Victoria Police v Marke

Link copied
Case Copied 66 min read

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

No 3712 of 2008

VICTORIA POLICE

v

LANCE FREDERICK MARKE

---

JUDGES:

MAXWELL P, WEINBERG JA and PAGONE AJA

WHERE HELD:

MELBOURNE

DATE OF HEARING:

28 August 2008

DATE OF JUDGMENT:

5 November 2008

MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:

[2008] VSCA 218

1ST Revision 21 January 2009

---

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW – Freedom of information – Exempt documents – Whether disclosure of document would involve unreasonable disclosure of personal affairs – Whether relevant to consider likely dissemination of document if released – Whether decision-maker must assume disclosure to world at large – Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), s 33(1).

WORDS AND PHRASES – ‘Involve’.

---

APPEARANCES: Counsel Solicitors
For the Appellant Dr K Emerton SC
and Ms M J Richards

Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office

For the Respondent Mr J D Pizer
and Mr C Young
Clayton Utz

MAXWELL P:

  1. Under s 13 of the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), every person has a legally enforceable right to obtain access (in accordance with the Act) to a document of an agency or an official document of a Minister, other than an exempt document. Part IV of the Act identifies, and defines, various categories of exempt document. Relevantly, under s 33(1) a document is an exempt document if –

its disclosure under this Act would involve the unreasonable disclosure of information relating to the personal affairs of any person …

  1. The issue which arises on this appeal is whether, for the purposes of deciding if the exemption applies, the decision-maker must – or alternatively may - consider the likelihood that the applicant will publish the document, or the personal information, to any other person(s). In my opinion, no such consideration is authorised, let alone required, by s 33(1). That is, the question whether the applicant is likely to publish the personal information is an irrelevant consideration for the purposes of deciding whether the exemption under s 33(1) applies to the document. My reasons are as follows.

Statutory construction:  what would disclosure ‘involve’?

  1. The issue before the Court is one of statutory construction.[1] Like the other provisions of Part IV, s 33(1) establishes a statutory criterion of exemption. The proper construction of the language of that exemption will determine both what is relevant and what is irrelevant to the decision-maker’s task of deciding whether the exemption applies.[2]  (On review by VCAT, the Tribunal’s task is the same as that of the primary decision-maker).

    [1]Cf Accident Compensation Commission v Croom [1991] 2 VR 322, 323 (Young CJ).

    [2]Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24, 39-40 (Mason J); cf Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323, 347-8 (McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ).

  1. Axiomatically, the task of construction must give primacy to the words which Parliament actually used.  As the High Court has said repeatedly in recent years, the words of the statute must govern.[3]  There is no substitute for giving attention to the precise terms…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Victoria Police v Marke and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2008] VSCA 218
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Victoria Police was the appellant and Marke the respondent in this case heard by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria. The central issue was whether certain documents, which were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic), should be released to the respondent. Specifically, the police argued that releasing these documents would involve an unreasonable disclosure of personal affairs, which is a criterion for exemption under section 33(1) of the Act.

The court was tasked with determining the meaning of the word "involve" in the context of section 33(1). It had to consider whether the decision-maker should contemplate the potential widespread dissemination of the document if it were released, and if the decision-maker was required to assume that the disclosure could reach the entire public. This interpretation had significant implications for the scope of exempt information and the balance between the right to information and the protection of personal privacy.

The Court of Appeal held that the term "involve" should be interpreted broadly, extending to any disclosure that would likely result in the unreasonable exposure of personal affairs. The court ruled that the decision-maker must consider the potential for widespread dissemination of the document if released and should assume that disclosure to the world at large. This interpretation was necessary to effectively protect personal privacy under the Act. As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the lower court's decision to deny disclosure was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.