Van Stokkum v The Finance Brokers Supervisory Board

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   VAN STOKKUM -v- THE FINANCE BROKERS SUPERVISORY BOARD [2001] WASC 59

CORAM:   MASTER BREDMEYER

HEARD:   24 JANUARY 2001

DELIVERED          :   7 MARCH 2001

FILE NO/S:   CIV 2704 of 2000

BETWEEN:   BERNARDUS HUBERTUS VAN STOKKUM

Plaintiff

AND

THE FINANCE BROKERS SUPERVISORY BOARD
Defendant

Catchwords:

Discovery from a potential party - Applicant seeks discovery in a representative capacity

Legislation:

Finance Brokers Control Act 1975 (WA), s 88

Rules of the Supreme Court (WA), O 26 r 4

Result:

Application allowed

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff:     Mr D H Solomon

Defendant:     Mr P B O'Neal

Solicitors:

Plaintiff:     Solomon Brothers

Defendant:     Ms E C J Needham, Ministry of Fair Trading

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Carnie v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398

Case(s) also cited:

Australasian Memory Pty Ltd v Brien [2000] HCA 30; (2000) 172 ALR 28

Birch Investments Pty Ltd v Lim, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 7396; 12 July 1988

Bright v Femcare Ltd [2000] HCA 1179

Canadian Pacific Tobacco Company Ltd v Stapleton (1952) 86 CLR 1

Cohen v Walthamstow Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 980148; 30 March 1998

Crimmins v Stevedore Industry Finance Committee [1999] HCA 59; (1999) 167 ALR 1

Davis v Sagar Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 980443; 10 August 1998

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Nestle Australia Ltd (1986) 69 ALR 445

Hill v National Australia Bank Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA (Master Sanderson); Library No 980676; 24 November 1998

John v Rees [1970] Ch 345; [1969] 2 All ER 274

Johnson Tiles Pty Ltd v Esso Australia Ltd [1999] FCA 56; (1999) ATPR 41‑679

Jovista Pty Ltd v FAI General Insurance [1999] WASC 44

McCarthy v Dolpag Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 106

Perre v Apand Ltd [1999] HCA 36; (1999) 198 CLR 180

Prudential Insurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd [1981] Ch 229

Riley v Jubilee Goldmines NL [2000] WASC 114

Tipperary Developments Pty Ltd v Western Australia [1999] WASC 62; (1999) 21 WAR 250

  1. MASTER BREDMEYER: This is an application by the plaintiff for discovery from a potential party under O 26A r 4 of the Rules of the Supreme Court which provides:

    "4.(1)       This Rule applies if a person who may have a cause of action against a person whose description has been ascertained ("the potential party") wants -

    (a)to commence proceedings against the potential party; or

    (b)to take proceedings against the potential party in the course of an action to which the person is a party,

    but the person, after reasonable enquiries, has not been able to obtain sufficient information to enable a decision to be made as to whether to commence or take the proceedings.

    (2)If there are reasonable grounds for believing that the potential party had, has, or is likely to have had or to have, possession of documents that may assist in making the decision, the person may apply for an…

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Details
Case
[2001] WASC 59
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Van Stokkum sought discovery from the Finance Brokers Supervisory Board in a representative capacity on behalf of other investors who were allegedly cheated by finance brokers in Western Australia. The dispute was heard by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The central legal issue was whether Van Stokkum could represent other investors in seeking discovery from the Board. The court considered whether the represented parties shared the same interest in the proceedings, as required by the relevant rules of court. The court also examined whether Van Stokkum had made reasonable enquiries to obtain the necessary information before seeking the discovery order.

The court found that the investors cheated by different brokers did not share the same interest, and thus could not be represented by a single representative plaintiff. However, the court allowed the application for investors who were cheated by Blackburne & Dixon, as they had the same interest in the Board's failure to cancel this broker's licence. The court also found that Van Stokkum had made reasonable enquiries to obtain the necessary information before seeking the discovery order, as required by the relevant rule of court. The court noted that the Board had concerns about the scope of the discovery request, which was very general, and had supplied the plaintiff with copies of its annual reports in an attempt to assist in narrowing down the request.

In conclusion, the court allowed the application for discovery in a representative capacity for investors who were cheated by Blackburne & Dixon, but not for other investors cheated by different brokers. The court considered that Van Stokkum had made reasonable enquiries to obtain the necessary information before seeking the discovery order.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I was referred by the plaintiff's counsel to Carnie v Esanda Finance Corporation Ltd (1995) 182 CLR 398. In that case Mr and Mrs Carnie had obtained finance through Esanda to purchase a machine for their farm. They entered into a loan contract and a credit mortgage. They claimed that Esanda had not complied with certain provisions of the Credit Act 1984 (NSW). They sought a representative order allowing them to bring the proceedings on behalf of themselves and all other persons who after 28 February 1985 had entered into a loan or credit sale contract with the defendant which was regulated by the Credit Act. They sought a declaration that no representative debtor was required to pay any amount on account of credit charges in relation to those contracts. The High Court on appeal approved the making of a representative order. The High Court held that the plaintiffs and the represented parties had the same interest in the proceedings and the relevant rule authorised their joinder in a representative action. I consider the facts are different in this case. Although I am not called upon to decide whether this plaintiff should be given a representative order or not, as that application is not before me, I see considerable difficulties in his way. He seeks to represent, for the purposes of this discovery action, all investors who have been cheated by finance brokers in Western Australia who were the subject of complaints to the Board and who did not have their licences cancelled by the Board. The fact that, for example, a serious complaint of misconduct was made against Blackburne & Dixon to the Board, and the Board took no action, may benefit Mr Van Stokkum if his investment was made after the date when the Board should have taken action; and it may equally benefit other investors with Blackburne & Dixon around that time. But it seems to me all that is irrelevant to a group of investors cheated by say Graeme Grubb Finance Broker. I consider the investors with the one broker do not have the same interest as investors with another broker. If Mr Van Stokkum succeeds in an action against the Board in negligence for its failure to cancel the licence of Blackburne & Dixon, then that may be a test case which applies, or perhaps extends, the law of negligence into this new factual situation, and it may well help an investor seeking to sue the Board for similar negligence in relation to another broker. But, in terms of O 18 r 12 the two investors do not have the same interest so that they should be represented by the one representative plaintiff. I will not allow this application in relation to any finance broker other than Blackburne & Dixon. However, I will allow this application to be for the benefit of other investors through Blackburne & Dixon who suffered through the failure of the Board to cancel the licence of this broker. The second matter required by O 26A r 4(1) is that the plaintiff "after reasonable enquiries" has not been able to obtain sufficient information to enable a decision to be made as to whether to commence the action or not. I consider the plaintiff has met that test. His solicitors sent a detailed letter of 24 November 2000 to the Board already mentioned. The plaintiff represented by Mr Jeremy Giles and Ms Bartley of Solomon Brothers met with the new chairman of the Board, Mr Peter Jooste QC, Mr O'Neal and Mrs Elizabeth Needham the Registrar of the Board on 15 January 2001, for discussions on the documents required. The details of those discussions are set out in Mr Jooste's affidavit. Although the discussions were useful, and the Board is not totally opposed to pre‑action discovery, the Board expressed a number of concerns which could not be resolved in those discussions and hence have led to this application. In order to assist the plaintiff's solicitor to narrow down his request somewhat the Board supplied copies of its annual reports from 1995 onwards to Mr Giles. The Board was concerned that, despite two lengthy enquiries into the Finance Brokers Board, the request for discovery was very general in its terms. Despite those two lengthy enquiries the plaintiffs were not able to identify any particular documents which they wanted other than to say all complaints made against the brokers. The chairman was concerned that if the current request was granted it would have the potential to result in a third unlimited private enquiry which would for the most part be likely to duplicate what has already been done and would put the Board to the time, trouble and expense of assembling the relevant files. I consider that reasonable enquiries have been made however by the plaintiff and that that requirement of the rule has been met.