Vucic v Baiada Select Poultry Pty Limited
[2006] NSWWCCPD 190
•18 August 2006
WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION
DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION:Vucic v Baiada Select Poultry Pty Limited [2006] NSWWCCPD 190
APPELLANT: Marijan Filip Vucic
RESPONDENT: Baiada Select Poultry Pty Limited
INSURER: Allianz Australia Workers Compensation (NSW) Ltd
FILE NUMBER: WCC 4930-05
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 12 September 2005
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 18 August 2006
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Sections 4, 9A and 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987; Estoppel; Referral of medical disputes to an AMS for assessment.
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Acting Deputy President Kevin O’Grady
HEARING:On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant: PK Simpson and Co
Respondent: Goldbergs
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL: The decision of the Arbitrator dated 12 September 2005 is confirmed.
No order is made as to the costs of the appeal.
BACKGROUND TO THE APPEAL
On 4 October 2005 Marijan Filip Vucic (‘the Appellant’) sought leave to bring an ‘Appeal Against Decision of Arbitrator’ (‘the Application’) in the Workers Compensation Commission (‘the Commission’) against a decision, dated 12 September 2005.
The Respondent to the Appeal is Baiada Select Poultry Pty Limited (‘the Respondent’).
The Appellant commenced employment as a Process Worker with the Respondent on or about 1 February 1994. The Appellant sustained an injury on 20 April 1994 arising out of and in the course of his employment with the Respondent when his right hand was caught in a boning and mincing machine. The occurrence of that injury is not in dispute.
The Appellant suffered incapacity as a result of the injury aforesaid and received benefits pursuant to the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (‘the 1987 Act’). In 1997 the Appellant made application to the Compensation Court of New South Wales (‘the Court’) seeking weekly benefits and lump sums as well as medical and hospital expenses pursuant to the provisions of the 1987 Act.
The Application for Determination filed with the Court was heard by his Honour Judge Walker following which an award was entered in favour of the Appellant. The original award of the Court, dated 9 February 1998, made orders with respect to payment of weekly compensation on a continuing basis pursuant to section 40 of the 1987 Act, together with payment to the Appellant of lump sums pursuant to sections 66 and 67 of the 1987 Act, together with hospital and medical expenses and interest. That award was, by consent, amended by order of the Court on 21 May 1998. It appears that the variation, reducing the entitlement to lump sums, was made having regard to the fact that the Respondent had lodged an Appeal with the NSW Supreme Court, Court of Appeal. The variation provided, inter alia, that the matter be stayed in all respects “save as for weekly compensation”.
The Respondent’s Appeal was heard by the NSW Court of Appeal on 5 July 1999. Judgment was delivered by the Court on 22 July 1999, the order being that the Appeal be dismissed with costs.
The Appellant remained in the employment of the Respondent following the subject injury up until November 1994. Since that time he has obtained employment with a number of employers including King Tomislav Croation Club (‘the Club’). That employment commenced on or about 1 September 1998 and the Appellant’s position was that of Barman. The Appellant alleges that he was injured whilst in the course of his employment with the Club on 15 November 1998. The injuries alleged involved his right shoulder, right arm, right hand, a post traumatic stress disorder, together with consequential sexual dysfunction.
On 31 March 2005, the Appellant filed with the Commission an Application to Resolve a Dispute. That Application cited Baiada Select Poultry Pty Limited as the First Respondent and King Tomislav Croation Club as the Second Respondent. That Application sought an award with respect to medical expenses, lump sums with respect to permanent loss of efficient use of sexual organs and pain and suffering (sections 40, 66 and 67 of the 1987 Act) as against the First Respondent, and lump sums in respect of medical expenses, permanent loss of efficient use of sexual organs, permanent impairment of neck and permanent loss of use of left leg at or above the knee, together with lump sums in respect of pain and suffering (sections 40, 66 and 67 of the 1987 Act) as against the Second Respondent.
The Appellant, in the course of the Conciliation Conference on 5 July 2005, discontinued his claim against the Second Respondent in its entirety.
Following the Conciliation Conference aforesaid the Arbitrator conducted an arbitration with respect to the Appellant’s claim against the First Respondent and a Determination was made on 12 September 2005. A Statement of Reasons for Decision (‘Reasons’) was published on the last mentioned date. The Determination provided for an award for the First Respondent in respect of the claims summarised above and further noted that the claim against the Second Respondent had been discontinued.
THE DECISION UNDER REVIEW
The ‘Certificate of Determination’, dated 12 September 2005 records the Arbitrator’s orders as follows:
“The determination of the Commission in this matter is as follows:
1. The claim against the Second Respondent is discontinued.
2. Award in favour of the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant’s claim for lump sum compensation under ss 66 and s67 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987.
3. Award in favour of the First Respondent in respect of the Applicant’s claim for expenses under section 60 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987.
4. There is no order as to costs.”
The Arbitrator, at paragraph 7 of her Reasons, stated:
“This matter not (sic) been referred to an AMS and this decision therefore relates only to causation.”
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
The issues in dispute in the appeal are:
(i)Whether the Arbitrator erred in law in her application of the provisions of section 9A of the 1987 Act to the present facts.
(ii)Whether, having regard to the findings of his Honour Judge Walker, the doctrine of Res Judicata and the principles of Estoppel operate with respect to the Compensation Court’s findings of fact “relating to physical and psychological injuries”. (Paragraph 6 of Appellant’s Submissions in Favour of Review.)
(iii)Whether the Arbitrator erred in failing to refer the question of the “extent of the loss of efficient use of sexual organs to an AMS to assess what portion relates to the physical and psychological injuries as already determined, and what portion relates to any other abnormality or condition.” (Paragraph 23 of Appellant’s Submissions.)
The issues enumerated above are addressed by the representatives of both the Appellant and the Respondent in Written Submissions which are before the Commission.
ON THE PAPERS REVIEW
Section 354(6) of the Workplace Injury Management and Workers Compensation Act 1998 (‘the 1998 Act’) provides:
“(6)If the Commission is satisfied that sufficient information has been supplied to it in connection with proceedings, the Commission may exercise functions under this Act without holding any conference or formal hearing.”
Both the Appellant and the Respondent submit that this matter may be decided solely on the basis of the written Application and the Notice of Opposition lodged.
Having regard to Practice Directions Numbers 1 and 6, and the documents that are before me, I am satisfied that I have sufficient information to proceed ‘on the papers’, without holding any conference or formal hearing, and that this is the appropriate course in the circumstances.
LEAVE
Before proceeding to deal with an appeal the Commission must determine whether the Application meets the requirements of section 352 of the 1998 Act.
The amount of compensation at issue on the appeal is such that the subject matter of the appeal meets the relevant threshold requirements of section 352(2) of the 1998 Act which must be met before a grant of leave to appeal may be made by the Commission.
The appeal was lodged within 28 days of the Arbitrator’s decision in compliance with section 352(4) of the 1998 Act.
The requirements of section 352(2) and (4) having been satisfied and having regard to the subject matter of the appeal and the arguments raised, I order that leave be granted to the Appellant to appeal to the Commission.
EVIDENCE AND SUBMISSIONS
The documentary evidence before the Arbitrator is noted at paragraph 11 of her Reasons.
It is to be noted that the Arbitrator in that paragraph made reference to evidence “for the Respondent” following which a number of documents were itemised and a statement – “All other information attached to the Reply.” Whilst the First Respondent’s Reply did not contain a report of Dr Giblin dated 4 December 1996, as stated by the Arbitrator, it is to be noted that that report comprised part of the evidence presented by the Appellant.
The Arbitrator had before her the Judgment of Judge Walker dated 9 February 1998 (‘Judgment’). His Honour found [at page 15 of Judgment]:
“I determine on the balance of probabilities the Applicant suffered a very painful deep soft tissue injury to his right hand that has yet to recover fully. I further find that as a result of the injury he also developed post traumatic stress disorder.
This disorder caused him to somatise his feelings resulting in symptoms of continued pain, swelling, discolouration, nightmares, lack of concentration and depression.”
It was noted by Judge Walker [at page 6 of Judgment] that:
“In April 1997 he was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia.”
There is, it is to be noted, no suggestion on the medical material that was before his Honour Judge Walker nor within the material before the Arbitrator, any suggestion that the Appellant’s schizophrenia is in any way work related.
The Statements of the Appellant which were before the Arbitrator each outlined relevant historical matters and it is asserted [at paragraph 7 of Statement dated 3 November 2004]:
“7. As a result of my injury sustained in this matter, I have suffered actual pain, distress and anxiety and restriction in the use of my head, neck, right arm, right hand, left leg, bowel function, sexual organs and anxiety and/or depression which have left me permanently disabled.”
The report of Dr Henry Stenning, Practitioner in Muscolo Skeletal Medicine, sets forth his diagnosis at page 4 of his report. Those disabilities noted by Dr Stenning are significantly more extensive than the disabilities found by his Honour Judge Walker in his Judgment abovementioned. It is clear that Dr Stenning (and indeed other Practitioners whose reports were before the Arbitrator) was dealing with allegations of injury to the right hand as well as injuries which were alleged to have occurred whilst in the employ of the Club. Dr Stenning noted [at page 4 of his report of 14 September 2004]:
“His symptoms have developed over a period of time. It is noted that your client is schizophrenic and also has problems in other areas regarding anxiety and he has diabetes. He certainly has significant problems.”
Dr Stenning proceeded in his aforementioned report to assess percentage losses with respect to the Appellant’s right arm [16%], permanent loss of use of the sexual organs [28%] as well as assessing 10% whole person impairment (comprising cervical spine [7%] and right hand [3%]).
Dr Matalani, Consultant Occupational Physician, in his report of 3 December 2004 stated his diagnoses as follows:
“Diagnosis:
1. Soft tissue injury and myofascial pain affecting the right arm.
2. Chronic pain syndrome affecting the right hand following crush injury.
3. Chronic strain of the neck.
4. Chronic strain of the left knee.
5. He suffers from secondary sexual dysfunction due to pain.”
Dr Matalani went on to assess permanent impairment of the right arm [15%], permanent impairment of the neck [12%], permanent loss of use of left leg at or above knee [5%] and permanent loss of sexual organs [20%].
The report of Dr Lowy, Sexual Health Physician, dated 15 December 2004 was before the Arbitrator. Dr Lowy [at page 2 of his report] expressed the view:
“Marijan Vucic continues to experience chronic right hand symptoms radiating up to his neck and right shoulder initially following a work injury in 1994 and exacerbated by another work injury in 1998. Mr Vucic subsequently developed schizophrenia which he claims arose from the trauma of his injury. As a result of the schizophrenia, he has been placed on medication that has contributed to his weight gain and possibly to the development of diabetes.
Mr Vucic has subsequently developed sexual difficulties presenting as loss of libido and poor quality erection. These difficulties may arise from the many reasons as stated in the previous paragraph. The physical damage to the right hand as such does not contributed (sic) greatly to the sexual dysfunction though may have been the beginning of a cascade of events that have resulted in the current situation.”
Dr Lowy went on to state in a short, second report (also dated 15 December 2004):
“I assess Marijan Vucic’s permanent loss of use of sexual organs at 50%. 20% arises from the effects of the work injury, the other 30% arises from other medication conditions.”
The Appellant, before the Arbitrator, also relied upon the reports of Dr Giblin, Orthopaedic Surgeon, which material did not address the question of loss of sexual organs. Reliance was also placed upon the report of Dr Lam, Pain Medicine Specialist, dated 4 April 2003. That report relates to pain management and I note that the question of loss of sexual organs is not addressed by that Practitioner.
In its Reply to Application to Resolve a Dispute the Respondent relies upon the opinion of Dr McClure, Consultant Psychiatrist, whose report dated 17 March 2003 was before the Arbitrator. Dr McClure took a history of the injury to the Appellant’s right hand, together with a history of the onset of his condition of schizophrenia. With respect to that condition Dr McClure expressed the view:
“Mr Vucic’s condition is constitutional. It seems that there is a family history of psychiatric disorder. The likelihood is that he would have developed schizophrenia, irrespective of his intercurrent life experiences. It is instructive, for example, that the onset of symptoms was 2-3 years after the actual accident.”
A report of Dr O’Neill, Consultant Neurologist, dated 11 June 2004 was before the Arbitrator. That Practitioner diagnosed a soft tissue injury to the fingers of the right hand resulting from the work injury in 1994 and noted the subsequent diagnosis of schizophrenia. Dr O’Neill did not relate that psychiatric diagnosis to the incident at work in 1994. Dr O’Neill did not address matters relevant to any loss of sexual organs.
A report of Dr Samuell, Psychiatrist, dated 25 July 2004 was before the Arbitrator. Dr Samuell in his report addressed the subject of the diagnosed condition of schizophrenia. It was that Practitioner’s view that the Appellant has a “constitutional disorder” and that same was “completely aetiologically unrelated to his hand injury.” That Practitioner did not address the subject of loss of sexual organs.
A report of Dr Mastroianni, Consultant Occupational Physician, dated 6 December 2004 was before the Arbitrator. Dr Mastroianni summarises the Appellant’s history and his stated complaints/symptoms. Included in those complaints/symptoms [at page 2 of the report] was a history of “loss of sexual function”. Dr Mastroianni went on to observe:
“His loss of libido is a sequelae of the schizophrenia and probably the medication. This can be further addressed by his treating Psychiatrist.
His loss of sexual function is not due to his right hand injury.”
Dr Mastroianni went on to state [page 5 of the report]:
“He has no loss of sexual use or loss of efficient use of sexual organs because of the right hand injury. On today’s examination I found normal sexual organs.
Mr Vucic has 10% loss of efficient use of the sexual organs. This is due to his schizophrenia and treatment for the condition. He has no loss of the efficient use of the sexual organs as a result of the hand injury (20 April 1994).”
A transcript of proceedings before the Arbitrator which took place on 5 July 2005 is available on the Commission file. It is to be noted that Counsel for the Appellant [at page 2, line 9] stated that the Appellant’s claim:
“is in respect of section 66. The Applicant’s claiming a loss of sexual organs, the capacity of sexual organs, and the Applicant has asked that it be referred off to an Approved Medical Specialist for a determination of the percentage impairment.”
In his Submissions the Appellant seeks revocation of the Arbitrator’s decision and an order that he be assessed by an Approved Medical Specialist with respect to “loss of efficient use of sexual organs resulting from the physical and psychological injury sustained by him on 20 April 1994.” The Appellant proceeds to argue that there was an error of law committed by the Arbitrator in “applying section 9A to the matter”. It is further argued that, by reason of the doctrine of res judicata and the principles of estoppel the Respondent is bound by certain findings of Judge Walker “relating to physical and psychological injuries”. [Paragraph 6 of Appellant’s Submissions.] The Appellant further argues that “the evidence in the case establishes that the Appellant suffers from the loss of the efficient use of sexual organs which is likely to be from multiple causes including the physical and psychological injuries resulting from the accident at work on 20 April 1994”.
The Appellant’s Submissions conclude with the assertion that “the proper thing for the Arbitrator to do would have been to refer the question of the extent of the loss of efficient use of sexual organs to an AMS to assess what portion relates to the physical and psychological injuries as already determined, and what proportion relates to any other abnormality or condition. This is what should be done on review”.
The Respondent in its Submissions seeks confirmation of the Arbitrator’s decision. It is conceded by the Respondent that section 9A was wrongly applied by the Arbitrator but asserted that any such error is not fatal to its defence of the Arbitrator’s reasoning. Reliance is placed upon the manner of reasoning demonstrated by the Arbitrator in the context of the definition of “injury” in section 4 of the 1987 Act.
Notwithstanding the matters argued as summarised in paragraph 39 above, the Respondent in submission 3 “denies that the Arbitrator made a fundamental error of law by applying section 9A to the matter”. In submissions 4 and 5 the Respondent attempts to develop an argument that the Arbitrator was correct in concluding that there is “no causal nexus between the injury to the right hand and any loss of efficient use of sexual organs”.
The Respondent [submission 7] argues that the principles of “estoppel and res judicata do not apply in this case”. The basis of that argument is that his Honour Judge Walker “did not have to consider whether the Applicant had any loss of sexual organs and accordingly it was a matter for the Arbitrator to consider this.” The Respondent goes on to submit that there was no attempt on its part to re-litigate the Appellant’s claim.
The Respondent [submission 9] argues that “any loss of sexual organs would in effect be a tertiary injury which would not be sufficiently causally linked to the hand injury”. The Respondent goes on to assert that the Arbitrator was correct to consider the issue of causation of the loss of efficient use of sexual organs prior to having the matter referred for assessment by an AMS.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
Given the circumstance that the Appellant, prior to the conduct of the arbitration, discontinued his Application as against the Second named Respondent, the Arbitrator had but two heads of claim before her for determination. Those heads of claim, as against the First named Respondent, were in respect of alleged loss of sexual organs and section 60 expenses.
The Arbitrator’s determination dated 12 September 2005 was, as stated in paragraph 7 of her Reasons, in relation only to the question of “causation”. The Appellant, in paragraph 1 of his Submissions, seeks an order that upon this review the Arbitrator’s decision should be revoked “and a new Decision should be made in its place with the Appellant being referred to an Approved Medical Specialist (AMS) to assess the extent of the loss of efficient use of sexual organs resulting from the physical and psychological injuries sustained by him on 20 April 1994.”
The Appellant at paragraph 23 of his Submissions states:
“The proper thing for the Arbitrator to do would have been to refer the question of the extent of the loss of efficient use of sexual organs to an AMS to assess what portion relates to the physical and psychological injuries as already determined, and what portion relates to any other abnormality or condition. This is what should be done on review.”
Having regard to the content of the submissions quoted above it seems that the Appellant disputes the procedural approach adopted by the Arbitrator in determining the question of “causation” (a determination as to whether the subject loss resulted from injury) before the matter was assessed by an AMS.
The Appellant proceeds in his Submissions to argue that the Arbitrator was in error “by applying section 9A to the matter”. The Respondent, in its Submissions, appears to acknowledge that reference by the Arbitrator to the provisions of section 9A of the 1987 Act was made in error given that the injury the subject of the proceedings was sustained prior to the commencement of that section. Notwithstanding that error the Respondent in its Submissions seeks to uphold the reasoning of the Arbitrator by reference to the provisions of section 9(1) and section 9(2) and section 4 of the 1987 Act. The Respondent also relies upon the Appellant’s acceptance of the relevance of section 9A of the 1987 Act at the hearing before the Arbitrator.
It is clear from the transcript of proceedings before the Arbitrator on 5 July 2005 that the Respondent relied upon the provisions of section 9A of the 1987 Act during the course of its submissions. At page 6 of the transcript it is recorded that the Respondent’s representative [Mr Malley] took issue as to the relevance of that last mentioned section. It is reasonably clear that the transcript should have recorded that it was the Appellant’s representative [Mr Jurisich] who took that point.
The Appellant proceeds in his Submissions to argue that “the Respondent is bound by the principles of estoppel relating to res judicata”. [Paragraph 6 of Submissions.] The Appellant makes reference to the findings of fact of Judge Walker in the original determination by the Compensation Court of NSW and narrated a summary of the medical material before the Arbitrator, however it is not clear from those submissions as to the basis upon which principles of estoppel are relied in the context of the Application then being heard by the Arbitrator with respect to the heads of claim earlier mentioned.
It is plain that the Appellant is correct when he asserts that the Arbitrator was in error “by applying section 9A to the matter”. That section came into operation on 12 January 1997, a date well after the occurrence of the subject injury. Whilst that error is of such a character as may lead to the revocation of the Arbitrator’s Determination, it remains to be examined as to whether the Arbitrator’s ultimate conclusion, having regard to the facts and the relevant law, was wrong.
The error identified with respect to the application of section 9A of the 1987 Act was compounded by the manner in which the Arbitrator purported to apply that section. The Arbitrator’s reasoning with respect to the application of that section is revealed at paragraph 33 of her Reasons. The Arbitrator accepted the Respondent’s submission “that section 9A is a limiting provision in that it limits compensable injuries to those where employment is a substantial contributing factor”. The question of injury had been determined by his Honour Judge Walker in the earlier proceedings and the task before the Arbitrator was to determine whether the alleged loss of sexual organs had resulted from the subject injury. As his Honour Judge Neilson noted in Rootsey v Tiger Nominees Pty Ltd (2002) 23 NSWCCR 725:
“…[a]s I read section 9A, the employment must be a substantial contributing factor to the event causing the injury; that is, to the receipt of the injury, rather than to be a substantial contributing factor to the ongoing incapacity.”
The Arbitrator, in her Reasons, made a careful and thorough summary of the medical material which was before her, [paragraphs 34 to 40 of Reasons.] It was also noted in the course of her Reasons [paragraph 41] that the only evidence before her in respect of loss of sexual organs appears in the histories as taken by the various Medical Practitioners whose evidence was before her (no reference was made to the Appellant’s statement as noted in paragraph 26 above). At paragraph 42 of her Reasons the Arbitrator gave close attention to the reports of Dr Mastroianni and Dr Samuell. The Arbitrator proceeded to find [at paragraph 43 of Reasons]:
“I find that there is no direct link between the injury to the Applicant’s right hand in 1994 for which he was awarded compensation in February 1998, and his present claim for loss of his sexual organs.”
The error in her reasoning is to be found at paragraph 44 where the Arbitrator concluded:
“44.Taking all the evidence into consideration, as well as the submissions of the parties, I find that employment was not a substantial contributing factor to the Applicant’s loss of sexual function/organs.”
Notwithstanding the demonstrated errors with respect to the Arbitrator’s reasoning process I am of the view that, having regard to all the medical material before the Arbitrator, her conclusion of fact as stated in paragraph 43 of her Reasons was correct. In particular I agree with the conclusions reached by the Arbitrator as stated in paragraph 42 of her Reasons where it was stated, inter alia:
“Dr. Mastroianni is of the view that the schizophrenic condition and the resulting medication for it and the diabetic condition, are the major cause of the Applicant’s loss of sexual function. Dr. Mastroianni’s diagnosis read in conjunction with the comments of Dr. Samuell, and the history and comments by the Applicant himself to the various doctors presents a reasonable scenario of sexual dysfunction substantially caused by the Applicant’s schizophrenic condition and the strong medications to control both it and the diabetic condition. Certainly the history given by the Applicant points to a lack of sexual drive, rather than lack of sexual function especially in light of the fact that he can achieve an erection by self-stimulation. Dr. Lowy’s final comments also accord with this diagnosis, in that he recommends medication to gain an erection and notes that this will be a permanent situation if the Applicant continues with his level of obesity, amount of smoking and taking antipsychotic medication. These final comments do not support his later assessment of 20% loss relating to the work injury, as he has provided no real basis on which to support this assessment. These comments certainly do not support a finding that the claimed loss of sexual function/organs has a direct link to the original employment related injury to the Applicant’s right hand.”
With respect to the Appellant’s argument that, in some way, the principles of estoppel preclude the Arbitrator from reaching a conclusion other than the alleged loss resulted from injury, I note that the issue in dispute before the Arbitrator was whether the loss of sexual organs resulted from the original injury. That issue of fact had never been addressed nor determined in the earlier proceedings and it is my opinion that the doctrine of res judicata and the principles of estoppel have no application in the present matter. As was stated by Dixon J [as he then was] in Blair v Curran (1939) 62 CLR 464 at 532:
“A judicial determination directly involving an issue of fact or law disposes once and for all of the issue, so that it cannot afterwards be raised between the same parties or their privies.”
The issue of fact raised in these proceedings has, as noted, not been the subject of prior judicial determination.
The Appellant has raised objection to the procedure adopted by the Arbitrator in determining the question of “causation” prior to assessment by an AMS. I am of the opinion that such approach is not only correct in law but appropriate in the circumstances, and that proceeding as she did was within power and does not in any respect constitute an error on her part (see discussion by Snell ADP in Ooi v NEC Business Solutions Limited [2006] NSWWCCPD 131 at paras. 36 to 44).
It can be seen that, notwithstanding the errors identified, I am of the view that the Arbitrator’s ultimate conclusion of fact was correct having regard to the evidence and proper application of principle. It follows that the Arbitrator’s Determination must stand.
DECISION
The appeal is unsuccessful. The decision of the Arbitrator dated 12 September 2005 is confirmed.
No order is made as to costs.
Kevin O’Grady
Acting Deputy President
18 August 2006
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE AND ACCURATE RECORD OF THE REASONS FOR DECISION OF KEVIN O’GRADY, ACTING DEPUTY PRESIDENT OF THE WORKERS COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
ASSOCIATE
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