

3. The wife annexes to her affidavit a market appraisal by a local agent, which says the property has a market range of $365,000 to $375,000.  That is not a valuation.  I make no criticism of the wife or those who advised her for using that material.  The husband has the option to raise issues as to the value of the property.  He has chosen not to do.  The wife is carefully husbanding her limited resources, and as such used a market appraisal, which is indicative of the value of the property. The value of that property was contained as an allegation in the wife’s financial statement and I am satisfied for the purpose of this undefended hearing that the value of the parties’ home is as set out earlier.

4. The wife asserts against her interest that her car has a value of $17,000.  The husband does not challenge that.  I will treat that as the value of the car.  The wife asserts the husband’s car has a value of $9,600.  The husband’s car is currently in the possession of the wife.  The husband has not objected to that valuation and I will treat that as the value of that car.  The wife asserts that the husband has a half-interest in a boat with a value of $7,000, and tools to the value of $2,000.  She also asserts that he has superannuation of some $56,380.

5. I am satisfied that those are accurate figures and I will treat those as the value of that property for the purpose of this determination.  The wife has liabilities over the home of some $215,000, credit card debt of $2,800 and a loan against a car of about $12,411, making the total liabilities of about $230,211.  This leaves a very modest pool of property of $165,389.

6. The wife has superannuation which falls into two categories.  The first is the superannuation accumulated by her prior to the parties living together.  She asserts that has as value of $114,882.  I note that that was what the wife asserted in her Financial Statement which she had served upon the husband.

7. She also asserted that she had post-cohabitation superannuation of $9,501, making a total of about $124,000 in superannuation entitlements.  The husband, of course, has the superannuation to which I referred to earlier of $56,380.  I am satisfied that this is the pool of assets.

Contribution

1. The parties have their personal effects, but the most significant asset at the time of cohabitation, apart from the cars, and there is no valuation of the parties’ cars at that time, was the wife’s equity in real estate of some $88,000.  In that respect I note paragraph 14 of the wife’s trial affidavit.  I am satisfied that this was a significant financial contribution by the wife.

2. In addition, the wife took redundancy during the course of the relationship.   She asserts in paragraph 15 of her trial affidavit that she received a sum of $55,000 and applied this amount as to $8,000 towards wedding costs, $21,000 for the purchase of a car for the husband, and then otherwise used it towards living expenses.   The only evidence before me is the evidence of the wife, which I accept.

3. The wife asserts in paragraph 16 of her trial affidavit that she loaned money to the husband to purchase a Motor Vehicle 1 utility, and this was to be paid back when he borrowed the money for it.  The husband, after acquiring the car, refused to obtain a loan and had made no repayments. 

4. Overall, the wife made greater financial contributions than did the husband.

5. The husband does not pay child support, and I have had regard to that in two respects.  The first is in a very modest way the child support has not been paid since the separation in February this year.  I will also deal with it in another way as to the future child support, because there is no evidence that the husband is paying or will pay child support, in respect of the future needs of the parties.

6. The wife’s contributions to the superannuation were significantly greater than that of the husband, and I note and generally accept the submissions of the wife’s lawyer in relation to how I should deal with that.

7. I accept that the wife has undertaken most of the parenting of the children since their respective births and I also accept that the husband has, at times, been irresponsible with money, as asserted by the wife in paragraph 17 of her affidavit, although I give this very limited weight given the overall property of the parties.

Future Needs

1. There is no evidence that the parties are in otherwise than good health.  I have referred to the parties’ age and their occupations earlier in these reasons.

2. The outcome sought by the wife will leave her with the house and a substantial mortgage and some other debts.  It will leave the husband with his superannuation, half-interest in a boat, the car or the proceeds of sale of the car, some tools and the like.

3. I am satisfied, however, that the wife has greater needs in the future, including the need to provide housing for the children for whom she has the lion’s share of the care.  The husband has an income of between $60,000 and $70,000 per year.  The wife has an income of $42,000 a year.  Whilst these are both modest incomes, the husband’s income is significantly superior to that of the wife, and given her role as the principal carer of the children, that is likely to continue for many years into the future, particularly having regard to the age of the children of six and three, respectively, there is some distance for her.

4. So there are significant factors under s 75(2)(b) and (c) of the Act. The wife has the obligation to support herself and the two children. On the evidence before me, the husband has an obligation simply to support himself. There is no evidence of either party having an obligation to support any other person. The wife is in receipt of a pension or allowance as set out in her Financial Statement.

1. It is likely, given the circumstance of the parties, that the standard of living of the wife has diminished as she is now wholly responsible for the mortgage and no support of any meaningful nature, or any support at this stage, from the husband.

2. The effect of the order which she proposes is that it will provide her with security as to accommodation for herself and the children.  It protects her wish to continue in her role as the children’s primary carer.  This is a short to medium term marriage, and I have had regard to that both in relation to the a 75(2) factors and in relation to contribution.

3. As I have said earlier, the husband is not paying child support and there is no indication that he is likely to pay child support in the future.  He is not spending significant time with the children.

4. There is no Kennon[1] claim in respect of this matter.  I have not, in the reasons so far, looked at percentages, but it seems to me that the orders sought by the wife are just and equitable, although I do not entirely agree with the percentages asserted by the legal representative for the wife.

   [1] (1997) FLC 92-757; (1997) 22 Fam LR 1.

5. It would seem to me that the adjustment in relation to the s 75(2) factors ought to have been around 15 per cent rather than 20 per cent.  However, the contributions of the wife are significant, and I have outlined earlier, including the two large amounts of money and her responsibility for the care of the children.

6. As such, I am satisfied that the orders which the wife seeks, that is, the transfer of the house to her, subject to the mortgage, and each party retaining their superannuation, is just and equitable.

7. I have treated the superannuation as part of the whole pool, bearing in mind the factors with which I have dealt with above.

8. Consequently, I will be making the orders sought by the wife. The wife also seeks orders under s 106A(1)(b) of the Act, based upon the husband’s refusal to engage in this process and her limited means. The husband’s refusal to engage in the process has significantly added to the financial stress and, no doubt, emotional stress on the wife.

9. It is unlikely, given his history, that the husband will facilitate the transfer of the home to the wife. As a consequence, it seems to me, that the order sought by the wife under s 106A(1)(b) of the Act, is entirely appropriate.

10. In her Initiating Application filed 2 September 2019, the wife sought an order for costs.  She presses for that order today. 

THE LAW AS TO COSTS

Costs orders generally

1. The power to make costs orders are set out in s 117 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘the Act’), which relevantly provides:-

   (1) Subject to subsection (2), subsection 70NFB(1) and sections 117AA, 117AC and 118, each party to proceedings under this Act shall bear his or her own costs.

   (2)    If, in proceedings under this Act, the court is of opinion that there are circumstances that justify it in doing so, the court may, subject to subsections (2A), (4), (4A) and (5) and the applicable Rules of Court, make such order as to costs and security for costs, whether by way of interlocutory order or otherwise, as the court considers just.

   (2A) In considering what order (if any) should be made under subsection (2), the court shall have regard to:

   (a)     the financial circumstances of each of the parties to the proceedings;

   (b)    whether any party to the proceedings is in receipt of assistance by way of legal aid and, if so, the terms of the grant of that assistance to that party;

   (c)     the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, the conduct of the parties in relation to pleadings, particulars, discovery, inspection, directions to answer questions, admissions of facts, production of documents and similar matters;

   (d)    whether the proceedings were necessitated by the failure of a party to the proceedings to comply with previous orders of the court;

   (e)     whether any party to the proceedings has been wholly unsuccessful in the proceedings;

   (f)     whether either party to the proceedings has made an offer in writing to the other party to the proceedings to settle the proceedings and the terms of any such offer; and

   (g)     such other matters as the court considers relevant.

2. In Penfold v Penfold (1980) FLC 90-800 the majority of the High Court expressed the general rule that s 117(1) is not paramount to s 117(2) of the Act. A court must make a finding that there are circumstances justifying the making of a costs order before proceeding to make the orders.

3. There is no guidance in the legislation between the two sub sections nor any additional special onus on the applicant for an order as to costs.

4. It is necessary to consider the facts in the light of the provisions set out in s 117(2A) of the Act. While the list in s 117(2A) gives rise to a wide range of factors there is nowhere in s 117(2A) that says any one factor provides a hierarchy in relation to the other factors, it is a matter of weight that is accorded to each of the relevant factors in the Court’s discretion (see Medlon and Medlon (No.6) (Indemnity Costs) (2015) FLC 93-664 per Strickland J). One factor may be enough. In PBF as Child Representative for AF (Legal Aid Commission of Tasmania) & Ors [2005] FamCA 158, the Full Court held:-

   41. Nowhere in subsection 2(a) or elsewhere in section 117, is there any prescription that more than one factor must be present before an order for costs is made nor of comparative weight of the factors set out in subsection (2A). As a consequence, there is nothing to prevent any factor being the sole foundation for an order for costs.

5. As such the Court has a broad discretion in determining costs.

6. It is of value to repeat what I have said in earlier judgments that the Court needs to consider the difference between the various types of unquantified costs orders available under the Act. There are many variations of types of costs orders, but they generally fall into three types:-

   a)Party and party costs - which are calculated having regard to the schedule of costs under the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth);

   b)Lawyer and client costs – these are essentially indemnity costs, with the onus upon the costs applicant to satisfy the taxing authority that such costs are on balance fair, reasonable and proportionate; and

   c)Indemnity costs - these are essentially lawyer and client costs, with the onus upon the costs respondent to satisfy the taxing authority that such costs are on balance not fair and reasonable and not on balance proportionate, that is the reversal of the onus of proof. 

7. It should be borne in mind that costs orders are restorative and not punitive, and costs cannot exceed the amount actually incurred.  They are an indemnity or partial indemnity.  In Cachia v Hanes (1994) 179 CLR 403 the plurality of the Court, comprising Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson and McHugh JJ observed:-

   Whilst the restricted basis upon which party and party costs are awarded may be debated as a matter of policy, it is to be borne in mind that party and party costs have never been regarded as a total indemnity to a successful litigant for costs incurred, let alone total recompense for work done and time lost. Putting to one side the question posed by the relatively rare exception of a solicitor acting in person, there is no inequality involved: all litigants are treated in the same manner. And if only litigants in person were recompensed for lost time and trouble, there would be real inequality between litigants in person and litigants who were represented, many of whom would have suffered considerable loss of time and trouble in addition to incurring professional costs. The partial indemnity which the law allows represents a compromise between the absence of any provision for costs (which prevails as a matter of policy in some jurisdictions) and full recompense. In these days of burgeoning costs, the risk of which is a real disincentive to litigation, the proper compromise is a matter of both difficulty and concern.

8. This costs application was considered and determined under the provisions of s 117 of the Act, and I discuss the reasons for this approach in this judgment.

9. In relation to s 117(2A), I have had regard to the financial circumstances of each of the parties. The end result of the property orders that I had proposed to make will be that the wife will end up with an income of about $42,000 per year plus some modest Centrelink benefits. The husband will end up with a superior income of between $60,000 and $70,000 per year.

10. Each of the parties will end up with property, although the husband’s property will be significantly less than the wife, and I have had regard to that. In respect to s 117(2A)(b) of the Act, there is no evidence that the husband has taken legal advice, but there is evidence that the wife is not in receipt of legal aid.

11. As to the conduct of the parties to the proceedings in relation to the proceedings, including the conduct of the parties in relation to pleading, particularly discovery, inspection, etcetera the wife endeavoured to resolve these matters before commencing proceedings.  The husband has not in any meaningful way engaged in a settlement process.  The wife and husband apparently had some negotiations, but the husband declined to put in place an oral or a written agreement which the parties had made, as is set out in paragraph 4 of the wife’s affidavit.

12. What has made this worse, of course, is that the husband has not engaged meaningfully in the proceedings.  He was served, and it is clear that he kept house and avoided service.  He has not responded to the application.  He did not turned up at the Case Assessment Conference, nor did he attend court before the Registrar in October, nor me today.  That is a significant feature of this case and has imposed upon the wife a considerable financial burden for her almost $4,000 in legal costs which I suspect she can ill afford.

13. Section 117(2A)(f) seems to be relevant in that clearly the wife had made an offer in terms of the orders which she sought and that were subsequently made, but the husband would not accept that settlement, and would not document that settlement. That seems to me to be ably treated as an offer in writing which the other party has to settle.

14. Finally, I have had regard to the modest amount claimed, and that the wife has been, in essence, wholly successful.

15. The wife has the Motor Vehicle 1 utility owned by the husband in her possession, and the wife seeks the sum of $3,818 in costs.  Exercising the broad discretion that I have regarding costs, I intend to make that order.

I certify that the preceding sixty-six (66) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Benjamin delivered on

20 November 2019.

Associate:     

Date:   18 December 2019