Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM & 5 Ors

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NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF APPEAL

CITATION:      Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM & 5 Ors [2004]  NSWCA 185

FILE NUMBER(S):
40828/03

HEARING DATE(S):               28 April 2004

JUDGMENT DATE: 16/06/2004

PARTIES:
Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (Claimant)
GM (First Opponent)
CM1 (Second Opponent)
CM2 (Third Opponent)
CM3 (Fourth Opponent)
CM4 (Fifth Opponent)
District Court of New South Wales (Sixth Opponent)

JUDGMENT OF:       Mason P Ipp JA McColl JA   

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION: District Court

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):          DC 383/03
DC 384/03
DC 385/03
DC 386/03
DC 387/03

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:     Sidis DCJ

COUNSEL:
C. L. Lonergan (Claimant)
M.D. Broun QC/R Batley (Opponents 1 to 6)

SOLICITORS:
I.V. Knight (Crown Solicitor) (Claimant)
McDonnell Schroder (Opponents 1 to 5)
I.V. Knight (Crown Solicitor) (Opponent 6)

CATCHWORDS:
VICTIMS COMPENSATION - whether evidence of injury is required to establish that a victim of a sexual assault is a primary victim of an act of violence pursuant to ss 5(1) of the Victims Support & Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW) or is otherwise entitled to compensation in respect of the compensable injury of sexual assault - whether the facts of the sexual assaults in this case demonstrated actual physical contact amounting to 'harm' for the purpose of the definition of 'injury' in the Act. (D)

LEGISLATION CITED:
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 437, s 578A, s 578(3)
District Court Rules 1973 (NSW) Pt 6 r 60C(4)
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 34(1)(a)
Supreme Court Act 1970 (NSW) s 69(4)
Victims Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) s 3(1)
Victims Compensation Amendment Act 1998 (NSW) Schedule 1 cll [19]-[23]
Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW) Pt 1, s 3(a), s 4(1), s 5, s 5(1), s 5(1)(b), s 5(1)(c), s 5(2), Pt 2, Div 1, s 6, s 6(a), s 7, s 7(1), s 8, Div 2, s 10, s 10(1), s 10(2), s 10(3), s 11, s 11(1), s 11(2), s 12, s 13, s 13(3), Div 3, s 14, s 15, s 16, s 17, s 17(1), s 19, s 19(1), s 20, s 20(1), Div 5, s 25(2), s 25(2)(a), s 26, s 26(3)(b), s 29(1), s 29(3), s 36, s 39, s 39(1), s 42(3), s 65, s 65(1), s 68(a), s 68(b), s 68(c), s 68(d), s 68(e), s 68(f), Pt 4, s 70(1), s 71(1)(a), s 75(4), s 72(2), s 90, Schedule 1, cl 1, cl 2, cl 3, cl 3(a), cl 3(b), cl 3(c), cl 5, cl 6, cl 7, cl 7A, cl 8, Dictionary

DECISION:
1. Order that the record of the proceedings before her Honour Judge Sidis DCJ at the District Court Newcastle on 18 June 2003 Nos. [383/03], [384/03], [385/03], [386/03] and [387/03] be removed into the Supreme Court of New South Wales.  2. Quash the orders made by Sidis DCJ in the proceedings.  3. Remit the proceedings to the District Court to be dealt with according to law. 4. Claimant to pay the opponents' costs as agreed or assessed.

JUDGMENT:

IN THE SUPREME COURT  
OF NEW SOUTH…

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Details
Case
[2004] NSWCA 185
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The parties in this matter were the Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (the Corporation) and five claimants who were victims of sexual assault. The dispute concerned whether the claimants were entitled to compensation under the *Victims Support & Rehabilitation Act 1996* (NSW) (the 1996 Act) for sexual assaults they had suffered. The case came before the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The central legal issues before the court were whether evidence of actual physical injury was required to establish that a claimant was a primary victim of an act of violence, or otherwise entitled to compensation for the compensable injury of sexual assault. Specifically, the court had to determine if the facts of the sexual assaults themselves demonstrated actual physical contact amounting to 'harm' as defined by 'injury' in the 1996 Act.

The court reasoned that legislative schemes for compensating victims of crime, including the 1996 Act, have consistently required claimants to establish that they have sustained injury or loss by reason of the relevant crime. This principle, derived from earlier legislation and confirmed in *Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown*, means that compensation is founded on the concept of "compensation for injury" or "loss". The court noted that the 1996 Act, by repealing the *Victims Compensation Act 1987*, was intended to limit eligibility for compensation, including for sexual assaults, by establishing monetary thresholds and caps. The court concluded that the mere fact of a sexual assault did not automatically establish an "injury" for the purposes of the Act without further inquiry into whether harm had been sustained.

The Supreme Court ordered that the proceedings be removed into the Supreme Court, quashed the orders made by the District Court, and remitted the proceedings to the District Court to be dealt with according to law. The claimants were ordered to pay the Corporation's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Order that the record of the proceedings before her Honour Judge Sidis DCJ at the District Court Newcastle on 18 June 2003 Nos. [383/03], [384/03], [385/03], [386/03] and [387/03] be removed into the Supreme Court of New South Wales. 2. Quash the orders made by Sidis DCJ in the proceedings. 3. Remit the proceedings to the District Court to be dealt with according to law. 4. Claimant to pay the opponents' costs as agreed or assessed.

Background

Background to the litigation

The case involves a dispute over whether the victims of sexual assault are entitled to compensation under the Victims Support & Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW). The six claimants, referred to as GM, DM, AM, DM1, CM and KM, were all victims of sexual assaults by a perpetrator, who had been previously convicted of various offences, including sexual assault. The claimants sought compensation from the Victims Compensation Fund Corporation, arguing that their sexual assaults constituted compensable injuries under the 1996 Act. The Corporation denied their claims, contending that the claimants had not established that they had sustained any injury within the meaning of the 1996 Act. The claimants, in turn, argued that the mere fact of their sexual assault was sufficient to establish that they had sustained injury, and that they were therefore entitled to compensation.

The claimants' claims were initially heard by Judge Sidis DCJ at the District Court of New South Wales, who rejected their claims on the basis that they had not established the requisite injury. The claimants then sought to appeal the decision to the Supreme Court of New South Wales, arguing that the District Court had erred in its interpretation of the 1996 Act. The case ultimately reached the High Court of Australia, which heard arguments from both the claimants and the Corporation. The central issue before the Court was whether the claimants had established that they had sustained injury within the meaning of the 1996 Act, and whether their sexual assaults amounted to actual physical contact that constituted 'harm' for the purpose of the definition of 'injury' in the Act.

The claimants argued that the mere fact of their sexual assault was sufficient to establish that they had sustained injury, and that they were therefore entitled to compensation. They contended that the 1996 Act did not require them to establish any additional injury beyond that which was inherent in their sexual assaults. The Corporation, on the other hand, argued that the claimants had not established any injury beyond that which was inherent in their sexual assaults, and that they were therefore not entitled to compensation. The Corporation submitted that the claimants were required to establish actual physical contact amounting to 'harm' in order to be deemed injured within the meaning of the 1996 Act. The High Court was required to determine the correct interpretation of the 1996 Act, and to decide whether the claimants had established the requisite injury in order to be entitled to compensation.

The case of Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v GM & 5 Ors originated in the District Court of New South Wales, Newcastle, where a series of proceedings were filed on 18 June 2003 under case numbers [383/03], [384/03], [385/03], [386/03], and [387/03]. These proceedings were subsequently removed into the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The matter before the Supreme Court involved a judicial review of the District Court's decision, which had granted orders in favour of the claimants who sought compensation under the Victims Support & Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW). The Supreme Court was tasked with examining the correctness of the District Court's orders and the interpretation of the Act's provisions concerning compensation for victims of sexual assault. This appeal followed the claimants' unsuccessful attempt to establish their eligibility for compensation, which hinged on whether their claims of sexual assault constituted 'injury' as defined by the Act. The Supreme Court's review included an assessment of the District Court's procedural rulings and the application of statutory interpretation principles, particularly in light of previous decisions such as Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority and Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether evidence of injury is required to establish that a victim of a sexual assault is a primary victim of an act of violence under s 5(1) of the Victims Support & Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW).
2. Whether the facts of the sexual assaults in this case demonstrated actual physical contact amounting to 'harm' for the purpose of the definition of 'injury' in the Act.
3. Whether the establishment of a sexual assault as a compensable injury under the Act negates the need for further inquiry into other injuries.
4. How the term "injury" should be interpreted in the context of the Act and whether it requires evidence beyond the occurrence of a sexual assault.
5. Whether the legislative history and purpose of the Act support the requirement of evidence of injury beyond the mere occurrence of a sexual assault.

Held
1. Whether evidence of injury is required to establish that a victim of a sexual assault is a primary victim of an act of violence under s 5(1) of the Victims Support & Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW): The court concluded that evidence of injury is required to establish that a victim of a sexual assault is a primary victim under s 5(1) of the Act.
2. Whether the facts of the sexual assaults in this case demonstrated actual physical contact amounting to 'harm' for the purpose of the definition of 'injury' in the Act: The court found that the sexual assaults in the case did not demonstrate actual physical contact amounting to 'harm' as required by the definition of 'injury' in the Act.
3. Whether the establishment of a sexual assault as a compensable injury under the Act negates the need for further inquiry into other injuries: The court ruled that the establishment of a sexual assault as a compensable injury under the Act does not negate the need for further inquiry into other injuries.
4. How the term "injury" should be interpreted in the context of the Act and whether it requires evidence beyond the occurrence of a sexual assault: The court interpreted the term "injury" in the context of the Act to require evidence beyond the mere occurrence of a sexual assault.
5. Whether the legislative history and purpose of the Act support the requirement of evidence of injury beyond the mere occurrence of a sexual assault: The court held that the legislative history and purpose of the Act support the requirement of evidence of injury beyond the mere occurrence of a sexual assault.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Finally, the opponents argued that once it was established that they had been the victims of a “sexual assault”, “injury” was established within the meaning of the 1996 Act and the sexual assault was a “compensable injury”. Thus, they contended, “there is no other injury to be inquired about other than the injury inherent in a sexual assault”.Consideration Section 10 must be construed in a manner which is “consistent with the language and purpose of all the provisions” of the 1996 Act: Project Blue Sky Inc & Ors v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355 at 381 [69] per McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. The proper approach to the interpretation of the 1996 Act was considered recently in Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown [2003] HCA 54; (2003) 77 ALJR 1797. In that case Heydon J (with whose reasons McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ agreed) considered whether the word “and” as it appeared in the phrase “symptoms and disability” in Schedule 1, cl 5 dealing with “shock” prior to the amendments effected by the 1998 Act was to be read conjunctively or disjunctively. Heydon J held that the word should be construed conjunctively with the consequence that a person who suffered symptoms of shock but no disability was ineligible for victims’ compensation. The following propositions may be gleaned from Heydon J’s analysis of the 1996 Act. First, legislative schemes concerning compensating victims of crime which, in New South Wales, date back at least to s 437 of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), have always required the claimant to establish that he or she had sustained injury or loss by reason of the relevant crime. Thus s 437 enabled a Court before whom an offender was tried and convicted to “direct that a sum not exceeding five hundred pounds be paid out of the property of the offender to any aggrieved person, by way of compensation for injury, or loss, sustained through, or by reason of, such felony”. Although the power to compensate victims of crime “widened over time” ([18]), it was always founded on the proposition of “compensation for injury” or “loss” (see [19]-[21]). The 1987 Act made four classes of victims of acts of violence eligible for “compensation for injury”. "Compensation for injury" in relation to primary or secondary victims meant, inter alia, compensation for pain and suffering and compensation for loss of enjoyment of life (s 10(1); see Brown at [19] – [23]). It might be noted that an “act of violence” for the purposes of the 1987 Act meant, in effect, an offence which “resulted in injury or death to one or more persons” (s 3(1)). Secondly, the repeal of the 1987 Act and the enactment of the 1996 Act were intended to limit eligibility to recover compensation both for “relevantly insignificant and very significant injuries”: Brown at [28]. This was achieved by establishing a monetary threshold of $2,400 for recovery (s 20(1)) and a cap of $50,000 in relation to any one act of violence (s 19).