Walker v New South Wales Bar Association

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Walker v New South Wales Bar Association [2016] FCA 799

File number: NSD 1060 of 2015
Judge: BESANKO J
Date of judgment: 12 July 2016
Catchwords: ASSOCIATIONS AND CLUBS – declaratory relief sought pursuant to s 21 of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – whether subject matter of declarations sought is justiciable – when Court will intervene in internal affairs of voluntary associations – where association is a company limited by guarantee - where issues do not relate to rules in association’s Constitution but rather the terms of a Senior Counsel Protocol – where no contractual or property rights affected - whether issues involve threat or interference with applicant’s livelihood or reputation.
CORPORATIONS – members’ rights and remedies – oppression – whether conduct of the association’s affairs in connection with applicant’s Senior Counsel application and appointment process was oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to or unfairly discriminatory against the applicant – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 232, 233.
Legislation:

Companies (New South Wales) Code s 320

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 232, 233

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 21

Cases cited:

Ainsworth and Another v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564

Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358

Campbell and Another v Backoffice Investments Pty Ltd and Another [2009] HCA 25; (2009) 238 CLR 304

Fexuto Pty Ltd v Bosnjak Holdings Pty Ltd and Others [2001] NSWCA 97; (2001) 37 ACSR 672

Forster v Jododex Australia Pty Limited and Another) (1972) 127 CLR 421

HNA Irish Nominee Ltd and Another v Kinghorn and Others (No 2) [2012] FCA 228; (2012) 290 ALR 372

In the matter of the New South Wales Bar Association and Another [2014] NSWSC 1695; (2014) 315 ALR 146

Islamic Council of South Australia v Australian Federation of Islamic Councils Inc [2009] NSWSC 211

John J Starr (Real Estate) Pty Ltd v Robert R Andrew (A’Asia) Pty Ltd and Others (1991) 6 ACSR 63

Johnco Nominees Pty Ltd v Albury-Wodonga (New South Wales) Corporation [1977] 1 NSWLR 43

Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner (No 2) [1979] 1 Ch 344

Morgan v 45 Flers Avenue Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692

Mutasa v Attorney-General [1980] 1 QB 114

O’Neill and Another v Phillips and Others [1999] 1 WLR 1092

Rose v Boxing NSW Inc and Anor [2007] NSWSC 20

Sturt and Anor v the Right Reverend Dr Brian Farran, Bishop of Newcastle and Ors [2012] NSWSC 400

Thomas v HW Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686

Wayde and Another v New South Wales Rugby League Limited (1985) 180 CLR 459

Dates of hearing: 21, 22 April 2016
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Regulator and Consumer Protection
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 105
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr D Williams SC with Mr M Costello
Solicitor for the Applicant: Johnson Winter & Slattery
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr I Jackman SC with Mr J Potts
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Details
Case
[2016] FCA 799
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Walker v New South Wales Bar Association involved the applicant seeking declarations and injunctions concerning the selection process for Senior Counsel within the Association. The applicant argued that the conduct of the Association's affairs in connection with her application and appointment process was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly discriminatory against her under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The court was required to determine whether the subject matter of the declarations sought was justiciable and if the court would intervene in the internal affairs of the Association. The court also needed to decide if the applicant's conduct of the association's affairs was oppressive under the Corporations Act.

The court considered that the subject matter of the declarations sought was not justiciable as the issues did not relate to the rules in the Association's Constitution but rather the terms of a Senior Counsel Protocol. There were no contractual or property rights affected, and the issues did not involve a threat or interference with the applicant's livelihood or reputation. The court also found that the conduct of the Association's affairs in connection with the applicant's Senior Counsel application and appointment process was not oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly discriminatory against the applicant under the Corporations Act.

The court dismissed the application and made the following order:

1. The application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

The Association is active in the area of ADR. This is not surprising. The New South Wales Barristers’ Rules (r 38) require a barrister to inform the client or the instructing solicitor of the alternatives to a fully contested adjudication of the case. As I have said, it has an Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee and that committee assists the Association in dealing with ADR issues. For example, the Association made a submission to the New South Wales Law Reform Commission about “updating” statutory provisions providing for mediation and other forms of ADR.The Facts The facts are not in dispute. On 20 May 2010, the Bar Council held a meeting at which it considered a Report on the Review of the New South Wales Bar Association Protocol for the appointment of Senior Counsel prepared by The Hon R V Gyles AO QC dated 30 April 2010. A number of matters in the Protocol were discussed and various principles or positions were agreed. In relation to mediation, the following appears in the minutes:It was agreed that skill in representation of clients in mediation, and in acting as a mediator, were relevant factors to be taken into account by the Selection Committee. The Bar Council agreed that the Selection Protocol be amended to clarify that the Selection Committee shall take into account experience and practice in mediation. In 2010, a review of the Senior Counsel selection process was undertaken and the Association published a paper by the Hon Keith Mason AC QC dated 7 October 2010 which made certain observations and suggestions concerning the Senior Counsel selection process in 2010 and the process to be adopted in the future. Mr Mason had been a member of the Senior Counsel Selection Committee in 2010 as a non-practising barrister with appropriate qualifications. In his paper, Mr Mason made the following observations concerning mediation:A related matter involved the place of mediation. The Committee recognised the significance of alternative dispute resolution in the modern law. It also acknowledged that a 2010 amendment to the Protocol had included as one of the non‑exhaustive list of “experience” criteria “experience and practice in mediation”. By way of analogy, it was also recognised that some great barristers of the past have had a very substantial advice practice in particular areas. The Committee were much troubled and divided about the intent of the Protocol as regards a barrister whose major or sole contemporary practice involves participation in mediations as mediator. It had no difficulty in concluding that such a person is a “practising advocate” who satisfies the stipulation (para 4) that appointment should be restricted to such persons, so long as such an applicant (if a member of the private Bar) stands ready to observe the cab-rank principle. But the majority of the Committee felt that the essential “skill” component referred to above requires it to be demonstrated that an applicant with a mediator’s practice can demonstrate (presumably based on prior experience) that he or she presently has skill “to a high degree” in “the presentation and testing of litigants’ cases”. If this is demonstrable, then there would be no impediment stemming from the current mix of the applicant’s practice being wholly or exclusively that of a mediator. The Committee invites the Bar Council to clarify the Protocol if it has been misinterpreted.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

First, it was submitted by the respondents that relief should be refused because any conduct which the Court concluded was oppressive did not affect the applicant in her capacity as a member. She was a Local Practising Barrister and member of the Outer Bar. Furthermore, any junior counsel with a full unrestricted practising certificate, whether a member of the Association or not, is entitled to apply for appointment as Senior Counsel. Those matters probably lead to the conclusion that had there been oppression, the applicant was not affected in her capacity as a member. However, without deciding the point, I make the observation that it may be relevant to the discretion to take into account whether the member, although affected in some other capacity, has alternative relief available to him or her. Secondly, Ms Needham and Mr Hutley advanced an argument by reference to the 2010 and 2011 resolutions that the Bar Council’s intention was not as the applicant asserted. The submission was that the 2011 resolution went no further than providing that the fact that an applicant was currently practising wholly or substantially as a mediator did not disqualify the applicant from appointment as Senior Counsel. That was as far as the resolution went and did not mean that the other criteria in a Protocol did not need to be considered. In the circumstances, I do not need to consider this argument.Conclusion The application is dismissed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I should mention arguments which were put, but which I do not strictly need to address. First, it was submitted by the Association that declaratory relief would be futile because the 2014 and 2015 Senior Counsel selection process had been finalised and could not be changed, and it was not known what form the 2016 Protocol would take. Declarations about the proper construction of old Protocols may be of no use. There is force in this submission, but I would refrain from expressing a final view. The Court only reaches the point of considering futility where the matters are otherwise justiciable, perhaps on the ground of threat to livelihood or damage to reputation, and any issue of futility would need to be considered in light of the precise findings made as to these matters. Secondly, the Association submitted that none of the relief should be granted because the relevant acts in the result were those of the President who was acting persona designata. Ms Needham and Mr Hutley put a related argument in the context of the oppression claim pursuant to the Corporations Act to the effect that the conduct complained of was not conduct of the Association within s 232(a) of the Corporations Act. Again, I do not strictly need to deal with these arguments, but I indicate that I would be disposed to reject them. The Bar Council approved the Senior Counsel Protocol each year as well as the Selection Committee. It would seem that in doing so, it was acting within the general powers it is given by the Constitution. The Senior Counsel Protocol contains the major policy decisions about the appointment of Senior counsel. As seen in this case, those major policy issues are debated and determined at the meetings of the Bar Council. The applications are to be made in a form approved by the Bar Council and, as seen in this case, unsuccessful applicants are advised of the result by letter from the President under the letterhead of the Association. It is the Bar Council which is given the power in the Protocol to terminate the appointment of Senior Counsel. In terms of selection, the Selection Committee takes “all steps towards the selection of appointees” and it is to make “its final selection of the proposed appointees”. It would seem that from there that the only impediment to appointment is the opposition of the Chief Justice. In those circumstances, it seems difficult to argue that the relevant conduct was not conduct of the Association or Bar Council or conduct of the Association’s affairs.2. Oppressive Conduct under ss 232 and 233 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Sections 232 and 233 of the Corporations Act are in the following terms232 Grounds for Court orderThe Court may make an order under section 233 if:(a)the conduct of a company’s affairs; or(b)an actual or proposed act or omission by or on behalf of a company; or(c)a resolution, or a proposed resolution, of members or a class of members of a company;is either:(d)contrary to the interests of the members as a whole; or(e)oppressive to, unfairly prejudicial to, or unfairly discriminatory against, a member or members whether in that capacity or in any other capacity.For the purposes of this Part, a person to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or by operation of law is taken to be a member of the company.233 Orders the Court can make(1)The Court can make any order under this section that it considers appropriate in relation to the company, including an order:(a) that the company be wound up;(b) that the company’s existing constitution be modified or repealed;(c) regulating the conduct of the company’s affairs in the future;(d)for the purchase of any shares by any member or person to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or by operation of law;(e)for the purchase of shares with an appropriate reduction of the company’s share capital;(f)for the company to institute, prosecute, defend or discontinue specified proceedings;(g)authorising a member, or a person to whom a share in the company has been transmitted by will or by operation of law, to institute, prosecute, defend or discontinue specified proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company;(h)appointing a receiver or a receiver and manager of any or all of the company’s property;(i)restraining a person from engaging in specified conduct or from doing a specified act;(j) requiring a person to do a specified act.Order that the company be wound up(2)If an order that a company be wound up is made under this section, the provisions of this Act relating to the winding up of companies apply:(a) as if the order were made under section 461; and(b) with such changes as are necessary.Order altering constitution(3)If an order made under this section repeals or modifies a company’s constitution, or requires the company to adopt a constitution, the company does not have the power under section 136 to change or repeal the constitution if that change or repeal would be inconsistent with the provisions of the order, unless:(a)the order states that the company does have the power to make such a change or repeal; or(b) the company first obtains the leave of the Court.