Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Lynch

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Court of Appeal

New South Wales

Case Title: Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Lynch
Medium Neutral Citation: [2012] NSWCA 273
Hearing Date(s): 20 July 2012
Decision Date: 04 September 2012
Jurisdiction:
Before: McColl JA at [1];
Meagher JA at [2];
Gzell J at [43].
Decision:

(1) The record of these proceedings before Levy DCJ of the District Court of 2 March 2012 (No. 376366 of 2011) be removed to this Court.
(2) The orders made by Levy DCJ in the said proceedings be quashed.
(3) The first respondent to pay the applicant's costs of the proceedings before this Court.
(4) The first respondent, if qualified, have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act 1951 in respect of the costs in this Court.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Catchwords:

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - claim for victims compensation - tribunal denied compensation on basis victim engaged in behaviour that contributed to injury sustained - appeal to District Court limited to questions of law - District Court set aside orders of tribunal - none of matters relied on involved error of law - Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996, s 30.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - relief in the nature of certiorari - whether Supreme Court has power when exercising supervisory jurisdiction under s 69 of the Supreme Court Act 1970 to make costs order in place of any costs order that has been quashed - decision in Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531 at [110] applied.

Legislation Cited: Civil Procedure Act 2005
District Court Act 1912
Minors (Property & Contracts) Act 1970
Motor Vehicles (Third Party Insurance) Act 1942
Suitors Fund Act 1951
Supreme Court Act 1970
Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996
Cases Cited: Azzopardi v Tasman UEB Industries Ltd (1985) 4 NSWLR 139
Baker v The Queen [1975] AC 774
Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027
Craig v The State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; 184 CLR 163
Edwards v Santos Ltd [2011] HCA 8; 242 CLR 421
Hoffenberg v The District Court of New South Wales [2010] NSWCA 142
Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales [2010] HCA 1; 239 CLR 531
Lynch v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation [2012] NSWDC 17
Miliangos v George Frank (Textiles) Ltd [1976] AC 443
R v Aldridge (1990) 20 NSWLR 737
R v Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner; Ex parte Moore [1965] 1 QB 456
Re McBain; Ex parte Australian Catholic Bishops Conference [2002] HCA 16; 209 CLR 372
Re Pochi and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 36 FLR 482
Trident General Insurance Co…
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Details
Case
[2012] NSWCA 273
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal to the Court of Appeal of New South Wales by the Victims Compensation Fund Corporation against an order of the District Court. The District Court had set aside a determination made by the Victims Compensation Tribunal, which had denied a claim for compensation on the basis that the victim's behaviour contributed to the injury sustained. The appeal to the District Court was limited to questions of law.

The Court of Appeal was required to determine whether the District Court had erred in law by setting aside the Tribunal's decision. Specifically, the Court considered whether the grounds relied upon by the District Court involved an error of law, and also whether the Supreme Court, in its supervisory jurisdiction, had the power to make a costs order in place of a quashed costs order, applying the principles established in *Kirk v Industrial Court of New South Wales*.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that the District Court's decision to set aside the Tribunal's determination was not based on an error of law. The primary judge in the District Court had found that the Tribunal's reliance on section 30(1)(a) of the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 to deny compensation was not sustainable. The Court of Appeal noted potential difficulties in making orders that specifically exclude certain evidence on a remitted hearing, suggesting that if material has no evidentiary value, this should be reflected in the reasons for the decision rather than a specific order.

The Court of Appeal ordered that the record of proceedings before the District Court be removed to the Court of Appeal, and that the orders made by the District Court be quashed. The Victims Compensation Fund Corporation was ordered to pay the first respondent's costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

(1) The record of these proceedings before Levy DCJ of the District Court of 2 March 2012 (No. 376366 of 2011) be removed to this Court.

(2) The orders made by Levy DCJ in the said proceedings be quashed.

(3) The first respondent to pay the applicant's costs of the proceedings before this Court.

(4) The first respondent, if qualified, have a certificate under the Suitors Fund Act 1951 in respect of the costs in this Court.

[Note: The Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 provide (Rule 36.11) that unless the Court otherwise orders, a judgment or order is taken to be entered when it is recorded in the Court's computerised court record system. Setting aside and variation of judgments or orders is dealt with by Rules 36.15, 36.16, 36.17 and 36.18. Parties should in particular note the time limit of fourteen days in Rule 36.16.]

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is one further matter to which reference ought be made. Order (d) as made by the primary judge provided that on remitter the proceeding was to be dealt with by the Tribunal according to law and in conformity with [113] and [114] of his reasons. The former provided:"[113] ... In my view, on the foregoing analysis and on the construction of s 30(1)(a) of the Act, the Tribunal's reliance on that provision to deny the appellant's compensation should not stand, with the result that the orders made in the Tribunal must be set aside and the matter should be remitted to the Tribunal to be reheard without regard to the opinion evidence to the effect the appellant was dealing in drugs from the premises." (emphasis added) Section 39(5) permits the District Court to set aside a determination and remit a matter to be considered and determined again by the Tribunal. I take the reference in s 39(5)(b) to the further consideration of the Tribunal being "either with or without the hearing of further evidence" to make clear that in accordance with s 38(3), the Tribunal may by leave receive further evidence on the remitted hearing if one of the relevant conditions is satisfied. It is also possible that an earlier decision of the Tribunal to receive or not receive further evidence may have been the subject of the appeal to the District Court with the result that the earlier decision may have to be revisited on the remitted hearing "in accordance with the decision of the District Court on the question of law concerned". The order of the primary judge in terms required that on the further hearing the Tribunal not have regard to opinion evidence to the effect that the first respondent was dealing in drugs from the premises. There are potential difficulties in making an order in terms which prevent regard to particular evidence on a remitted hearing. First, the order may or may not reflect the decision of the Court on the relevant question of law. If it does not, it will go beyond what s 39(5)(b) permits and empowers the Court to do. Secondly, the order may not clearly indicate what evidence is referred to. For example, in the present case it is not clear whether the reference is to all of the police officer's evidence or only that part of it which purports to record his opinion that the first respondent was supplying drugs. Thirdly, an order in this form may prevent regard to further evidence on a subject and in doing so be inconsistent with the continued availability of s 38(3) in relation to the adducing of further evidence at the remitted hearing. If the decision in a case like the present one is that certain material has no evidentiary value and was not reasonably capable of supporting particular findings or inferences and that is recorded in the reasons, it should not be necessary to make an order which seeks specifically to identify such material. A further determination of the Tribunal "in accordance with the decision of the District Court" would be required to treat that evidence as incapable of supporting those particular findings or inferences.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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