Vick and Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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Vick and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] AATA 1486 (17 May 2023)

Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2022/7386

Re:Stephen Vick

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Securities and Investments Commission

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Senior Member G Lazanas

Date:17 May 2023

Place:Brisbane

The applications for a stay and confidentiality orders pursuant to ss 41 and 35 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), respectively, are refused.

These reasons shall not be published (other than to the parties) for a period of 14 days after the date of these reasons.

.........................[SGD]...............................................

Senior Member G Lazanas

CATCHWORDS

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for stay of decision and confidentiality orders – applicant banned from providing any financial services for five years – whether discretion of the Tribunal is enlivened to grant a stay – whether a stay is desirable for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the hearing – applicant no longer providing financial services – whether consequences for applicant and third parties substantiated – public interest considerations –  presumption of openness and transparency of proceedings – whether grounds for confidentiality orders made out – reputational damage and financial hardship not sufficient – applications for stay and confidentiality orders refused

LEGISLATION

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 35, 41
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth) s 1
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 920A, 920B, 952E, 961B, 961G, 963A, 963G

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) ss 55, 80

CASES

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Adler (2002) 42 ACSR 80
Australian Securities & Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2009] FCAFC 185
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Forge [2007] NSWSC 1489
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v McCormack [2017] FCA 672
Daly and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 1516
McLean v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2016] AATA 22
McNamara and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2016] AATA 189
Poidevin and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2018] AATA 124
Rawson Finances Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2013) 133 ALD 39
Scott and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2009] AATA 798
Trading Life Services Pty Ltd and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2022] AATA 4746

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Regulatory Guide 98 ASIC’s Power to suspend, cancel and vary AFS licences and make banning orders

REASONS FOR DECISION

Senior Member G Lazanas

17 May 2023

INTRODUCTION

  1. On 5 September 2022, Mr Stephen Vick, the Applicant, applied to the Tribunal seeking a review of the decision made by a Delegate of the Respondent (ASIC) on 30 August 2022 banning him under ss 920A and 920B of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (Corporations Act). Specifically, Mr Vick was banned from providing any financial services, performing any function involved in the carrying on of a financial services business and controlling an entity that carries on a financial services business, for a period of five years (Banning Order).

  2. Amongst other things, ASIC determined that Mr Vick earned substantial sums of ‘conflicted…

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Details
Case
[2023] AATA 1486
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned applications by Mr Vick for a stay of a decision made by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and for confidentiality orders in relation to that decision. ASIC had banned Mr Vick from providing any financial services for a period of five years. The applications were heard by G Lazanas SM in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.

The Tribunal was required to determine whether its discretion was enlivened to grant a stay of ASIC's banning order and whether such a stay was desirable to secure the effectiveness of the hearing. Furthermore, the Tribunal had to consider whether grounds for confidentiality orders were made out, particularly in light of Mr Vick no longer providing financial services and the potential consequences for him and third parties.

In reaching its decision, the Tribunal applied the principle that justice is administered openly and in public, and that suppression orders are rarely made. It noted that reputational damage and financial hardship, while potentially serious, are generally not sufficient reasons to depart from the norm of a public hearing, especially when the banning order itself is inherent to the nature of such regulatory action. The Tribunal also emphasised the importance of transparency in financial markets, stating that investors are entitled to be fully informed about banning orders made against financial service providers to ensure the proper operation of the market. The Tribunal considered that the risk of bad publicity accompanying adverse regulatory action is often an incident of participation in a regulated occupation.

The applications for both a stay of the banning order and for confidentiality orders were refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

In ASIC v AAT, Downes and Jagot JJ stated at [75]:Suppression orders are rarely made in courts, even though publicity undoubtedly disadvantages the parties. Criminal proceedings are a good example. In the AAT itself facts which parties would not wish to be published and which may disadvantage them are frequently published. Social security applications are a good example. The reason these matters are not kept secret is the overriding importance of justice being administered openly and in public. It is not readily apparent why persons in businesses should be treated differently even when, for example, employees may be disadvantaged.When measured against the existence of the norm of a public hearing and the scheme established by the Corporations Act with respect to banning orders, it is apparent that the AAT would need some cogent reason by reference to the particular case to depart from the ordinary requirement of a public hearing. It is difficult to accept that harm (even serious harm) to the recipient’s reputation resulting from public awareness of the banning order will be a sufficiently cogent reason to justify the grant of a stay in most cases. This is because the risk of harm of this type is inherent in the nature of a banning order. (underlining is emphasis added) At [54] of ASIC v AAT, Downes and Jagot JJ observed as follows in relation to the issue of openness and transparency:Moreover, information is the key to effective trading in any market. It takes the place of regulation in ensuring fairness. A market which is not fully informed is not operating properly. Is not an investor who is about to deposit funds with a person providing financial services entitled to know that a banning order has been made against the person? If the order has been stayed on substantial grounds the person is also entitled to know that. The informed investor may continue with the proposal. If the investor does not, then that is just an example of the operation of the market place. The critical matter is that the market is fully informed. If the banning order is not disclosed, but subsequently upheld, is not the investor entitled to complain that all the circumstances should have been made public? (underlining is emphasis added) In Daly and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 1516 at [17], Deputy President McCabe stated that:The Tribunal will look carefully at requests to suppress news of a reviewable decision even where the Tribunal is otherwise prepared to issue a stay under s 41(2). The reasons for that caution are obvious enough. The Tribunal’s review mechanism is intended to operate in a transparent way. But the Tribunal is also conscious that others who continue to deal with an applicant will be understandably angry if they later discover they were kept in the dark about a reviewable decision that might have influenced their choices as consumers of the applicant’s services.While the Tribunal will consider the reputational damage and economic loss that an applicant might experience if the reviewable decision is published while the review proceeds, it might not give those concerns much weight. Requests for suppression orders – for that is what they are, in substance – will be scrutinised very carefully where the reviewable decision in question relates to a person’s right to participate in a regulated occupation. Participation in a regulated occupation brings many benefits, including (in many cases) economic advantages that accrue to licence holders. Those economic advantages flow from the establishment of barriers to entry that incidentally reduce competition between the favoured few. The licence necessarily carries with it a requirement that the licensee conform to the rules and participate in regulatory processes according to law. Most of those regulatory regimes – including the one established in Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act 2001 (the Corporations Act) – place a premium on transparency. It follows that a risk of bad publicity accompanying adverse regulatory action will often be regarded as an incident of a licensee’s participation in a regulated occupation.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established