FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VKAC v Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 124MIGRATION – Cancellation of visa on character grounds – whether failure to accord natural justice in failing to inform visa holder of adverse information in issues paper
Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 499, s 501(2), 501(6), 501(7), 501G(1), 501G(4)Re MIMIA; ex partePalme (2003) 216 CLR 212; [2003] HCA 56 followed
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433; [2002] FCAFC 281 followed
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 applied
VEAL v MIMIA (2005) 222 ALR 411; [2005] HCA 72 cited
Dagli v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 541; [2003] FCAFC 298 considered
Naidu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 83 ALD 64; [2004] FCAFC 184 distinguished
Jones v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 70 distinguishedVKAC AND WAKW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
WAD 206 OF 2005
MOORE, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ
8 AUGUST 2006
MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD 206 OF 2005
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
VKAC
FIRST APPELLANTWAKW
SECOND APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGES:
MOORE, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
8 AUGUST 2006
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders made by Nicholson J on 15 July 2005 are set aside.
3.A writ of prohibition issue out of this Court directed to the respondent prohibiting her from further proceeding to act against the first appellant in respect of the decision made by the former minister dated 22 January 2002 to cancel the first appellant’s visa.
4.A writ of certiorari issue out of this Court directed to the respondent removing into this Court to be quashed the said decision made by the former minister dated 22 January 2002 to cancel the first appellant’s visa.
5. The respondent is to pay the first appellant’s cost of the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
WAD 206 OF 2005
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN:
VKAC
FIRST APPELLANTWAKW
SECOND APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGES:
MOORE, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ
DATE:
8 AUGUST 2006
PLACE:
MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MOORE J:
I agree with the orders proposed by North and Mansfield JJ generally for the reasons given by their Honours.
I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore. Associate:
Dated: 8 August 2006
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
WESTERN…
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- Case
- [2006] FCAFC 124
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Minister had indeed made VKAC's citizenship status relevant by considering the extent of disruption to her family and the degree of hardship to them, including whether her immediate family would be able to travel overseas to visit her in the country to which she might be returned. The court held that the Minister, in making this assessment, had taken into account that VKAC was a Burmese citizen and may be returned there. The court also found that the Minister did not take into account the possibility that VKAC might not be a Burmese citizen and might either remain in detention in Australia or be removed to a country other than Burma. The court concluded that the Minister's assertion of VKAC's nationality as Burmese was adverse material that removed from consideration the position advanced by VKAC that she was stateless and could not be returned to Burma.
The appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the primary judge were set aside. The court issued a writ of prohibition to prevent the Minister from proceeding with the cancellation of VKAC's visa and a writ of certiorari to remove the decision to cancel VKAC's visa into the court to be quashed. The Minister was also ordered to pay VKAC's costs of the appeal.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The orders made by Nicholson J on 15 July 2005 are set aside.
3. A writ of prohibition issue out of this Court directed to the respondent prohibiting her from further proceeding to act against the first appellant in respect of the decision made by the former minister dated 22 January 2002 to cancel the first appellant’s visa.
4. A writ of certiorari issue out of this Court directed to the respondent removing into this Court to be quashed the said decision made by the former minister dated 22 January 2002 to cancel the first appellant’s visa.
5. The respondent is to pay the first appellant’s cost of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
His Honour held that, in any event, the appellant’s solicitors regarded the question of citizenship as relevant, and addressed the issue in the written submission to the minister. Thus the appellant had been heard on the question.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL The first ground of appeal challenged his Honour’s conclusions on the issue of the reference to the appellant as holding Burmese citizenship. The parties agreed that the test applied by the primary judge was the applicable test. Mr Gray, who appeared as counsel for the minister, correctly identified, as the crux of the appeal, the question of whether the citizenship of the appellant was relevant information within the meaning of the test to be applied. In written submissions the minister adopted the reasoning of the primary judge, namely, that the difficulty in removing the appellant was not relevant to the exercise of the power to cancel the visa. In oral argument, counsel further contended that the cancellation of a visa was a separate and discrete matter from the question of the removal of the non-citizen. As the argument developed at the hearing of the appeal, the focus of attention shifted somewhat. Greater attention was given to whether the relevance of citizenship could lie in its link to hardship, particularly hardship to the family of the appellant. When pressed by the Court on the issue of whether hardship arising from the cancellation might be a relevant consideration for the minister to take into account, Mr Gray, whilst maintaining his primary position that it was not a relevant matter, said that he found it difficult to resist the proposition that it could be a relevant consideration. The power to cancel a visa under s 501(2) involves broad discretionary considerations. The minister in this case advised the appellant of the discretionary considerations which he regarded as relevant for the exercise of power. This was an obviously proper and desirable action for the minister to take. He did it by reference to Directions 17 and 21 and suggested that the appellant address each and every topic that the appellant felt applied to her. The Directions referred to the extent of disruption to the appellant’s family and the degree of hardship to them including whether they could travel overseas to visit the appellant. If the appellant held Burmese citizenship as asserted in the paper prepared for the minister, she would be at risk of return to Burma if her visa were cancelled. This risk was relevant to the disruption of her family and the degree of hardship to them if the visa were cancelled. Seen in this way, the information had been made relevant by the minister in the way in which he notified the appellant that he intended to approach the issues. In other words, the minister took into account the extent of disruption to the appellant’s family and the degree of hardship to them, including whether her immediate family would be able to travel overseas to visit her in the country to which she might be returned. Clearly, the country to which the appellant might be returned if her visa was cancelled was information relevant to that assessment. The minister, it can readily be inferred from the decision record, took into account that she was a Burmese citizen and may be returned there. It can also be inferred that the minister did not take into account the possibility that she might not be a Burmese citizen and might either remain in detention in Australia or that it might be necessary to remove her, if possible, to a country other than Burma. The statement in the decision record that the appellant was a Burmese national was adverse material in that it was a positive and unambiguous assertion by the minister's departmental advisers about her nationality which, in effect, removed from consideration the position advanced by the appellant (a contention of substance based on probative material) that she was stateless and could not be returned to Burma. It consequentially removed from consideration the consequences on the appellant's family of the appellant being stateless and that she might be kept in detention or, potentially more significant for her family, removed to a country other than Burma.