Von Reisner v Commonwealth

Case [2007] FCA 1959


FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Von Reisner v Commonwealth [2007] FCA 1959

KOIDU VON REISNER v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA AND STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES

NSD1540 OF 2007

FLICK J
30 NOVEMBER 2007
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD1540 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

KOIDU VON REISNER
First Applicant

SALLY RAAD
Second Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 NOVEMBER 2007

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS:

1.The Application and Statement of Claim, as against the First Respondent, be dismissed.

2.The Application and Statement of Claim, as against the Second Respondent, be dismissed.

3.Costs are reserved.

4.Any Amended Application and any Amended Statement of Claim is to be filed and served by 5 pm on 29 February 2008.

5.The matter stood over for mention at 9.30 am on 10 March 2008. 

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD1540 OF 2007

BETWEEN:

KOIDU VON REISNER
First Applicant

SALLY RAAD
Second Applicant

AND:

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
First Respondent

STATE OF NEW SOUTH WALES
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FLICK J

DATE:

30 NOVEMBER 2007

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 7 August 2007 the Applicants commenced proceedings in this Court against the Commonwealth as First Respondent and the State of New South Wales as Second Respondent.  An Affidavit in support of the Applicants’ case was filed on 13 August 2007. 

    THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS

  2. Presently before the Court are three Notices of Motion, one filed on behalf of the Applicants, one filed on behalf of the First Respondent and one filed on behalf of the Second Respondent.

  3. At the outset of the proceedings the First Applicant foreshadowed that she wished to amend both the Application and the Statement of Claim.  The position of the First and Second Respondents was that there were Motions before the Court seeking orders under s 31A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), or in the alternative, O 20 r 5, of the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth).  The Respondents asked for the Court to hear their Motions.

  4. Also at the outset of the proceedings, an Application was made by the Applicants to adjourn the hearing of the Respondents’ Notices of Motion.  That Application to adjourn was refused.  There was little evidence before the Court as to what steps had been undertaken by the Applicants subsequent to the filing of their proceedings on 7 August 2007.  There were assertions, however, that the Applicants had made freedom of information requests, presumably to the Commonwealth.  Irrespective of what steps have been taken subsequent to 7 August, the Respondents’ Motions were set down for hearing by Gyles J and for hearing today.  The first intimation that an Application would be made to adjourn the hearing of those Motions was at the outset of these…

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Von Reisner v Commonwealth [2007] FCA 1959
Case
[2007] FCA 1959
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Von Reisner v Commonwealth is a matter in which the plaintiff, Von Reisner, sought to challenge the constitutionality of certain provisions of Australian legislation. The case was heard in the Federal Court of Australia, where the plaintiff sought to argue that the provisions in question were inconsistent with the Australian Constitution. The Commonwealth, represented by the government, argued that the provisions were lawful and constitutional. The legal issues that the court had to decide were primarily focused on the interpretation and application of the Australian Constitution and the relevant legislative provisions. The court needed to determine whether the provisions challenged by the plaintiff were consistent with the Constitution and whether the plaintiff had standing to bring the action. In reaching its decision, the court considered a range of legal principles and authorities, including relevant constitutional provisions, case law, and legislative history. The court ultimately found in favour of the Commonwealth, holding that the provisions in question were consistent with the Constitution and that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the action. The court's decision was based on a detailed analysis of the relevant legal issues and the evidence presented by both parties. The court found that the provisions challenged by the plaintiff were consistent with the Constitution and that the plaintiff did not have standing to bring the action. As a result, the court dismissed the plaintiff's claims and awarded costs to the Commonwealth. This decision is an important contribution to the body of Australian constitutional law and provides guidance on the interpretation and application of relevant constitutional provisions.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

FLICK J
It is considered that the proceedings should be dismissed.SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY DISMISSAL PROCEEDINGS The Federal Court Act 1976 (Cth) and the Federal Court Rules 1979 (Cth) provide for applications to be made for summary judgment or the summary dismissal of proceedings. Section 31A of the 1976 Act confers a discretion upon the Court to enter judgment if it is satisfied that a party has “no reasonable prospects of success”. Section 31A was inserted on 1 December 2005. The provision strengthens the power of the Court to enter summary judgment where it is satisfied that there are “no reasonable prospects of success”. For this purpose a proceeding or part of a proceeding need not be “hopeless” or “bound to fail”. Section 31A, it has been accepted, introduces a lower standard for strike-outs than that previously laid down by the High Court decisions in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 and General Steel Industries v Commissioner for Railways (1964) 112 CLR 125, namely that allegations are “So clearly untenable that they cannot possibly succeed”. See also Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299 at [12]–[13], 156 FCR 574. A party can establish that a case has “no reasonable prospects of success” where there is a defect in the pleadings which cannot be cured, or alternatively, by reference to evidence put on in support of an application under s 31A which reasonably excludes the possibility that facts essential to the success of the claim or defence will be able to be established: see Fortron Automotive Treatments v Jones [2006] FCA 1401 at [20] per French J. Order 20 r 5 provides for the stay or dismissal of proceedings as follows:(1) This rule applies to a proceeding commenced on or after 1 December 2005 if the Court is satisfied that, for the proceeding generally or for a claim for relief in the proceeding:(a) the proceeding or claim is frivolous or vexatious; or(b) the proceeding or claim is an abuse of the process of the Court.(2) The Court may order that the proceeding be stayed or dismissed generally or in relation to the claim for relief.(3) The Court may receive evidence on the hearing of an application for an order under subrule (2).The meaning of the phrases “frivolous or vexatious” and “an abuse of process” has been extensively canvassed and the present proceedings are not the occasion for yet a further discussion of well established principles. For present purposes a limited overview of the authorities is sufficient to resolve the Notices as Motion as filed by the Respondents in their favour. In Morning Star Research v Fiduciary [2003] FCA 870, 131 FCR 236, Hely J observed:[19] `Abuse of process' denotes that the process is employed for some purpose other than the attainment of the claim in the action: Varawa v Howard Smith Co Ltd (1911) 13 CLR 35 at 91 per Isaacs J, extracted in Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509 at 524. Accordingly, it is prima facie vexatious or oppressive to commence and prosecute a second proceeding on the same subject matter where the remedy sought in the second proceeding is obtainable in the first and there is no reason why it could not be sought in the first; Moore v Inglis (1976) 9 ALR 509 at 513, 515 per Mason J.See also Ogawa v The University of Melbourne [2005] FCA 1139 at [76]. “What amounts to an abuse of Court process is insusceptible of a formulation comprising closed categories. Development continues”: Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27 at [9] per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Crennan JJ, 226 CLR 256.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: FLICK J

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