Vasudevan and Migration Agents Registration Authority (Migration)
[2020] AATA 3640
•16 September 2020
Vasudevan and Migration Agents Registration Authority (Migration) [2020] AATA 3640 (16 September 2020)
Division:GENERAL DIVISION
File Number(s): 2019/7348
Re:Rathinam Vasudevan
APPLICANT
AndMigration Agents Registration Authority
RESPONDENT
DECISION
Tribunal:Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
Date:16 September 2020
Place:Sydney
The decision under review is affirmed.
........................[sgd]............................................
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
CATCHWORDS
MIGRATION AGENTS – registration – cancellation of registration as a migration agent – whether non-compliance with Code of Conduct – whether the applicant is not a person of integrity or is otherwise not a fit and proper person to give immigration assistance – whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to cancel the Applicant’s registration – immigration assistance – failure to act diligently – where failure to properly respond to complaint – where provision of misleading and deceiving information to the Respondent and the Department – where failure to maintain proper records – decision under review affirmed
LEGISLATION
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 276, 290, 300, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 314, 316, 321A
CASES
Australian Broadcasting Authority v Bond [1990] 170 CLR 321
Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 362
Davies v Australian Securities Commission and Another (1995) 131 ALR 295
Hudson and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2004] AATA 1007
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) (1955) 93 CLR 127
Kraues v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2018] FCA 664
Krause v Office of Migration Agents Registration Authority [2019] FCAFC 52
Lilenthal v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2002] FCA 93
Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] 67 ALR 170
Peng and Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] AATA 12
Re Christopher Gerald Narayanan and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2006] AATA 353
Re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409
Re Nima Mottaghi and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2007] AATA 60
Shi v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31
Trades College Australia Pty Ltd and Australian Skills Quality Authority [2020] AATA 812
Tejani and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2009] AATA 240
REASONS FOR DECISION
Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
16 September 2020
The Migration Agents Registration Scheme
In 1992 the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act) was amended[1] to establish a scheme (the Migration Agents Registration Scheme (the Scheme)) whereby certain persons could be registered as migration agents and thereby authorised to give what is called “immigration assistance”[2] to clients seeking to navigate the complexities of the Act.
[1] Migration Amendment Act (No. 3) 1992 (Cth).
[2] Section 276 of the Act.
In introducing the legislation, the Minister at the time stated that the scheme was “designed to improve standards of professional conduct and quality of service.”[3]
[3] Hansard, House of Representatives, 27 May 1992 at 2937.
The Minister identified the ills which needed to be remedied as follows:
The initiative reflects the Government’s concerns over the level and nature of complaints made against incompetent and unscrupulous agents ….. It also recognises the fact that many of those who are most likely to seek the assistance of agents are among the most vulnerable in our society …. I do not intend to list comprehensively problems which led to the development of the scheme, but some examples include agents having been paid to lodge applications and then failing to do so; lodging applications without paying the prescribed fees, thereby not giving effect to the application; lodging applications tardily in a way which adversely affects the entitlements of applicants; and holding passports as 'security and then demanding extra payments'. There are also examples of agents providing incompetent advice because they lack even a rudimentary knowledge of the Migration Act and regulations.[4]
[4] Idem.
The legislation establishes a system whereby a person seeking to become a migration agent must apply for and be granted registration.
Registration requires that an applicant meet certain statutory requirements (for example, being over the age of 18, holding professional indemnity insurance or holding Australian citizenship or appropriate other status) and the Act provides that they must be a person who is deemed to be a person of integrity or who is a fit and proper person to give immigration assistance.[5]
[5] Section 290 of the Act.
In addition, the Act[6] provides for the development and publication of a Code of Conduct (the Code) for migration agents and adherence to this Code is mandatory. The Minister made clear that “This is a critical element of the scheme”[7] designed to ensure both the protection of consumers (“clients”) and the orderly management of the Scheme itself.
[6] Section 314 of the Act.
[7] Hansard, House of Representatives, 27 May 1992 at 2939.
The Scheme is now regulated by the Migration Agents Registration Authority (MARA) whose responsibilities, powers and duties are set out in the Act.
Among MARA’s responsibilities are the registration and re-registration of migration agents; the monitoring of adherence to the Code; and the investigation of complaints against migration agents.[8]
[8] Section 316 of the Act.
Where a complaint is made against a migration agent there is a formal process which MARA must follow in investigating the claim which ensures that the migration agent against whom the complaint is made is accorded procedural fairness in the investigation and an opportunity to respond to any allegations made against them.[9]
[9] Sections 303 to 305 of the Act.
If, after an investigation is completed in accordance with these requirements, MARA makes findings adverse to any registered migration agent, it is empowered to impose sanctions[10] which may range from the issuing of cautions through to the suspension of registration and in the extreme the cancellation of registration.[11]
[10] Section 316(1)(d) of the Act.
[11] Section 303(1) of the Act.
Decisions made by MARA are subject to review by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.[12]
[12] Section 306 of the Act.
At the relevant time section 306C of the Act provided a definition of the “client” of a migration agent in the following terms:
For the purposes of this Division, if a registered migration agent gave, or anticipated giving, immigration assistance to another person:
(a) the other person is a client of the registered migration agent and, if the registered migration agent dies, the other person remains a client of the deceased registered migration agent; and
(b) if the registered migration agent becomes an inactive migration agent--the other person remains a client of the inactive migration agent and, if the inactive migration agent dies, the other person remains a client of the deceased inactive migration agent.
By passage of the Migration Amendment (Regulation of Migration Agents) Act 2020 (Cth) this definition has now been changed but such changes are not relevant for the present considerations.
The term “immigration assistance” is also defined in the Act, the relevant part of which provides:
Immigration assistance
(1) For the purposes of this Part, a person gives immigration assistance if the person uses, or purports to use, knowledge of, or experience in, migration procedure to assist a visa applicant or cancellation review applicant by:
(a) preparing, or helping to prepare, the visa application or cancellation review application; or
(b) advising the visa applicant or cancellation review applicant about the visa application or cancellation review application; or…[13]
[13] Section 276 of the Act.
The matter and proceedings before the Tribunal
In April 2017 MARA (the Respondent) received a complaint made against Mr Rathinam Vasudevan (the Applicant) as a result of which it undertook an investigation into his conduct as a registered migration agent.
This complaint was subsequently withdrawn by the complainant, however, MARA’s investigations to that date had left it with ongoing concerns about the Applicant’s fitness to retain registration as a migration agent. It therefore continued its investigations and, on 31 October 2019, cancelled the Applicant’s registration.[14]
[14] Section 303(1) of the Act.
On 12 November 2019 the Applicant applied to this Tribunal for a review of that decision and the matter came before the Tribunal for hearing on 29 July 2020.
At that hearing the Applicant, through his legal representative, applied to the Tribunal under section 34J of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) for the matter to be determined “on the papers”; that is, without proceeding to a formal hearing.
Circumstances in which hearing may be dispensed with
If:
(a) it appears to the Tribunal that the issues for determination on the review of a decision can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties; and
(b) the parties consent to the review being determined without a hearing;
the Tribunal may review the decision by considering the documents or other material lodged with or provided to the Tribunal and without holding a hearing.
The Tribunal briefly adjourned proceedings to allow the Respondent’s legal representative to seek instructions from the Respondent who, on resumption of the hearing, advised its consent to the application.
The Tribunal then directed that further submissions in writing be provided to the Tribunal by both parties no later than 14 August 2020 after which, on receipt of those submissions, it proceeded to make its determination on the application.
Evidence before the Tribunal
In the event, after final submissions were lodged by the Applicant, the material before the Tribunal consisted of the following:
·Section 37 Tribunal Documents (paginated from page 1 to page 294).
·Respondent’s Tender Bundle (paginated from page 1 to page 112).
·Amended Applicant’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, lodged 24 March 2020, running to 22 paragraphs.[15]
·Respondent’s Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions, dated 24 June 2020, running to 78 paragraphs.
·Transcript of the hearing held on 29 July 2020 (paginated from page 1 to page 12).
·Applicant’s Written Outline of Submissions, dated 29 July 2020, tendered in association with the application for a hearing on the papers, and running to 11 pages.
·Respondent’s Written Submissions, dated 7 August 2020, running to 39 paragraphs with an Annexure of 3 pages containing certain visa details.
·Applicant’s Reply dated 12 August 2020, being a 3-page document.
[15] The document is undated but was lodged with the Tribunal on 24 March 2020.
Applicant’s evidence: initial comment
No direct evidence was given by the Applicant,[16] and at both the hearing,[17] when the application for this matter to be determined on the papers was made, and in their written submissions, the Respondent put to the Tribunal that it should be conscious of the point made by the High Court in Jones v Dunkel. This was outlined as follows:
[16] Transcript, 29 July 2020 page 4 lines 39-41.
[17] Transcript, 29 July 2020 page 3 lines 24-26.
The SFIC at [45]-[59] outlines the numerous inconsistencies and contradictions in the evidence presently before the Tribunal, such as the internal inconsistencies in the file notes (TD 155-160), and the inconsistency between the file note (TD 159-160) and the 457 business sponsor application: TD 138-144. The Applicant has elected not to give any evidence about these matters. The consequence of the Applicant’s failure to adduce evidence clarifying these inconsistencies is that the Tribunal can draw an inference that any such evidence would not have assisted him in accordance with the principle formulated by Kitto J in Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 (at 308) as follows:
any inference favourable to the plaintiff for which there was ground in the evidence might be more confidently drawn when a person presumably able to put the true complexion on the facts relied on as the ground for the inference has not been called as a witness by the defendant and the evidence provides no sufficient explanation of his absence
When the principle applies, 2 different types of result may follow:
21.1. the tribunal of fact might infer that the evidence of the absent witness, if called, would not have assisted the party who failed to call that witness
21.2. the tribunal of fact might draw with greater confidence any inference favourable to the party seeking to draw that inference, if a witness who is in a position to cast light on whether that inference should properly be drawn is not called: see Manly Council v Byrne and Anor [2004] NSWCA 123 at [51] per Campbell J, with whom Beazley JA and Pearlman AJA agreed.
The Jones v Dunkel principle is clearly applicable in the present case as the Applicant is in a position to give evidence about the irreconcilable inconsistencies in the documentary evidence before the Tribunal and has chosen not to do so. In light of the inconsistencies, and applying the principle in Jones v Dunkel, the Tribunal could draw with greater confidence the inference available from the face of the documentary evidence that the Applicant had intentionally provided false and misleading information to the Respondent and the Department.
It must also be said that while the Applicant has provided the Tribunal with a number of submissions on various points raised by MARA in its cancellation determination, he has failed to provide anything to the Tribunal which might be described as evidence.
That said, the Tribunal recognises that the obligation lies upon MARA, as it does upon any equivalent statutory scheme regulator, to prove its case for the making of findings and imposition of sanctions. This was made clear in a case involving the Australian Skills Quality Authority (ASQA) which is the national regulator of the National Vocational Education Training Scheme, where the Tribunal stated, in relation to the presentation of material to this Tribunal that:
“We have concluded that in future cases where there is a contest about non-compliances, ASQA must start and do so without the assumption that its allegations of non-compliance are prima facie correct.”[18]
[18] Trades College Australia Pty Ltd and Australian Skills Quality Authority [2020] AATA 812 at [13].
The basis for the cancellation decision
Put shortly, MARA based its decision to cancel the Applicant’s registration on findings that:
(i)The Applicant had breached several clauses of the Code; and
(ii)The Applicant was not a fit and proper person or a person of integrity to be authorised to give migration assistance under section 303(1)(f) of the Act.[19]
[19] T Documents at 9.
Section 303 of the Act provides:
Disciplining registered migration agents
(1) The Migration Agents Registration Authority may:
(a) cancel the registration of a registered migration agent by removing his or her name from the register; or
(b) suspend his or her registration; or
(c) caution him or her;
if it becomes satisfied that:
(d) the agent's application for registration was known by the agent to be false or misleading in a material particular; or
(e) the agent becomes bankrupt; or
(f) the agent is not a person of integrity or is otherwise not a fit and proper person to give immigration assistance; or
(g) an individual related by employment to the agent is not a person of integrity; or
(h) the agent has not complied with the Code of Conduct prescribed under section 314.
Details of these concerns and findings were set out in a Decision Record dated 31 October 2019 which runs to 158 paragraphs over 30 pages, plus Attachments.[20]
[20] T Documents at 12-42.
MARA’s concerns were triggered by a complaint which it received from Ms Devi Kumari Dhakal Chhetri about the way in which migration assistance had been provided to her by the Applicant.
It is therefore necessary for the Tribunal to outline both the history of the Applicant as a migration agent, the nature of the complaint of Ms Chhetri, the findings of the MARA investigation, the relevant sections of the Code and the response of the Applicant to any of these findings.
The Applicant as a migration agent
The Applicant’s initial registration as a migration agent took place on 4 September 2001 and he operated his business under the name of Krish Associates Pty Ltd. His registration was subject to annual renewal[21] and was continuously renewed, with the last valid renewal taking place on 4 July 2019. A further renewal application was made on 22 August 2019 and consideration of it is in abeyance pending the outcome of these proceedings. The decision to cancel the Applicant’s registration was made on 31 October 2019.
[21] Section 300(5) of the Act.
Ms Chettri’s complaint
Under the provisions of section 306C as it applied at the relevant time for these proceedings,[22] Ms Chhetri was a “client” of the Applicant because she used his services as a migration agent to obtain “immigration assistance.”[23]
[22] i.e. before the 2020 amendments.
[23] Hudson and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2004] AATA 1007 at [97].
Ms Chhetri made her complaint to MARA on 4 April 2017, the essence of which was that the Applicant had failed to provide her with the immigration assistance for which she had applied. In particular, he had not acted upon her application for an employer sponsored visa and then a visa under the Regional Sponsored Migration Scheme (RSMS). In the meantime, on his advice, she applied for and was granted a student visa,[24] but she undertook this application without his assistance, although she had previously requested it. During the course of her engagement with the Applicant’s services she paid him significant sums of money for his services which were eventually refunded. The failure to provide the agreed upon services, the Applicant’s unavailability to Ms Chhetri and the difficulties occasioned in obtaining refunds of monies paid had, according to the complainant, a detrimental impact on her health and wellbeing and resulted in her loss of confidence and trust in him and thereafter her complaint to MARA.[25]
[24] T Documents at 14, footnote 2.
[25] T Documents at 14.
After MARA had commenced its investigations of Ms Chhetri’s complaint (on 21 September 2017), Ms Chhetri withdrew her complaint on 18 October 2017. The reasons she gave for this were that:
“I have settled the dispute with Vasudevan Rathinam and have received the payment in question to my satisfaction.
As a result of the above I permanently release Vasudevan Rathinam from any claims by me in my letter of complaint.”[26]
[26] T Documents at 58.
MARA’s investigations and findings
As noted above, MARA was established as the regulator of the Scheme with the specific responsibility of monitoring the quality of services provided by registered migration agents and to ensure the Scheme’s overall and continuing integrity.
As a result, the withdrawal of Ms Chhetri’s complaint did not result in the discontinuation of any investigations of the Applicant’s performance as a migration agent. Indeed, the initial findings of MARA were such that it determined to continue its investigation of the Applicant’s practices.
The first step in this process was to issue a Notice, on 21 September 2017, under section 308 of the Act which gives MARA the statutory power to require the production of information from registered migration agents. In particular, it required the Applicant to respond to Ms Chhetri’s complaint (which at that stage was still enlivened) in the form of a Statutory Declaration, and to send MARA her complete client file.
The Applicant’s response was two-fold. In the first instance he failed to provide Ms Chhetri’s file and his response to her complaint was simply:
“The issue was a private matter between me and the complainant and it did not involve any provisions in the Migration Act nor engage any breach of the Code of Conduct.
I was neither instructed to act nor was there any application for the visa being initiated to bring the matter within the scope of the code of conduct.[27]
[27] T Documents at 65.
MARA did not find this a satisfactory response and on 26 September 2018 issued a Notice under section 309 (first 309 notice) of the Act which informed the Applicant that it was considering imposing sanctions on him[28] and inviting him to comment on its potential actions. Because it was contemplating action under section 303, MARA also issued a Notice under section 305C again requiring the Applicant to produce Ms Chhetri’s file.
[28] Under section 303 of the Act.
The Applicant’s response, via his solicitors, to the first 309 notice suggested that indeed certain migration advice had been given:
“Our client advised the complainant that she should regularise her visa status. After a review of documents (that had been supplied between 28 July 2016 and 14th September 2016 by the complainant to our client) our client suggested that the Regional Employer Sponsored Visa (Subclass 187) was a suitable and lawful option.”[29]
[29] T Documents at 84-85.
When a person formally engages the services of a migration agent, they are required to complete a Form 956 (Advice by a Migration Agent) which requires them to sign and declare that they have engaged a particular nominated agent to act on their behalf. Apparently, a Form 956 was given to Ms Chhetri[30] but does not ever appear to have been signed by her.
[30] T Documents at 85.
The Applicant also recorded that “the complainant made numerous abusive and threatening calls to our client’s office Staff including reporting our client to the Authority.”[31]
[31] Idem.
In addition, the Applicant provided to MARA a copy of correspondence from the (then) Department of Immigration and Border Protection addressed to Jaya Transport Pty Ltd (Jaya Transport) but sent via the Applicant’s email address which acknowledged receipt of an employer nomination by them on behalf of Ms Chhetri.[32] That correspondence is dated 12 December 2016.
[32] T Documents at 96-97.
This precipitated further action by MARA which wrote to the Applicant on 20 February 2019 and issued another section 309 Notice (second 309 notice) requiring the Applicant to comment on the Jaya Transport nomination and (under section 305C) requiring production of the Jaya Transport client file.
The Applicant replied to these requests on 21 March 2019 attaching the Jaya Transport file, although noting subsequently (by email dated 9 May 2019) that his requests for further information from Jaya Transport had not been responded to by them.[33]
[33] T Documents at 259.
MARA’s consideration of the Applicant’s replies to their various Notices led to a finding that the Applicant had breached several clauses of the Code and that, as a result, the Applicant was not a fit and proper person to continue as a registered migration agent. Hence his registration was cancelled.
The specific findings in relation to breaches of the Code were as follows[34] (with the relevant clauses of the Code set out thereunder):
[34] Respondent’s SFIC at [13]. Citations omitted.
Clauses 9.1 and 9.3 – the Applicant had provided immigration assistance to Ms Chhetri and his contention that the matter was ‘private’ was unacceptable and dishonest.
9.1 A registered migration agent must respond properly to a complaint by a person (whether or not the person is a client) about the work or services carried out by the agent or the agent’s employee.
9.3 If the Authority gives a registered migration agent details of a complaint made to the Authority about: (a) the work or services carried out by the agent or the agent’s employees; or (b) any other matter relating to the agent’s compliance with this Code — the agent must respond properly to the Authority, within a reasonable time specified by the Authority when it gives the details to the agent.
Clause 5.2 – the Applicant failed to provide Ms Chhetri with written confirmation of the services to be performed, and the fees and disbursements associated with those services
5.2 A registered migration agent must: (a) before starting work for a client, give the client: (i) an estimate of charges in the form of fees for each hour or each service to be performed, and disbursements that the agent is likely to incur as part of the services to be performed; and (ii) an estimate of the time likely to be taken in performing the services; and (b) as soon as possible after receiving instructions, obtain written acceptance by the client, if possible, of: (i) the estimate of fees; and (ii) the estimate of the time likely to be taken in performing the services; and (c) give the client written confirmation (an Agreement for Services and Fees ) of: (i) the services to be performed; and (ii) the fees for the services; and (iii) the disbursements that the agent is likely to incur as part of the services; and (d) give the client written notice of any material change to the estimated cost of providing a service, and the total likely cost because of the change, as soon as the agent becomes aware of the likelihood of a change occurring.
Clause 2.1 – the Applicant had not advised Ms Chhetri in a competent, diligent and fair manner, including by failing to appreciate her visa status.
2.1 A registered migration agent must always: (a) act in accordance with the law (including, for an agent operating as an agent in a country other than Australia, the law of that country) and the legitimate interests of his or her client; and (b) deal with his or her client competently, diligently and fairly. However, a registered migration agent operating as an agent in a country other than Australia will not be taken to have failed to comply with the Code if the law of that country prevents the agent from operating in compliance with the Code.
Clauses 2.9 and 2.9A – due to the various inconsistencies in the Applicant’s file relating to Jaya Transport, the delegate found the Applicant had altered some of the documents and retrospectively created file notes to mislead the Respondent.[35] Further, the delegate found that the Applicant was aware that Jaya Transport was not operating in a regional area and had entered into an arrangement with Jaya Transport and Ms Chhetri to achieve a migration outcome. The delegate found that the Applicant had lodged the RSMS nomination application in an attempt to deceive the Department and the Respondent.
2.9 A registered migration agent must not make statements in support of an application under the Migration Act or Migration Regulations, or encourage the making of statements, which he or she knows or believes to be misleading or inaccurate.
2.9A In communicating with, or otherwise providing information to, the Authority, a registered migration agent must not mislead or deceive the Authority, whether directly or by withholding relevant information. A registered migration agent must not make statements in support of an application under the Migration Act or Migration Regulations, or encourage the making of statements, which he or she knows or believes to be misleading or inaccurate.
[35] T Documents at 28-30.
Clauses 6.1 and 6.1A – the Applicant had failed to maintain and manage proper records.
6.1 A registered migration agent must maintain proper records that can be made available for inspection on request by the Authority, including files containing: (a) a copy of each client’s application; and (b) copies of each written communication between: (i) the client and the agent; and (ii) the agent and any relevant statutory authority; and (iii) the agent and the Department regarding the client; and (c) file notes of every substantive or material oral communication between: (i) the client and the agent; and (ii) the agent and an official of any relevant statutory authority; and (iii) the agent and the Department regarding the client.
6.1A A registered migration agent must keep the records mentioned in clause 6.1 for a period of 7 years after the date of the last action on the file for the client.
Clause 2.19 – the Applicant had not provided sufficient relevant information to the Department to allow a full assessment of the 3 applications he lodged on behalf of Jaya Transport.
2.19 Subject to a client’s instructions, a registered migration agent has a duty to provide sufficient relevant information to the Department or a review authority to allow a full assessment of all the facts against the relevant criteria. For example, a registered migration agent must avoid the submission of applications under the Migration Act or Migration Regulations in a form that does not fully reflect the circumstances of the individual and prejudices the prospect of approval.
MARA’s determination
Sections 289 to 294 of the Act specify the requirements and qualifications for a person to become, or remain, a registered migration agent. In particular, a person must not be (or remain) registered if they are, inter alia, not a fit and proper person or a person of integrity.[36]
[36] Section 290 of the Act.
In the event that a person fails to meet these requirements, sanctions of varying degrees may be applied against them.
MARA considered the alleged breaches of the Code outlined above to be of a sufficient degree of seriousness and gravity as to disqualify the Applicant as a fit and proper person, or person of integrity, such as to trigger the extreme sanction under section 303(1)(a) to cancel the Applicant’s registration.
The Applicant’s response to the findings
In the absence of any written evidence presented to the Tribunal or any direct testimony from the Applicant, his responses are taken to be contained in the three written submissions of 24 March 2020, 29 July 2020 and 12 August 2020.
In the 29 July 2020 document he submits formally:
Admissions
The Applicant admits the following:
1A failure to have a signed fee agreement contrary to Part V of the Code of Conduct.
2The failure to provide the client file and associated documentation until 21 March 2019
3The assertion made by the Applicant that the relationship was a private matter when in fact it was “immigration assistance” as defined. [2 and 3 are an admission of a prima facie breach of clause 9.3 of the Code of Conduct]
4The applicant made restitution to the satisfaction of the complainant Chhetri.
The failure admitted in item (1) above constitutes a breach of clause 5.2 of the Code and in the Applicant’s statement of 24 March 2020 he concedes:
There was no fee agreement between the parties as required by Part 5 of the Code of Conduct, the breach of clause 5.2 Is admitted (Paragraph 60 page 15, T2 page 26).
The parenthetical reference is to paragraph 60 of MARA’s Statement of Reasons given on 31 October 2019 which reads:
As such I find that the Agent failed to provide Ms Dhakal Chhetri with written confirmation of the services to be performed, as well as fees and disbursements associated with those services. For the reasons discussed, I am satisfied that the Agent has breached his obligations in regard to clause 5.2 of the Code.
Further in that document of 24 March 2020, the Applicant concedes:
“It is contended that there was no “engagement’ in the ordinary meaning of the word and it is contended that although “immigration assistance” was provided prior to 16 October 2016 there was no client relationship until there was an agreement between the parties that the Applicant would act for the Complainant in a free consultation (16 October 2016): the earliest date, or when the professional costs were paid (2 December 2016).”[37]
[37] Applicant’s SFIC at [9].
However, in the statement of 29 July 2020, a breach of clause 5.2 is denied. Therein the Applicant claims:
The alleged failure necessarily turns upon the Authority not believing that when the Applicant said that he gave Chhetri a Form 956 and a cost (fee agreement) on 16 October 2017 and that statement is not to be believed.
The matter remains unresolved because the Authority has failed to properly investigate its own motion complaint. There is no statement from Chhetri which traverses the statement made by the Applicant.
This failure to properly investigate the relevant issue does not ground the alleged breach.
The requirement embedded in the Code at Clause 5.2(c) is to “give” written confirmation of what is described as “an Agreement for Services and Fees”. In this case the Applicant gave to Chhetri a fee agreement and a form 956 at their meeting on 15 October 2016. That statement remains un contradicted and is not evidence of a breach of clause 5.2 of the Code of Conduct.
The failure of the Applicant to ensure that the Agreement for Services and Fees was signed was an oversight and does not constitute a breach of the Code and may at best be conduct capable of being resolved by a “warning” as contemplated by the “Complaint Classification matrix-Appendix A”
The gravamen of much of what the Applicant relies upon subsequently to refute allegations of breaches of the Code turns upon his insistence that it lies upon MARA to justify all aspects of the case which it seeks to make against the Applicant and to conduct its own in-depth investigations to resolve matters when the Applicant challenges its assumptions.
This matter arises in both the allegations of Code breaches regarding the fees agreement with Ms Chhetri and the legal status of Jaya Transport (see below).
In the Applicant’s document of 12 August 2020, he asserts:
It is respectfully submitted that the gravamen of the Applicant’s submissions has been misunderstood.
The position of the Applicant is that once the Authority embarks on an own motion “investigation” it cannot ignore the potential for exculpatory third-party evidence if it decides not to investigate the matter further.
It is not suggested that the powers of compulsion embodied in the statutory scheme could have been exercised in the current case, but the failure to email or telephone both Chhetri (the applicant for the visa) or the Director of Jaya Transport to resolve threshold questions underpinning the allegations to the effect of the Applicant’s knowledge as to whether the Employer was in fact “regional” (paragraph 66 of the Section 309 Notice) remains unresolved.
Further the findings as to the making of “statements in support of an application….” Which are within the knowledge of the Applicant in these proceedings are …”misleading or inaccurate” (paragraph 67 of the Section 309 Notice) also remain unresolved because of the unwillingness of the authority to properly investigate the matter.
The suggestion that the Authority was constrained by the Privacy Act is unsustainable as both Chhetri and Sathgunarajah were themselves persons who had submitted forms and supporting documents to the Department.
Submissions
It is incumbent upon persons exercising statutory powers, irrespective of the availability of merits review to discharge their statutory duties faithfully and diligently.
In this respect, the Applicant cites section 316(1)(c) and (d) of the Act in support. These sections relate to MARA’s role in relation to the investigation of complaints and the taking of disciplinary actions against agents. The Applicant reads them as requiring MARA to seek information from parties other than the Agent before making any findings or decisions in relation to the actions of the Agent.
This proposition was restated in the Applicant’s submission at the brief oral hearing.[38]
[38] Transcript, 9 July 2020 page 8 lines 19-22.
However, this is an unsustainable proposition as those sections relate to the “functions” of MARA not its powers or operations.[39] It also fails when it is remembered that after Ms Chhetri’s withdrawal of her complaint on 18 October 2017, no live complaint remained on foot to be “investigated”.
[39] Kraues v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2018] FCA 664 at [54] “the applicant’s submissions as to jurisdiction are misconceived in that they conflate the statutory functions conferred on the Authority by s 316 of the Act, on the one hand, with the powers conferred upon the Authority to undertake those functions, on the other hand” per Perry J.
These suggestions are, not unnaturally, rejected in toto by the Respondent.[40] It makes it clear that there is no power in MARA to summons material from third parties – section 309(2) refers only to gathering material from the Agent in question. It also makes the valid point that it is prohibited from disclosing information related to personal information about migration agents to unauthorised third parties or for purposes that are not specifically authorised.[41]
[40] Respondent’s Written Submissions at [7]-[14].
[41] Section 321A of the Act.
The Tribunal agrees that MARA is under no such obligations as the Applicant suggests to obtain information from parties other than the migration agent concerned, or the complainant where a complaint is actually on foot. It is however still MARA’s responsibility to establish its case on other grounds and with other evidence which is available to it.
Dealings with Ms Chhetri
It is established, by the Applicant’s own concessions, that he provided Ms Chhetri with “immigration assistance”. It is also established that he failed to secure from her a written agreement (in terms of the Form 956) but that nevertheless he charged her fees for a number of occasions of service. Most of these services were not delivered and the Applicant subsequently refunded monies to Ms Chhetri.
In his reporting to MARA of his services provided to Ms Chhetri, the Applicant asserted that, in relation to her visa status at the time he commenced to act for her: “The Complainant was not (sic), and never held any visa.”[42] This was in reply to the first 309 Notice and hence required careful and accurate response on the part of the Applicant.
[42] T Documents at 84.
His statement was not correct. At the time Ms Chhetri was the holder of a visa which was due to expire, and she asked the Applicant to assist her with its renewal. She was sufficiently concerned that she expressed herself as follows:
“ … my IELTS will expire on 11th of October and my VISA will expire on 15th of October. So, the application should be launched before 11th of October. I am really in tenson (sic). Pls pls do it on time. Sorry to bother you all the time. Hope you understand my problem.”[43]
[43] T Documents at 51.
Despite this plea on her behalf, the Applicant failed to assist her in this matter.
The Applicant advised Ms Chhetri on 16 October 2016 that it was a “suitable and lawful”[44] option for her to apply for an RSMS visa (with Jaya Transport), but she did not advise him that she wished to be so sponsored until 2 December 2016.[45] The Respondent asserts that:
“Given that one of the criteria for the grant of an RSMS visa is that the applicant must be nominated by an approved business, there does not appear to be any basis for the Applicant’s advice to Ms Chhetri on 16 October 2016.”[46]
[44] T Documents at 85.
[45] Idem.
[46] Respondent’s SFIC at [43].
This matter is discussed further below.
Finally, the Applicant has failed, consistently, to provide a copy of Ms Chhetri’s client file to either MARA or this Tribunal. The production of client files to MARA on demand is a key element of the regulatory system of the Scheme and his failure to do so in this respect is a serious breach of the Code.
The Respondent is right to point out that this failure enlivens the concerns in a Jones v Dunkel respect, suggesting the strong probability that either such a file has not been created, as required, or that it contains material which would be adverse to the Applicant and his case.
Dealings with Jaya Transport Pty Ltd
There are two matters of concern in relation to the Applicant’s dealings involving Jaya Transport, MARA and Ms Chhetri.
The first of these relates to the location of the services provided by Jaya Transport. Jaya Transport was to be used as a sponsor for Ms Chhetri under the RSMS which requires that the employer operate in a “regional” location. From 22 September 2014 (the date of its registration) until 12 October 2016 Jaya Transport operated from Bella Vista which is a suburban address in metropolitan Sydney. On 12 October 2016 it changed its registered address to one in Kariong, NSW. Kariong is located on the Central Coast region of the State and qualifies as a regional location.[47]
[47] T Documents at 30, [75].
However, when Jaya Transport submitted its 457 Standard Business Sponsorship form to the (then) Department of Immigration and Border Protection, it listed its address as being at Bella Vista.[48]
[48] T Documents at 138-139.
There are then some inconsistencies in the nomination of Ms Chhetri by Jaya Transport for a position in their employ.
The Applicant’s version of events
The Applicant maintains that he and Ms Chhetri first discussed RSMS visa arrangements on 16 October 2016 with Mr Sathgunarajah who was an executive of Jaya Transport. Jaya Transport then posted job advertisements for the position of an accountant on 27 and 31 October 2016 on the websites SEEK and Jora Australia. [49]
[49] T Documents at 179 and 181.
On 2 December 2016 Ms Chhetri informed that Applicant that she wished to apply for the Jaya Transport position.[50] It should be noted that Ms Chhetri is fully qualified as an accountant and has a record of employment as such.[51]
[50] T Documents at 32.
[51] T Documents at 229-240.
On 5 December 2016 Mr Sathgunarajah instructed the Applicant to lodge the RSMS application[52] but on the same day it further advertised the accountant position on Backpage.[53]
[52] T Documents at 157.
[53] T Documents at 182.
Ms Chhetri’s nomination for an RSMS visa, based on employment with Jaya Transport, was lodged on 12 December 2016.[54]
[54] T Documents at 150.
In the event, Ms Chhetri did not take up this offer of employment and on 10 January 2017 she informed the Applicant that she had “found another employer who wanted to sponsor her under a different occupation – that of a Restaurant Manager.”[55] Jaya Transport was then advised of this.
[55] T Documents at 85.
The Respondent’s concerns
The Respondent attacks the credibility of the narrative provided by the Applicant.
In the first place the Respondent asserts that the Applicant, at the time that the 457 application was made, was aware that Jaya Transport was based in Bella Vista[56] and was not a genuine regional employer for the purposes of the RSMS. As such, he was aware that the requirements of the position under discussion were not consonant with the requirements set out in clause 187.233 of Schedule 2 of the Migration Regulations 1994.
[56] T Documents at [159] where the Applicant notes that Jaya Transport had provided details to him of its ASIC record and tax documents which disclosed its Bella Vista address: see Tender Bundle at 83-84.
The Respondent draws attention to the following inconsistencies or matters of concern:
(a)The lack of any corroborative evidence from Ms Chhetri that she ever met with the sponsor (Jaya Transport) in person;
(b)The Applicant’s file notes in relation to dealings with Jaya Transport suggest that some of the documentation has been altered, both in terms of changed dates and that some documents purporting to be from Mr Sathgunarajah were in fact composed by and signed by Sundari Vasudevan (the Applicant’s sister and business associate).[57] Further concerns were expressed about the possible alteration of another document involving these two parties related to issues of possible monies owed between the parties;[58]
(c)The position which was discussed with Ms Chhetri on 16 October 2016 was subsequently advertised on numerous occasions and that she was “not included in the list of applicants considered for the position”;[59]
(d)The Applicant had failed to provide an adequate file in relation to his dealings with Jaya Transport and that any claims that this resulted from the failure of Jaya Transport to provide him with requested information was not sustainable;[60]
(e)It may be inferred from an analysis of the information provided by the Applicant to MARA in response to various Notices that documents in the Jaya Transport file were created for the specific purpose of “supporting the RSMS nomination” and were not genuine and contemporaneous recording of matters of fact.[61]
[57] T Documents at 184.
[58] T Documents at 161.
[59] T Documents at 34.
[60] T Documents at 37.
[61] Idem.
General conclusions
In the absence of any direct evidence from the Applicant, it is hard for the Tribunal to do anything other than accept the Respondent’s conclusions in relation to his dealings with Jaya Transport, especially as the Respondent’s Decision Record[62] is so thorough, detailed, comprehensive and uncontradicted.
[62] T Documents at 12-42.
It is no answer for the Applicant merely to assert that:
“Internal inconsistency does not of itself constitute evidence of a concocted document, it may be possible to infer but it is also susceptible to an exculpatory explanation which is that the file notes were created contemporaneously but include later and additional material because they are created not in anticipation of a compliant or an order to produce them but a an aide memoire to the practitioner. The form of File notes is not prescribed the only requirement is that it record “material” events.”[63]
[63] Applicant’s Written outline of submissions at 8.
Again, the Applicant’s failure to produce anything by way of evidence to refute the Respondent’s claims must weigh against him.
In relation to the Applicant’s dealings with Ms Chhetri there is no doubt that although he proffered “immigration advice”, he failed to enter into a proper formal agreement with her for the provision of services; he failed to act on her instructions; he appears to have misled her in relation to issues of employment under the RSMS with Jaya Transport and he failed to produce her client file as required by the Code when required.
Concessions and withdrawals
The Applicant has conceded to a breach of clause 9.3 and initially, at least to a breach of clause 5.2.[64]
[64] Applicant’s SFIC of 24 March 2020 at [4].
The Respondent in final submissions has indicated that it does not wish to press a contravention of 9.1.[65]
[65] Respondent’s Written Submissions at [28].
The Tribunal is not bound to accept any of these concessions or withdrawals but must determine, for itself, on the evidence before it (or not before it) at the time of its decision-making whether or not breaches occurred.[66]
[66] Shi and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31 at [37] per Kirby J.
Conclusions related to the Code [section 303(1)(h)]
The Respondent has alleged breaches of various sections of the Code, details of which appear above.
Both parties referred the Tribunal to the well-established dictum in Briginshaw that where a sanction might be of an extreme nature (in this case, the cancellation of registration), the Tribunal must satisfy itself that its findings are based on a high degree of satisfaction and not just some mere degree of concern or unease.[67]
The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding, are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.[68]
[67] Applicant’s Written Outline of Submissions at 11; Transcript, 29 July 2020 page 8 lines 24-40; Respondent’s Written Submissions at [18].
[68] Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 362 per Dixon J.
The Respondent, on this point notes
In Vines v ASIC [2007] NSWCA 75, Ipp JA observed that nothing in Briginshaw detracted from the proposition that a serious allegation might be proved by ‘circumstantial evidentiary facts’ and ‘inference and circumstance’ and found that the inquiry was, taking due account of the observation in Neat Holdings, whether the allegation had been proven on the balance of probabilities.[69]
[69] Respondent’s Written Submissions at [17].
Bearing those strictures in mind, the Tribunal finds in relation to the various clauses of the Code that:
·2.1 (give diligent and proper advice to client): BREACHED by the Applicant’s failure to act on Ms Chhetri’s instructions and to advise her properly in relation to the RSMS visa application.
·2.9 (not make misleading statements): BREACHED by the Applicant’s misleading statements regarding the visa status of Ms Chhetri and in relation to the visa application involving Jaya Transport. The Applicant’s submission that any failing in this regard is vitiated by provisions in section 55 of the Act which it says “permits the giving of relevant information at any time prior to decision,”[70] cannot be sustained as section 55(2) clearly indicates that a Minister does not have to wait upon such information before making a decision and, if accepted, would mean that an applicant could delay replies to statutory Notices indefinitely.
·2.9A (not mislead MARA/the Department by providing misleading information or withholding information): BREACHED by the Applicant in relation to information regarding the Jaya Transport’s status and nomination and failure to produce relevant client files as required.
·2.19 (requirement to provide sufficient information to MARA/the Department to allow the undertaking of its responsibilities): BREACHED by Applicant’s failure to maintain and provide proper and comprehensive client files as required.
·5.2 (provide client Applicant with written confirmation of the services, fees and disbursements): BREACHED, as admitted by the Applicant, in relation to his dealings with Ms Chhetri and with Jaya Transport.
·6.1 (keep proper records): BREACHED by the Applicant in relation to both Ms Chhetri and Jaya Transport.
·6.1A (keep records for statutory period): BREACHED by the Applicant as a consequence of his actions in relation to clause 6.1.
·9.1 (respond properly to a complainant who has made a complaint): BREACHED, to the extent that the complaint was on foot by the Applicant’s failure to respond in a proper and timely manner to Ms Chhetri’s complaints and to make timely restitution of financial matters. The subsequent withdrawal of the complaint may render this finding moot and of no consequence.
·9.3 (respond in a proper and timely fashion to MARA/the Department in relation to complaints under investigation): BREACHED by the Applicant in failing to produce Ms Chhetri’s file to MARA or provide a proper file and account of dealings with Jaya Transport.
[70] Applicant’s Written outline of Submissions at 10.
There is a further matter which the Tribunal must take into account. On 31 October 2019 the Applicant’s registration was cancelled. As of that date, the Applicant ceased to be a registered migration agent and under section 280 of the Act, “a person who is not a registered migration agent must not give immigration assistance.” The decision took effect immediately upon notification to the Applicant (section 305(3)). Despite this clear provision, the Applicant continued to advertise the services of Krish Associates Immigration Consulting with the name of the Applicant attached to such advertising.[71] While there was no prohibition on the company advertising its services as provided by Sundari Vasudevan, who is a registered migration agent,[72] it is clearly a breach of the Act for the Applicant to continue to put his own name forward in this context. No stay order in relation to the MARA decision (section 306AA) was in place and its order deregistering the Applicant was effective at a time that he advertised his immigration services in breach of that determination.
[71] Respondent’s Tender Bundle at 21-25.
[72] Ibid at 23.
Conclusions related to the Applicant’s integrity [section 303(1)(f)]
The Applicant has asserted that if the Tribunal were to make a finding that the Applicant had committed a serious breach of the Code this would amount to finding that he had committed “a breach of the general obligation of ‘candour’ and could, by reason of section 234 of the Migration Act constitute a criminal offence.”[73]
[73] Citing Re Davis (1947) 75 CLR 409, comments by Dixon J.
This does not, in the opinion of the Tribunal, necessarily follow as a matter of logic and, in any event, would be a matter for determination in another jurisdiction and by usual judicial processes. The Code itself contemplates no criminal sanctions, nor does section 303 of the Act, wherein is established the sanctions regime applicable to such instances.
That is not to say that a finding of providing false or misleading information is not in itself and by definition a serious matter.[74] It is.
[74] Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd (1992) 67 ALR 170, 171.
The question then arises as to whether or not the finding of serious breaches of the Code leads to the conclusion that the Applicant is not a fit and proper person or a person of integrity such that he should be allowed to retain his registration as a migration agent (section 303(1)(f)).
The requirement to be met under section 303(1)(f) is general in application and not confined to instances involving the provision of “immigration assistance”[75] and is also to be determined at the time of the Tribunal’s decision-making.[76]
[75] Krause v Office of Migration Agents Registration Authority [2019] FCAFC 52 at [126]-[134].
[76] Shi and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2008] HCA 31 at [37] per Kirby J.
The term “fit and proper” person is not defined in the Act and thus is, as explained by the High Court, context specific.
“The expression ‘fit and proper person’, standing alone, carries no precise meaning. It takes its meaning from its context, from those activities in which the person is or will be engaged and he ends to be served by those activities.”[77]
[77] Australian Broadcasting Authority v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321.
This takes the Tribunal’s consideration to the objects of the Act itself which are clearly stated in section 4(1) as:
The object of this Act is to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non-citizens.
Hence, fit and proper relates to a person in terms of their activities, or their “qualifications for offices or vocations,”[78] in this instance as a migration agent and provider of “immigration advice” to clients, and as a person required to adhere to the provisions of the Code.[79]
[78] Davies v Australian Securities Commission and Another (1995) 131 ALR 295 at 305, citing Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) (1955) 93 CLR 127 at [156]-[157].
[79] Re Nima Mottaghi and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2007] AATA 60 at [30]-[37].
The relevant definition of integrity was spelled out in Peng[80] as follows:
Disqualification can be on one or both grounds. I am obliged to satisfy myself firstly, whether or not the applicant is a person of integrity. This word is defined relevantly in Macquarie Dictionary as "soundness of moral principle and character; uprightness; honesty". In the alternative, I am to be satisfied whether the applicant is not a fit and proper person to give immigration assistance. The use of the word "assistance", in my view, extends not only to help given to would-be applicants, but also help given to the Department in the administration of immigration programs. In that regard, frankness and truth are of primary importance. As I said in Re Lachmaiya and Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1994) 90 AAR 148 at 155 - 156:
"The observance of truth in dealing with officials in migration matters (particularly where the truth is known only to the person making the statement) is of fundamental importance to the control mechanism which this country exercises in visa applications when dealing with the many reasons for coming to Australia."
[80] Peng and Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1998] AATA 12 at [26] per Deputy President McMahon. See also Tejani and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2009] AATA 240 at [105] and Lilenthal v Migration Agents Registration Authority [2002] FCA 93 at [22].
Considerations
The Applicant has been operating as a registered migration agent for some 18 years and there was no evidence presented to the Tribunal to indicate that MARA had previously raised any concerns about his behaviour or operations. Nor was there evidence of previous complaints against him from clients which would establish any negative pattern of behaviour or conduct. He has undertaken regular professional development courses over a number of years.[81]
[81] T Documents at 41, [145].
As such, the Applicant cannot claim that he was unaware of his obligations under the Act or the requirements under the Code, nor can he plead naivete or inexperience in dealing with clients, sponsorships or in responding to statutory Notices from MARA.
It can only be concluded that his failure to respond to MARA’s Notices in the time and manner required was deliberate and wilful. It can only be concluded that his failure to maintain files (an essential element of the Scheme) was grossly negligent. It can only be concluded that the provision of false or misleading information to MARA/the Department was calculated and knowing. It can only be concluded that the Applicant’s failure to present written evidence or appear as a witness for cross-examination in the Tribunal was a deliberate attempt to shield himself from scrutiny per Jones v Dunkel.
Although writing in dissent in Cunliffe, Mason CJ emphasised that the point of this particular registration scheme was
“to achieve that object by protecting aliens from incompetent and unscrupulous advisors through the introduction of a regulatory scheme which is designed to ensure that those who advise and represent aliens are competent and are persons of integrity.”[82]
[82] Cunliffe v Commonwealth (1994) 124 ALR 120, 128-129.
Since the whole raison d’etre of the Scheme is consumer protection, this aspect of consideration must be given significant weight.
Sanctions
A finding that the Applicant has breached the requirements of sections 303(1)(f) and 303(1)(h) of the Act means that the sanctions regime of section 303(1)(a)-(c) is enlivened. The range of sanctions available encompass various degrees of severity, from the issuing of a caution to the suspension or cancellation of registration.
MARA’s Complaint Classification Matrix[83] sets out its advice to its own decision-makers as a guide to the relationship between findings and sanctions. The Tribunal is not bound by this as it is not a statutory instrument or binding direction and it is clear that the Tribunal must decide for itself the appropriate level of sanction in each case and may, if appropriate, vary any sanction imposed by MARA.[84]
[83] Appendix A to MARA: Working with the Migration Advice Industry (1 July 2019); Tender Bundle at [26].
[84] Re Christopher Gerald Narayanan and Migration Agents Registration Authority [2006] AATA 353.
In this instance the Tribunal is satisfied, to a requisite level of confidence (Briginshaw) that the actions of the Applicant constitute a serious breach of the Code and that they reveal the Applicant to be not a fit and proper person or a person of integrity.
It follows that sanctions at the upper level of severity are appropriate.
The Tribunal has considered both the options of suspension for a significant period of time with conditions attached (sections 303(1)(b) and 304(1)) or of cancellation (section 303(1)(a) which would result in denying the Applicant the chance to re-register within a five year period (section 292)).
Four elements have weighed most heavily with the Tribunal. The first is the extent of the breaches of the Code and in particular the failure of the most basic requirements of proper record keeping.
Secondly, the failure to respond in a proper and timely manner to various Notices from MARA which the Applicant knew required his considered response and were matters of some gravity.
Thirdly, the behaviour of the Applicant in continuing to advertise his service after notification of the cancellation of his registration.
Fourthly and finally, the Applicant’s failure to put on significant evidence or give evidence in his own behalf to address all the issues which this Tribunal has considered and in relation to which he was clearly on notice at the time of the Tribunal’s hearing.
Consideration of these elements have led the Tribunal to the conclusion that the extent of the breaches of the Code and the lack of integrity of the Applicant justify fully the imposition of the sanction of registration cancellation.
DECISION
The decision under review is affirmed.
I certify that the preceding 126 (one hundred and twenty-six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Chris Puplick AM, Senior Member
..............................[SGD]..........................................
Associate
Dated: 16 September 2020
Date(s) of hearing: 29 July 2020 (on the papers) Solicitors for the Applicant: Christopher Levingston & Associates Solicitors for the Respondent: M Gao, Australian Government Solicitor
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