Jovicic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Jovicic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1758

MIGRATION – cancellation of visa on character grounds – s 501(2) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where direction made under s 499 of Migration Act 1958 (Cth) referred to international instruments – whether applicant had made claims requiring assessment in relation to international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons

Dagli v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2003) 133 FCR 541 referred to
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50 referred to
Minogue v Human Rights & Equal Opportunity Commission (1999) 84 FCR 438 referred to
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 referred to
VKAC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCAFC 124 referred to
VKAC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] FCA 974 referred to

ROBERT JOVICIC v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS AND COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
NSD 2554 OF 2005

MOORE J
15 DECEMBER 2006
SYDNEY


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 2554 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

ROBERT JOVICIC
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MOORE J   

DATE OF ORDER:

15 DECEMBER 2006

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

  1. The application be dismissed.
  2. The applicant pay the respondents' costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

NSD 2554 OF 2005

BETWEEN:

ROBERT JOVICIC
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
FIRST RESPONDENT

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

MOORE J

DATE:

15 DECEMBER 2006

PLACE:

SYDNEY

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. These proceedings were commenced on 20 December 2005 as an application for a declaration that the applicant, who had been removed from Australia, was entitled to an absorbed person visa pursuant to s 34 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The applicant also sought an order that the respondents arrange the return of the applicant to Australia, a declaration of wrongful imprisonment and damages. Since then, a number of events have occurred which have altered the issues that need to be determined. First, the applicant has been returned to Australia by the Commonwealth. Secondly, the High Court has given judgment allowing an appeal against a judgment of a Full Court of this Court. The Full Court's judgment underpinned part of the case originally advanced by the applicant. The parties agreed that judgment in this matter could be reserved until the High Court gave its judgment. The High Court gave judgment, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50, on 8 November 2006. The judgment of the High Court had the effect of removing two of the grounds…

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Details
Case
[2006] FCA 1758
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The proceedings in Jovicic v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs involved the applicant, who had been removed from Australia, seeking a declaration that they were entitled to an absorbed person visa under section 34 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The applicant also sought an order for their return to Australia, a declaration of wrongful imprisonment, and damages. Several events impacted the case, including the applicant's return to Australia, a High Court judgment that altered some of the applicant's grounds, and an agreement between the parties to reserve judgment pending the High Court's decision.

The central legal issues addressed by the court involved the interpretation of "left Australia" within the context of an absorbed person visa under the Migration Act 1958, as well as the implications of the applicant's travel history on their eligibility for such a visa. The court also examined whether the applicant had a legitimate expectation that international obligations under the ICCPR and CSSP would be considered before their visa was cancelled, and if the failure to consider these obligations constituted a breach of procedural fairness.

The court found that the applicant's travel to Yugoslavia in 1984 meant they did not meet the statutory criteria for an absorbed person visa. Additionally, the court held that the applicant did not have a legitimate expectation that international obligations would prevent their visa from being cancelled, as there was no suggestion of statelessness or risk of treatment contrary to the ICCPR at any stage before the decision was made. Consequently, the court dismissed the application and ordered the applicant to pay the respondents' costs.

In summary, the court ruled against the applicant on both the eligibility for an absorbed person visa and the procedural fairness claim, leading to the dismissal of the application and the imposition of costs on the applicant.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the respondents' costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

These proceedings were commenced on 20 December 2005 as an application for a declaration that the applicant, who had been removed from Australia, was entitled to an absorbed person visa pursuant to s 34 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act). The applicant also sought an order that the respondents arrange the return of the applicant to Australia, a declaration of wrongful imprisonment and damages. Since then, a number of events have occurred which have altered the issues that need to be determined. First, the applicant has been returned to Australia by the Commonwealth. Secondly, the High Court has given judgment allowing an appeal against a judgment of a Full Court of this Court. The Full Court's judgment underpinned part of the case originally advanced by the applicant. The parties agreed that judgment in this matter could be reserved until the High Court gave its judgment. The High Court gave judgment, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Nystrom [2006] HCA 50, on 8 November 2006. The judgment of the High Court had the effect of removing two of the grounds relied on by the applicant. The High Court's judgment is discussed shortly. Background facts The facts agreed upon by the parties were as follows. The applicant was born in Paris, France on 4 December 1966 to parents who were then both citizens of Yugoslavia. In 1968, when the applicant was two years of age, his parents migrated to Australia with him and his siblings. The applicant and his family members were granted permanent entry permits on their arrival into Australia. In 1983, the applicant's parents became Australian citizens. The applicant was not included in his parents' application for citizenship. From 19 September 1984 to 4 November 1984, the applicant travelled with his father to that part of Yugoslavia which, up until very recently, was known as Serbia and Montenegro, and then returned to Australia as the holder of an old visa of a kind known as a "Return Endorsement". On 1 September 1994, the applicant became the holder of a transitional (permanent) visa by operation of reg 9 the Migration Reform (Transitional Provisions) Regulations 1994 (Cth). Between 1979 and 2001, the applicant was convicted of a number of criminal offences. On 15 October 2002, the then Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs made a decision pursuant to s 501(2) of the Act to cancel the applicant's transitional (permanent) visa. The applicant was removed from Australia on 18 June 2004.Issues no longer requiring resolution Before the decision of the High Court in Nystrom the principal ground relied on by the applicant was that he held an absorbed person visa by operation of s 34 of the Act and that the failure of the Minister to take into account that he held that visa gave rise to jurisdictional error. One of the statutory criteria for that visa was that the applicant had not, on or after 2 April 1984, left Australia. The Minister contended this criterion had not been satisfied by the applicant having regard to his travel to Yugoslavia in late 1984. Submissions were directed to the meaning of "left Australia".

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

MOORE J

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: MOORE J

The Minister submitted that none of the alleged errors in the issues paper indicated extreme irrationality or an illogical fact finding process. It was acknowledged that validity of a decision may be challenged on the basis that the submission on which it was grounded, contained fraudulent or knowing misrepresentations or half-truths. However, short of that, an error of fact would not vitiate the decision itself: see Oates v Attorney-General for the Commonwealth of Australia [2001] FCA 84; (2001) 181 ALR 559. The Minister submitted that though it was possible that an error of fact contained in an issues paper relied upon by the decision-maker could vitiate a decision, the error must relate to a matter that the decision-maker was bound to take into account and there was only a limited range of such matters. With respect to citizenship status and statelessness the Minister relied on the judgment of a single judge in VKAC which, as noted, has since been reversed by a Full Court.Consideration The contention of the applicant that he had a legitimate expectation that both a non-refoulment obligation said to arise under the ICCPR and an obligation not to expel a stateless person under the CSSP would not be acted on without giving him the opportunity to argue against that course being taken, fails at the threshold. The applicant was notified on 19 October 2001 of the intention to consider cancelling his visa under s 501. A written submission was made on his behalf by a solicitor from Victoria Legal Aid on 19 March 2002. The applicant was interviewed by a Departmental officer on 22 August 2002. Letters were written by his sister and fiance, who was also interviewed, in support of his case against cancellation of his visa. At no point was it suggested that he was stateless (if that be the fact) or that circumstances existed which pointed to a real possibility that he might be. Similarly, while his heroin addiction and mental health problems were adverted to, it was not suggested that he might be at risk of being exposed to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment or otherwise placed in a situation where rights protected by the ICCPR might be violated. As the Full Court noted in Minogue, the authority relied on by counsel for the applicant, the notion that departure from a course that a person has an expectation will be followed, is an aspect of procedural fairness. Even making a range of assumptions in the applicant's favour about the contents of the two international instruments and that an expectation of the type asserted had been raised in a general sense, the applicant singularly failed to provide the Minister with any information which might reasonably have caused the Minister not to decide to cancel the applicant's visa because of the instruments. In substance, the factual case now called in aid to establish that there would have been an expectation that the Minister would act in a particular way, was a case never raised with the Minister before he made the impugned decision. There was no unfairness: see Lam at [24]-[25]. At best, it would be a case based on facts now known and advanced by the applicant in these proceedings.