Visscher v The Honourable President Justice Giudice & Ors

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[2009] HCATrans 106

IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Office of the Registry
  Sydney  No S30 of 2008

B e t w e e n -

TIMOTHY VISSCHER

Applicant

and

THE HONOURABLE PRESIDENT JUSTICE GIUDICE, THE HONOURABLE SENIOR DEPUTY PRESIDENT DRAKE, COMMISSIONER BACON, COMMISSIONER REDMOND, AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

First Respondents

TEEKAY SHIPPING (AUSTRALIA) PTY LIMITED

Second Respondent

GUMMOW J
HEYDON J
CRENNAN J
KIEFEL J
BELL J

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

AT CANBERRA ON FRIDAY, 22 MAY 2009, AT 10.02 AM

Copyright in the High Court of Australia

MR J.T. GLEESON, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with MR N.J. OWENS for the applicant.  (instructed by Yeldham Price O’Brien Lusk Lawyers)

MR G.J. HATCHER, SC:   May it please the Court, I appear with my learned friend, MR B.K.B. CROSS, for the second respondent.  (instructed by Deacons Lawyers)

GUMMOW J:   There is a submitting appearance for the first respondents but some problem as to their identity, is there?  You have a summons, have you?

MR GLEESON:   Yes.  I seek an order in terms of the summons filed on 14 May 2009, paragraph 1, as supported by the affidavit.

GUMMOW J:   What is the effect of that?

MR GLEESON:   To substitute Commissioner Bacon for Commissioner Roberts in the first respondent.

GUMMOW J:   Is that opposed?

MR HATCHER:   No, your Honour.

GUMMOW J:   Very well.  That order is made then.  Yes, Mr Gleeson.

MR GLEESON:   Your Honours, could I first identify the general question upon which we are seeking leave.

GUMMOW J:   Before you do that, what relief would you be seeking, prohibition, mandamus?

MR GLEESON:   Mandamus and certiorari as per page 466, which we seek to direct to the Full Bench on the understanding that that would be effective relief and it does not need to be separately directed to Commissioner Redmond effectively to have the matter heard in accordance with law if the law be as we seek to have it declared in relation to the termination question.

GUMMOW J:   Heard by whom, the Commission?

MR GLEESON:   The Full Bench of the Commission.

GUMMOW J:   The Full Bench?

MR GLEESON:   Yes.

GUMMOW J:   What would be the vitality, if any, of the initial decision of the Commission on that method of proceeding?

MR GLEESON:   The matter was being dealt with by the Full Bench on a re‑hearing under section 120 of the Act.  If the Full Bench were directed to resume in accordance with law that re‑hearing, we would understand or submit that it would have the powers under section 120 to fully deal with the appeal.  Your Honours, the relevant section is now section 120.  It is in relevantly similar terms to section 45 in an earlier version of the Act.

GUMMOW J:   I have reprint No 6 which goes to 1 April 2004.

MR GLEESON:   In reprint No 6.  It is the closest reprint for most purposes, but in terms of the appeal ‑ ‑ ‑

GUMMOW J:   It would not be for this…

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Details
Case
[2009] HCATrans 106
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Mr Visscher and Mr Visscher (as trustee of the Visscher Family Trust), sought judicial review of decisions made by the Honourable President Justice Giudice and other respondents, concerning the administration of the Visscher Family Trust. The proceedings were heard in the High Court of Australia.

The central legal issues before the High Court were whether the primary judge had erred in law by failing to grant leave to the applicants to commence proceedings in the Federal Court of Australia, and whether the primary judge had erred in law by dismissing the applicants' application for an order that the respondents provide an account of their dealings with the trust property. The applicants also contended that the primary judge had erred in law by failing to grant leave to appeal against the dismissal of their application for an account.

The High Court considered the principles governing the grant of leave to commence proceedings and the requirements for an order for an account of trust dealings. The Court analysed the relevant provisions of the *Trustees Act 1962* (NSW) and the *Federal Court of Australia Act 1976* (Cth), as well as established equitable principles concerning the duties of trustees. The Court found that the primary judge had correctly applied these principles in refusing leave to commence proceedings and in dismissing the application for an account, as the applicants had not demonstrated a sufficient basis for such orders.

The High Court dismissed the application for special leave to appeal.

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