[2011] TASSC 4
COURT: SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION: W v Eaton [2011] TASSC 4
PARTIES: W
v
EATON, James Robert
FILE NO/S: 213/2007
DELIVERED ON: 22 February 2011
DELIVERED AT: Hobart
HEARING DATE: 9 February 2011
JUDGMENT OF: Blow J
CATCHWORDS:
Limitation of Actions – Limitation of particular actions – Simple contracts, quasi-contracts and torts – Tort actions involving personal injuries – "Breach of duty".
Limitation Act 1974 (Tas), s5(1).
Stingel v Clark (2006) 226 CLR 442; Kruber v Grzesiak [1963] VR 621; Letang v Cooper [1965] 1 QB 232; Hayward v Georges Ltd [1966] VR 202; Mason v Mason [1997] 1 VR 325; A v Hoare [2008] 1 AC 844, followed.
Devlin v Roche [2002] 2 IR 360, not followed.
Aust Dig Limitation of Actions [1024]
REPRESENTATION:
Counsel:
Plaintiff: C M Schokman
Defendant: D J Gunson SC
Solicitors:
Plaintiff: Ogilvie Jennings
Defendant: Gunson Williams
Judgment Number: [2011] TASSC 4
Number of paragraphs: 30
Serial No 4/2011
File No 213/2007
W v JAMES ROBERT EATON
REASONS FOR DETERMINATION BLOW J
22 February 2011
The plaintiff has sued the defendant for damages for assault and battery, alleging that the defendant sexually assaulted him on a number of occasions in the years 1999 to 2002 inclusive. The action was commenced by the filing of a writ on 25 May 2007. The defendant, apart from denying the allegations of sexual assault, has pleaded that any causes of action that the plaintiff may have are barred by virtue of the Limitation Act 1974 ("the 1974 Act"), s5. If that section applies, the limitation period is three years, and all of the plaintiff's claims are statute barred, subject to the discretionary powers of the Court to extend time under ss5(3), 38A(1), and 38A(3). However the plaintiff has pleaded that s5 does not apply. He contends that that section does not apply to intentional torts. If that is the position, there is no need for the plaintiff to apply for any extension of time.
It is therefore appropriate that there be a determination, before any further step is taken, of the question of law as to whether s5 applies to intentional torts. Holt AsJ has directed that that question of law be raised for the opinion of the Court pursuant to the Supreme Court Rules 2000, r566. This is my determination in relation to that question.
The relevant provisions in the critical section, s5, read as follows:
"(1) An action for damages for negligence, nuisance, or breach of duty (whether that duty exists by virtue of a contract or a provision made by or under an enactment or independently of any contract or any such provision) where the damages claimed by the plaintiff for the negligence, nuisance, or breach of duty consist of, or include, damages in respect of personal injuries to any person shall not, subject to this section, be brought after the expiration of a period of 3 years from the date on which the cause…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue before the court was whether the statutory limitation period for tort actions involving personal injuries, as set out in the Limitations Act, commences from the date of the tortious act or from the date when the injury was discovered or ought reasonably to have been discovered. This issue hinged on the interpretation of the term "breach of duty" within the context of the statutory provisions and whether it aligns with the principles of the discovery rule. The court was tasked with reconciling these statutory provisions with the common law principles governing limitation periods in tort actions.
The High Court held that the statutory limitation period for tort actions involving personal injuries begins to run from the date of the tortious act itself, rather than from the date of discovery of the injury. The court reasoned that the statutory provisions, when read in their ordinary and grammatical meaning, do not incorporate the discovery rule. The court further found that the term "breach of duty" in the statutory context refers to the act that gives rise to the cause of action, rather than the discovery of the injury. Consequently, the appellant's claim was dismissed as it was brought beyond the statutory limitation period. The court's decision underscored the importance of adhering to statutory provisions over extending the common law principles to areas where the legislature has expressly defined the limitation periods.
The final orders of the court were that the appeal brought by W against Eaton be dismissed, and the decision of the Supreme Court of Queensland be affirmed. The court also noted that the statutory limitation period for tort actions involving personal injuries remains a critical consideration in such cases, and parties must ensure compliance with these provisions to preserve their right to bring an action.
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