SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Venz v Moreton Bay Regional Council (formerly Caboolture Shire Council) [2009] QCA 224
PARTIES:
ROBERT VENZ
(applicant/applicant)
v
MORETON BAY REGIONAL COUNCIL (FORMERLY CABOOLTURE SHIRE COUNCIL)
(respondent/respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 1862 of 2009
DC No 3404 of 2008DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
4 August 2009
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
27 July 2009
JUDGES:
Muir JA, Mullins and Philippides JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made.ORDERS:
Application for leave to appeal allowed;1.
Appeal allowed;2.
Orders made at first instance be set aside and order that:3.
(a)The applicant have leave pursuant to s 59 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) to start a proceeding in the District Court against the respondent for damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him on 14 August 2004 at Morayfield, Queensland;
(b)The proceeding be stayed until the parties have complied with Chapter 2 Part 1 of the said Act;
(c)The parties' costs of the application filed 5 December 2008 be the parties' costs in the proceeding; and
(d)The respondent pay the applicant's costs of the appeal.
CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – EXTENSION OF TIME IN PERSONAL INJURIES MATTERS – PRINCIPLES UPON WHICH DISCRETION IS EXERCISED – where the respondent signed a consent order granting the applicant leave to initiate proceedings against the respondent pursuant to s 43 Personal Injuries Act 2002 (Qld) ("the Act") – where consent order specified a date by which proceedings were to be filed – where proceedings were not filed on or before stipulated date – where applicant applied to District Court for leave to commence proceedings pursuant to s 43 or, alternatively, s 59(2)(b) of the Act – where primary judge, dismissing the application, considered the granting of leave would deprive the respondent of contractual rights – whether primary judge erred in the exercise of his discretion by attributing undue weight to the respondent’s contractual rights and insufficient weight to other considerations
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), s 43, s 59
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 968(4), r 969(5)Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales (1982) 149 CLR 337; [1982] HCA 24, cited
Ernst & Young(a firm) v Butte Mining plc [1996] 2 All ER 623, cited
Moga v Australian Associated Motor Insurers Ltd[2008] QCA 79, cited
Siebe Gorman & Co Ltd v Pneupac Ltd [1982] 1 WLR 185, cited
Spencer v Nominal Defendant [2008] 2 Qd R 64; [2007] QCA 254, distinguishedCOUNSEL:
R D Green for the applicant
A C Harding for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Qld Law Group for the applicant
HBM Lawyers for the respondent
MUIR JA:Introduction
The applicant seeks leave to appeal pursuant to s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967…
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- Case
- [2009] QCA 224
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue in this case was whether the primary judge erred in the exercise of his discretion by attributing undue weight to the respondent's contractual rights and insufficient weight to other relevant considerations when deciding whether to grant leave to the applicant to commence proceedings. The applicant argued that the primary judge's decision was flawed because it did not adequately consider the principles guiding the exercise of discretion in such matters, particularly the balance between the respondent's contractual rights and the applicant's rights under the Act.
The court held that the primary judge had indeed erred in the exercise of his discretion. The court emphasised that while contractual rights are an important consideration, they are not the sole factor to be taken into account when deciding whether to grant leave under the Act. The court held that the primary judge had given disproportionate weight to the respondent's contractual rights and had not sufficiently weighed other relevant considerations, such as the applicant's right to seek redress under the Act and the potential for prejudice to the respondent if leave were granted. Consequently, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders made at first instance.
In summary, the court granted the applicant leave to commence proceedings against the respondent, staying the proceeding until the parties had complied with the relevant provisions of the Act. The court also ordered the respondent to pay the applicant's costs of the appeal, reflecting the court's view that the primary judge's decision was flawed and that the applicant's rights under the Act should have been given greater consideration.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application for leave to appeal allowed;1.
Appeal allowed;2.
Orders made at first instance be set aside and order that:3.
(a)The applicant have leave pursuant to s 59 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) to start a proceeding in the District Court against the respondent for damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained by him on 14 August 2004 at Morayfield, Queensland;
(b)The proceeding be stayed until the parties have complied with Chapter 2 Part 1 of the said Act;
(c)The parties' costs of the application filed 5 December 2008 be the parties' costs in the proceeding; and
(d)The respondent pay the applicant's costs of the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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