Vmam v Minister for Immigration (No.1) - [2003] FMCA 505

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VMAM v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION (No.1)

[2003] FMCA 505

MIGRATION – Whether jurisdictional error – protection visa – preliminary issue – whether Applicant entitled to rely upon statutory declaration relating to material in possession of Applicant prior to RRT hearing – relevance of advice not to attend RRT hearing – relevance of marriage to Australian citizen prior to RRT hearing – application to rely upon statutory declaration and certificate of marriage refused – no jurisdictional error.

Migration Act 1958, ss.47, 65, 414, 474

Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1277

MIEA v Guo and Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559
Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155
Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323

SAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) FCAFC 65
NACP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) FCA 499 (23 May 2003)
SDAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SBBK (2003) FCAFC 129

Applicant:

VMAM

Respondent:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

File No:

MZ 227 of 2003

Delivered on:

14 November 2003

Delivered at:

Melbourne

Hearing Date:

5 November 2003

Judgment of:

McInnis FM

REPRESENTATION

Applicant:

In person

Counsel for the Respondent:

Dr S. Donaghue

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Blake Dawson Waldron

ORDERS

The Application filed 23 January 2003 be dismissed.

FEDERAL MAGISTRATES
COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT
MELBOURNE

MZ 227 of 2003

VMAM

Applicant

and

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL & INDIGENOUS AFFAIRS

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

This is an application for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) dated 28 November 2002. The application was filed in the Federal Court on 23 January 2003 and subsequently transferred to the Federal Magistrates Court by order of the Federal Court on

4 March 2003.
The Applicant seeks review of the RRT decision in relation to its refusal to grant a protection visa. The Applicant is a citizen of Nigeria who had arrived in Australia on 16 September 2000 and on 23 October 2000 lodged an application for protection visa.
When the matter was transferred to this court certain procedural orders were made by consent and those orders provided for the applicant to file and serve an amended application for review on or before 30 June 2003 with the applicant to file and serve any supplementary documents and contentions of fact and law on or before 30 June 2003, and the respondent to file and serve contentions of fact and law on or before

14 July 2003.
When the matter proceeded before the court this day the applicant appeared in person. The respondent was represented by Dr Donaghue of counsel. The respondent, consistent with the orders to which I have referred, relied upon contentions of fact and law filed 4 August 2003. The applicant had not provided an amended application and hence had relied upon the application to which I have referred, filed in the Federal Court on 23 January 2003.
However, the applicant did seek to rely upon further documents, namely a statutory declaration declared on 20 June 2003, together with a photocopy of what purports to be a certificate of marriage dated 29 October 2002. The certificate of marriage is claimed by the applicant to be a certificate of marriage verifying that he was married to an Australian citizen on the date of the certificate, that is, 29 October 2002.
For the sake of completeness inquiries were made during the course of the hearing as to whether there are any other outstanding applications for visas, and in particular spouse visa, currently made by the applicant. It was noted that where the protection visa has not yet been ultimately determined that the applicant would not be in a position to make application for any other visa other than those prescribed under the legislation and in the circumstances a spouse visa does not appear to be one of the prescribed applications.
A preliminary issue therefore arose as to whether or not the court should receive the statutory declaration and purported certificate of marriage. In relation to that issue counsel for the respondent referred the court to the authority of the Federal Court of Australia in the matter of Rahman v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1277. In particular the court was referred to the judgment of French J, which appears at paragraphs 29 and 30 as follows:-
“29 Generally speaking when a statute provides for a person to apply to some authority for the grant of a right or privilege the decision-maker is, absent some relevant statutory direction, entitled to rely upon the materials supplied by the applicant as that which is presented in favour of the application. There is no general duty on the decision-maker to seek additional material which may remedy deficiencies in the applicant's presentation - Turner v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1981) 35 ALR 388 at 392-393 (Toohey J); Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 587 (Mason J). As Hill J said in Enichem Anic Srl v Anti-Dumping Authority (1992) 111 ALR 178 at 190 (Gummow J agreeing):
‘Decision-making is a function of the real world. A decision-maker is not bound to investigate each avenue that may be suggested to him by a party interested. Ultimately, a decision-maker must do the best on the material available after giving interested parties the right to be heard on the question.’
30 There may be cases in which a decision maker who unreasonably fails to ascertain relevant facts known to be readily available will be taken to have exercised the decision-making power improperly. In Prasad v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 170, Wilcox J said:
‘It is no part of the duty of the decision-maker to make the applicant's case for him. It is not enough that the court find that the sounder course would have been to make inquiries. But, in a case where it is obvious that material is readily available which is centrally relevant to the decision to be made, it seems to me that to proceed to a decision without making any attempt to obtain that information may properly be described as an exercise of the decision-making power in a manner so unreasonable that no reasonable person would have so exercised it. It would follow that the court, on judicial review, should receive evidence as to the existence and nature of that information.’
On judicial review at common law or under the ADJR Act, the Court is entitled to consider those facts which were known to the decision-maker, actually or constructively, together only with such additional facts as the decision-maker would have learned but for any unreasonable conduct by him – Prasad at 169 (Wilcox J) and Videto v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1985) 8 FCR 167 at 178 (Toohey J).”
It was submitted by counsel for the respondent that in the present case the court should not receive the additional material. If indeed the certificate of marriage provides proof that the applicant was married on 29 October 2002 then it is clear that that pre-dated the date of the RRT’s decision, it having made its decision on 28 November 2002. It was further submitted in any event that the material cannot be now relevant as the statutory declaration material, together with the purported certificate of marriage, could not be said to be material before the RRT and could not, in the circumstances, possibly constitute an error of a kind that would attract judicial intervention upon judicial review of the RRT decision.
It was further submitted that in any event the material set out in the statutory declaration was material that was in the possession of the applicant prior to the decision of the RRT. The applicant sought to rely upon the material and elaborated that his circumstances had changed and he was now in a position where he has settled in Australia and other indicated that his problems arise essentially because of difficulties in his own country, Nigeria.
As the applicant was unrepresented it was clear that he did not have an appropriate appreciation of the role of the court in judicial review of the RRT decision. Understandably he sought to bring to the attention of the court his current circumstances, including his recent marriage, which is the subject of the purported certificate of marriage. It is otherwise noted, without referring to the detail, that the statutory declaration sought to be relied upon provides some further details concerning events which had allegedly occurred to the applicant whilst in Nigeria and prior to coming to Australia.
In relation to the preliminary issue it is my view that in a matter of this kind, even making due allowance for the fact that the applicant is unrepresented, it would not be appropriate as a matter of law to permit the applicant to rely upon the additional information. It should be noted for the sake of completeness that when asked why the material had not been provided to the RRT the applicant indicated that at that stage, despite the request from the RRT to provide further information he then acted upon, he alleges, the advice of an immigration agent who had advised him not to attend the RRT hearing nor to provide further information. That is perhaps a surprising advice in circumstances where the RRT had, by letter dated 2 October 2002, advised the applicant of the following:
“That the Tribunal has considered the material before it in relation to your application but is unable to make a decision in your favour on this information alone.
We now invite you and any persons listed above to come to a hearing of the Tribunal to give oral evidence and present arguments in support of your claims. You can also ask the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from another person or persons.”
The letter goes on to advise the applicant that the hearing was to take place on 20 November 2002. In the letter reference is made to what is described as the ‘Response to Hearing Invitation form’. Under that heading the tribunal advises the following:
“Please read and complete the enclosed form carefully and:
·    tell us if you are coming to the hearing or not coming to the hearing.
·    complete the Witnesses part of the form if you want the Tribunal to get oral evidence from another person; please note the Tribunal does not have to get evidence from any person you name.
·    send us any new documents or written arguments you want the Tribunal to consider; please note any documents or arguments you send must be in English or translated by a qualified translator.
·    answer all the other questions on the form and return the completed form or any new documents or written arguments by 18 October 2002.”
In the same letter the tribunal advised the applicant that:
“We have enclosed a brochure explaining what will happen on the day of the hearing.”
There is no issue taken that the applicant received a letter from the RRT, nor is there any issue taken with the “Response to Hearing Invitation”, which appears at page 47 of the court book where, in response to the question, "Do you want to come to a hearing?" the applicant has marked the box, "No."
On the preliminary issue it was submitted therefore that in the circumstances, despite the reason advanced the applicant should not now be permitted to rely upon information which was clearly available prior to the hearing of the RRT and I have indicated applying the authorities to which I have been referred, and in particular the passages from the decision of French J in the decision of that court in the matter of Rahman, I am satisfied in the present case that there is no material which would suggest the decision‑maker has not received information in circumstances where the non-receipt of that information could be said in any way to have arisen from any unreasonable conduct by the decision-maker. I further accept that in all the circumstances, having regard to the correspondence from the RRT to which I have referred, namely the letter dated 2 October 2002, that the RRT has acted reasonably in seeking to bring to the attention of the applicant that he is required to provide further information or attend an oral hearing in circumstances where on the material then available to the RRT it was unable to make a decision in favour of the applicant.
Even if it is the case that advice was given by a migration agent not to attend the hearing or provide further information I am satisfied that that alone would not constitute a basis upon which this court should, upon judicial review, receive and/or act upon the additional material now sought to be relied upon by the applicant. Ultimately the applicant made the decision not to attend the RRT hearing or provide further information. The claimed marriage of the applicant to an Australian citizen in any event would not be relevant to the protection visa application. Nor does the statutory declaration provide details of a kind which could be regarded as likely to alter the outcome without the benefit of questioning by the RRT.
Having rejected the applicant's request to rely upon the additional information it is now necessary for me to consider the merits of the application which is before the court. The application for review filed 23 January 2003 refers in general terms to the applicant being aggrieved by the RRT decision on basis of the following matters:
“A.THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL
(a)was made without jurisdiction or is affected by an error of jurisdiction;
(b)is affected by an error of law:
(c) is an unreasonable decision that no reasonable decision-maker could have made it;
(d)is based on a finding for which there is no evidence or other material;
(e)takes into account irrelevant considerations;
(f)fails to take into account relevant considerations;
(g)was an improper exercise of the power conferred by the Migration Act 1958;
(h)was not made in good faith or was not a bona fide attempt to exercise the powers conferred on the Tribunal;
(i)was not capable of reference to the powers given to the tribunal under the Migration Act 1958;
(j)was otherwise contrary to law.”
The application under the heading ‘particulars’ of the matters to which I have just referred indicates that details of the error would be provided in accordance with directions of the court. The applicant otherwise relies in his application on an alleged failure by the respondent to accord the applicant natural justice or to review the application for the purposes of ss.47, 65 and 414 of the Migration Act 1958, was biased, that it failed to review and consider the application for the purposes of ss.47, 65 and 414 of the Migration Act 1958, failed to follow the procedures required by the Migration Act and that it asked the wrong questions or misconceived a duty. Again the particulars were to be provided in accordance with directions of the court.
The applicant, who is unrepresented before the court, understandably has not advanced further particulars on this hearing and apart from the general matters to which I have referred in terms of his current situation has not provided further details as to the way in which the RRT is said to have fallen into error in considering the applicant's claim.
It is appropriate that I set out the background to this matter before considering the RRT's decision and the submissions made on behalf of the respondent. The background is adequately set out in the RRT's decision as follows:
“The applicant, who claims to be a citizen of Nigeria, arrived in Australia on 16 September 2000. On 23 October 2000 he lodged an application for protection (class XA) visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs under the Migration Act 1958 (the Act). An applicant for a protection (class XA) visa is entitled to be considered against the criteria for each of its subclasses: 785 (Temporary Protection) and 866 (Protection). On 8 November 2000 a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs refused to grant a protection visa and on 23 November 2000 the applicant applied for a review of that decision.”
Having considered the application for a protection visa and the application to the RRT, it is my view that the RRT, under the heading, "Claims and Evidence", has accurately and fairly summarised the claims of the applicant in this application. It is appropriate therefore to set out that material as it appears in the RRT's decision in following terms at page 53 of the Court Book:
“On 2 October 2002 the Tribunal wrote to the applicant advising that it had considered all the material before it relating to his application but it was unable to make a favourable decision on that information alone. The Tribunal invited the applicant to give oral evidence and present arguments at a hearing on 20 November 2002. On 7 November 2002 the applicant advised the Tribunal in writing that he did not wish to give oral evidence and consented to the Tribunal proceeding to make a decision on the review without taking any further action to allow or enable him to appear before it. This matter has therefore been determined on the evidence available to the Tribunal.
The applicant is aged thirty-two, he is from the Igbo Tribe and is a Christian. He was born in Aba and went to school in Aba from 1976 until 1985. The applicant lived in Ibadan before coming to Australia.
The applicant claimed that the authorities in Nigeria were after him, to persecute him, due to his involvement in resisting the implementation of Sharia law in Kaduna State. The applicant feared he would be killed if he returned to Nigeria. The authorities, including the Muslim organisations, were searching for the applicant to execute him because he was involved in a protest in Kaduna state against the implementation of Sharia law. Thousands were killed in the protest and many people were injured. The applicant was amongst those who have been held responsible for the conflict. The authorities would not protect him because they were the ones who would persecute him if he returned to Nigeria.
In his application for review the applicant claimed that currently in Nigeria there is no democracy, the rule of law does not function properly and the authorities can easily track him down and persecute him. The applicant feared that if he returned to Nigeria he would be mistreated and killed. The applicant claimed he is unable to relocate as he is unable to stay hidden in his own country for the rest of his life. All those that were arrested during the protest are still being persecuted in Nigeria. They are in prison and some of them have disappeared.”
It is evident from that material referred to by the RRT that it has, in my view, accurately and reasonably summarised the material then provided to it by the applicant. In its reasoning the tribunal refers to there being no onus of proof upon the applicant, though it states that, “It remains for the applicant to satisfy the tribunal that all of the statutory elements are made out.”
Correctly, in my view, the RRT states that it is not required to make the applicant's case for him, nor is it required to accept uncritically any or all of the allegations made by the applicant (see MIEA v Guo and Anor (1997) 191 CLR 559 at 596 and Prasad v MIEA (1985) 6 FCR 155 at 169-70).
After stating the general principles to which I have referred the RRT did make reference to country information and in particular also referred to information set out in US Department of State annual reports on International Religious Freedom of Nigeria, with the first report released 5 September 2000 and a second report released 7 October 2002. After considering that material the RRT goes on to state the following at page 56 of the Court Book:
“This material suggests that the authorities are trying to resolve the problems. There is no material before the Tribunal that suggests that the authorities are searching for those responsible in order to execute them. However more recently there has been further unrest in Kaduna (see 'City Mourns After Miss World riots' by Oloche Samuel, The Guardian, 26 November 2002).
On the material before the Tribunal is (sic) cannot determine the extent of his role, if any, in the Kaduna protests. On the material before the Tribunal it is unable to be satisfied that there is a real chance that the applicant will be persecuted for reasons of his involvement in the protests against the introduction of Sharia penal law in Kaduna. The Tribunal finds, on the evidence before it, that the applicant does not have a well‑founded fear of persecution for reasons of any Convention ground and therefore he is not a refugee within the terms of the Convention.”

It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that in the circumstances the tribunal's decision discloses no error of a kind which would justify judicial review. Reference was made to the appropriate tests now to be applied since the decision of the High Court in S157.
In considering the issue of jurisdictional error in my view the Court is able to rely upon the broader version of jurisdictional error identified in the High Court decisions of Craig v State of South Australia (1995) 184 CLR 163 and Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323. In Yusuf McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at paragraph 82 of their judgment cited with approval an extract from Craig v South Australia and stated the following:-
“82.It is necessary, however, to understand what is meant by "jurisdictional error" under the general law and the consequences that follow from a decision-maker making such an error. As was said in Craig v South Australia, if an administrative tribunal (like the Tribunal) "falls into an error of law which causes it to identify a wrong issue, to ask itself a wrong question, to ignore relevant material, to rely on irrelevant material or, at least in some circumstances, to make an erroneous finding or to reach a mistaken conclusion, and the tribunal's exercise or purported exercise of power is thereby affected, it exceeds its authority or powers. Such an error of law is jurisdictional error which will invalidate any order or decision of the tribunal which reflects it."
"Jurisdictional error" can thus be seen to embrace a number of different kinds of error, the list of which, in the passage cited from Craig, is not exhaustive. Those different kinds of error may well overlap. The circumstances of a particular case may permit more than one characterisation of the error identified, for example, as the decision-maker both asking the wrong question and ignoring relevant material. What is important, however, is that identifying a wrong issue, asking a wrong question, ignoring relevant material or relying on irrelevant material in a way that affects the exercise of power is to make an error of law. Further, doing so results in the decision-maker exceeding the authority or powers given by the relevant statute. In other words, if an error of those types is made, the decision-maker did not have authority to make the decision that was made; he or she did not have jurisdiction to make it. Nothing in the Act suggests that the Tribunal is given authority to authoritatively determine questions of law or to make a decision otherwise than in accordance with the law.”
It is also useful to note the following extract from the Full Court of the Federal Court in SAAD v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) FCAFC 65, per Carr J (with whom Cooper and Finkelstein JJ agreed) as follows:-
“…There is no mention in the above passage of the first sur place claim. Nor is that claim mentioned anywhere else in the Tribunal's reasoning. My assessment is that the Tribunal failed to consider the discrete, first sur place claim. This, in my view, was not (as the respondent submitted) simply a failure to refer to evidence in support of such a claim, but a complete failure to consider the claim at all. In my view, the Tribunal thereby fell into jurisdictional error of the type referred to in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf [2001] HCA 30. See also SBAB v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 161; Htun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1802 at [14] and Paul v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2001) 113 FCR 396 at [79].
I note a further recent decision of Hill J in NACP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs (2003) FCA 499 (23 May 2003). In that case the following paragraphs are relevant:-
“31 The question not decided in Plaintiff S157/2002 (because it was unnecessary to decide, other than in respect of denial of procedural fairness) is what constitutes jurisdictional error in the sense used by the High Court in that case. Clearly failure to afford natural justice will constitute jurisdictional error for that is what the High Court actually decided in Plaintiff S157/2002. However, the question of what constitutes jurisdictional error as a ground for the grant of the constitutional writs of prohibition and mandamus (or the ancillary relief of certiorari) such as to bring about the result that the decision in question is a nullity, has been the subject of discussion in a number of cases.
…
33 Gaudron and Kirby JJ noted that the question whether there was a failure or constructive failure, to exercise jurisdiction required consideration of the nature of the obligation imposed upon the Tribunal (and in relation to a decision of the Minister which was also challenged, by the Minister). Their Honours stated the effect of Plaintiff S157/2002 to be as follows (par 72):
‘... [Section] 474 does not prevent the grant of prohibition, mandamus or certiorari in respect of decisions on the part of officers of the Commonwealth involving jurisdictional error for such decisions are not regarded, in law, as decisions at all and are, thus, not properly described as `a decision ... under [the] Act'. However and as also explained in Plaintiff S157/2002 v The Commonwealth of Australia, the effect of a provision such as s474 of the Act is to necessitate an examination of statutory limitations or requirements to ascertain whether, in the light of s474's restrictions on judicial review, non-observance of those limitations or requirements does or does not result in jurisdictional error.’
…
35 What matters for present purposes is not whether a failure to consider the relevant criteria would be jurisdictional error, but rather whether a failure to consider at all the case or a substantial part of the case advanced by an applicant would constitute jurisdictional error. Clearly the Tribunal has the same powers as the original decision maker within the context that the Tribunal was obliged to review the original decision and acting in the shoes of the decision maker to do again what the decision maker was required to do. The powers thus conferred upon the Tribunal likewise involve the consideration of the application against the criteria which the Act and the Regulations prescribed. It is, I think, quite clear that in the view of Gaudron and Kirby JJ, at least, the failure of the Tribunal to give consideration to the argument or case put forward by an applicant would constitute jurisdictional error and result in a decision which would not be a decision made under the Act and accordingly not be protected by s 474.”
For the sake of completeness I also note the Full Court of the Federal Court in SDAV v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SBBK (2003) FCAFC 129 at paragraphs 27 and 28 relevantly states the following:-
“27 The statement that a particular error is a `jurisdictional error' is a statement of conclusion. The conclusion is that, be the error one of omission or commission, some essential or indispensable requirement for jurisdiction has not been met. An imperative duty has not been discharged or some inviolable limitation has been breached and therefore the action or decision is null and void; Plaintiff S157 at [76] per Gaudron, McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. The error may be easy to detect (manifest error) or more difficult but, either way, an action or decision is either one which falls within the decision maker's lawful authority or it is not. If it falls within the decision maker's lawful authority then the error is made `within jurisdiction'. If it does not fall within the decision maker's lawful authority then the error is a `jurisdictional error' and as such it cannot be a valid action or decision.
28 In relation to statutory jurisdiction, such as that of the Tribunal, a conclusion as to the full extent of the jurisdiction granted, that is whether the decision is or is not authorised, can properly be reached only by construction of the whole of the relevant statute, in this case the Migration Act. When the statute contains a privative clause there is an inevitable tension between the privative clause and those parts of the statute that confer jurisdiction. As Gleeson CJ commented in Plaintiff S157 at [17]:
`The essential problem is the inconsistency between a provision in a statute, or an instrument, conferring a limited power or authority, and a provision which appears to mean that excess of power or authority may not be prohibited.'
Resolving that tension involves the process of reconciliation referred to by the High Court in Plaintiff S157.”
Applying the relevant authorities the respondent submitted that in the present circumstances the reasoning of the RRT is such that on the material then before it it could not be said that there is any error of a kind which would attract judicial intervention. There has been no jurisdictional error according to the respondent's submissions. Instead, the RRT has made a finding of fact which, it was submitted, is not a finding which could attract a judicial review of the RRT decision. Essentially, it is argued, the matters upon which the applicant relies amount to a challenge to factual findings made by the RRT. It is not necessary for me in this decision to further consider the question of the extent to which s.474 of the Migration Act applies.
Applying the principles of law to which I have referred following the High Court decision in S157 it is clear to me on the material currently before the court that there is in fact no error of a kind which would attract judicial intervention. There is no jurisdictional error. I am satisfied that by its correspondence to the applicant inviting him to provide further information the tribunal has done all that could reasonably be required, and indeed perhaps more than what might be required as a matter of law, to bring to the attention of the applicant the need for the applicant to provide either by oral evidence or other documents additional material which may assist to explain the applicant's particular role in the Kaduna protests.
On the material accurately described by the RRT it was entitled to reach the conclusion that it was unable to determine the extent of the applicant's role, if any, in the Kaduna protests. It was then entitled to make a finding on the evidence before it that the applicant did not have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of any Convention ground and that the applicant was not therefore a refugee within the terms of the Convention.
There is nothing in the material before me which would persuade me that in the circumstances there has been any jurisdictional error or error of a kind which would enable this court to accept the application made on behalf of the applicant. Accordingly it follows that the application should be dismissed.

I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of McInnis FM

Associate:

Date: 14 November 2003