Vasilopoulos and Migration Agents' Registration Authority
[2005] AATA 368
•27 April 2005
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2005] AATA 368
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL )
) No V2004/507
GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISION ) Re ARTHUR VASILOPOULOS Applicant
And
MIGRATION AGENTS' REGISTRATION AUTHORITY
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal Senior Member Joan Dwyer Date27 April 2005
PlaceMelbourne
Decision The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review. In substitution, the Tribunal decides:
(i) Mr Vasilopoulos has not complied with clauses 2.8(a), (c) and (d), 5.2, 6.1(c) and 11.3 of the Migration Agents’ Code of Conduct prescribed under s 314(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”); and
(ii) In all the circumstances, it is not appropriate to cancel or suspend his registration or to caution him under s 303 of the Act.
[sgd] Joan Dwyer
Senior Member
MIGRATION AGENTS’ REGISTRATION – suspension of applicant’s registration as migration agent – complaint from DIMIA – whether applicant breached the Code of Conduct for migration agents prescribed under Migration Agents’ Regulations 1998 – finding that clauses of Code of Conduct breached – breaches relating to office procedures rather than professional standards – purpose of scheme is to protect the public not to punish – applicant completed courses in office procedures and e-mail – appropriate to take into account matters after decision under review – no longer reason for caution – evidence that caution may affect ability to obtain professional indemnity insurance required from July 2005 –appropriate that no sanction be imposed – decision under review set aside.
LAW REFORM – suggested amendment to the Migration Agents’ Code of Conduct.
Migration Act 1958 ss 286, 303, 304, 304A, 306, 314(1), 417.
Migration Legislation Amendment (Migration Agents’ Integrity Measures) 2004
Re Altintas and Migration Agent’s Registration Authority [2004] AATA 978
Re Donald and Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2001) 64 ALD 717
Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577
Freeman v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 19 FCR 342
Re Griffiths and Migration Agents’ Registration Authority [2001] AATA 240Re Hudson and Migration Agents’ Review Authority [2004] AATA 1007
REASONS FOR DECISION
27 April 2005 Senior Member Joan Dwyer INTRODUCTION
1. This is an application under s 306 of the Migration Act 1958 (“the Act”) for review of a decision of the Migration Agents Registration Authority (“MARA”) made on 19 April 2004, which suspended Mr Vasilopoulos’ registration as a Migration Agent for a period of twelve months, or until the following conditions were satisfied (T2, p7):
·a minimum period of six months has passed;
·[Mr Vasilopoulos] complete and pass the Migration Advice Professional Knowledge Entrance Examination; and
·[Mr Vasilopoulos] undertake a CDP activity which is a file management course and provides evidence to the Authority that the Agent has completed that course; and
·[Mr Vasilopoulos] provide a statutory declaration in Commonwealth form stating that he has not made immigration representations for a fee nor given immigration assistance as defined in the Act while suspended.
The basis for that decision was MARA’s finding that Mr Vasilopoulos had not complied with the Migration Agents’ Code of Conduct (“the Code”) prescribed under s 314(1) of the Act.
2. At the hearing, Mr Byrne, solicitor, appeared for Mr Vasilopoulos. Mr Vasilopoulos gave evidence. Mr Brereton, a Senior Executive Lawyer with Australian Government Solicitor, appeared for MARA. The Tribunal had before it the documents (“the T-Documents”) lodged pursuant to s 37 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (“the AAT Act”), together with the exhibits tendered during the hearing.
3. The matter was heard over two days on 28 February and 1 March 2005. At the end of the hearing on 1 March 2005, the Tribunal, on the application of Mr Byrne and without opposition from Mr Brereton, decided to adjourn the matter to a telephone hearing on 20 April 2005, in order to provide time for Mr Vasilopoulos to attend a course run by iVisaLaw on immigration practice and office procedures and also to obtain instruction in the use of e-mail. The Tribunal also gave leave to both parties to provide evidence and a submission addressing the possible consequences of imposition of a caution under s 303(1)(c) of the Act, for a Migration Agent who later seeks professional indemnity insurance. Such insurance will be compulsory when seeking any renewal of registration after 1 July 2005. The Tribunal had indicated that if a decision to administer a caution could have the effect of making it impossible or impractical for a Migration Agent to obtain compulsory professional indemnity insurance, that would render a caution similar to a suspension or cancellation. The Tribunal expressed concern about that possibility and suggested that it could be a relevant consideration in exercising the discretion under ss 303 of the Act.
4. Mr Vasilopoulos appeared, but was not represented, at the resumed telephone hearing. Mr Brereton appeared on behalf of MARA.
BACKGROUND
5. Mr Vasilopoulos has been a registered Migration Agent since June 2000. Prior to that, he worked with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Department”) or its predecessors, for 30 years.
6. This matter did not arise of a result of a complaint by a client of Mr Vasilopoulos. He said that no client of his had ever complained to MARA. Mr Brereton did not challenge that evidence. The complaint was initiated by the Department in a letter to MARA dated 3 March 2003 (T5, pp76‑77). The concerns raised by the Department related to requests for ministerial intervention under s 417 of the Act lodged by Mr Vasilopoulos. The suggestion was that an analysis of five such requests “revealed three with poorly substantiated claims and another which lacked a supporting document alluded to in the initial intervention request”. The letter also raised concern as to a failure by Mr Vasilopoulos to contact the Department in respect of one matter, once he had obtained a better understanding of his client’s circumstances than he had at the time he lodged the application. There was concern about one case in which Mr Vasilopoulos had lodged a request for Ministerial intervention under s 417 of the Act, when a request had already been lodged by another Migration Agent. The letter of complaint stated:
These cases raise concerns about Mr VASILOPOULOS’ level of knowledge of migration law and policies (Code of Conduct Clause 2.3), his disclosure of likely success of applications to clients (Code of Conduct Clauses 2.6 & 2.7), his submitting vexatious applications (Code of Conduct Clause 2.17,) and his providing sufficient relevant information to the Department to allow full assessment of the facts against the relevant criteria (Code of Conduct Clause 2.19).
7. MARA requested Mr Vasilopoulos to produce his files relating to the five clients referred to by the Department. He did so. The MARA decision was made after an examination of those files. The files were copied and included in full in the T Documents. MARA made no findings in respect of the alleged breaches of Clauses 2.7 and 2.19 of the Code, both of which are in Part 2 headed “Standards of Professional Conduct”, but it found a number of other breaches under Part 5 “Fees and Charges”, Part 6 “Record Keeping and Management” and Part 11 “Client Awareness of the Code”.
8. It should be said that there is no suggestion in this matter that Mr Vasilopoulos has been anything but cooperative with MARA. He clearly took the allegations against him very seriously and prepared a careful and detailed response to the matters raised by MARA (T7, pp80-156). Nor is there any suggestion that Mr Vasilopoulos ever charged a client an excessive fee. The complaints as to fees and charges relate to inadequate documentation, but not to overcharging.
9. At the hearing, the respondent relied on the five client files as containing evidence of breaches of the Code. At the commencement of the hearing, Mr Brereton agreed to provide the Tribunal with a table showing which alleged breaches were relied on in respect of each of the five clients. That table was very helpful in understanding the evidence and preparing these reasons for decision.
10. The alleged breaches were in respect of Mr Vasilopoulos’ dealings with:
(i)Mr and Mrs K and their children, from Fiji, who came to Mr Vasilopoulos after another Migration Agent had lodged a Refugee Visa, which was later refused by the Refugee Review Tribunal (“RRT”), on their behalf. Mr Vasilopoulos advised the family to leave Australia. Once they had done so, he lodged an (offshore) application for a skilled visa on 28 June 2002, on the basis of Mr K’s trade skills. He lodged that application without lodging an assurance of support, which is one of the matters required to qualify for a skilled visa.
(ii)Ms D, Mr and Mr K’s daughter, on behalf of whom Mr Vasilopoulos lodged an application for a bridging visa and, on 1 September 2002, wrote to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (“the Minister”) requesting an exercise of his discretion under s 417 of the Act on compassionate grounds.
(iii)Ms E, from Mongolia, on behalf of whom Mr Vasilopoulos, on 7 October 2002, wrote to the Minister seeking an exercise of his discretion under s 417 of the Act on compassionate grounds. It transpired that a s 417 request had already been lodged on Ms E’s behalf by another Migration Agent. After the Minister decided not to exercise his discretion in favour of Ms E, Mr Vasilopoulos lodged an application for a Child (Residence) visa on her behalf, on 19 December 2002, in order to give access to Ministerial Intervention under s 351 of the Act.
(iv)Mr R, from Egypt, who also came to see Mr Vasilopoulos after being unsuccessful in his application to the RRT. Mr Vasilopoulos requested Ministerial intervention under s 417 on his behalf.
(v)Mrs Bi, for whom Mr Vasilopoulos acted in lodging an application for a protection visa. When that application was unsuccessful, he lodged an application to the RRT and subsequently a request for Ministerial intervention under s 417.
BREACHES OF THE CODE AND EVIDENCE AS TO THOSE BREACHES
professional standards
Clauses 2.1, 2.3 & 2.4
11. The alleged breaches relied on by Mr Brereton in regard to Part 2 of the Code dealing with standards of professional conduct were breaches of Clauses 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4. Clauses 2.1, 2.3 and 2.4 provide:
STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
2.1 A Migration agent must always:
(a)act in accordance with the law and the legitimate interests of his or her client; and
(b)deal with his or her client competently, diligently, fairly and without any conflict of interest that would affect the legitimate interest of the client.
...
2.3A migration agent’s professionalism should be reflected in a sound working knowledge of the Migration Act and Migration regulations, and other legislation relating to migration procedure, and a capacity to provide accurate and timely advice.
...
2.4A migration agent must have due regard to a client’s dependence on the agent’s knowledge and experience
12. The respondent alleges Mr Vasilopoulos breached those clauses in his dealings with Mr K and Ms E.
13. In regard to the first client Mr K, the concern arose because Mr Vasilopoulos had lodged a skills visa application on 28 June 2002 (T9, p491), without an assurance of support. Mr Vasilopoulos agreed that he had lodged the application without the assurance of support. First, he raised a technical legal point. He explained that the definition of an assurance of support in the regulation dealing with this particular sort of visa could not be satisfied. That problem has now been corrected by amendment to the legislation. However, even before those amendments, it was possible to lodge an assurance of support which was accepted as complying with the regulations. Thus, I do not regard the technical point as a satisfactory explanation. The intention of the provision was clear and Mr Vasilopoulos would have lodged an assurance of support at the time that the visa application was lodged, if Mr K could provide a contact who was prepared to give the necessary assurance. As Mr Vasilopoulos explained, the reason no assurance of support was lodged with the skilled visa application was that, at that time, neither Mr K nor his family or friends knew anybody whose financial position satisfied the requirements for lodging an acceptable assurance of support.
14. Mr Vasilopoulos explained that when Mr K came to see him in about June 2002, he had already lodged a refugee application, through another Migration Agent. Mr Vasilopoulos realised that it could not succeed and it was subsequently refused by the RRT on 23 August 2002 (T9, p481). Mr Vasilopoulos said that from his discussions with Mr K, he also realised that Mr K had trade skills as a mechanic, which entitled him to obtain a visa on the basis of his trade skills. However, that application had to be made from offshore. Further, it had to be made quickly for two reasons. First, Mr K was 44, and an application for a general skilled migration visa can only be made by a person under 45. Secondly, an applicant must have been in employment for a specified period of time up until and including the time when the visa application is made. Once Mr K’s application for a refugee visa was refused, he would no longer be entitled to work in Australia. Thus, Mr Vasilopoulos advised him he had to leave Australia and return to American Samoa, where he had lived from March 1996 to May 2001, to continue working there so that the visa could be lodged.
15. Although Mr K’s application for general skilled migration to Australia was refused by the Department, because no assurance of support had been lodged (T9, p487), the appeal to the Migration Review Tribunal (“MRT”) was successful as to the other aspects of the application. Mr Vasilopoulos produced the MRT decision record of 13 September 2004 which remitted the application to the Department for consideration of the assurance of support (A5). Mr Vasilopoulos explained that that form of decision is used where the MRT is satisfied that the applicant has met the trade skills relationships and age requirements for that visa. He said that it had taken a considerable time for Mr K’s family to find somebody who was prepared to be the assurer, and whose financial position met the departmental requirements, but that hurdle had eventually been overcome. He said that Mr K would now have no difficulty satisfying the assurance of support requirements. Mr Vasilopoulos explained that if he had waited until the family could provide a satisfactory assurance of support, the application could not have been lodged as Mr K would have turned 45.
16. In regard to Mr Vasilopoulos’ dealings with Ms E, the respondent relied on the fact that Mr Vasilopoulos had made a request for Ministerial intervention under s 417 of the Act, when another application had already been lodged by another agent. Mr Vasilopoulos explained that Ms E was Mongolian and could not speak English when she came to see him. She could not afford an interpreter and, even if she had been able to do so, Mongolian interpreters are very hard to find in Melbourne. He said he knew of only one recognised interpreter, who was usually busy with Court or Tribunal hearings. He said Ms E came with a friend who acted as an interpreter. She had assured him that the earlier agent had not taken any steps after receiving an unfavourable Tribunal decision. He therefore lodged the application for exercise of Ministerial discretion under s 417 of the Act, not knowing that such an application had already been lodged.
17. When Mr Vasilopoulos became aware of the unsuccessful application for Ministerial Intervention under s 417 of the Act, Mr Vasilopoulos lodged a child visa application on behalf of Ms E, in order to give her access to Ministerial intervention under s 351 of the Act. He explained to Ms E that she could not obtain a child visa, but that it was only lodged for her to gain access to the Minister under s 351.
18. In the application itself, which is signed by Ms E, question 19 asks, “Is there any other information you want the Department to take into account in deciding whether or not to grant bridging visa class E to you?” The answer given is “Yes” and the details provided are (T11, p742):
I have applied for a child visa so I can access Minister again under section 351.
19. Mr Vasilopoulos explained that he had acted under considerable time pressure in his work for Ms E. He said that although Ms E and her friend came into his office empty handed, they told him that Ms E’s application had been refused by the RRT. He said he acted quickly in putting in the request to the Minister before he had obtained Ms E’s file from the Department, because it was imperative that an application be lodged as quickly as possible once her original application had been refused, in order to give her an entitlement to a bridging visa, so as to rectify or avoid her becoming “unlawful”. He explained that where a claim has been rejected by the Refugee Review Tribunal, a client becomes “unlawful” 35 days after the date of the decision, if the decision was posted to the client, and 21 days after that day if the client was at the Tribunal when a decision was delivered. Those dates were not challenged by Mr Brereton.
20. In regard to the alleged breach of clause 2.1(a) of the Code, Mr Vasilopoulos’ evidence about Mr K and Ms E satisfied me that in each case he did act in accordance with the law and the legitimate interests of his clients. In regard to clause 2.1(b), I find that he did deal with his clients competently and fairly, and without any conflict of interest. I find that he acted with the best interests of his clients as the foremost consideration in his mind.
21. As to whether Mr Vasilopoulos dealt with his clients diligently, as I said during the hearing, there are matters which were troubling in regard to his handling of Mr K’s matter. I am concerned that he did not keep Mr K informed about the progress of his application. The e-mail Mr K sent to Mr Vasilopoulos one month after his application for a skilled visa had been refused (T9, p472) establishes that Mr Vasilopoulos had not directly advised Mr K, who was in American Samoa, of the refusal of the application. Mr Vasilopoulos said that he had passed that information on to the sponsor for Mr K, who was resident in Melbourne, but apparently that message was not passed on to Mr K. I find that was not an acceptable way for Mr Vasilopoulos to advise his client of the outcome of his application. Another concern was that there was no record on the file of Mr Vasilopoulos’ communication with the sponsor. I was also concerned that Mr Vasilopoulos had not written to Mr K pointing out the need to produce an assurance of support as quickly as possible.
22. I considered whether on the basis of those concerns I should find that Mr Vasilopoulos failed to deal with his client, Mr K, “diligently”. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary gives the following three definitions of the word diligent:
Diligent (adj):
1. Of persons: ‘Constant in application, persevering in endeavour, assiduous’, industrious; ‘not idle, not negligent, not lazy.’ J.
2. Of actions, etc.: Constantly or steadily applied; prosecuted with activity and perseverance; assiduous.
3. Attentive, observant, heedful, careful. (Of persons and their actions, etc.) Obs.
23. Mr Vasilopoulos explained that because his charges are moderate and because he quite often acts without fee, he is not in a position to telephone clients overseas to report on progress in a matter. I did suggest to him that, in that situation where a client has an e-mail, the best way to report on progress is by e-mail. I will refer further to that issue later in these reasons.
24. I have decided that the matters of concern, while indicating that Mr Vasilopoulos’ performance did not comply with best practice standards, was not so inadequate that I should find that he did not deal diligently with his client, Mr K. He did reply to Mr K after receiving the e-mail enquiring about the progress his application. Mr Vasilopoulos could have dealt with Mr K more diligently, but that does not mean that he did not deal with him diligently. The defaults on Mr Vasilopoulos’ part are more specifically and more appropriately dealt with as breaches of clauses 2.8 and 6.1.
25. As to clause 2.3 of the Code, I find that Mr Vasilopoulos’ professionalism is reflected in a sound working knowledge of the Migration Act and Migration Regulations. I find that he does have the capacity to provide accurate and timely advice to his clients, and that he does do so.
26. I am also satisfied, as to clause 2.4 of the Code, that Mr Vasilopoulos does have due regard to his clients’ dependence on his knowledge and experience.
27. I do not find that Mr Vasilopoulos failed to comply with any of the clauses of the Code relating to standards of professional conduct.
Clause 2.8
28. Mr Vasilopoulos is alleged to have breached clause 2.8 of the Code in respect of his dealings with all five clients, whose files were considered by MARA. Clause 2.8 of the Code provides:
2.8A migration agent must:
(a)within a reasonable time after agreeing to represent a client, confirm the client’s instructions in writing; and
(b)act in accordance with the client’s instructions; and
(c)keep the client fully and regularly informed in writing of the progress of each case or application that the agent undertakes for the client; and
(d)within a reasonable time after the case of application is decided, tell the client in writing of the outcome of the client’s case or application.
29. In regard to Mr K, I find that Mr Vasilopoulos did not comply with paragraph 2.8(a), 2.8(c) or 2.8(d) of the Code. Nowhere on the file is there written confirmation of Mr K’s instructions in writing, and Mr Vasilopoulos did not contend that he done so. I find there was a breach of 2.8(a) in respect of Mr K.
30. I agree with Mr Brereton’s submission that there is also a clear breach of Clauses 2.8(c) and 2.8(d) in respect of Mr Vasilopoulos’ dealings with Mr K. The application for a skilled sponsored visa was refused by the MRT on 23 May 2003, and on 14 June 2003, Mr K wrote to Mr Vasilopoulos asking what had happened about the application. As explained earlier, Mr Vasilopoulos said he had telephoned Mr K’s sponsor, but the message did not appear to have been passed on. Clause 2.8(d) requires that there be written advice of the outcome of a client’s application. A telephone call to a relative in Melbourne does not satisfy that requirement. Thus, I find that Mr Vasilopoulos did not comply with 2.8(c) or 2.8(d).
31. In regard to Ms D, the daughter of Mr K, Mr Vasilopoulos said that he did not regard her as his client. He explained that he thought she had left Australia together with her family, when they left in order for Mr K to go “offshore” to lodge his skilled visa application. Mr Vasilopoulos said “I almost fell off my chair when he walked in. I thought she had gone back with her family”.
32. However, Mr Vasilopoulos did lodge a request for an exercise of Ministerial discretion for Ms D when she came into his office on or about 1 September 2002 (T9, p473). He said he lodged the application under s 417 of the Act because, unless it was lodged, Ms D would become “unlawful”, and he felt something had to be done to regularise her position in Australia. Mr Vasilopoulos said he did not charge Ms D for the lodging of that request and she did not return to see him after it had been lodged. He said that he did not regard Ms D as a client in her own right. He helped her because Mr K and his family were his clients in regard to the skilled visa.
33. As I said in Re Hudson and Migration Agents’ Registration Authority [2004] AATA 1007, I consider that the term “client”, as used in the Code, refers to a person who uses the services of a migration agent to obtain “immigration assistance”. Mr Byrne said that he accepted the analysis of the term client in the decision in Hudson, paragraphs 37-44 and 85-119. I find that Ms D was a “client” of Mr Vasilopoulos. In relation to Ms D, I find Mr Vasilopoulos failed to comply with Clauses 2.8(a), (c) and (d) of the Code. There is no evidence on the file that Mr Vasilopoulos confirmed Ms D’s instructions in writing; or kept her fully and regularly informed in writing of the progress of her application, or that he told her in writing of the outcome of her application. Nor did he contend that he did so.
34. Ms E’s client file contained a letter of appointment, which confirms her instructions in writing (T11, p741). Therefore I do not find any breach Clause 2.8(a) in regard to Ms E. I find there was a failure to comply with clauses 2.8(c) and (d). I am aware, from Mr Vasilopoulos’ evidence, that Ms E was unable to speak, let alone read English. He said he advised her through the interpreter, but the Code requires written communications. A letter on his letterhead would at least have let Ms E know that she should come in to see him. I find there was a failure to comply with clause 2.8(c) and (d) of the Code.
35. Similarly, in regard to the other two clients, Mr R and Ms B, there is no correspondence on file except for original confirmations of instructions in writing (Mr R - T7, p98; Ms B – T10, p321). I find those confirmations of instructions satisfy clause 2.8(a). I find that there was a failure to comply with clauses 2.8(c), in regard to Mr R and Ms B.
Clause 2.17
36. The only client in regard to whom the respondent alleged Mr Vasilopoulos breached clause 2.17 of the Code was Ms E. Clause 2.17 provides:
2.17If an application under the Migration Act of the Migration Regulations is vexatious or grossly unfounded (for example, an application that has no hope of success) the agent:
(a)must not encourage the client to lodge the application; and
(b)must advise the client that, in the agent’s opinion, the application is vexatious or grossly unfounded; and
(c)if the client still wishes to lodge the application – must obtain written acknowledgement of the client of the advice given under paragraph (b).
37. Mr Vasilopoulos lodged an application for a child visa on behalf of Ms E. There is no doubt that, as Ms E was an adult, she could not succeed on that application. However, Mr Vasilopoulos explained that he had lodged that application only in order to give access to exercise of Ministerial discretion under s 351 of the Act. The letter of appointment Mr Vasilopoulos prepared for Ms E to sign makes that point quite clear. It includes the following (T11, p741) :
... This application is lodged for the sole purpose of gaining access to the Minister’s discretionary powers under Section 351 of the Migration Act, as I believe there are factors he did not previously have before him about my circumstances.
I fully understand that this course of action will enable me to remain lawfully in Australia and the Minister will be able to consider my case only after I receive refusal advice from DIMIA and the Migration Review Tribunal (MRT).
38. The covering letter that Mr Vasilopoulos sent to the Department with the child visa application states (T11, p744):
My client is fully aware that she does not meet the criteria for the class of visa she is applying for and is making the application for the sole purpose of seeking the Ministers intervention after the application has been refused by you and the Migration Review Tribunal.
39. The practice of lodging applications that do not have any reasonable prospect of success, in order to gain access to an exercise of Ministerial discretion appears to be recognised within Migration Agent circles. In my reasons for decision in the matter of Altintas and Migration Agents’ Registration Authority [2004] AATA 978, I said at paragraphs 156 and 157:
156.... I have found that the advice Mr Altintas gave to his clients Mr Toohey and Miss Khamhong, was that “the system” operated in such a way that they needed to lodge a visa claim, even though it would inevitably be rejected, in order to eventually be able to seek an exercise of a Ministerial discretion.
157.I find that the advice Mr Altintas gave to his clients was not unreasonable or ill‑informed. I accept that it was not the advice the Department would want him to give but, bearing in mind the way the legislation as to exercise of Ministerial discretion is structured, it may well have been good advice from the point of view of his clients. It would have been helpful if Mr Fell had addressed the way in which the system [of applying] for an exercise of Ministerial discretion operates so as to encourage the lodging of applications as a step towards obtaining an exercise of Ministerial discretion, even in circumstances where the primary application cannot succeed.
Similarly, in Hudson, I considered the matter at paragraphs 71, 72 and 73:
71.As to the recent lodging of the application for a refugee visa on grounds which it would seem cannot succeed, Ms Johnsons said that she did that on advice from a migration agent at Victoria Legal Aid. She said she was advised that it was the appropriate way to place her in the position where an application could be made to the Minister for an exercise of the Ministerial discretion.
72.Although Dr Hudson was very critical of that step in his cross-examination of Ms Johnsons, it transpired later that his advice to Mr Vernal and Ms Johnsons when they came to see him in April 2002, had been to the same effect. They came to ask what steps to take about the difficult position in which his actions had placed Ms Johnsons. He said that he would also have asked her to sign a visa application which was without foundation. He explained that he would have lodged an application for a child visa on her behalf, but that he would have noted on it that it was without foundation, and was being lodged in order to provide a basis for Tribunal rejection, so that Ministerial intervention could be sought.
73. Dr Hudson’s evidence was as follows (trans, p101-102):
Well, if I may explain what I was proposing to do? My proposal was that Romantha should put in an application for another kind of visa and I would have thought perhaps - this is going to sound silly, but – a child visa. Now, obviously she was not eligible for a child visa because she was not a child, citizen or anything like that. But the technique I was – or the tactic I was going to suggest which I have used successfully with other clients, is you put in an application for something like child visa. You state frankly and honestly in that application that the applicant is not entitled to a child visa because he is not a child, and you state frankly and honestly this is being done only as a way of accessing the Minister's discretion under section 351.
Then of course, the application for a child visa gets refused. You make an appeal to the Migration Review Tribunal. Again you state honestly in the appeal papers that this application is only being put in for the sake of accessing the Minister's intervention. That also gets naturally refused by the Migration Review Tribunal. Furthermore, all these things can happen very quickly if you just admit up front that this is the purpose of the application. It is not really to secure a child visa, or to win the appeal.
In my experience, it can be done in a couple of weeks with the Department and another couple of weeks with the Tribunal. The Migration Review Tribunal then refuses the child visa and then you make an application to the Minister for humanitarian consideration under section 351, pointing out – in this case – pointing out that Romantha Johnsons has a child who is an Australian citizen which is the main - one of the main criteria used by the Minister for granting humanitarian intervention which would have made her almost certain to succeed. So that is what I would have done.
40. The course suggested by Dr Hudson as the appropriate course to adopt is precisely what Mr Vasilopoulos did in this matter. On the evidence I have heard in this matter, and in Altintas and Hudson, the practice of lodging claims which can not succeed, in order to gain access to Ministerial intervention is widespread, and does sometimes result in a favourable Ministerial response.
41. I recognise that in the matter of Altintas, I did find that such an application was “grossly unfounded” to use the words in clause 2.17 of the Code. However, Mr Altintas did not make clear on the applications he lodged, that they were unfounded and were being lodged only to access the Minister’s intervention. I consider that where the application shows on its face that it is unfounded, and gives a reason for being lodged, it is not correct to characterize it as either vexatious or grossly unfounded. Thus, I do not find that there has been a breach of clause 2.17 of the Code in Mr Vasilopoulos’ filing of the child visa application on behalf of Ms E.
clauses relating to fees and charges
Clause 5.2
42. The respondent alleged Mr Vasilopoulos breached clause 5.2 in his dealings with all five clients. Clause 5.2 provides:
5.2 A migration agent must:
(a)before starting work for a client, give the client:
(i)an estimate of fees in the form of charges for each hour or each service, and disbursements that the agent is likely to incur as part of the work; and
(ii)an estimate of the time likely to be taken in performing a service; and
(b)as soon as possible after receiving instructions, obtain written acceptance by the client, if possible, of the terms of the work to be done; and
(c)give the client written confirmation of the terms of the service to be rendered; and
(d)give the client written notice of any material change to the estimated cost of providing a service, and the total likely cost because of the change, as soon as the agent becomes aware of the likelihood of a change occurring.
43. The files for each of the clients, Ms E, Mr R and Ms B, do contain letters of appointment signed by the client which include a statement of the fees to be charged for each service (Ms E - T11, p741; Mr R - T8, p321; Ms B - T7, p98). I find that those agreements do satisfy the requirements of Clause 5.2 in regard to those clients.
44. However, there is no fee agreement in respect of Mr K or his daughter, Ms D. In regard to Mr K, although there is no letter of appointment or estimate of fees on the file, I do find that an arrangement was made between Mr Vasilopoulos and Mr K as to those fees, and when they were to be paid. That is referred to in Mr K’s e-mail to Mr Vasilopoulos (T9, p472), where Mr K wrote:
... As we had agreed prior to leaving Australia that I will be paying the rest of the amount owed to when I get there.
45. Mr Vasilopoulos said that the agreement that he made with Mr K was that the first payment was made by the sponsor in Australia, and the balance was to be paid by Mr K when he returned to Australia as a result of the trade skills application being successful. I find that there has been a breach of Clause 5.2 in respect of Mr K, insofar as Clause 5.2 requires that there be written confirmation of the terms of the service to be rendered and written acceptance by the client. I find that there was an oral arrangement as to those matters with the client, but not a written agreement.
46. Mr Vasilopoulos said that he never regarded Ms D as his client and he only took steps he took on her behalf because he was concerned about her position in staying in Australia after her father’s application to the RRT had been refused, as already discussed. He said that he did not ever charge her any fee or intend to do so. As I have found that Ms D was a client of Mr Vasilopoulos, I consider the Code required that he give her a written estimate of the fees involved and the terms of the work to be completed and to otherwise comply with clause 5.2. On his evidence, the written estimate would simply have stated that he would not charge her a fee for lodging the application for exercise of Ministerial discretion, but that if he did further work for her, a written estimate of fees would be provided. I find that Mr Vasilopoulos breached clause 5.2 in respect of Ms D, although that breach is not of great significance, given that he did not charge her any fee.
record keeping and management
Clause 6.1
47. The respondent relied on the client files of all five clients in alleging breaches of clause 6.1 of the Code. That clause provides:
6.1A migration agent must maintain proper records that can be made available for inspection on request by the Authority, including files containing:
(a)a copy of each client’s application; and
(b)copies of each written communication between:
(i)the client and the agent; and
(ii)the agent and any relevant statutory authority; and
(c)file notes of every substantive or material oral communication between:
(i)the client and the agent; and
(ii)the agent and an official of any relevant statutory authority.
48. There is no problem in this matter as to Clauses 6.1(a) and 6.1(b). There are problems as to Mr Vasilopoulos’ compliance with Clause 6.1(c). I find that there have been breaches of clause 6.1(c), in that there are no file notes of several substantive or material oral communications which Mr Vasilopoulos says took place.
49. In respect of Mr K, Mr Vasilopoulos gave evidence that he had a number of communications with the sponsor, who he regarded as the representative of Mr K, after Mr K had returned to American Samoa. There is no record of any of those communications on the file. I find on Mr Vasilopoulos’ evidence that those conversations did take place. There must also have been conversations advising Mr Vasilopoulos when a person prepared to be the assurer of support was identified. There was no evidence of any file note as to those matters. However, the Code, strictly applied, only requires file notes of every substantive or material oral communication between the client and the agent, or between the agent and an official. It does not specifically include a requirement that there be file notes of every substantive or material oral communication between the client, or any representative of the client, and the agent.
50. Nor was there any record of the communications Mr Vasilopoulos said that he had with Mr K, when he attended Mr Vasilopoulos’ office, in which Mr Vasilopoulos explained to Mr K the need for the assurance of support, and the other steps that Mr K had to take, in order to be able to lodge the trade skills visa application. All those matters should have been recorded and kept on the file. The failure to keep file notes of the communications with Mr K is a breach of clause 6.1(c)(i). I do not find that the failure to keep file notes of conversations with the sponsor is a breach of the Code, but it falls short of standards the Code endeavours to ensure are maintained. It may be that there should be consideration given to adding into (b) and (c), a sub-paragraph (iii) reading “the agent or any other person in relation to the client’s migration affairs”, or some similar formula.
51. Mr Vasilopoulos said it was his practice to give a client a list of tasks for the client to do. A copy of that list should be kept on the file. It would serve as a file note of the advice Mr Vasilopoulos gave to his clients as to the material they should collect and provide to him, in order to lodge and succeed in an application for a visa. Such advice is clearly a substantive and material oral communication. I find there was a breach of Clause 6.1(c) in regard to Mr K.
52. Similarly, I find there was a breach of Clause 6.1(c) in regard to Ms D, Mr K’s daughter. There is no note of any conversation between Mr Vasilopoulos and Ms D. I find that, under clause 6.1(c) of the Act, Mr Vasilopoulos should have kept a file note of the oral communication he had with Ms D when she came into his office unexpectedly, and told him that she had remained in Australia.
53. In regard to Ms E, once again, there are no records of any communication with Ms E. Mr Vasilopoulos said that Ms E had not disclosed her true circumstances to him when she first came in. I find there should have been a file note of Mr Vasilopoulos’ consultation with Ms E, and the friend acting as her interpreter.As discussed previously, Mr Vasilopoulos said he was not aware on 7 October 2002 when he wrote the letter to the Minister seeking Ministerial intervention under s 417 (T11, p760), that another request had already been lodged, because Ms E through the interpreter had told him that no steps had been taken on her behalf after her application had been refused by the RRT. Thus, it would have been of assistance to him if he had a file note of the oral communication made to him by Ms E, through the friend acting as an interpreter.
54. Mr Vasilopoulos said that he had learnt in later consultations that Ms E was divorced, and had been the victim of domestic violence, and that she had a long standing relationship with a man who was an Australian citizen. He said that he has now made a spouse visa for Ms E to return to Australia on the basis of that relationship. He said he was not aware of the relationship when he lodged the application for exercise of the Minister’s discretionary powers under s 351 of the Act on her behalf, on 20 December 2002. All those matters should be recorded in dated file notes, as they are substantive or material oral communications.
55. Mr Brereton submitted that there are no file notes of any substantive or material communications with Mr R or Ms B on either of the files. This was not contested by Mr Byrne. I find that Mr Vasilopoulos breached clause 6.1(c) in relation to both Mr R and Ms B.
Clause 11.3
56. Mr Brereton submitted that Mr Vasilopoulos breached clause 11.3 in respect of his dealings with all the clients in question. Clause 11.3 provides:
11.3 Each contract made between an agent and a client must:
(a) include a statement about the existence and purpose of the Code; and
(b) guarantee that the client can obtain a copy of the Code, on request,
from the agent.
57. Mr Byrne conceded, and I find, that Mr Vasilopoulos did not comply with clause 11.3 in respect of all five clients.
evidence as to current practice
58. Mr Vasilopoulos said that he now ensures his practices comply with clause 11.3. After the hearing, with leave, he supplied a copy of his current service agreement (A8). It includes the following statement:
Please note Registered Migration Agent’s [sic] conduct is prescribed by the:
(a) Migration Agents Act [sic] and Regulations; and
(b)Migration Agents Registration Authority (MARA) Code of Conduct, which is a code governing all registered migration agents and the services they provide. A copy of the Code will be given to you on request.
59. I find that agreement does comply with clause 11.3.
summary of findings as to non-compliance with the code
60. Section 303 of the Act provides MARA with a discretion to cancel or suspend a migration agent’s registration, or caution him or her, if it becomes satisfied that the agent has not complied with the Code. I have found under s 303(h) of the Act, that Mr Vasilopoulos did not comply with clauses of the Code as follows:
·Clause 2.8(a) – written confirmation of instructions
Non-compliance in respect of Mr K and Ms D
·Clause 2.8(c) – keeping client fully informed in writing
Non-compliance in respect of all clients
·Clause 2.8(d) – advising clients in writing of outcome
Non-compliance in respect of Mr K, Ms D and Ms E
·Clause 5.2 – Providing written estimates and confirmation of fees and terms of service
Non-compliance in respect of Mr K, although there was an oral arrangement as to fees
Non-compliance in respect of Ms D, although her work was done without charge
·Clause 6.1(c) – file notes of material oral communications
Non-compliance in respect of each client
·Clause 11.3 – failure to include reference to Code in contract with clients
Non-compliance conceded in respect to each client.
61. I find that Mr Vasilopoulos has a good knowledge of Migration law and procedure, but that he has a poor knowledge of good file management and office procedures. There was no suggestion in the evidence that any of the clients, in respect of whom Mr Brereton alleged that there had been non compliance with the Code, have ever complained about Mr Vasilopoulos. In fact, his evidence was that none of his clients have ever lodged a complaint. Clients are entitled to be kept fully informed as to progress in their matters, and the keeping of file notes provides a means of refreshing one’s memory as to what matters have been discussed, and so reduces the chance of matters being overlooked or forgotten. It would also allow Mr Vasilopoulos to establish the content of his discussions regarding clients’ matters.
62. I find that Mr Vasilopoulos does bear in mind the interests of his clients and assists them by lodging applications and requests and giving advice, and that he does so with a good knowledge of Migration law and procedures. If it is his view that the fees he charges are not sufficient to cover him writing follow up letters to request that his clients produce further material, or to report to his clients overseas on progress of their matters, he should increase his fees sufficiently to allow him to do so. It is his duty to report to his clients in writing as required by clause 2.8(c) and (d) and to keep proper file records as required by clause 6.1(c). There are also formal obligations under clauses 5.2 and 11.3 of the Code, with which Mr Vasilopoulos has not strictly complied.
SANCTIONS
63. I find under s 303(h) of the Act, that Mr Vasilopoulos did not comply with a number of provisions in the Code, thus I have a discretion to cancel or suspend his registration or to decide that he be cautioned, or to decide that, in spite of the non‑compliance, it is not appropriate that a sanction be applied.
64. Mr Brereton did not submit that Mr Vasilopoulos’ registration should be cancelled or suspended. He submitted that Mr Vasilopoulos should be cautioned. He referred me to s 304A of the Act, inserted by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Migration Agents Integrity Measures) Act 2004. That section provides, from 1 July 2004, that a caution may be imposed with a condition or conditions for the lifting of the caution. He suggested that on the evidence at the hearing, a caution for a brief period for four to six months would be appropriate and that the conditions should be:
1)Completion by Mr Vasilopoulos of a file management course; and
2)The making of a statutory declaration by Mr Vasilopoulos that he has not given immigration advice between the date when he was notified of the making of the decision suspending his registration and the date when the operation of the suspension was stayed by Deputy President Forgie on 9 June 2004.
65. I said, during the hearing, that I considered that Mr Vasilopoulos should become familiar with the use of e-mail and should use it as a valuable tool in his practice, for keeping those clients who have access to e-mail up to date with developments in regard to their applications. I suggested that I may decide that it also be a condition that Mr Vasilopoulos have tuition in the use of e-mail.
66. After some discussion, Mr Byrne asked if the hearing could be adjourned for a short period of time to enable Mr Vasilopoulos to do a file management course. Mr Brereton did not oppose that application. I received in evidence a copy of a prospectus for such a course to be conducted on 16 April 2002 (A7) and I agreed to adjourn this hearing to a telephone directions hearing on 20 April 2002. With the consent of the parties, that directions hearing was later amended to a telephone hearing, to allow the Tribunal to take in further evidence if required.
67. Prior to the commencement of the resumed hearing, the Tribunal had received from Mr Vasilopoulos:
(a)A copy of his Certificate of completion and attendance at a iVisaLaw course on 16 and 17 April (A9), which included the following credits:
(i) Immigration Practice and Office Procedures;
(ii) Merits Review – MRT, RRT, AAT;
(iii) Business Visas – Temporary Visa Applications;
(iv) Points Test Application/Skilled Migration
(v) Spouse Visas; and
(vi) Apply for and Manage Student Visa.
(b)A copy of a letter from Tassos Gray, I.T. Consultant, certifying that Mr Vasilopoulos had completed of basic training in the use of e-mail (A10).
68. As I said in Hudson:
I consider it is necessary when deciding to impose a sanction under s 303 of the Act, to provide reasons for the choice of sanction, and, if conditions are imposed during a suspension, for the imposition of those conditions.
69. In this matter, MARA suspended Mr Vasilopoulos’ registration for twelve months, or until a minimum period of six months had passed and Mr Vasilopoulos had completed and passed the Migration Advice Professional Knowledge Entrants examination (“the entrance exam”), undertaken a continuing professional development activity being a file management course, and provided a statutory declaration in Commonwealth form stating that he has not made immigration representations for a fee nor given immigration assistance, as defined in the Act, while suspended.
70. I am puzzled as to why it was considered that Mr Vasilopoulos needed to complete and pass the entrance exam. I did suggest that such a condition should perhaps be imposed in the case of Altintas, but that was because there was evidence that he did not fully understand his professional obligations as a migration agent. In this matter, although Mr Vasilopoulos, like Mr Altintas, has never sat the entrance exam, I do not have the same concerns. As I have already said, he demonstrated a very good knowledge of the intricacies of Migration law and practice, such as one could expect from somebody who worked within the Department for thirty years.
71. I agree with MARA that it was appropriate that Mr Vasilopoulos undertake a file management course. Mr Vasilopoulos, himself, has at all relevant times agreed that would be appropriate. In his lengthy response to MARA, dated 25 February 2004 (T7, pp80-92), he acknowledged (T7, p81):
No doubt, better file notes would have given you a more accurate picture of the problems we, as agents, have on occasions in communicating with our clients...
I have often not kept file notes of “hurry up” calls I have made to clients, as I have not previously thought such detailed notes were necessary in a small business like my own. As a result of your inquiries I shall certainly ensure those notes are made in future.
72. Mr Vasilopoulos also acknowledged that he needed to change his form of agreement with his clients. He wrote in his response to MARA (T7, p88):
I am heartened by the fact that you have not reviewed any complaints from clients, only from DIMIA...
...
I stress that any client I represent to the Minister is told quite clearly that the success rate is very low, I usually quote a figure of 3 to 7 percent. From now on all clients who wish to appeal to the Minister will sign a simple statement to acknowledge they have been counselled about the likelihood of success
73. There is some guidance as to the exercise of a discretion to impose a sanction, although in a different context, in the Tribunal decision of ReDonald and Australian Securities and Investment Commission (2001) 64 ALD 717, where the Tribunal was reviewing a decision to make a banning order under s 829 of the Corporations Law. The Tribunal considered the purpose of a banning order and whether it was the best way to ensure protection of the public. The Tribunal said, at paragraphs 52, 55 and 57:
(52) We will not set out the findings we have already made in our previous reasons. As we said in those reasons, in our view, it seems to us that Mr Donald needs further time to reflect upon his actions so that he gains a proper understanding of what is appropriate behaviour of a dealers representative. But in what circumstances is he to reflect? In considering that question, we are mindful that we must have as our objects only those of achieving public protection and the maintenance of proper professional standards. Although any decision may involve great deprivation for Mr Donald, the object of the order is not to punish or to extract retribution. The protection of the public requires that persons operating in the market as dealers representatives understand that their behaviour must be such that it protects the integrity of the market.
...
(55) To impose a further banning order when a banning order has been stayed and there is no evidence of further inappropriate behaviour in the short period of Mr Donald’s resuming work as a dealers representative almost smacks of punitive action rather than of protection of the public. Considerations of punishment are as inappropriate as are considerations of the hardship that has been caused to Mr Donald by his inability to work as a dealers representative.
...
(57) It seems to us that the public is better protected both in the short and the long term if a more pro-active approach is taken to Mr Donald’s rehabilitation. It seems to us that Mr Donald should be permitted, having served the period of the banning order to 22 November 2000, to resume his duties as a dealers representative under supervision while undergoing a program of education. That program would be directed to extending his knowledge of what is appropriate legal and ethical behaviour generally in the industry and specifically as a dealers representative. Both actions would achieve some level of protection to the public.
74. I agree with the comments made by the Tribunal in Donald, to the effect that the reason for a sanction should be protection of the public rather than punishment.
75. I am persuaded that Mr Vasilopoulos now understands to the need to comply strictly with the Code, which does have statutory authority. Section 314(2) of the Act provides:
314(2)A registered migration agent must conduct himself or herself in accordance with the prescribed Code of Conduct.
76. I find that Mr Vasilopoulos, as a result of this proceeding, now appreciates the need to keep good file records. That is important, both for the benefit of his clients and to protect himself. It ensures there is a record of his discussions with his clients, if any issue or dispute should arise with his client or with the Department on behalf of the client. It will provide a record of all material or substantive communications by him or between him and his clients, or between him and others, regarding his clients. Such records would be very important if it were ever again suggested that in some way Mr Vasilopoulos’ conduct as a Migration Agent had been unsatisfactory.
77. There is a discretion whether or not to impose a sanction under s 303 of the Act, even if the Tribunal is satisfied as to one of the matters in paragraphs 303(d) – (h) of the Act. Bearing in mind the considerations mentioned by the Tribunal in Donald, I consider, now that Mr Vasilopoulos has amended his form of agreement (A8), has attended a course on immigration practice and office procedures (A9), and has had tuition in the use of e-mails as a means of communication (A10), that there is no point in imposing a caution, simply to lift it immediately, as Mr Vasilopoulos has satisfied the conditions I would have imposed.
78. Mr Byrne submitted that the consequences for Mr Vasilopoulos or any agent of being given a caution under the Act would be significant. This is because from 1 July 2005 all Migration Agents will be required to carry professional indemnity insurance in order to gain re-registration. Mr Vasilopoulos gave evidence that he had sought indemnity insurance from an insurance company which had declined to cover him because of MARA’s suspension, even though he advised the proposed insurer that the suspension had been stayed by order of the Tribunal on 9 June 2004. He tendered correspondence to that effect (A6). He said he had also made enquiries with the insurer as to whether he would be likely to obtain cover if he had been cautioned under the Act. He said that he had been told that was unlikely.
79. At the resumed hearing, Mr Vasilopoulos gave evidence that he had made further enquiries about insurance, but was not given any firm advice as to what effect a caution would have on any future application for professional indemnity assurance. He was told it would be a relevant matter which he would have to disclose, and that it could lead to a refusal, or to an increased premium being payable.
80. Mr Brereton, by consent, advised that he had received similar advice. The position seems to be that the proposed insurer cannot give any firm indication in any case without reading the Tribunal’s decision.
81. Mr Brereton submitted that if a caution is an appropriate sanction, it should be imposed without regard to the insurance issue. I cannot agree with that submission. It would be wrong, where a minor sanction was appropriate, to impose that sanction if it would be likely to preclude Mr Vasilopoulos gaining professional indemnity insurance, and thus preclude him continuing to practice as a registered Migration Agent.
82. On the other hand, the evidence does not establish that a caution would be likely to have that effect. The whole proceeding would need to be disclosed, and if a caution were imposed that would be just one factor the insurer would regard as relevant. I do suggest that MARA should engage in some discussion of this general issue with the proposed professional indemnity insurers.
83. I asked Mr Brereton for a submission as to whether I may take into account the evidence of Mr Vasilopoulos’ attendance at courses and training since the decision under review. I also asked whether the respondent accepted that it was appropriate for me to have regard to s 304A of the Act, as to the lifting of a sanction, even though it was not in force at the time the reviewable decision was made.
84. Mr Brereton referred me to the decision of Deputy President Forgie in Re Griffiths and Migration Agents’ Registration Authority [2001] AATA 240. In that matter, the Tribunal referred to Drake v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1979) 24 ALR 577 where Bowen CJ and Deane J said at 589:
The question for the determination of the Tribunal is not whether the decision which the decision-maker made was the correct or preferable one on the material before him. The question for the determination of the Tribunal is whether that decision was the correct or preferable one on the material before the Tribunal.
85. Deputy President Forgie in Griffiths also referred to the decision of Freeman v Secretary, Department of Social Security (1988) 19 FCR 342 where Davies J explained that a review of a decision to cancel an entitlement must be done on the facts as they were on the date of the cancellation decision, but that the position may be different if there is a decision as to an ongoing entitlement.
86. On the basis of Griffiths, Mr Brereton submitted:
[T]he Tribunal is limited to considering the facts that existed at the time of the alleged breaches of the Code of Conduct when establishing whether it is satisfied of the breach. Once satisfied however, there is no restriction on the Tribunal considering after acquired evidence when dealing with appropriate sanctions. …
87. I accept that submission. I have already found specific non-compliance with some provisions of the Code. Those relate broadly to procedural matters, rather than to the more serious issues of professional conduct and duty to clients.
88. In all the circumstances of this matter, I find that the decision under review should be set aside. In substitution, I will decide:
(i)That Mr Vasilopoulos has not complied with clauses 2.8(a), (c) and (d), 5.2, 6.1(c) and 11.3 of the Code;
(ii)That in all the circumstances, it is not appropriate to cancel or suspend his registration or to caution him under s 303 of the Act.
I certify that the 88 preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision of Senior Member Joan Dwyer.
Signed: Josephine McKay
Associate
Date of hearing: 28 February, 1 March and 20 April 2005
Date of decision: 27 April 2005
Advocate for applicant: Mr Byrne (28 February – 1 March 2005 ) & Mr Vasilopoulos (20 April 2005)
Advocate for respondent: Mr Brereton
Solicitor for respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
0
6
0