[2007] QSC 243
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CIVIL JURISDICTION
JONES J
Application No SC 157 of 2006
| VIS CONSTRUCTIONS PTY LTD and LAMAN and CHARLENE HALFHYDE | First Applicant Second Applicants |
| and | |
| JAMES LAWSON COCKBURN and KILFOY CABINETS | First Respondent Second Respondent |
CAIRNS
..DATE 19/04/2007
JUDGMENT
HIS HONOUR: This is an application for costs by the applicants who have been successful in their quest to have set aside the adjudicators determination made pursuant to the Building and Contractors Industry Payments Act 2004(BCIPA). The Court has a general discretion to order costs in proceedings for judicial review but regard must be had to the specific statutory provisions set out in section 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991. Minister for Transport v Anghel [1994] QCA 232.
These require particularly that the Court may have regard to such matters as the financial resources of the parties, whether the proceeding involves issue or affects or may affect the public interest, whether the proceeding discloses a reasonable basis for the application and whether the case in review can be supported on a reasonable basis.
As to these matters, it is clear that the dispute arose out of what was essentially a private matter between the applicants and the second respondent. The choice of progressing the claim to an adjudication was perhaps encouraged by a belief that the remedies under BCIPA were more of expedient, less expensive and generally to be preferred to the normal progress of claims through the Court. At the time when the adjudication proceedings were commenced under the strict timelines provided by the legislation, the amount of the claim was not precisely known but it would not on any view have exceeded $15,000. The fact that the second respondent chose, and persisted in, that course exposed some of the shortcomings of this procedure when claims are small.
If the contest had been between a publicly funded organisation and the unsuccessful respondent some reasonable allowance would have to be made on the quantum of costs on this account. But as the issue was essentially between private individuals, the public interest in this incidence must be seen to be less. However, to some extent there is a public interest component which should ameliorate the impact of costs otherwise to be ordered.
The applicants, though successful overall, did lose on some issues which were argued. The issues on which the applicants were unsuccessful were not so significant as to impact on costs to any substantial degree, certainly not to the extent that there should be no order for costs as the respondent contends. Nonetheless, this should be a factor for some discretion based reduction on the quantum of costs bearing in mind that it was the choice of the second respondents to go to adjudication that led to the litigation in the first place.
The adjudicator was made a party to the proceedings as the first respondent but became involved only to the extent of notifying an intention to abide…
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- Case
- [2007] QSC 243
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court determined that it had a general discretion to order costs in judicial review proceedings, subject to the statutory provisions outlined in the Judicial Review Act 1991. The court considered the financial resources of the parties, the nature of the dispute, and the public interest involved. It found that the dispute was primarily a private matter between the applicants and the second respondent. The choice to pursue the adjudication was influenced by the perceived expediency and lower cost compared to court proceedings. The court acknowledged the shortcomings of the adjudication process for smaller claims but noted that the second respondent's decision to proceed with the adjudication led to the litigation. The court concluded that the applicants should recover the major proportion of their costs, albeit on the Magistrates Court scale due to a concession made by the applicants. The court declined to order costs for the adjudicator, finding that the adjudicator did not fall within the definition of "Court" under the Appeal Cost Fund Act. Furthermore, the court found no authority to order the repayment of the adjudicator's fee, considering it outside the scope of the court's jurisdiction.
The court's final order was that the second respondent pay the first and second applicants' costs, to be assessed on the Magistrates Court scale. This decision balanced the need to address the costs incurred by the successful applicants while also considering the broader implications of the adjudication process for small claims.
Background
Background to the litigation
The matter came before the Supreme Court of Queensland as an application for costs following the successful setting aside of an adjudicator's determination. The court had to determine the costs pursuant to the provisions of the Judicial Review Act 1991 and consider various factors such as the financial resources of the parties, the public interest, and the reasonableness of the proceeding. The court also considered submissions regarding indemnity certificates under the Appeal Cost Fund Act and the reasonableness of the adjudicator's fees.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the applicants should recover the major proportion of their costs given their success in setting aside the adjudicator's determination.
2. Whether the first respondent should be subject to any order for costs for his role in these proceedings.
3. Whether an indemnity certificate should be granted under the Appeal Cost Fund Act.
4. Whether the adjudicator's fees were excessive and unreasonable, and if the court has the power to order a repayment of the fees.
Held
1. The court concluded that the applicants should recover the major proportion of their costs given their success in setting aside the adjudicator's determination.
2. The court decided that the first respondent should not be subject to any order for costs for his role in these proceedings.
3. The court declined to grant an indemnity certificate under the Appeal Cost Fund Act.
4. The court determined that it does not have the power to order a repayment of the adjudicator's fees, finding them not to be excessive and unreasonable.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court exercised its discretion to order costs in the proceedings for judicial review, considering the financial resources of the parties, the nature of the dispute, and the public interest. Given the private nature of the dispute and the applicants' success, the court ordered the major proportion of costs, albeit at a reduced rate in line with the Magistrates Court scale. The court held that the first respondent, who acted only to notify an intention to abide the court's order, should not bear any costs. The court declined to grant an indemnity certificate under the Appeal Cost Fund Act, reasoning that an adjudicator does not have the same statutory standing as a statutory tribunal, and therefore does not fall within the definition of "Court" for the purposes of the Act. Finally, the court found that it lacks the power to order a repayment of adjudicator's fees, as this power must be expressly or by necessary implication conferred by statute. The reasoning of the court was based on established legal principles that costs are the creation of statute and that the power to award costs must clearly appear.
The ratio decidendi of this case is that while the court has discretion to order costs in judicial review proceedings, this discretion must be exercised with regard to statutory provisions and legal principles governing costs. Additionally, the court lacks the power to order a repayment of adjudicator's fees, as such a power must be expressly or by necessary implication conferred by statute.