Vasilevski v R

[2019] NSWCCA 277

Court of Criminal Appeal

Supreme Court

New South Wales

• Summary available

Medium Neutral Citation:

Vasilevski v R [2019] NSWCCA 277

Hearing dates:

13 September 2019

Date of orders:

22 November 2019

Decision date:

22 November 2019

Before:

Bell P, Simpson AJA and Fullerton J

Decision:

1.   Grant leave to appeal conviction.

 

2.   Appeal dismissed.

 

3.   Grant leave to appeal aggregate sentence.

 4.   Appeal dismissed.

Catchwords:

CRIME – Appeal – Appeal against conviction – Inconsistency of verdicts – Unreasonable verdict – Whether inconsistency as a result of acquittal on 7 counts and conviction on 2 counts – Whether inconsistency between acquittal on a particular count and conviction on count of persuading a witness to withhold “true evidence” – Identification of the “true evidence” withheld

  CRIME – Appeal – Application for leave to appeal against sentence – Manifest excess – Whether aggregate sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust

Legislation Cited:

Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) s 14
Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW) ss 21A, 53, 53A
Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 61I, 61HE(3), 323
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 37
Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) ss 5(1), 6(1)
Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) ss 11, 166
Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 35(2)
Criminal Code (Cth) s 127(1)
Criminal Code (Qld) ss 668E(1), 668E(1A)
Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW) r 4

Cases Cited:

Evans v R [2017] NSWCCA 281
Hili v R (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45
House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
JM v R (2014) 246 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 297
Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439; [1997] HCA 56
Libke v R (2007) 230 CLR 559; [2007] HCA 30
M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487; [1994] HCA 63
MacKenzie v R (1996) 190 CLR 348; [1996] HCA 35
MFA v R (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53
Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454; [1987] HCA 50
R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308; [2016] HCA 35
R v Burton [2008] NSWCCA 128
R v Danahay [1993] 1 Qd R 271
R v JCW (2000) 112 A Crim R 466; [2000] NSWCCA 209
R v Lansdell (NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 22 May 1995, unrep)
R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; [2001] NSWCCA 290
R v Pham [2015] HCA 39
TK v R (2009) 74 NSWLR 299; [2009] NSWCCA 151

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Steve Vasilevski (Applicant)
Crown (Respondent)

Representation:

Counsel:
G D Wendler (Applicant)
K Jeffreys (Respondent)

  Solicitors:
Nicopoulos Sabbagh Lawyers (Applicant)
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2016/381434

Publication restriction:

Pursuant to s 578A of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), and subject to the qualifications therein, a person shall not publish any matter which identifies, or which is likely to lead to the identification of, the complainant in these proceedings.

 Decision under appeal 

Court or tribunal:

District Court of New South Wales

Jurisdiction:

Criminal

Date of Decision:

10 May 2019

Before:

Baly SC DCJ

File Number(s):

2016/00381434

Headnote

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

Mr Steve Vasilevski was charged on indictment with a number of offences, including three counts of assault, one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, four counts of sexual intercourse without consent, and one count of influencing a witness to withhold true evidence. Following a trial in the District Court of New South Wales, a jury found Mr Vasilevski not guilty on seven of the counts, but guilty on one count of assault occasioning actual bodily harm (Count 6), and one count of influencing a witness to withhold true evidence (Count 9). Mr Vasilevski was sentenced to an aggregate term of imprisonment consisting of a head sentence of 4 years, with a non-parole period of 3 years.

Mr Vasilevski sought leave to appeal his conviction on the ground that it was unreasonable within the meaning of s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW). Mr Vasilevski submitted that:

1. With respect to Count 6, having regard to the jury’s verdicts of acquittals on all counts on the indictment but two, such acquittals should have been translated to the complainant’s general credibility as a witness.

2. With respect to Count 9, as the jury had acquitted Mr Vasilevski on a count of sexual assault without consent (Count 7), it was unreasonable and inconsistent for the jury to find Mr Vasilevski guilty on Count 9 (influencing the complainant to withhold true evidence in relation to that allegation of sexual assault), as the jury had not found the complainant’s allegations of such sexual assault to be “true”.

Mr Vasilevski further sought leave to appeal on the ground that the aggregate sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, because the indicative sentences were manifestly excessive. The indicative sentences imposed were 2 years and 6 months against the statutory maximum of 5 years’ imprisonment for Count 6, and 3 years and 6 months against the statutory maximum of 7 years’ imprisonment for Count 9.

The Court granted leave to appeal, but dismissed the appeal, holding:

1. The challenge to conviction on Count 6 be dismissed. The jury’s acquittal on the other counts did not necessarily render their conviction on Count 6 unreasonable, as the jury was not obliged to reach the same verdict on each count, and its acquittal on the other counts was not necessarily explained by any rejection of the complainant’s credibility as a witness.

2. The challenge to conviction on Count 9 be dismissed. The jury’s acquittal on Count 7 was not necessarily inconsistent with its conviction on Count 9, as the jury may have acquitted Mr Vasilevski on Count 7 because it was not satisfied to the requisite standard of the third element of the offence of sexual intercourse without consent, namely, that the accused knew that the complainant did not consent.

3. The challenges to sentence on both Count 6 and Count 9 be dismissed. Neither of the indicative sentences imposed by the primary judge was excessive and, after taking into account the significant degree of concurrence in the aggregate sentence, the Court was not satisfied that the aggregate sentence was unreasonable or plainly unjust.

Judgment

1. THE COURT: The applicant, Steve Vasilevski, was charged on indictment with the following offences:

“1   between 1 January 2015 and 1 January 2016, at Muswellbrook in the State of New South Wales, did assault [the complainant].

S 61 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 64782

2    between 1 January 2015 and 1 January 2016, at Denman in the State of New South Wales, did assault [the complainant].

S 61 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 64782

3    between 1 January 2015 and 1 January 2016, at Denman in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with [the complainant] without her consent and knowing that she was not consenting.

S 61I Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 271

4    between 31 May 2015 and 31 March 2016, at Denman in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with [the complainant] without her consent and knowing that she was not consenting.

S 61I Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 271

5    between 1 January 2016 and 19 December 2016, at Denman in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with [the complainant] without her consent and knowing that she was not consenting.

S 61I Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 271

6    on or about 19 December 2016, at Denman in the State of New South Wales, did assault [the complainant] thereby occasioning actual bodily harm to her.

S 59(1) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 64780

7    on 19 December 2016, in Denman in the State of New South Wales, did have sexual intercourse with [the complainant] without her consent and knowing she was not consenting.

S 61I Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 271

8    on 19 December 2016, at Denman in the State of New South Wales, did assault [the complainant].

S 61 Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 64782

9    on 20 February 2017, at Cessnock in the State of New South Wales, did cause [the complainant] to write a statutory declaration, with intent to influence [the complainant], a witness in proceedings in the Muswellbrook Local Court against Steve Vasilevski, to withhold true evidence.

S 323(a) Crimes Act 1900 Law part code 16766”.

2. Section 61I of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), under which Counts 3, 4, 5 and 7 were brought, is in the following terms:

“61I   Sexual assault

Any person who has sexual intercourse with another person without the consent of the other person and who knows that the other person does not consent to the sexual intercourse is liable to imprisonment for 14 years.”

3. Section 323 of the Crimes Act, under which Count 9 was brought, is in the following terms:

“323 Influencing witnesses and jurors

A person who does any act—

(a)   intending to procure, persuade, induce or otherwise cause any person called or to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding to give false evidence or withhold true evidence or to not attend as a witness or not produce any thing in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena, or

(b)   intending, other than by the production of evidence and argument in open court, to influence any person (whether or not a particular person) in the person’s conduct as a juror in any judicial proceeding, whether he or she has been sworn as a juror or not,

is liable to imprisonment for 7 years.”

4. Following a trial before Baly SC DCJ and a jury in the District Court of New South Wales at Newcastle between 18 February 2019 and 27 February 2019, the jury found the applicant not guilty on Counts 1-5, 7 and 8 but guilty on Counts 6 and 9.

5. At the time that the offence constituting Count 6 was committed, the applicant was the subject of an apprehended domestic violence order and was also on bail for other offences. He was arrested on 19 December 2016 and was refused bail. He was released on bail on 9 January 2017.

6. On 15 April 2017, the applicant was arrested and charged in relation to contravention of the apprehended domestic violence order and refused bail in respect of all charges that were then pending. The conduct the subject of the contravention was the assault which became Count 6 on the indictment. There was a mention before a magistrate in the Muswellbrook Local Court on 19 April 2017 relating to bail. As shall be seen, this mention was relevant to what ultimately became Count 9 on the indictment.

7. On 29 May 2017, the applicant was arrested in respect of matters that ultimately formed the basis of Count 9.

8. On 10 May 2019, pursuant to s 53A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 (NSW), the applicant was sentenced by Baly SC DCJ to an aggregate term of imprisonment consisting of a head sentence of 4 years with a non-parole period of 3 years in respect of Counts 6 and 9. Her Honour nominated indicative sentences of imprisonment of 2 years and 6 months in respect of Count 6, 3 years and 6 months in respect of Count 9 and 14 months for breach of the apprehended violence order. Also before the court pursuant to s 166 of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) was the related offence of contravening an apprehended domestic violence order (s 14 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)), which attracted an indicative sentence of one year.

9. The applicant appeals his conviction and seeks leave to appeal the aggregate sentence.

Grounds of appeal

10. The applicant appeals against his conviction on Counts 6 and 9 and his sentence on the following grounds:

“GROUND 1

That the verdicts on counts 6 and 9 on the indictment were unreasonable within the meaning of s 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW).

GROUND 2

That the aggregate sentence imposed upon the [a]pplicant was manifestly excessive because the indicative sentences were manifestly excessive.”

11. During the course of the hearing, counsel for the applicant sought and was granted leave to add a further ground of appeal, which was expressed in the following terms:

“That the [t]rial [j]udge erred in law by failing to direct the jury that if they found beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant influenced the complainant to give true evidence about sexual assault they must acquit the applicant.”

No such direction having been sought at trial, leave is required for the ground to be argued (r 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW)).

12. The essence of the applicant’s appeal against his conviction on Counts 6 and 9 is captured in the following three paragraphs of the written submissions filed on his behalf (at paras 26, 34 and 36):

“Having regard to the jury’s doubt(s) or verdicts of acquittal on all counts on the indictment except counts 6 and 9 the [a]pplicant submits such doubts or acquittals should have been translated to [the complainant’s] general credibility as a witness, given her belligerent, dismissive and rude behaviour during cross-examination, her history of making a false complaint against the [a]pplicant and generally. The [a]pplicant submits the inconsistency of verdicts on counts 6 & 9 require appellate intervention to prevent the injustice occasioned to the [a]pplicant. Put another way, the question is whether the multiple acquittals so affected the credibility of the complainant that in combination with other factors in the trial it was not open to the jury to convict on counts 6 & 9 – this was particularly so with respect to count 9 on the indictment.

…

As a matter of logic and reasonableness and having regard to the way the trial was conducted the acquittals could only have been on the basis the jury were not convinced beyond reasonable doubt the sexual assaults took place at all or, in every case, were consensual – the more likely explanation is the sexual intercourse was consensual in each case.

…

The Statutory Declaration (Ex C) raised by the complainant was a confession by the complainant that she had fabricated allegations of sexual assault against the [a]pplicant – i.e. fabricated the very charges of sexual assault the subject of the indictment. Thus, even if the jury accepted the [a]pplicant interfered with the complainant as a witness against him by assisting her to raise the Statutory Declaration in the manner described by the complainant it was unreasonable for the jury to find beyond reasonable doubt that such interference was to give false evidence but rather the interference was to encourage the complainant to embrace the truth namely, that her allegation of non-consensual sexual intercourse (rape) was false. In short, the jury ought to have had a reasonable doubt about an essential element of the charge under s 323 [of the Crimes Act] – ‘to give false evidence’.” (emphasis in original).

It is to be noted, at this point, that the reference in the second and third sentences of [36] of the submission to the giving of “false evidence” does not reflect the language of Count 9 which was expressed in terms of the withholding of “true evidence”. Whilst s 323(a) of the Crimes Act employs the language both of withholding “true evidence” and giving “false evidence”, the two should not be conflated.

13. The additional ground of appeal was not felicitously drafted. It was formulated following questions from the Court as to: (i) the terms in which the jury had been directed in respect of Count 9; (ii) the lack of particularisation as to the “true evidence” referred to in Count 9; and (iii) whether or not the jury’s decision to acquit the applicant on Count 7 was inconsistent with its decision to convict on Count 9.

The Crown case at trial

Count 6

14. The applicant and the complainant had been in an ongoing sexual relationship since early 2015. The complainant gave evidence that she was aged 19 when she first met the applicant who, at that time, was aged about 40 and was married with two children. In cross-examination, the complainant agreed that the relationship between herself and the applicant commenced in about late February 2015, and ended on 19 December 2016. The assault occasioning actual bodily harm the subject of Count 6 occurred on the evening of 18 December 2016 (or early in the morning of 19 December 2016) at a graveyard near Denman to which the applicant and the complainant had driven.

15. The applicant, having abused her verbally, threatened the complainant en route to the graveyard. At the graveyard, he said that he wanted to kill her, told her to get out of the car and tried to run her over. She then threw a rock at him which hit him on the head. At some point, the applicant hit her on the left leg with a “full swing” using a bamboo stick which was in the car. They then returned to the applicant’s house in Paxton Street, Denman. At that point, the complainant left the applicant’s company and took refuge in a house up the road in circumstances described more fully later in these reasons.

16. Later that day, the complainant said that she returned to the Paxton Street property and was sexually and physically assaulted by the applicant. These allegations formed the basis of Counts 7 and 8 on the indictment in respect of which the applicant was found not guilty.

Count 9

17. The Crown alleged that the applicant caused the complainant to write and execute a statutory declaration on 20 February 2017 which was in the following terms:

“Statutory Declaration

OATHS ACT 1900, NSW, NINTH SCHEDULE

I, xxx, of xxx

do hereby solemnly declare and affirm that [i]n the matter of Steve Vasilevski and myself that, [t]o your hono[u]r I would like to apologise for my false rape accusations and a subsequent [d]ef[a]mation of Steve’s character, it was unwar[ra]nted and complete[l]y false to ac[c]use him of such things, my current struggle with substance abuse had enabled me to do things I usual[l]y would not while I’m seeking the help I need I’m still very remors[e]ful and apologetic for my actions and any time wasted. [T]hank you!”

18. At the time this statutory declaration was made, the only sexual assault allegation that the complainant had made against the applicant was that which ultimately formed the subject of Count 7 on the indictment, namely that on 19 December 2016, in Denman, the applicant had sexual intercourse with the complainant without her consent and knowing she was not consenting (see [16] above). The allegations which gave rise to Counts 1-5 on the indictment, Counts 3-5 of which were also allegations of sexual assault, were not made until February 2019, shortly before the trial commenced.

19. It follows that the “rape accusations” referred to in the statutory declaration, extracted at [17] above, must be taken to be those that related to the sexual assault which was alleged in Count 7 to have occurred on 19 December 2016, the day following the physical assault which was the subject of Count 6.

Evidence relating to Counts 6 and 7

20. Notwithstanding the acquittal on Count 7, it is necessary to refer in some detail to the evidence adduced in support of that charge and the evidence in support of Count 6.

21. The events the subject of Count 6 began on the evening of 18 December 2016. The complainant said that on that evening, the applicant drove her from his house at Paxton Street, Denman, past the train tracks to the graveyard. She said that, along the way, he “called me a lot of names and stuff”, of a derogatory nature, and “said he was going to kill [the complainant]”.

22. The complainant gave evidence that, at the graveyard, the applicant told her to get out of the car, and that they were “[s]creaming back and forth”. She said that she was screaming at him to “take me home” and to “please stop” and that he was saying that “he’s going to kill me, that he was going to end me.”

23. After the applicant threatened to kill her, the complainant said that he got back into the car and prepared to run her over. She went on to say that after he attempted to run her over a couple of times, the applicant got out of the car and told the complainant to get into the car.

24. The complainant gave evidence that she had picked up a rock in each hand, and kept saying that she did not want to get back into the car and that she was really scared. When the applicant started walking towards her, she said that she “thought he was going to hit [her]”, and so she “ducked and [threw] a rock at the same time, and it had got him on the forehead”.

20. The complainant also gave evidence that the applicant hit her once on her left leg with a “full swing” with a piece of bamboo that she had with her in the car. She also gave evidence that, before they got back to Denman, the applicant punched her in the face leaving her nose “pretty sore”.

21. Upon arriving at Paxton Street, the applicant and the complainant returned to the applicant’s house. At about 12:15am on 19 December 2016, police attended the premises, and spoke briefly to the applicant. He had a towel around his head. The complainant had taken off and gone to another house down the street, and went to sleep in a back sunroom.

22. The complainant did not know Ms Therese Garland, the owner of the house to which she had gone. Ms Garland found her there at about 5:30am on 19 December 2016. The complainant told Ms Garland that she was running away from “Steve”. Ms Garland had to go to work and arranged for a neighbour, Ms Amanda Limon, to check on the complainant’s welfare. After speaking to Ms Limon, Ms Garland telephoned police, who attended Ms Garland’s premises at about midday. The complainant told Detective Senior Constable Mawhinney that the applicant had “bashed me again last night”. Detective Mawhinney observed abrasions, scratches and bruising on the complainant’s legs. The injuries were later photographed.

23. The complainant told Detective Mawhinney that she did not wish to take any action. Ms Garland suggested to the complainant that she could not go back to the applicant, but the complainant said:

“He’s the only person I’ve got.”

29. Between 10:59am and 4:32pm on 19 December 2016, the applicant and the complainant exchanged no fewer than 143 text messages. The text messages reveal a considerable degree of conflict, but by 12:39pm, the applicant was asking the complainant to come to his house. Eventually she agreed.

30. The complainant’s evidence was that they then went into the lounge room; the applicant “was making out like he was tired” and he wanted to go into the bedroom to lie down.

31. She was asked during examination-in-chief if she wanted to lie down with the applicant, to which she replied:

“Part of me.”

She said:

“He wanted to fuck.”

She then said:

“Well, I remember he kissed me and then, like, he made, like, a gesture, like, for sex sort of thing, and I – I – I wasn’t – I didn’t want to anymore.”

32. She said that she was lying on her stomach with her face in a pillow and the applicant then inserted his penis into her anus. Asked by the Crown if she wanted him to do that, she said:

“No, [not] at all.”

It was this event that gave rise to Count 7 on the indictment (of which the applicant was acquitted).

33. Precisely what occurred immediately thereafter is not clear on the evidence. What is clear is that police were called again, and attended at about 5:40pm. They saw the complainant seated outside:

“… visibly upset, erratic in her conversation and appear[ing] agitated.”

34. At about 6:45pm the complainant sent the applicant a text message which read:

“Rapest fuck wit.”

Three minutes later, at about 6:48pm she sent another message saying:

“I hate you.”

35. The complainant returned to Ms Garland’s house. Ms Garland arrived home at about 5:45pm. The complainant told Ms Garland that she had been raped. An ambulance and police were called and the complainant was taken to the local (Muswellbrook) hospital. She was later taken to the John Hunter Hospital in Newcastle, where she was examined by Dr Anousha Victoire. She told Dr Victoire that she had been raped between 1:00pm and 2:00pm.

36. In cross-examination, the applicant’s counsel put to the complainant that she had not only consented to various forms of sexual intercourse, including penile/anal intercourse, but had instigated it. It was the applicant’s case that consensual penile/anal intercourse took place in his house on 19 December 2016.

37. Counsel also put to the complainant that she did not go to the graveyard with the applicant in the circumstances she described the night before and that the applicant did not assault her.

38. The complainant rejected both propositions.

39. Dr Victoire gave evidence that she performed a medical and forensic examination of the complainant on 20 December 2016 at John Hunter Hospital. Reading from her report, Dr Victoire gave evidence as follows:

“[The complainant] had multiple bruises to the fronts of the legs, inner left calf, her right buttock and the back of her left shoulder. The multiple bruises were caused by a blunt force trauma; forceful enough to cause bleeding under or within the skin. Blunt force trauma injury could occur by the patient's body impacting forcefully against a surface or being held or struck forcefully. For example, by a blow with a fist or a hard object. The degree of visible bruising will be affected not only by the force of the impact but also movement during the assault; the age of the person assaulted; use of medications that increase bleeding tendency or delay blood clotting; the area of the body injured; the object used during the assault and any first aid used.

It is generally accepted that not every blow will lead to an obvious injury and it is not possible to precisely age the bruises. The two bruises on the left shoulder area support the history of being held by the left shoulder during the assault. It is a [less] common site for accidental injury.”

40. Dr Victoire gave further evidence in relation to accidental injury, stating that:

“So bruising from accidental injury tends to occur on exposed surfaces and bony prominences such as the - the tips of the elbows or the - the knees and

the outer surfaces. So slightly more protected sites so the inner - sort of - insides of trying not [to] use medical language here - sorry - so that the - the less bony areas and softer fleshier areas tend not to bruise so easily.”

41. The applicant did not give evidence.

Count 9

42. On 20 February 2017, the complainant made the statutory declaration, the terms of which have been set out at [17] above.

43. The complainant gave evidence that on 20 February 2017 the applicant drove her to a carpark, and told her that he wanted her to write a statutory declaration. According to the complainant, the applicant spoke to someone on the telephone, asking how to write the statutory declaration legally. After the applicant wrote out a draft copy, the complainant “rewrote it with him”. When questioned whether the applicant had told her why he had this document, the complainant gave evidence as follows:

“Nuh, he just wanted me to do it and I pretty much said yes to everything he wanted me to do”.

44. The complainant gave evidence that she did not want to do it because “writing out false shit really is a big thing”. However, she felt “obligated to”, giving evidence as follows:

“I told him I didn’t want to, and then he made me feel really bad because he does have two beautiful boys and they don’t deserve to lose their dad, and what not. And it just made me feel really bad.”

45. The statutory declaration was witnessed at a pharmacy, after which the complainant said she “handed it back to [the applicant]… and that was the end of it.”

46. The applicant did not give evidence but evidence was adduced at the trial that the statutory declaration was in the possession of his then solicitor, Mr Nikopolous, who appeared on his behalf at a bail related mention in the Local Court on 19 April 2017 (as noted at [6] above) after the applicant had been charged with the sexual assault the subject of Count 7 on the indictment. The applicant had also been charged at that time with the assault the subject of Count 6.

47. There was evidence adduced at trial that, in the course of the bail mention, Mr Nikopolous informed the Court that the applicant denied the allegations of sexual assault on 19 December 2016 and contended that the applicant and the complainant had no sexual contact on that day.

48. The complainant was cross-examined about the statutory declaration. When questioned as to whether she knew what was in the statutory declaration before she signed it, she gave evidence that:

“I didn't take much knowledge of it. To be honest I just letter by letter wrote what he wrote. So that, as he said, it was in my own handwriting.”

49. The complainant agreed that she knew that at the time of signing the statutory declaration it would be treated as a legal document and would be shown to a judge and the police. It was put to the complainant in cross-examination, but denied by her, that the applicant had nothing to do with the preparation of the statutory declaration. The complainant denied signing the statutory declaration because it was true, giving the following evidence:

“… I signed it because he needed it and I still wanted to protect him.”

50. Professor Hayes, an expert witness called for the prosecution, gave evidence in relation to the complainant’s statutory declaration in which the complainant stated that her allegation of rape was “false”, and whether this was uncommon in terms of domestic violence relationships. The Professor said:

“No, in fact retractions happen frequently. Saying something, and then retracting it later. About 44% of people who are the victims of domestic violence retract their statement during the police investigation. So that's nearly half of the people, and there's a number of reasons why people retract. Sometimes they are pressured to do it by the perpetrator, sometimes they think that things will get better, sometimes they're afraid of going through the [c]ourt process. [They] [m]ight fear repercussions from the perpetrator, and they might still feel that they are in love with the perpetrator. So there's lots and lots of complex reasons why people retract their initial statements.”

51. Professor Hayes gave evidence in relation to whether the complainant’s mild intellectual disability would have had any bearing upon that issue, as follows:

“Certainly, it makes [the complainant] vulnerable to being influenced by stronger personalities. And also, being unable to foresee the consequences of the actions – that, that you know – that might damage her credibility if she made a subsequent allegation. So both of those things, one is vulnerability and the second is this inability to foresee the long-term consequences.”

52. The applicant’s case with respect to Count 9, as revealed by the cross-examination of the complainant, was that she had prepared the document “of [her] own free will”, that she had done so because its contents were true, and that the applicant had nothing to do with it. The complainant rejected these propositions.

Evidence of previous false allegations

53. Before turning to a consideration of the applicable legal principles and the grounds of appeal, it is necessary to refer to one further aspect of the evidence at trial.

54. Under cross-examination, the complainant agreed that she had made a false allegation about the applicant to police previously. The complainant agreed that on 8 May 2018, she was sentenced at Muswellbrook Local Court for the offence of making a false allegation with intent to subject another to investigation.

55. Professor Hayes gave evidence about the complainant’s previous false allegation in relation to the applicant kidnapping her, and offered the following conclusions:

“She did tell me that at the time she had been consuming drugs heavily.

And so that affected her judgment, obviously. She also said that she didn’t really understand the consequences, the seriousness of – of what making false allegations meant. And also, she said, although this doesn’t appear in my report, I’m not quite sure why [I] didn’t include that, but it’s in my notes that she was scared of the accused and wanted him, she wanted him behind bars.”

The appeal – legal principles

56. Appeals from convictions on indictment are only as of right if the grounds relied upon involve questions of law alone. In all other cases, leave must be granted to appeal from a conviction on indictment: s 5(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act1912 (NSW). While the additional ground of appeal raises a question of law alone and is therefore brought as of right (subject to r 4 of the Criminal Appeal Rules), Ground 1, as is accepted, requires leave. We consider this an appropriate case to grant leave.

57. It is convenient to deal first with the additional ground of appeal, as it relates to Count 9.

58. That ground raises for consideration whether the conviction on Count 9 can be reconciled with the acquittal on Count 7. The applicant submitted that the two verdicts are inconsistent. For the reasons which follow, that submission cannot be sustained.

59. The elements of an offence against s 323(a) of the Crimes Act are:

1. that the accused person does an act;

2. that, in doing the act, the accused person intends to procure, persuade, induce or otherwise cause any person to:

(a)   give false evidence; or

(b)   withhold true evidence; or

(c)   not to attend as a witness; or

(d)   not produce anything in evidence pursuant to a summons or subpoena;

3. that that person is called, or is to be called, as a witness in a judicial proceeding.

60. Having regard to the manner in which Count 9 was formulated, it was necessary that the Crown prove beyond reasonable doubt:

1. that the applicant caused the complainant to write the statutory declaration;

2. that the complainant was a witness in a judicial proceeding against the applicant in the Muswellbrook Local Court;

3. that, in causing the complainant to write the statutory declaration, he intended to influence her to withhold evidence; and

4. that the evidence referred to in element (iii) was true evidence.

61. An allegation of sexual intercourse without consent contrary to s 61I of the Crimes Act (the subject of Count 7 on the indictment) requires the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt three elements, as follows:

1. that the accused person had sexual intercourse with the complainant;

2. that the complainant did not consent to the sexual intercourse; and

3. that the accused person knew that the complainant did not consent.

62. By s 61HE(3) of the Crimes Act, the third element may be established by proof that the accused person actually knows the complainant did not consent, is reckless as to whether or not the complainant consented, or has no reasonable grounds for believing that the complainant consented.

63. Failure by the Crown to prove any one or more of the elements to the requisite standard will result in acquittal.

64. For the purpose of the consideration of this ground of appeal it may be assumed that the evidence that the Crown contended was true (and that the applicant sought to have the complainant withhold) was either or both of:

1. an allegation by the complainant that the applicant had sexual intercourse with her on 19 December 2016; and/or

2. an allegation that the complainant did not consent.

(It might be speculated that the complainant could give some evidence indicating knowledge of the absence of consent on the part of the applicant, but such a conclusion is not possible on the evidence.)

65. That is consistent with the manner in which the trial was conducted. In summing up, the trial judge told the jury that, in relation to Count 7, the issue was consent. Notwithstanding what had been put on the applicant’s behalf in the Muswellbrook Local Court on 19 April 2017, to the effect that he denied any sexual contact with the complainant on 19 December 2016, at trial the applicant did not dispute that on that date penile/anal intercourse took place. Cross-examination of the complainant was to the effect that she had not only consented to various forms of sexual intercourse, including penile/anal intercourse on 19 December 2016, but had instigated it.

66. It may therefore reasonably be concluded that the jury acquitted the applicant of Count 7 either because they were not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent, or not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the applicant knew that the complainant did not consent.

What was the “true evidence” the subject of Count 9?

67. No particulars were furnished nor requested as to what was the “true evidence” which the Crown alleged the applicant intended to cause the complainant to withhold. In the way the trial was conducted, the applicant could have been in no doubt that the “true evidence” was the complainant’s account that on 19 December 2016, the applicant had sexual intercourse with her without her consent. In short, the “true evidence” was the “rape accusations” which the complainant purported to withdraw in the statutory declaration. This is clear from the trial judge’s written directions to the jury in relation to Count 9 which were as follows:

“Count 9: Cause the complainant to write a statutory declaration with intent to influence her, a witness, to withhold true evidence.

On 20 February 2017 at Cessnock the accused caused [the complainant] to write a statutory declaration with intent to influence her, a witness in proceedings in the Muswellbrook Local Court against him, to withhold true evidence.

The Crown case is that the accused told the complainant to write a statutory declaration and that he wrote out a draft that she copied, stating that her allegations against him were false. The Crown case is that the accused influenced her to write the statutory declaration. The Crown case is that he intended to influence her especially by making reference to his children and the fact that they did not deserve to lose their father. The Crown case is that the accused believed that she was to be a witness against him and intended that the complainant would withhold true evidence.

The case for the accused is that he did not cause her to write the statutory declaration. The complainant wrote it and its content is true.

Essential Fact 1

The accused caused the complainant to write a statutory declaration. Provided that you are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that an act of the accused substantially or significantly contributed to the complainant making the statutory declaration, the Crown will have proved this fact.

Essential Fact 2

The accused intended to influence the complainant, a witness, to withhold true evidence. Intent and intention are very familiar words; in this legal context they carry their ordinary meaning. Intention may be inferred or deduced from the circumstances in which the act took place, and from the conduct of the accused before, at the time of, or after he did the specific act. In some cases, a person’s acts may themselves provide the most convincing evidence of [his/her] intention. Where a specific result is the obvious and inevitable consequence of a person’s act, and where he deliberately does that act you may readily conclude that he did that act with the intention of achieving that specific result.

The Crown must be able to satisfy you beyond reasonable doubt of the essential facts before you can find the accused guilty of Count 9.” (emphasis in original).

68. The complainant’s “rape accusations” can be taken to have involved two components:

1. that the applicant had sexual intercourse with her on that date; and

2. that the sexual intercourse was without her consent.

69. It may be assumed (and is apparent from the transcript of cross-examination of the complainant) that those allegations were contained in a statement or statements that had, by the time of trial, been served on the applicant. Certainly, no complaint was made at trial that the applicant was unaware of the evidence the Crown relied upon to prove Count 9. Nor was any such complaint made on appeal.

70. Although proof of the offence of sexual assault entails a further element, namely that the accused person knew that the complainant did not consent, in the way the trial was conducted we do not infer that the “true evidence” the subject of Count 9 included an assertion to that effect. An accused’s knowledge is proved, generally, by inference from other evidence. That is not to overlook that a complainant may give evidence that intercourse was verbally or physically resisted, from which an accused’s knowledge as to lack of consent may be inferred.

The necessary facts

71. We will deal now with the four matters of fact that it was necessary for the Crown to prove to establish the applicant’s guilt on Count 9.

Fact (i)

72. In relation to Fact (i), namely that the applicant caused the complainant to write the statutory declaration, the thrust of the applicant’s case to the jury was that it was a document that the complainant was capable of preparing herself, with the implication that she had done so.

73. The Crown Prosecutor emphasised that the language employed in the statutory declaration was not language the complainant would use. He also referred to the complainant’s relatively detailed evidence about the circumstances in which she said that the statutory declaration had been prepared, including her evidence that she left it with the applicant after she had executed it and to the fact that the statutory declaration was used on the applicant’s behalf by his solicitor at the bail mention on 19 April 2017.

74. The jury’s verdict establishes that it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that it was the applicant who caused the complainant to write the statutory declaration. Fact (i) is therefore established.

Fact (ii)

75. Since the applicant’s case (through cross-examination of the complainant) was that he did not cause her to write the statutory declaration, he made no case with respect to his intention. However, it is inherent in the jury’s verdict that the necessary intention was proved. Fact (ii) is therefore established.

Fact (iii)

76. The third fact required to be established was that the complainant was a witness to be called in proceedings in the Muswellbrook Local Court against the applicant.

77. The expression employed in s 323(a) of the Crimes Act “to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding” was considered by Gleeson CJ in R v Lansdell (NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, 22 May 1995, unrep) (Lansdell). In Lansdell the charge was attempting to induce a person to be called as a witness in a judicial proceeding to give false evidence. The accused in that case had sought to procure a person who, it may be assumed, would not otherwise have been called as a witness, to give false evidence, and therefore to be a witness. There Gleeson CJ said (at 6-7):

“The meaning of the expression ‘person … to be called as a witness in any judicial proceeding’, in cognate Queensland legislation was considered in R v Danahy [1993] 1 Qd R 271. As Williams J pointed out (at 279) the test determining whether or not a person is ‘to be called as a witness’ cannot be whether the person was in fact subsequently called; otherwise a plea of guilty at the trial would frustrate a prosecution for an offence against s 323. The meaning of the expression is to be found in the legislative purpose of the section. The offence is aimed at preventing the corruption or improper influencing of witnesses, and a critical element is the intention with which the alleged offender has acted.

It is unnecessary, and undesirable, to formulate a comprehensive statement of what will be necessary, or sufficient, for a conclusion that, in a given case, someone satisfies the description of a person to be called as a witness. The present case was clear and that, no doubt, is why (without objection from counsel) the matter was dealt with so dismissively in the summing up.

Where it is objectively likely that a person, because of her involvement in the relevant events, will be a witness in future legal proceedings, and that likelihood is known to (and, a fortiori, intended by) someone who thereupon sets out to influence her evidence, or her conduct, in one of the ways described in the section, then the requirements of the provision are satisfied.

The above is not intended to be a statement of what is necessary in every case; it is rather a statement of what is sufficient, and it is related to the facts of the present case …” (emphasis in original).

78. Applying the test stated by the Chief Justice, it was, in this case, objectively highly likely that the complainant would be called as a witness in the proceedings against the applicant, whether on 19 April 2017, or another date (the indictment did not specify the date of the proceedings in which it was contended that the complainant would be influenced to withhold true evidence).

79. It is true that the indictment specified the Muswellbrook Local Court as the court where the proceedings were to take place, and that location was not established by the evidence of Ms Lyte, a solicitor for the Director of Public Prosecutions. That, plainly, was not regarded by counsel who represented the applicant at trial as a matter of any significance; nor has it struck counsel on appeal as of any significance. It is not, in our opinion, critical to proof of the charge. The location of the court was not a material fact.

80. Fact (iii) was therefore established.

Fact (iv)

81. Consideration of Fact (iv) raises the issue whether the jury could have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that “evidence” that was sought to be withheld could be characterised as “true evidence” in light of the acquittal of the applicant on Count 7.

82. Cross-examination of the complainant on the statutory declaration was, with one exception, entirely directed to the proposition that the applicant had nothing to do with the document and that it was written by the complainant “of [her] own free will” and that she appreciated its significance. She disagreed that it was written of her own volition.

83. Cross-examination concerning the truth or otherwise of the “evidence” the subject of Count 9 was confined to the question and answer set out at [48] above.

84. That was the extent to which any issue about the truth of the “evidence” the subject of Count 9 was raised in terms in the course of the trial, although the complainant was obviously cross-examined at length about the substance of the “rape accusations” to which she had referred in the statutory declaration and which formed the basis of Count 7. In this context, the complainant’s evidence on Count 7 at trial necessarily translated to an assertion that “the evidence” the subject of Count 9 was “true evidence” – that is, that the applicant had had sexual intercourse with her and that that sexual intercourse was without her consent.

85. Had the jury convicted the applicant of Count 7, it could be inferred that it accepted, beyond reasonable doubt, the complainant’s evidence of non-consensual sexual intercourse. That would have been sufficient to establish Fact (iv). The converse does not, however, necessarily follow. Viewed in isolation, the acquittal on Count 7 establishes neither that the sexual intercourse did not take place, nor that (if it did) it was consensual. The most that can be read into the acquittal on Count 7, again viewed in isolation, is that the jury was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of one or more of the elements of the offence charged, namely:

1. that sexual intercourse had taken place;

2. that the complainant did not consent;

3. that the applicant knew that the complainant did not consent.

86. These three elements were the subject of clear written and oral instructions to the jury by the trial judge.

87. Notwithstanding what had been put on his behalf in the Muswellbrook Local Court on 19 April 2017 (denial of sexual contact on 19 December 2016), the applicant did not dispute that, on that date, penile/anal intercourse had taken place. That being the case, element (i) set out in [85] above was satisfied. This meant that the applicant’s acquittal on Count 7 was either because the jury was not satisfied of elements (ii) and/or (iii) set out in [85] above.

88. It may, in our opinion, be inferred from the applicant’s conviction on Count 9 that the jury must have acquitted the applicant on Count 7 because they were not satisfied to the requisite standard of element (iii) above. Were the jury satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the sexual intercourse was without the consent of the complainant (being element (ii)), then, axiomatically, it could not have been satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the equivalent component of the Count 9 charge, that is, the complainant’s evidence that sexual intercourse was non-consensual (the “rape accusations”). The two verdicts would be logically inconsistent. It should not be inferred that the jury acted illogically.

89. There is no necessary inconsistency of the kind contended for by the applicant between the acquittal on Count 7 and the conviction on Count 9. They can sit together for the reasons set out above.

90. There was evidence at trial to support the jury entertaining a reasonable doubt as to whether the applicant knew or believed that the complainant did not consent to the sexual intercourse the subject of Count 7 or was reckless as to that fact. This evidence included text messages sent between 10:59am and 4:32pm on 19 December 2016, which suggested at least some equivocation on the part of the complainant as to her feelings towards the applicant. The culmination was that, at the applicant’s request, she went to his home and went into his bedroom with him. She did not suggest that that was other than voluntary. She said that he wanted her to lie down with him; when asked if she wanted to do so, she said:

“Part of me.”

Later, in answer to a question in cross-examination suggesting that on an earlier occasion she wished to have intercourse with the applicant (on 16 December 2016) she answered:

“As his girlfriend I felt it was my job, yeah.”

91. For these reasons, it was open to the jury to have found beyond reasonable doubt that Fact (iv) was established, namely that the evidence which the applicant sought to have the complainant withhold by executing the statutory declaration was “true evidence”.

92. We do not consider that, in the circumstances of the case, there was any deficiency in the trial judge’s direction to the jury. Although the “true evidence” was never identified by the trial judge with particularity, it was sufficiently clear from the text of the statutory declaration that this consisted of the complainant’s rape accusations which the applicant had persuaded her to withdraw through the statutory declaration. The purported withdrawal was the relevant withholding of that evidence. The jury’s verdict on Count 9 must be understood to mean that it accepted as true the complainant’s “evidence” in the form of the rape accusations that had resulted in the applicant being charged with sexual intercourse without consent, the offence the subject of Count 7.

93. Whilst it is true that her Honour could have directed the jury that if they acquitted the applicant on Count 7 because they did not accept the complainant’s evidence that she did not consent to the sexual intercourse that occurred on 19 December 2016, no such direction was sought. The real contest insofar as Count 9 was concerned was whether the jury were satisfied that the applicant had caused the complainant to prepare the statutory declaration.

94. In opening the case for the applicant before the jury, the applicant’s then counsel said in respect of Count 9 that the applicant denied causing the complainant to write the statutory declaration. The thrust of the Crown’s final address to the jury in relation to Count 9 was that the applicant had in fact caused that to occur.

95. In his final address to the jury, the applicant’s counsel took issue with the Crown submission that the language used in the statutory declaration was unlikely to be that of the complainant. He also emphasised that there was no evidence of any threat or use of physical violence, even on the complainant’s version of events, to have her execute the statutory declaration and was critical of her evidence in relation to its preparation. He referred to the complainant’s conviction for the offence of making a false accusation with intent to subject another to investigation, emphasising the serious nature of this offence. He submitted that the circumstances in which the events underpinning this charge occurred disclosed “planning and foresight on the part of the complainant concerning the accused and wanting to set him up…”

96. In short, the thrust of the applicant’s case in respect of the statutory declaration was that it was a document that the complainant was capable of preparing herself, with the implication that she had done so. As with the Crown’s address to the jury, no attention was paid to, nor any analysis made, of what was the “true evidence” withheld in terms of Count 9 on the indictment.

97. In her summing up to the jury, the trial judge said very little about Count 9, simply summarising the brief submissions that had been made by the Crown and the applicant’s counsel. The trial judge also gave a description of the elements of Count 9 and provided the jury with a document which contained that description. It has been set out at [67] above.

98. We are satisfied, having regard to the trial judge’s directions and the way the case was conducted at trial, that the jury could have been in no doubt that the effect of the statutory declaration was to withdraw the “rape accusations” which the complainant adhered to in the course of the trial. By their verdict on Count 9 and the acquittal on Count 7, the jury must be taken to have rejected the applicant’s case that he did not cause the complainant to execute the statutory declaration, but had a reasonable doubt as to the applicant’s state of knowledge that the complainant was not consenting to sexual intercourse.

99. The additional ground of appeal should be rejected.

100. For similar reasons, we also do not consider that the jury’s verdict on Count 9 was unreasonable, as contended in appeal ground 1. Upon the whole of the evidence, we are satisfied that it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the applicant’s guilt on this count. The fact that the statutory declaration was deployed by the applicant’s solicitor on 19 April 2017 in the Muswellbrook Local Court was entirely consistent with it having been procured by the applicant, knowing that the complainant had made accusations against him and would be a witness in proceedings.

A further point

101. The foregoing analysis has proceeded on the footing that “true evidence” when used in s 323 of the Crimes Act means “objectively true evidence”, the applicant’s argument being, as has been seen, that the evidence could not have been objectively true evidence if it had been rejected by the jury. But there is a nice question of construction that was not explored in argument, namely whether “true evidence” when used in s 323 (as well as ss 321 and 322) means “objectively true evidence” or “the evidence that a witness truly believes and would give under oath”, whether or not that evidence is objectively true or not.

102. The difference may be illustrated by way of example. A person to be called as a witness may be persuaded not to give evidence that he or she saw a person at a particular place on a particular day, notwithstanding that such evidence represents the person’s true belief as to what he or she saw and was what the witness would say on oath in the witness box in a hearing. That person’s evidence may be objectively wrong and “untrue”, for example if it were a case of mistaken identity, but nonetheless is evidence which the person believes to be true.

103. Someone who persuaded that person not to give his or her honest but mistaken evidence would not commit the offence if “true evidence” bears the first of the two meanings identified in [101] above but this construction might not be thought to further the purpose of s 323 of the Crimes Act, which is to prevent interference with witnesses by persuading them to give either false evidence or to withhold true evidence.

104. If the second interpretation outlined above in [101] were correct, viz. that “true evidence” means the evidence that a prospective witness would give and believe to be true, no question of potential inconsistency in verdicts of the kind considered above would arise. The only inquiry would be as to whether or not the person to be called as a witness was persuaded to withhold some or all of the evidence he or she was otherwise prepared to give. In this context, in R v Danahay [1993] 1 Qd R 271 at 282-283, Williams J (with whom Thomas J agreed) observed:

“It is obvious what is encompassed by ‘give false testimony’, but the alternative intent of ‘withholding true testimony’ is not so clear. When that latter expression is contrasted with the former it seems to me that the concept of withholding evidence essentially involves remaining silent (saying nothing) when required to present ‘the whole truth’. That may be established by the witness giving a great volume of detail on oath but withholding evidence on one point (that is, remaining silent as to one fact); that may also be caught by a proscription against giving false testimony. I would think it beyond doubt, that there would logically be a withholding of true testimony if an eye-witness stood mute in the witness-box (either before or after taking the oath); I cannot see that a witness has to say anything positive before there can be a withholding of true testimony.”

105. “True testimony” as opposed to “true evidence” is the expression used in s 127(1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) as well as in s 37 of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).

106. In the absence of any argument on this point, it is sufficient to observe that, irrespective of which interpretation of “true evidence” is correct, we would not set aside the jury’s verdict on Count 9 as unreasonable or grant leave to appeal.

Two further observations in respect of Count 9

107. The first point to be made is that the charge uses the language of “with intent to influence”. This language does not reflect the terms of s 323(a) of the Crimes Act. True it is that s 323 of the Crimes Act is headed “Influencing witnesses and jurors”, but this heading does not form a part of the Act: see s 35(2) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW). Whether or not the expression “with intent to influence” constituted “similar words” to those actually employed under s 323(a) of the Crimes Act within the meaning of s 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act was not the subject of any argument before this Court and no point was taken in respect of that question. (Section 11 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that the “description of any offence in the words of an Act or a statutory rule or other document creating the offence, or in similar words, is sufficient in law”.)

108. Prosecutors ought, however, to take care in formulating counts on an indictment, to adhere as closely as possible to the language of the statute creating the offence.

109. The second point to be made is that, as has been seen, Count 9 was expressed in terms of the withholding of “true evidence” as opposed to the giving of “false evidence”. These are two distinct concepts. In the course of the trial, both in addresses to the jury and the summing up, Count 9 was referred to from time to time in terms of the giving of “false evidence” as opposed to the withholding of “true evidence”. The two are distinct concepts and should not be conflated. No point, however, was taken on appeal in this regard.

Ground 1

110. The test for whether a jury verdict is “unreasonable, or cannot be supported” within the meaning of s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act is whether the court “thinks that upon the whole of the evidence it was open to the jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was guilty”: M v R (1994) 181 CLR 487 at 494-5; [1994] HCA 63 (M v R). The court is obliged to undertake its own “independent assessment of the evidence, both as to its sufficiency and its quality”: Morris v R (1987) 163 CLR 454 at 473; [1987] HCA 50. The burden of persuading the court that appellate interference is required is upon the person who impugns the verdict: MacKenzie v R (1996) 190 CLR 348 at 370; [1996] HCA 35 (MacKenzie).

111. However, the court “must not disregard or discount either the consideration that the jury is the body entrusted with the primary responsibility of determining guilt or innocence, or the consideration that the jury has had the benefit of having seen and heard the witnesses. On the contrary, the court must pay full regard to those considerations”: M v R at 493; Jones v R (1997) 191 CLR 439 at 451; [1997] HCA 56 (Jones).

110. In R v Baden-Clay (2016) 258 CLR 308 at 329-330; [2016] HCA 35, the High Court stated that:

“Given the central place of the jury trial in the administration of criminal justice over the centuries, and the abiding importance of the role of the jury as representative of the community in that respect, the setting aside of a jury’s verdict on the ground that it is ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of s 668E(1) of the Criminal Code [(Qld)] is a serious step, not to be taken without particular regard to the advantage enjoyed by the jury over a court of appeal which has not seen or heard the witnesses called at trial… With those considerations in mind, a court of criminal appeal is not to substitute trial by an appeal court for trial by jury.” (footnotes omitted).

Section 668E(1) of the Criminal Code (Qld), when read with s 668E(1A), is in relevantly similar terms to s 6(1) of the Criminal Appeal Act.

113. Where the M v R test is sought to be employed in circumstances not involving legal or technical inconsistency between verdicts of acquittal and conviction, the legal test becomes one of “logic and reasonableness”: MacKenzie at 366-8; Jones at 450; R v Markuleski (2001) 52 NSWLR 82; [2001] NSWCCA 290 at [6]; TK v R (2009) 74 NSWLR 299; [2009] NSWCCA 151 at [93] (TK).

114. The question is whether the jury must, as distinct from might, have entertained a doubt as to the applicant’s guilt: Libke v R (2007) 230 CLR 559; [2007] HCA 30 at [113].

115. In TK, Simpson J (as her Honour then was), with whom McClellan CJ at CL and Latham J agreed, described the approach to be taken as follows. At [128] and [130], she said:

“…In determining whether convictions are unreasonable, in these circumstances, the focus of the inquiry is upon any explanation, not for the convictions, but for the acquittals. If such an explanation can be found, without resort to doubts about the complainant’s credibility, the verdicts of guilty may not be unreasonable, at least not on that basis… [Before] an appellate court, faced with diverse verdicts on multiple counts, must intervene to set aside the convictions, the court must inquire whether there exists any rational explanation for the acquittals (not the convictions), other than doubts about the complainant’s credibility… The central question is whether the acquittals are attributable only, or principally, to doubt about the complainant’s credibility.” (emphasis in original).

116. Further, at [158], her Honour said that:

“It would hardly be surprising in an allegation of sexual intercourse without consent in the context of a marriage, and particularly where there has been explicit evidence of a history of consensual sexual intercourse (and of the kind the subject of one of the charges), if the jury regarded the issue of the state of mind of the accused person as a primary one. That is more particularly so where, as is here the case, the evidence that the complainant did not consent is rather weak. Even weaker is the evidence that the complainant did anything to convey to the appellant that she was not consenting.”

117. Finally, a verdict of acquittal on one or more counts involving the same complainant does not mandate a conclusion that the jury regarded the complainant as untruthful generally. As explained in MFA v R (2002) 213 CLR 606; [2002] HCA 53 at [34]:

“…In the case of sexual offences, of which there may be no objective evidence, some, or all, of the members of a jury may require some supporting evidence before they are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt on the word of a complainant. This may not be unreasonable. It does not necessarily involve a rejection of the complainant’s evidence. A juror might consider it more probable than not that a complainant is telling the truth but require something additional before reaching a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. The criminal trial procedure is designed to reinforce, in jurors, a sense of the seriousness of their task, and of the heavy burden of proof undertaken by the prosecution. A verdict of not guilty does not necessarily imply that a complainant has been disbelieved, or a want of confidence in the complainant. It may simply reflect a cautious approach to the discharge of a heavy responsibility. In addition to want of supporting evidence, other factors that might cause a jury to draw back from reaching a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt in relation to some aspects of a complainant's evidence might be that the complainant has shown some uncertainty as to matters of detail, or has been shown to have a faulty recollection of some matters, or has been shown otherwise to be more reliable about some parts of his or her evidence than about others…”

Analysis

Count 6

118. The essential thrust of the applicant’s case in relation to his conviction on Count 6 is reflected in para 27 of his submissions, namely that the complainant was the central witness in the prosecution case and “as such everything depended on her as a reliable historian”.

119. Whilst it is correct that the complainant was the central witness in the prosecution case, as will be demonstrated, not everything in relation to Count 6 “depended on her as a reliable historian”.

120. To the extent that the applicant called in aid the complainant’s “belligerent, dismissive and rude behaviour during cross-examination”, it is certainly the case that at various points in her cross-examination, the complainant exhibited these characteristics, but we do not consider that it is accurate or fair to characterise the entirety of her evidence in that way. Further, a distinction must be drawn between the form and the substance of the evidence that the complainant gave. It is true that she became frustrated at various points of the cross-examination with questions she considered to be repetitive or obvious. That is not a unique phenomenon. Moreover, the court should be conscious, with regard to any lay witness, of the pressures that necessarily attend what, for most people, is a one off experience in the witness box.

121. Insofar as the applicant placed reliance upon the complainant’s history of making a false complaint against the applicant (see [53]-[55] above), that was a matter in respect of which counsel for the defence addressed the jury. That may or may not have had a role in the jury’s decision to acquit in respect of Counts 1-5 and 7-8, but there were other reasons why the jury may have acquitted on those counts. For example, with respect to Counts 3-5 which involved allegations of sexual assault, as the Crown submitted, it may have been the case that the jury had a doubt as to the applicant’s knowledge as to the complainant’s consent or lack thereof, as opposed to simply rejecting the Count by reference to its scepticism as to the complainant’s credibility more generally: see, for example, TK at [158], cited at [115] above.

122. We do not consider that the jury’s verdict in relation to Count 6 was unreasonable. In particular, we do not think that the jury’s acquittal of the applicant in relation to Counts 1-5 and 7-8 rendered the conviction on Count 6 unreasonable. This is so for the following reasons.

123. First, the jury was told by the Crown Prosecutor, properly and correctly, that it was not obliged to reach the same verdict on each count. So also the trial judge, in her summing up to the jury, said that:

“You will need to consider each charge separately and, obviously, there is some evidence that is only relevant to one or other of the charges.

There is no legal requirement that the verdicts must all be the same. Having said that, however, if you do come to the view that the accused is not guilty of a particular charge, because you are not satisfied of the reliability of the complainant’s evidence, then you must ask yourselves whether that doubt about the complainant’s evidence causes you to have a reasonable doubt about her evidence on the other charges.”

124. Secondly, Counts 1-5 were only the subject of complaint by the complainant in a statement made on 12 February 2019, shortly prior to the trial, even though they dated back to events a number of years beforehand. Under cross-examination the complainant was vaguer in her recollections of these events by contrast with the events which were alleged to have taken place forming the basis of Count 6.

125. Count 6, by way of contrast with Counts 1-5, was the subject of complaint more or less immediately. Thus the complainant explained what had happened to her to Ms Garland as described at [35] above on the following morning and repeated this explanation to DSC Mawhinney that morning: see [27] above.

126. Thirdly, the fact that the complainant had effectively taken refuge in Ms Garland’s home following her return to Paxton Street from the graveyard with the applicant is consistent with her account that she had been bashed by the applicant.

127. Fourthly, the complainant’s complaint to DSC Mawhinney included her showing the Detective an injury on her leg where she said the applicant had struck her with a bamboo stick. In this context, a suggestion put to the complainant in cross-examination, namely that the mark on her leg occurred later on 19 December 2016 after she returned to the house in the afternoon was contradicted by the fact that she had shown DSC Mawhinney the injury earlier that day. In other words, this line of attack by way of cross-examination as to the origins of the injury to the complainant’s leg misfired.

128. Fifthly, the decisions by the jury to acquit on Counts 3-5 and 7, all of which involved allegations of sexual assault, were not necessarily to be explained by a rejection by the jury of the complainant’s credibility as a witness. Rather, and has been observed above, they were capable of being explained by the jury’s non-satisfaction that the applicant was aware, in respect of each of those counts, as to the complainant’s lack of consent. This possibility was far from remote in light of aspects of the cross-examination of the complainant, in which she accepted that she had not expressly indicated to the applicant that she did not consent to their sexual interaction on those particular occasions. Thus, in relation to the earlier allegations of sexual assault, the following exchange occurred:

“Q.   Now, your evidence on Monday was that you did not say anything to the accused after you were woken by him. Do you recall that?

A.   Yep.

Q.   As a matter of common sense by this I take it that at no point in time did you tell the accused ‘no’ or words to that effect.

A.   Correct.

Q.   Your description of physical events on this incident was simply that the accused was ‘having sex with me’. Correct?

A.   Correct.

Q.   You agree with me that at no time in your evidence on Monday or in your statement on 12 February 2019 do you describe any physical resistance on your part.

A.   That’s correct.”

129. Later, in answer to a question in which it was suggested to the complainant that she had been seeking out the applicant in order to have sexual intercourse with him, she answered:

“As his girlfriend I felt it was my job, yeah.”

130. Specifically in relation to the sexual assault allegation the subject of Count 7, the complainant was asked whether she wanted to lie down with the applicant, to which she said:

“Part of me.”

131. All of the foregoing matters provide a sufficient basis for differentiation by the jury between Count 6 and the other Counts in relation to which the applicant was acquitted. For all of these reasons, the challenge to the conviction on Count 6 as unreasonable should be dismissed.

Sentence

132. The application for leave to appeal against sentence is limited to a complaint that the aggregate sentence of 4 years’ imprisonment with a non-parole period of 3 years was manifestly excessive.

133. The indicated sentences were as follows:

(a)   Count 6 - a sentence of 2 years and 6 months against the statutory maximum of 5 years’ imprisonment;

(b)   Count 9 - a sentence of 3 years and 6 months against the statutory maximum of 7 years’ imprisonment;

(c) Breach of the apprehended domestic violence order (the subject of the s 166 certificate) - 14 months’ imprisonment against a maximum of 2 years’ imprisonment, equivalent to the jurisdictional limit of the Local Court.

134. Although the appeal is mounted on the basis that the indicated sentences were manifestly excessive, the applicant's submissions acknowledged that it is the aggregate sentence imposed pursuant to s 53 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act which is under challenge as “unreasonable or plainly unjust”. Although the indicative sentences are not amenable to appeal, they may be a guide to whether a House v R (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40 (House v R) error is established in the aggregate sentence. However, even if any one or more of the indicated sentences might be regarded as excessive, it does not necessarily follow that the aggregate sentence is excessive (see JM v R (2014) 246 A Crim R 528; [2014] NSWCCA 297 at [40]).

135. In assessing the objective seriousness of Count 6 as falling in the mid-range, the sentencing judge noted that the injury to the complainant’s leg, delivered with some degree of force, whilst not severe was also not trifling. The assault resulted in an abrasion and bruising to the complainant’s left calf.

136. The applicant challenges the factor the sentencing judge found aggravated that offending, being the applicant’s use of a bamboo stick as a weapon. The finding that the offences the subject of Counts 6 and 9 were aggravated by the applicant being subject to a grant of conditional bail at the time of the offending was not challenged.

137. Her Honour’s appointment of the objective seriousness of Count 9 in the mid-range, and the breach of the apprehended domestic violence order in the upper end of the mid-range, was not challenged. Insofar as concerns the offending the subject of Count 9, the sentencing judge found that the complainant was vulnerable to the applicant's demands that she execute the statutory declaration due to her mild intellectual disability, the nature of her relationship with the applicant, the disparity in their ages and her drug taking. Her Honour did not regard the absence of any violence or threats as a mitigating factor, since an allegation of conduct of that kind would have constituted a more serious charge (see R v Burton [2008] NSWCCA 128 at [89]-[90] (Burton)).

138. The applicant’s counsel at the sentence hearing conceded there were no mitigating factors upon which reliance could be placed in the appointment of any of the indicative sentences.

139. There is no challenge to the degree of notional accumulation of the indicative sentences reflected in the aggregate sentence, or the degree of notional accumulation between Count 6 and the breach of the apprehended domestic violence order the subject of the s 166 certificate, the sentencing judge having accepted that breach of that order, imposed for the protection of the complainant, overlapped with the sentence to be indicated for Count 6.

140. The only challenge to the facts the sentencing judge found established for the sentence on Count 6 concerned whether, in light of the applicant being acquitted of the assaults charged as Counts 1, 2 and 8 on the indictment, the Crown was able to establish that the assault the subject of Count 6 was not an isolated act of violence.

141. In respect of that issue, the applicant submitted that the indicated sentence of 2 years and 6 months, against the statutory maximum of 5 years’ imprisonment, was excessive because the sentencing judge took into account what were described in the applicant’s written submissions as “uncharged acts of violence”. That submission proceeds on the assumption that the sentencing judge was prohibited from undertaking any enquiry into whether the assault the subject of Count 6 was an isolated act of violence, or whether it was representative of a wider course of assaultive conduct the complainant was subjected to in her relationship with the applicant.

142. The assumption that other acts of violence were irrelevant for sentencing purposes is misplaced (see R v JCW (2000) 112 A Crim R 466; [2000] NSWCCA 209). It is clear from the proceedings on sentence that the applicant’s counsel was aware that the sentencing judge intended to take into account the complainant’s evidence of other assaults she had suffered (other than the evidence led to prove Counts 1, 2 and 8), which had been led at trial for context purposes, in order to determine whether the assault the subject of Count 6 was an isolated act. Both the Crown and the applicant’s counsel were invited to advance submissions as to whether that evidence proved the uncharged acts of violence to the criminal standard. It was in that context that the applicant's counsel objected to parts of the complainant’s victim impact statement which referred to injuries other than those she sustained as a result of the assault the subject of Count 6. That submission was noted in the sentencing reasons, as was counsel’s further submission that the sentencing judge should treat the complainant’s evidence of other assaults with caution, given what he submitted was the sustained challenge to her credit where she admitted under cross-examination in the trial to making a false report of kidnapping.

143. The sentencing judge acknowledged the need to examine the complainant’s evidence in considering whether other acts of violence were available for sentencing purposes, and a need for a close examination of the evidence given by other witnesses bearing upon that issue, including the expert evidence of Professor Hayes.

144. The applicant does not identify any House v R error in her Honour’s assessment of that evidence. Neither does he challenge her finding that the complainant was assaulted on other occasions, including being struck in an action the complainant described as a “haymaker” (that is, blows to both sides of her head and face); by the applicant holding a knife to her right leg and tapping it resulting in some cuts and bruises and on another occasion hurting her ankle. Her Honour made express reference to the complainant's evidence when she was asked to recall other occasions where violence was inflicted as follows:

“There’s that many of them that come to mind. It’s honestly hard to imagine - and like he used to hurt me for hours and get angrier and angrier.”

145. Her Honour also referred to Professor Hayes’ evidence where she described the complainant as having a mild intellectual disability and compromised cognitive reasoning and adaptive behavioural skills. Professor Hayes assessed the complainant’s verbal functioning age at 11 years and 4 months and her non-verbal age at 7 years and 3 months. So far as the false report of sexual assault was concerned, the sentencing judge extracted lengthy passages from Professor Hayes’ evidence which addressed the circumstances in which the report was made. It is not necessary to refer to that evidence. Her Honour was satisfied that despite the complainant’s intellectual disability and low cognitive functioning, while her conduct in making a false report of kidnapping was suggestive of a level of planning or foresight, it was in essence a “naïvely executed” plan motivated by her fear of the applicant and her view that he should be kept in custody, with bail refused. In those circumstances, the sentencing judge did not regard the complainant’s misconduct as so adversely affecting her credit that it gave rise to a doubt as to her honesty and reliability. She was satisfied the complainant’s evidence of uncharged acts of violence should be accepted.

146. The sentencing judge found as follows:

“… back to Mr Norrie’s submission about Count 6. I reject his submission that I should regard Count 6 as being a bare assault only, that resulted in the injury to the complainant’s leg. Instead, I find the offender did hit the victim, once, with a bamboo stick. I find that this occurred, in circumstances whereby he drove the car at her, and threatened to kill her. I find that this happened, after the offender had seen a text message on her phone and called her derogatory names.

These surrounding circumstances place the assault into context. They do no more than that. In addition, I find that this assault was not an isolated one. The evidence of other acts of violence does no more than that.”

147. Importantly, although her Honour found the other acts of violence allowed for a finding that the assault the subject of Count 6 was not an isolated event, she made no finding that the assault was more objectively serious for that reason. To have used the evidence for that purpose would have constituted error. The finding of objective seriousness in the mid-range was based upon other factual findings, including that at the time of the assault the complainant was vulnerable on account of her mild intellectual disability and that she was in a graveyard late at night, isolated and alone with the applicant. Her Honour expressly disavowed any reliance upon the complainant’s vulnerability as an aggravating factor under s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act in order to avoid any suggestion of double counting.

148. In our view, in light of the foregoing, there is nothing in the appointment of an indicative sentence of 2 years and 6 months for Count 6 that is suggestive of error leading to the appointment of an excessive aggregate sentence.

149. The applicant cited Evans v R [2017] NSWCCA 281 (Evans) as a single comparator against which he submitted the seriousness of the conduct the subject of Count 9 should be assessed. That submission was also advanced without any challenge to the findings upon which the sentence was based, including, in particular, that the offence was committed to dissuade the complainant from giving evidence of the applicant’s sexual offending which, by being committed in a domestic context, required a significant element of general deterrence.

150. The approach of referring the Court to other sentencing decisions where the challenge to a sentence is one of manifest excess has been frequently criticised by this Court, there being little utility in comparing a sentence under challenge with sentences imposed in other cases where the issue for the Court is not to achieve “numerical or mathematical equivalence” between sentences but “consistency in the application of the relevant legal principles”: see Hili v R (2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 at [18], [49] and R v Pham [2015] HCA 39 at [28]. In this case there is even less utility in that approach where a single case is cited as a comparator.

151. Since the applicant relied upon a particular passage in Evans in the judgment of Adamson J (with which Hoeben CJ at CL and Davies J agreed) which might be thought to suggest that a different approach ought to be taken to the use of comparative sentences where a breach of s 323(a) of the Crimes Act is involved, it is necessary to set out those passages of the judgment where Adamson J dealt with the question whether the sentence indicated in that case was excessive.

152. The sentence under review in Evans was an aggregate sentence of 5 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 3 years and 6 months. The sentence comprised one count under s 323(a) of the Crimes Act and a second count of indecent assault. Multiple offences, including two counts of common assault, contravention of an apprehended domestic violence order and intentional destruction of property (all offences arising in the context of domestic violence) were taken into account on a Form 1. A further offence of common assault was before the Court on a s 166 certificate. The count under s 323(a) consisted of the applicant sending 16 text messages over a period of two weeks to the complainant inviting her, or asking her, to withdraw her complaint to police which resulted in him being charged. The text messages were part of a course of communication over a two month period. The content of the text messages were set out in the judgment at [33].

153. The sentencing judge described that conduct in the following terms:

“Count 2 reveals a course of conduct that I regard as being particularly serious. It was repetitive and was clearly designed to emotionally manipulate and blackmail the complainant to discontinue the charges against him. It was also conduct that was in breach of his bail conditions as well as another court order, namely an interim ADVO. These are aggravating features.

To my mind, to seek to have the victim of domestic violence and a violent sexual assault discontinue the charges in the illegitimate way he did, deserves condign punishment.

The integrity of the criminal justice system must be protected and a strong deterrent message must be sent to like-minded individuals. Without such protection of this system the victims of these serious crimes have no recourse.”

154. A sentence of 3 years and 2 months was indicated for that offence.

155. On the appeal, Adamson J was satisfied the indicative sentence was excessive which, in turn, led to the aggregate sentence being excessive.

156. In reasoning to that conclusion and after setting out the terms of s 323(a) of the Crimes Act, Adamson J said (at [46]-[50]):

“It can be seen from the terms of s 323(a) of the Crimes Act that it covers a very broad range of conduct, including procuring a witness to give false evidence, as well as persuading someone not to attend to give evidence and many variations in between. Where a single offence covers a broad range of conduct, it will often be necessary to have regard to the range of sentences which tend to be imposed for other offending of a like nature. It is within the common experience of courts that many charges of domestic violence cannot be prosecuted because the defendant manages to persuade the complainant, including by threatening violence, not to give evidence against him. Conduct of this nature against complainants is inimical to the interests of justice and the administration of justice. The perpetrators of domestic violence may, by committing offences under s 323(a) of the Crimes Act, effectively immunise themselves from prosecution.

Although the sentencing judge considered the offence in count 2 to be particularly serious, this classification is, in my view, insufficient to distinguish it from other offences covered by the section, where an offender may threaten violence against a person for giving evidence or try to inveigle a witness to tell lies in court, or bribe a witness. That these features did not form part of the circumstances of count 2 is an indication that the seriousness of the applicant’s conduct was, compared with other offences against s 323(a), not particularly high. In so far as one can discern a motive from the text message, his motives appear to include the desire to save legal costs; his wish to retain his house; his concern for his career; and his concern for their three children.

…

Of the many communications between February and March 2016 only 16 text messages constituted the offending conduct under count 2. The evidence did not reveal the content of the other communications. It is therefore not possible to infer that these communications were made with the intention of inducing the complainant not to give evidence against the applicant. Thus, while the other communications were capable of forming part of the circumstances surrounding count 2, the seriousness of count 2 must be adjudged by the content and timing of the 16 text messages.

In my view the sentence indicated for count 2 was excessive, having regard to the matters referred to above, and led to the aggregate sentence being excessive. The content of the 16 text messages did not include any threat of violence. Although the applicant expressed the sentiment in the first text message that he did not consider life without the complainant to worth living I do not regard the message as being tantamount to a threat to commit suicide. Rather, I regard that particular text message as the histrionic plea of a man who had difficulty coming to terms with the loss of his relationship with the complainant. I do not discern a threat of violence in any of the text messages. Nor do I detect any indication that the applicant proposed to stalk the complainant or prevent her in any way from having another relationship if, in spite of his pleas, she gave evidence against him.”

157. On re-sentence, a sentence of imprisonment of 1 year was indicated for the s 323(a) offence and the aggregate sentence reduced to 3 years and 6 months’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years.

158. Although at [46] Adamson J referred to the need to have regard to a range of sentences which tend to be imposed for other offending of a like nature, she did not refer to other sentencing cases from which a range of sentences for a breach of s 323(a) might be discerned.

159. The applicant’s counsel did not refer to any cases other than Evans, from which he invited the Court to find that although the applicant’s offending was serious, because the complainant was willing to assist him by signing a false declaration having been made to feel responsible for the fact that the applicant would be separated from his children, and that no threats of violence were involved, an indicative sentence of 3 years and 6 months was excessive.

160. We are unable to see how an absence of threats of violence was relevant in the assessment of the objective seriousness of the offending in Evans and, accordingly, how the absence of any threats of violence by the applicant in the present case was relevant. The approach of the sentencing judge and her citation of Burton was correct.

161. In Burton at [89]-[90], Johnson J held (Campbell JA and Grove J agreeing) that it was wrong, as a matter of law, to have regard to the absence of threats in assessing the objective seriousness of an offence against s 323(a) of the Crimes Act:

“I am satisfied that her Honour fell into specific error in having regard to the absence of threats in assessing the objective seriousness of the s 323(a) offence. The Respondent's s 323(a) offence involved the commission of acts intended to persuade, induce or cause the victim, who was to be called as a witness in judicial proceedings against him, to give false evidence or withhold true evidence or to not attend as a witness. The maximum penalty for that offence is imprisonment for seven years. Section 322(a) provides for an offence of threatening to do or cause any injury or detriment to a person intending to influence the person, who is to be called as a witness, to give false evidence or withhold true evidence or to not attend as a witness. The maximum penalty for that offence is imprisonment for 10 years. Where sentence is passed for a public justice offence, care must be taken not to approach sentence as if a more serious offence had been charged: R v Mobbs [2005] NSWCCA 371 at [30]-[33]; Warby v R (2007) 171 A Crim R 575 at 580.

In my opinion, it was wrong, in assessing the objective criminality of the s 323(a) offence, to have regard to the absence of a feature which, if it were present, would constitute a different and more serious offence.”

162. While there are features of the facts in Evans which are comparable to the facts found by the sentencing judge in the present case, principally that the offences were committed in the context of relationship violence, there remains a range of features of the applicant’s offending which are not comparable, including the vulnerability of the complainant by reason of the nature of her relationship with the applicant, his domination of her, and her intellectual disability, being the most marked. In addition, where in Evans the acts relied upon as constituting the offending conduct went no further than invitations or requests that the applicant’s partner withdraw her complaint, the applicant in the present case drafted the statutory declaration which he then persuaded the complainant to replicate and thereby execute. The integrity of the criminal justice system was also impacted in a more direct and serious way. As the sentencing judge found, the false declaration must have been provided to the applicant’s solicitor and presented to the Local Court. In addition, on re-sentence in Evans, the offending was appointed well below the mid-range of seriousness, a finding which must have been erroneously influenced by taking into consideration the absence of any threats of violence. Finally, on re-sentence a discount of 20 per cent was applied for the plea of guilty before a sentence of 1 year was indicated.

163. In those circumstances, we are not persuaded that the challenge to the indicative sentence imposed by the sentencing judge on Count 9 was excessive, whether by reference to Evans or on any other basis.

164. Having concluded that none of the indicative sentences are excessive, and after taking into account the significant degree of concurrence in the appointment of the aggregate sentence, including, as the Crown noted in its submissions, where the aggregate sentence was only six months longer than the indicated sentence for Count 9, we are not persuaded that the aggregate sentence was “unreasonable or plainly unjust”.

Orders

165. The orders of the Court are:

1. Leave to appeal conviction granted.

2. The appeal is dismissed.

3. Leave to appeal aggregate sentence granted.

4. The appeal is dismissed.

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Decision last updated: 22 November 2019