VKAC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VKAC v Minister for Immigration and
Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 124

MIGRATION – Cancellation of visa on character grounds – whether failure to accord natural justice in failing to inform visa holder of adverse information in issues paper

Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth), s 39B
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), s 499, s 501(2), 501(6), 501(7), 501G(1), 501G(4)

Re MIMIA; ex partePalme (2003) 216 CLR 212; [2003] HCA 56 followed
Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433; [2002] FCAFC 281 followed
Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 applied
VEAL v MIMIA (2005) 222 ALR 411; [2005] HCA 72 cited
Dagli v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 541; [2003] FCAFC 298 considered
Naidu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 83 ALD 64; [2004] FCAFC 184 distinguished
Jones v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 70 distinguished

VKAC AND WAKW v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS

WAD 206 OF 2005

MOORE, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ
8 AUGUST 2006
MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 206 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

VKAC
FIRST APPELLANT

WAKW
SECOND APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

MOORE, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

8 AUGUST 2006

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.        The appeal is allowed.

2.        The orders made by Nicholson J on 15 July 2005 are set aside.

3.A writ of prohibition issue out of this Court directed to the respondent prohibiting her from further proceeding to act against the first appellant in respect of the decision made by the former minister dated 22 January 2002 to cancel the first appellant’s visa.

4.A writ of certiorari issue out of this Court directed to the respondent removing into this Court to be quashed the said decision made by the former minister dated 22 January 2002 to cancel the first appellant’s visa.

5.        The respondent is to pay the first appellant’s cost of the appeal.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN AUSTRALIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

WAD 206 OF 2005

ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

BETWEEN:

VKAC
FIRST APPELLANT

WAKW
SECOND APPELLANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGES:

MOORE, NORTH & MANSFIELD JJ

DATE:

8 AUGUST 2006

PLACE:

MELBOURNE (HEARD IN PERTH)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

MOORE J:

  1. I agree with the orders proposed by North and Mansfield JJ generally for the reasons given by their Honours. 

I certify that the preceding one (1) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore.

Associate:

Dated:             8 August 2006

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

WESTERN…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCAFC 124
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of VKAC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved an appeal by VKAC against the decision of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs to cancel her visa. The central issue in this case was whether VKAC's citizenship status was relevant information that should have been considered by the Minister when exercising his discretion to cancel her visa. The primary judge had held that the Minister's reference to VKAC's citizenship as Burmese was not relevant information, as the difficulty in removing VKAC did not affect the exercise of the power to cancel the visa. However, VKAC argued that the Minister had made the information relevant by suggesting that the extent of disruption to her family and the degree of hardship to them, including whether they could travel overseas to visit her, were relevant considerations.

The court found that the Minister had indeed made VKAC's citizenship status relevant by considering the extent of disruption to her family and the degree of hardship to them, including whether her immediate family would be able to travel overseas to visit her in the country to which she might be returned. The court held that the Minister, in making this assessment, had taken into account that VKAC was a Burmese citizen and may be returned there. The court also found that the Minister did not take into account the possibility that VKAC might not be a Burmese citizen and might either remain in detention in Australia or be removed to a country other than Burma. The court concluded that the Minister's assertion of VKAC's nationality as Burmese was adverse material that removed from consideration the position advanced by VKAC that she was stateless and could not be returned to Burma.

The appeal was allowed, and the orders made by the primary judge were set aside. The court issued a writ of prohibition to prevent the Minister from proceeding with the cancellation of VKAC's visa and a writ of certiorari to remove the decision to cancel VKAC's visa into the court to be quashed. The Minister was also ordered to pay VKAC's costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is allowed.

2. The orders made by Nicholson J on 15 July 2005 are set aside.

3. A writ of prohibition issue out of this Court directed to the respondent prohibiting her from further proceeding to act against the first appellant in respect of the decision made by the former minister dated 22 January 2002 to cancel the first appellant’s visa.

4. A writ of certiorari issue out of this Court directed to the respondent removing into this Court to be quashed the said decision made by the former minister dated 22 January 2002 to cancel the first appellant’s visa.

5. The respondent is to pay the first appellant’s cost of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Then, by a letter from the department also dated 31 August 2001, a copy of Direction 21, which replaced Direction 17 was enclosed. The letter included the following:In the interests of natural justice, you are provided with an opportunity to provide comments against the new Direction. In preparing your comments please read fully and carefully the contents of the Minister’s Direction. You should address each and every topic that you feel applies to you or is relevant to your circumstances. You may also wish to provide any further information that you feel the Minister ought to be aware of and take into account. The appellant was given until 21 September 2001 to provide any written submissions. A relevant change to Direction 17 was the addition to paragraph 2.17(a) of, inter alia, the following:…Article 23.1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) provides that:“The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society, and is entitled to protection by society and the state.THE CANCELLATION DECISION By a letter dated 31 January 2002, the department notified the appellant that the minister had cancelled her visa. A document described as a decision record was enclosed with the letter. The letter described the decision record as setting “out the reasons for the decision”. Section 501G(1) obliges the minister to give reasons for the decision to cancel a visa. However, the failure to give reasons does not invalidate the decision (s 501G(4)). Despite the reference in the letter from the department to the decision record as constituting the reasons, the decision record signed by the minister does not constitute reasons for the purpose of s 501G(1): Re MIMIA; ex partePalme (2003) 216 CLR 212. It is common ground that the appellant did not seek reasons and that no reasons were produced. The relevance of the document in this case is as evidence of the information which was before the minister when he made his decision. The Court may also infer the reasons for the decision from the information in the decision record: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v W157/00A (2002) 125 FCR 433, especially per Branson J (with whom Goldberg J agreed) at [72]. The decision record was a document prepared by the department for use by the minister. At the end of the document the minister was given a number of options of possible decisions which he could make. He was asked to delete the options which were not applicable, and to sign the document as a record of his decision. The document commenced with a statement of its purpose, namely, to seek the minister’s decision on whether to cancel the appellant’s visa. It then set out the appellant’s personal details including her citizenship, which was described as “Burmese”. Next the document described the appellant’s visa history. This was followed by a section headed “Consideration of Visa Cancellation”. After summarising the matters relevant to the character test, the document discussed a series of issues under the heading “Discretion”. The issues discussed reflected the matters referred to in Direction 21. In relation to the issues raised in paragraph 2.17 of Direction 21 the decision record stated:[23] Paragraph 2.17 of the Minister’s Direction provides that other considerations may be taken into account by the decision-maker. It is the Government’s view that where relevant, it is appropriate that these matters be taken into account.[24] In [the appellant’s] submission, Annex C, the extent of disruption to her family, business and other ties to the Australian community were not addressed. Letters of support from her mother and defacto spouse are held at Annex I.[25] [The appellant] is in a defacto relationship with an Australian citizen. The Ministry of Justice Immigration Report, Annex G, dated 01.08.2001 states:“Her new partner … came into her life approximately two and half years ago. She states he has been a constant support and had tried to pull her away from the scene she was involved with … is not a drug user according to [the appellant]…”[26] In a letter of support for [the appellant], Annex J, her son stated:‘…If she was to be sent back to Burma, her life (and mine) would be completely turned upside down, as she knows no one there, neither family nor friends. Without her I would have no one to rely on for moral support as I do not see my father at all.”In [the appellant’s] submission, Annex C, she did not address the degree of hardship which would be caused to immediate family members lawfully resident in Australia, including whether they would be able to travel overseas to visit her, the nature of their relationship or their degree of dependence.[27] In [the appellant’s] submission, Annex C, her solicitor stated:“…she has approximately eighty (80) family members currently residing in Australia, including her parents…Her siblings…who also reside in Western Australia primarily in the metropolitan area…” [original emphasis]THE JUDGMENT OF THE PRIMARY JUDGE

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

His Honour held that, in any event, the appellant’s solicitors regarded the question of citizenship as relevant, and addressed the issue in the written submission to the minister. Thus the appellant had been heard on the question.CONSIDERATION OF THE GROUNDS OF APPEAL The first ground of appeal challenged his Honour’s conclusions on the issue of the reference to the appellant as holding Burmese citizenship. The parties agreed that the test applied by the primary judge was the applicable test. Mr Gray, who appeared as counsel for the minister, correctly identified, as the crux of the appeal, the question of whether the citizenship of the appellant was relevant information within the meaning of the test to be applied. In written submissions the minister adopted the reasoning of the primary judge, namely, that the difficulty in removing the appellant was not relevant to the exercise of the power to cancel the visa. In oral argument, counsel further contended that the cancellation of a visa was a separate and discrete matter from the question of the removal of the non-citizen. As the argument developed at the hearing of the appeal, the focus of attention shifted somewhat. Greater attention was given to whether the relevance of citizenship could lie in its link to hardship, particularly hardship to the family of the appellant. When pressed by the Court on the issue of whether hardship arising from the cancellation might be a relevant consideration for the minister to take into account, Mr Gray, whilst maintaining his primary position that it was not a relevant matter, said that he found it difficult to resist the proposition that it could be a relevant consideration. The power to cancel a visa under s 501(2) involves broad discretionary considerations. The minister in this case advised the appellant of the discretionary considerations which he regarded as relevant for the exercise of power. This was an obviously proper and desirable action for the minister to take. He did it by reference to Directions 17 and 21 and suggested that the appellant address each and every topic that the appellant felt applied to her. The Directions referred to the extent of disruption to the appellant’s family and the degree of hardship to them including whether they could travel overseas to visit the appellant. If the appellant held Burmese citizenship as asserted in the paper prepared for the minister, she would be at risk of return to Burma if her visa were cancelled. This risk was relevant to the disruption of her family and the degree of hardship to them if the visa were cancelled. Seen in this way, the information had been made relevant by the minister in the way in which he notified the appellant that he intended to approach the issues. In other words, the minister took into account the extent of disruption to the appellant’s family and the degree of hardship to them, including whether her immediate family would be able to travel overseas to visit her in the country to which she might be returned. Clearly, the country to which the appellant might be returned if her visa was cancelled was information relevant to that assessment. The minister, it can readily be inferred from the decision record, took into account that she was a Burmese citizen and may be returned there. It can also be inferred that the minister did not take into account the possibility that she might not be a Burmese citizen and might either remain in detention in Australia or that it might be necessary to remove her, if possible, to a country other than Burma. The statement in the decision record that the appellant was a Burmese national was adverse material in that it was a positive and unambiguous assertion by the minister's departmental advisers about her nationality which, in effect, removed from consideration the position advanced by the appellant (a contention of substance based on probative material) that she was stateless and could not be returned to Burma. It consequentially removed from consideration the consequences on the appellant's family of the appellant being stateless and that she might be kept in detention or, potentially more significant for her family, removed to a country other than Burma.