Anghel v Minister for Transport (No 2)

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1994] QCA 232
SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 249 of 1994

Before

Fitzgerald P. McPherson JA. Shepherdson J.

[Minister for Transport v. Anghel]

BETWEEN:

SOUTH EAST QUEENSLAND PROGRESS ASSOCIATION

(First Applicant)

AND:

GRETA DOROTHEA ANGHEL

(Second Applicant) First Respondent

AND:

ANTHONY JAMES BERGLAS

(Third Applicant) Second Respondent

AND:

JOHN CRISPIN BOULSOVER

(Fourth Applicant) Third Respondent

AND:

TIMOTHY HENRY JEREMY FLORIN

(Fifth Applicant) Fourth Respondent

AND:

ALBERT HECTOR NORD

(Sixth Applicant) Fifth Respondent

AND:

JOHN EDGAR NORTON

(Seventh Applicant) Sixth Respondent

AND:

JAMES BRODIE PROSS

(Eighth Applicant) Seventh Respondent

AND:

ALICE SIMPSON

(Ninth Applicant) Eighth Respondent

AND:

NOEL SMITH

(Tenth Applicant) Ninth Respondent

AND:

BARBARA FRANCES THORN

(Eleventh Applicant) Tenth Respondent

AND:

VERNON JOHN WILLIAMS

(Twelfth Applicant) Eleventh Respondent

AND:

MINISTER FOR TRANSPORT AND MINISTER ASSISTING THE

PREMIER ON ECONOMIC AND TRADE DEVELOPMENT

(Respondent) Appellant

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT - FITZGERALD P.

Judgment delivered 28/06/94

The circumstances giving rise to this appeal are set out in the judgment of McPherson J.A. and need not be repeated.

I agree with his Honour that the primary judge's power to award costs was not his general power to do so but the specific power conferred by section 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991. The respondents had made a "costs application" under subsection 49(1) prior to the appellant's application to have their application for judicial review stayed or dismissed under section 48 of the Act, and they were entitled to have the position with respect to costs determined in accordance with subsections 49(1) and (2), which are set out in McPherson J.A.'s reasons for judgment.

As his Honour states, those provisions enable costs orders more favourable to the respondents than would ordinarily be appropriate under the general law. I should add that I consider that subsection 49(1)(d) is wide enough to permit an order for costs on a solicitor and client basis, and is not confined to an order for costs "on a party and party basis". There is no sufficient reason why the larger power should not include power to make the more limited order. Further, I agree with McPherson J.A. that an order for costs made under subsection 49(1)(d) is not limited to costs incurred after the order with respect to costs is made but may extend to costs incurred "from the time the costs application was made." As his Honour points out, the order under appeal in this matter extended back beyond that point and, to that extent, was not supported by that subsection. Subsection 49(1)(e) is not similarly limited.

As McPherson JA. indicates, it falls to this Court to exercise afresh discretionary power to make an order with respect to costs. The Court may refuse to make an order in favour of the respondents on their costs application, may take the usual course of making an order against them in favour of the appellant who was successful in the proceeding, or may make an order under subsections 49(1)(d) or (e). Matters to which regard…

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Details
Case
[1994] QCA 232
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Anghel v Minister for Transport, the applicants sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to approve a rail link and also sought indemnity for their costs under section 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991. The applicants' review application was dismissed by the court. However, the court ordered the Minister to pay the proper costs of the applicants. The Minister appealed the costs order, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to order him to pay the proper costs of the applicants. The applicants cross-appealed, contending that the costs order should have been for the proper costs of the application, not just the ordinary costs.

The legal issues before the court were whether a successful respondent could be ordered to pay the proper costs of an applicant under section 49 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 and whether the court had the power to order the Minister to pay the proper costs of the applicants. The court considered the relevant provisions of the Act, as well as relevant case law. The court held that the proper costs of an application could be ordered against a successful respondent under section 49 of the Act. However, the court also held that the proper costs of an application were not the same as the ordinary costs of the application. The proper costs of an application were those costs that were reasonably incurred in relation to the application, whereas the ordinary costs of an application were those costs that were reasonably incurred in relation to the hearing and determination of the application.

The court found that the Minister was a successful respondent and that the applicants had incurred proper costs in relation to the application. The court also found that the proper costs of the application were not the same as the ordinary costs of the application. The court held that the proper costs of the application were those costs that were reasonably incurred in relation to the application, whereas the ordinary costs of the application were those costs that were reasonably incurred in relation to the hearing and determination of the application. The court held that the Minister was liable to pay the proper costs of the application, but not the ordinary costs of the application. The Minister's appeal was dismissed, and the applicants' cross-appeal was allowed in part.

The court ordered that the Minister pay the proper costs of the applicants, but not the ordinary costs of the application. The court also ordered that the Minister pay the applicants' costs of the appeal and cross-appeal. The Minister was ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the application, including the costs of preparing and filing the application, the costs of attending the hearing, and the costs of preparing and filing the appeal and cross-appeal. The Minister was not ordered to pay the applicants' costs of the hearing and determination of the application.

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