VVTR and Child Support Registrar (Child support)

[2021] AATA 501

VVTR and Child Support Registrar (Child support) [2021] AATA 501 (16 March 2021)

Administrative Appeals Tribunal

1. the decision states that the care percentages for L are 58% to BNMG, with effect from 12 February 2019, and 42% to VVTR, with effect from 26 June 2019; and

2. paragraph [54] of the statement of reasons states that the care percentages are 58% for BNMG, and 42% for VVTR.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL No: 2020/3274 General Division Re: VVTR Applicant And: Child Support Registrar Respondent And: BNMG Other Party CORRIGENDUM TRIBUNAL: Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member DATE OF CORRIGENDUM: 29 March 2021 PLACE: Melbourne The Tribunal directs the Registrar, pursuant to subsection 43AA(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 , to alter the text of the decision in this application as follows: 1. The text of the decision be amended to reflect that the percentages of care for L are 58% to BNMG, with effect from 26 June 2019, and 42% to VVTR, with effect from 12 February 2019. ...............[sgd].................................................... Senior Member Administrative Appeals Tribunal ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL No: 2020/3274 General Division Re: VVTR Applicant And: Child Support Registrar Respondent And: BNMG Other Party DIRECTION TRIBUNAL: Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member DATE OF CORRIGENDUM: 24 March 2021 PLACE: Melbourne The Tribunal directs the Registrar, pursuant to subsection 43AA(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 , to alter the text of the decision in this application so that: ...............[sgd].................................................... Senior Member Division: GENERAL DIVISION File Number(s): 2020/3274

Re:

VVTR APPLICANT And Child Support Registrar RESPONDENT And BNMG OTHER PARTY

DECISION

Tribunal:Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member

Date:16 March 2021  

Place:Melbourne

The decision under review is set aside and substituted for a decision that the percentages of care for L are 58% to BNMG, with effect from 12 February 2019, and 42% to VVTR, with effect from 26 June 2019.

......[sgd]..................................................................

Dr Stewart Fenwick

Names used in all published decisions are pseudonyms. Any references appearing in square brackets indicate that information has been removed from this decision and replaced with generic information so as not to identify involved individuals as required by subsections 16(2AB)–16(2AC) of the Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988.

Catchwords

CHILD SUPPORT – percentage of care – child resident at boarding school – factors relevant to determination of actual care – disagreement about contribution to payment of school fees – determination of new percentages of care – decision set aside and substituted

Legislation

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth)

Child Support (Registration and Collection) Act 1988 (Cth)

Cases

P v Child Support Registrar [2013] FCA 1312
P v Child Support Registrar and Another [2014] AATA 229
P v Child Support Registrar [2014] FCAFC 98

P v Child Support Registrar [2015] FCA 116

Secondary Materials

Child Support Guide

REASONS FOR DECISION

Dr Stewart Fenwick

BACKGROUND

1. The Applicant lodged an application dated 26 May 2020 seeking review of a decision of the Social Services and Child Support Division of the Tribunal (AAT1) dated 6 May 2020. That review was brought by VVTR after an initial decision by a delegate of the Respondent dated 6 September 2019, and the disallowance of an objection to that decision, dated 20 January 2020.

2. The Applicant and the Other Party are the parents of a child (‘L’) who attended boarding school at all relevant times. L lived with the parents when not at school, and the parents separated sometime in 2015 while living overseas. Once VVTR and BNMG had returned from overseas they lived as separated under the one roof. The decisions in this matter address the care percentage applicable to the parents with respect to their child between the dates 12 February 2019, when BNMG left the family home, and 29 June 2019, when L turned 18.

3. The date of 26 June 2019 is also significant as this was the day on which VVTR advised the Child Support Agency that there had been a change in the care arrangements. The change advised was that BNMG had left the family home on 12 February 2019.

4. From August 2017 the care arrangements were accepted as 50/50, which persisted until early 2019. In summary, the following further different care percentage assessments have been made in this matter:

   (a)Decision of 6 September 2019: VVTR – 22%; BNMG – 78%; percentages to apply to both parties from 12 February 2019;

   (b)Objection decision of 20 January 2020: VVTR – 22%, applying from 26 June 2019; BNMG – 78%, applying from 12 February 2019;

   (c)AAT1: VVTR – 30%, applying from 12 February 2019; BNMG – 70%, applying from 26 June 2019.

   The decision of AAT1 corrects an error in the Objection Decision in which the date of effect of care percentages as between VVTR and BNMG were reversed.

5. In the application before the Tribunal, VVTR states that there has not been a fair apportionment of the child care contributions made by the parents across a range of factors being: emotional and financial support, supervision, accommodation, health care and time spent with each parent. It is also stated, specifically, that particular consideration should be given to the source of funds used to pay school fees, and whether these funds were joint assets of the marriage.

6. VVTR submitted during the Objection Decision that the care percentages found in the original decision should be reversed, with the Applicant being found to have 78% care for L. The decision-maker in the Objection Decision determined that care of the child was shared outside of periods at boarding school. Both parties argued that they had care responsibilities for L during the school term. The decision maker acknowledged this, and also gave weight to the financial contributions of BNMG to the care of L in maintaining the 78% determination in favour of BNMG.

7. AAT1 in its decision balanced a range of factors including financial support, emotional support, and time spent with each parent in deciding that the pattern of care should be adjusted slightly in favour of VVTR, to 30%.

8. The Respondent lodged T documents and a Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (T, at pp 286-301). The Respondent’s written and oral submissions were made on the basis that they would assist the Tribunal in reaching findings of fact, without advancing a particular position. The Applicant and Other Party were self-represented. 

9. The matter was first listed for hearing on 9 November 2020 but the hearing did not progress beyond a preliminary assessment of material lodged. It became apparent there were a number of gaps in the record due to problems with mail delivery, material provided by BNMG dated 1 November 2020 was not before the Tribunal, and the Applicant had not seen this material; there was further relevant material from the parties’ family law proceedings that I asked be lodged; and, material from BNMG that had been before AAT1 had been omitted from the T documents. I directed that the Applicant be given the opportunity to respond to BNMG’s November 2020 material and that the Other Party could make final submissions with respect to any issues arising. The hearing resumed on 17 December 2020.

10. The Applicant lodged the following material:

    (d)a Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (T pp 274-281), including attachments (T pp 343-398) (Exhibit A1);

    (e)a response dated 29 November 2020 to Other Party’s 1 November 2020 material (T pp 329-333), including attachments (T pp 399-403) (Exhibit A2).

11. The Other Party lodged the following material:

    (a)a statement dated 1 November 2020 (T pp 302-328) including attachments (T pp 308-328) (Exhibit OP1);

    (b)a response dated 9 December 2020 to the Applicant’s submission of 29 November 2020 (T pp 334-342) (Exhibit OP2); and

    (c)submissions by BNMG to AAT1 dated 9 March 2020 were added to the T documents, as noted, (T pp 224-225), including attachments (T pp 226-271) (Exhibit OP3).

12. Material from the parties’ family law proceedings was lodged by VVTR on 27 November 2020 and comprised:

    a)an Affidavit of VVTR, dated 17 September 2020; and,

    b)Sealed Final Orders of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia, dated 16 October 2020 (Exhibit A3) (‘the family law orders’); and

    c)an Affidavit of BNMG, dated 16 September 2020 (Exhibit OP4).

    LEGISLATION

13. There are several provisions governing the revocation of a care determination, being ss 54F, 54G, and 54H of the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (the Act). Section 54G relates to circumstances in which a person may have less than regular care, and as will become apparent from the evidence and submissions, this condition does not arise in this matter. Section 54H is a discretionary revocation power which only applies when s 54F does not apply (s 54H(1)(c)), and applies in circumstances in which a new care percentage determination may be made.

14. Under s 54F of the Act, the Registrar must revoke an existing determination when notified that the actual care taking place for a child does not correspond with the percentage adopted in that determination, and which may result in a new cost percentage determination. Cost percentages are established with reference to the table in s 55C. When the Registrar is notified more than 28 days after the change took place, as in this case, the revocation decision takes effect the day before notification, in respect of an increase in care; and in the case of a decrease, the revocation takes effect the day before the change of care (s 54F(3)).

15. A person’s cost percentage is to be ascertained according to the table in s 55C of the Act which sets out cost percentages in several bands reflecting different care levels. For example, in the context of this matter, a percentage of care falling between 48% and 52% results in a cost percentage of 50% (corresponding to the existing care determination).

16. Section 54A provides that the actual care of a child that person has during a care period ‘may be worked out on the number of nights’ a child was in  a person’s care. In such a case, a child cannot be in the care of more than one person at the same time (s 54A(3)).

17. I note the commentary in the Respondent’s SFIC (at [38]) that, given the language of s 54A (being the use of the word ‘may’), it is open to the Tribunal to adopt a different methodology for determining percentage of care. Further, the Federal Court of Australia has held that in the case of a child at boarding school, this provision may provide little, if any, guidance.[1]

    [1] P v Child Support Registrar [2013] FCA 1312, at [62]-[63].

18. A care percentage determination can be made under s 49 or s 50 the Act. Section 49 applies in instances where there is no pattern of care. The circumstances of this case indicate that a pattern of care was in place and therefore s 50 is the applicable provision. A determination under s 50  must correspond with the actual care the Registrar is satisfied that the responsible person has for the child during the care period. The care period itself is not defined for the purposes of making a determination, but rather refers to such period as the Registrar considers appropriate having regard to all the circumstances.

19. The Child Support Guide (the Guide) addresses the concept of care in the making of child support assessments in section 2.2.[2] The Guide (section 2.2.1) observes that where there is doubt as to the extent to which a person is providing care, in making a child support assessment the Registrar will ‘take into account whichever of the following are relevant to the particular case’:

    [2] The Guide is found at what extent the person has control of the child, including having overall responsibility for the child and making:

    omajor decisions relating to who the child spends time with and the child’s health, education, discipline, recreational and/or social activities, and

    oarrangements for others to meet the needs of the child (delegated care).

    ·To what extent the person meets the needs of the child by providing the child with accommodation, clothing, food, child care, education, health care, emotional support, supervision, transport and extra-curricular activities.

    ·To what extent the person pays for the costs of meeting the needs of the child.

    ·To what extent the person otherwise provides financial support for the child.

    ·To what extent the child provides for his or her own needs or has those needs met from another source.

    ·To what extent the child is financially independent or financially supported from another source.

20. In the case of older children living away from home, the Guide observes (section 2.2.1) that provision of ‘substantial financial support’ will generally be considered an indicator that the person ‘is continuing to provide care for the child’. It states further that while financial support is often a key factor, where financial support is limited, other factors may indicate a person continues to provide care for a child. These include being involved in major decisions, and involvement in other forms of support identified in the quote immediately above.

21. With respect to the percentage of care, the Guide states, consistent with the legislation, that the number of nights spent with a person will generally be used as the basis for this determination. It goes on:

    Additionally, in limited circumstances, a person may have care of a child who is not living with them for a period of time. For example, a person can provide care for a child who is at boarding school, in hospital, or in separate accommodation …

    Consideration is given to who has responsibility for making arrangements for, and decisions about, the child’s welfare, as well as who is meeting the child’s costs, rather than just the accommodation arrangements themselves. The Registrar will give weight to statements from both parents and any non-parent carers.

    SUBMISSIONS

22. At the opening of the hearing the following submissions were made on the Respondent’s behalf:

    (a)it is open to the Tribunal to find the care period is between 12 February 2019 and 20 November 2019, that is, that it runs to the close of the school year, and the evidence needs to speak to this timeframe;

    (b)there is no dispute as to the fact that BNMG paid the boarding school fees during the relevant timeframe, but it is a question of fact as to whether payments were from joint funds;

    (c)the family law proceedings may have a bearing on the matter with respect to individual entitlements to the source of funds for the school fees.

23. On resumption after the matter was adjourned, it was further submitted on the Respondent’s behalf that:

    (a)the ultimate question for the Tribunal to determine is the percentage of care which is usually, but not always, assessed as totalling 100%;

    (b)a view can be taken of the care period as a whole, and can involve considering a pattern of care rather than specific days of care;

    (c)the specific logistics of the care arrangement do not necessarily define the care provided, and nights in care is normally a reference point when making a care percentage determination. In this case, L spent equal time with both parents outside of boarding school;

    (d)the heart of the dispute in this matter is the ownership of the source of funds for the payment of school fees, which VVTR claims were joint funds;

    (e)other relevant issues include emotional and other day-to-day involvement and discussions with the school. In this instance the weight of evidence suggests that both parents provided support, and it was not disproportionately weighted one way;

    (f)the family law orders dated from October 2020, while providing for a split of joint assets, leave open the question of an appropriate apportionment of care during the care period.

24. VVTR states in their SFIC as follows:

    (a)the financial contributions during the care period are the biggest issue in this matter;

    (b)BNMG paid the school fees from joint funds, having previously urged VVTR to pay the school fees from a mortgage redraw account;

    (c)VVTR paid a weekly $50 allowance until May 2019 and BNMG paid an allowance from January 2019. Thereafter VVTR provided ad hoc financial support;

    (d)VVTR’s non-financial contributions during school included attending parent-teacher interviews, accessing school reports and being the primary point of contact, responding to permission requests, making transport arrangements, and providing emotional support;

    (e)VVTR’s non-financial contributions outside school included playing a predominant role in health care coordination during 2019, although documents indicate some payments may have been made by VVTR for health appointments.

25. VVTR’s SFIC is accompanied by a large number of attachments, the vast majority being copies of email correspondence passing between VVTR and the school and other associated school paperwork. Their contents indicate that they serve to substantiate the categories of non-financial support summarised above in VVTR’s SFIC.

26. VVTR lodged further material (Exhibit A2) that there was a review underway in relation to Family Tax Benefits payments which should be taken into account to ensure consistent care percentages. A table was also provided asserting the source of funds for school fees, and a severance payment is identified as the source of school fee payments. It was submitted, in summary, that financial contributions should be assessed as 50/50 with BNMG and non-financial care as a minimum 70% in VVTR’s favour.

27. BNMG submitted in their substantive written submission in this matter (Exhibit OP1) as follows:

    (a)school fees were paid entirely from funds available to BNMG and not from joint funds. The family law orders do not identify the fees as a joint liability, and no determination was made regarding joint assets until October 2020;

    (b)BNMG paid almost the entire amount of L’s other costs including allowances, phone charges, holidays, extra-curricular activities, schoolies and other ad hoc costs;

    (c)BNMG drove back to boarding school following their weekends with L to assist with attaining  L’s learner’s permit;

    (d)VVTR was the point of contact for parent teacher interviews, however BNMG attended a dinner and had contact with boarding staff;

    (e)as L was in Year 12 at boarding school, the child made most of their own decisions day-to-day and had considerable autonomy;

    (f)BNMG supports the reviewable decision.

28. This submission includes an attachment (T p 308) which is a written statement from a finance officer at the boarding school stating that three payments totalling $35,535.68 were made by BNMG during the care period.

29. In response to the further submission of VVTR, BNMG states (Exhibit OP2) that much of the further submission addresses matters outside the scope of the care period. BNMG reiterates prior submissions with respect to the family law orders, and states that VVTR’s other ad hoc financial contributions were minimal.

30. In the additional written material (T at pp 223-271/Exhibit OP3) BNMG states that VVTR was the point of contact at school because this was the arrangement made while they lived overseas as a family. This submission includes attachments evidencing a range of payments by BNMG as noted above (allowance, phone charges and extracurricular activities).

    EVIDENCE

31. At the hearing the Respondent’s representative assisted the Tribunal by directing questions to the Applicant and Other Party. VVTR was asked to confirm the circumstances of the care percentage change notified to the Respondent agency, specifically why reference was made to 12 February 2019. VVTR responded by referring to a child support claim in January that year.

1. The Respondent’s representative noted for the Tribunal’s benefit that the notification of 26 June 2019 is reported in agency records (T9, p 109), and that this record notes advice that BNMG had moved out. For completeness, I note that the record in question contains the additional further advice provided by VVTR: that actual care should reflect a split of 86% (or 313 nights) in favour of VVTR and 14% (52 nights) to BNMG; that there are no written parenting arrangements, care orders or parenting plan; and, that L spends two nights per fortnight with each parent but that VVTR financially supports the child.

2. VVTR also stated that the school fees prior to the care period were paid from a joint account, that there were fees outstanding at the end of 2018, and that fees actually paid in 2019 matched sums from a withdrawal from superannuation.

3. BNMG stated that fee payments were made from a personal account and that there was a drawdown of superannuation, and also contract salary income during the relevant period. BNMG stated that after April 2019 they were unemployed and sustained themself and L with their superannuation.

4. VVTR agreed in evidence that the family law orders did not address the historical situation, that is, payments made prior to their finalisation in October 2020. It was also noted in evidence that VVTR had access to a redraw facility and made contributions to various property outgoings.

5. BNMG stated that they considered their non-financial contribution to L as greater than 50/50, however they were  prepared to accept an equal split, covering both school and non-school time. BNMG reiterated that they paid the majority of financial support outside of school fees.

6. VVTR disagreed that the majority of financial support outside of school fees was paid by BNMG. They also disagreed that non-financial support during school time was 50/50.

7. In respect of the family law proceedings I note the significant additional material provided in Exhibits A3 and OP4. VVTR and BNMG reached agreement by consent to the settlement of property matters in Final Orders dated 16 October 2020. These orders provide for a comprehensive set of outcomes across all categories of real and other assets of the marriage. One superannuation fund is the subject of a splitting order, but other funds are excluded from the orders. The orders provide that the net assets of the parties be divided 52.5% in favour of BNMG and 47.5% in favour of VVTR.

8. There is no reference in the orders to funds arising from cessation of overseas employment. However I note in the Affidavit of BNMG (Exhibit OP4) they state that school fees were paid from a ‘provident fund’ being accumulated benefits to which both the employer and BNMG contributed. Prior to the end of BNMG’s employment, school fees were part of the remuneration package and paid by the employer. I note that documents provided by BNMG to the Respondent in relation to earlier phases of this matter indicate that BNMG has proof of payment of two sums of $10,000 to the school in March and August 2019, charged to BNMG’s credit card (T11, pp 162 and 180).

9. With respect to the circumstances of the physical separation of the parties in February 2019, BNMG states in the Affidavit that prior to arranging separate rental accommodation, a range of interim accommodation was used for approximately six weeks including hotels and staying with a parent at a nursing home. The Affidavit does not state explicitly whether there was a break in continuity of the shared weekend time with the child. However, in the bundle of material provided to the Respondent and referred to above, BNMG states that during the period of approximately six weeks following the departure from the former matrimonial home, BNMG was unable to provide weekend accommodation to L, but continued to provide other financial and non-financial support  (T11, pp 167 and 184).

   CONSIDERATIONS

10. It is contended in the Respondent’s SFIC that the issues for consideration in this matter are:

    (a)Must or should the existing care percentage determination be revoked; and

    (b)If so, what are the parents’ respective percentages of care for L during the care period?

11. It is further stated that consideration must be given to which of sections 54F, 54G or 54H apply to the circumstances of this matter. The Respondent submits that there appears to be no dispute that if a change of care is found, that it took place on 12 February 2019, and (as noted above) it may be appropriate to find that the care period continues until L completed secondary schooling on 20 November 2019.

12. On the basis of the evidence, it is further contended that this is a matter to which the pattern of care provision, s 50, applies. In this case, it is contended there is evidence adduced as to the actual care provided during the care period and, accordingly, the Tribunal should have regard to that evidence.

13. In order to resolve the two key issues in this matter, set out above, the Respondent submits in its SFIC that the following steps should be pursued:

    (a)identify the appropriate care period;

    (b)determine if there was a pattern of care in this period and, if so, each parent’s care percentages during that period, with reference to the factors identified in the Guide;

    (c)consider whether the percentage corresponds with the decision under review and, if not substitute a new decision with the following additional steps;

    (d)determine if the percentage corresponds with the existing (pre-review) care percentages and, if not;

    (e)determine which of sections 54F, 54G and 54H is applicable and make a new determination under s 50 of the Act.

14. With respect to the care period I have noted the contention of the Respondent’s representative that it may be appropriate to find the care period extended from 12 February 2019 to 20 November 2019. In its SFIC this is justified by reference to L’s child support case being closed on this date (T7, p 56), a date which corresponds with  the end of L’s secondary schooling. Given the fact that L was out of home at boarding school and occupied full time in education during this period, a matter not contradicted by any party appearing, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to find the care period as running between 12 February 2019 and 20 November 2019.

15. As noted briefly above, s 54A of the Act may not sit well with the assessment of care for a child at boarding school. There may be no single approach to be taken in such circumstances, however, the authorities indicate that it is open to a decision maker not to reference the number of nights when making a care percentage determination.[3]

    [3] See P v Child Support Registrar [2014] FCAFC 90, at [40]-[49]; P v Child Support Registrar [2013] FCA 1312, at [62].

16. An illustration of a care percentage assessment for a child in boarding school can be found in P and Child Support Registrar [2014] AATA 229. Here the Tribunal assessed percentages of care for the periods a child spent in the care of the parties when not at boarding school, and made a separate assessment for percentages of care for the period the child was at boarding school. The two percentage outcomes were then averaged.[4] Reference to the authorities reinforces, however, that each matter contains its own particular facts and circumstances.

    [4] An appeal against this decision was unsuccessful; P v Child Support Registrar [2015] FCA 116.

17. I accept that it is appropriate to consider the actual care provided during the care period, and that it is appropriate to take into account the diverse forms of care provided by both VVTR and BNMG to L both while at boarding school, and when with either parent on weekends.

18. The evidence presented demonstrates there was notification in June 2019 of a change in the prevailing circumstances as of 12 February 2019. VVTR made this notification and, based on the written material of BNMG above, this would appear to have resulted in what was, in effect, a relatively brief impact on  the previous care arrangements. Specifically, for a period of approximately six weeks, or three weekends of direct parental care, BNMG was unable to accommodate the child on weekends. In all other respects, it appears that care continued unchanged. That is, by the time of the notification, the situation with respect to time physically spent with the child had reverted to that in place prior to February 2019.

19. The evidence also demonstrates that the notification brought to light information about the other factors relevant to a percentage of care determination, and in particular information regarding the payment of school fees. Indeed, the evidence as to fee payment varies starkly from the information noted in the agency record of June 2019 that VVTR, primarily, provided financial support to the child. In short, and as has been apparent from the approach taken by all parties, the question of the source of funds is of critical importance.

20. I am satisfied that BNMG was solely responsible for the payment of at least the two sums of $10,000 paid for school fees during the care period. I am also satisfied that the weight of evidence indicates that BNMG also made additional payments for L’s various needs totalling at least $5,000. I do not discount the sums said to have been paid by VVTR, but they are less substantial in size and less regular.

21. Besides these financial contributions, I am satisfied that both VVTR and BNMG played roles of similar importance in supporting L while at boarding school. I am also satisfied that time outside of boarding school was spent equally with both parents, expect for a brief interruption following BNMG’s departure from the family home.

22. I consider it appropriate to make assessments of care for the time L spent away from home, and time spent with the parents and, in doing so, I take into account that the financial support of both VVTR and BNMG spanned these two different periods of care. I also consider it appropriate to then average these two percentages to arrive at a final assessment for each parent.

23. With respect to time spent at boarding school, I find the percentage of care to be as follows: 60% to BNMG and 40% to VVTR. With respect to weekend time, I find the percentage of care to be as follows: 55% to BNMG and 45% to VVTR. The resulting average figures are: 58% to BNMG and 42% to VVTR.

24. These figures differ to both the decision under review and the existing care determination. Therefore I am satisfied that the relevant provision to apply is s 54F of the Act. That is, there was a notification that the percentage of care did not correspond with the existing percentages of care (s 54F(1)(a)), and that a determination of percentage of care would result in a change to the cost percentage (s 54F(1)(b)).

25. The new care percentage assessment results in an increase in that applicable to BNMG and a reduction to that applicable to VVTR. Taking into account the provisions in s 54F(3), the following are the applicable timeframes for the revocation of the existing determination: BNMG – 25 June 2019, the day prior to the notification; and, VVTR – 11 February 2019, the day prior to the change of care day.

    DECISION

26. For the reasons given above the Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and substitutes it with a decision that the percentages of care for L are 58% to BNMG, with effect from 12 February 2019, and 42% to VVTR, with effect from 26 June 2019.

58.     I certify that the preceding 57 (fifty-seven) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Dr Stewart Fenwick, Senior Member

...[sgd]...........................................................

Associate

Dated: 16 March 2021

Dates of hearing:	17 December 2020
Advocate for the Applicant:	Self-represented
Advocate for the Respondent:	Karwan Eskerie
Solicitors for the Respondent:	Sparke Helmore
Advocate for Other Party:	Self-represented