Van Der Berg v City of Perth

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JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CHAMBERS

CITATION:   VAN DER BERG -v- CITY OF PERTH [2025] WASC 197

CORAM:   GETHING J

HEARD:   12 - 13 MAY 2025 

DELIVERED          :   22 MAY 2025

FILE NO/S:   CIV 1479 of 2025

BETWEEN:   ANNA MIA VAN DER BERG

Applicant

AND

CITY OF PERTH

Respondent


Catchwords:

Judicial review - Decision by a City of Perth Ranger to seize and detain a dog - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Dog Act 1976 (WA) s 11, s 29
Dog Regulations 2013 (WA) reg 14, Form 1, Form 6

Result:

Application for judicial review dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Applicant : In person
Respondent : Mr T L Beckett

Solicitors:

Applicant : In person
Respondent : McLeods Lawyers

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Attorney-General v Morrison [No 2] [2022] WASC 295

Australian Securities Commission v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (1996) 138 ALR 655

Fisher v Ellerton [2000] WASCA 264

Fisher v Ellerton [2001] WASCA 315

Forrest & Forrest Pty Ltd v The Honourable William Richard Marmion, Minister for Mines and Petroleum [2017] WASCA 153; (2017) 51 WAR 425

Glew v Frank Jasper Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 87

Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 264 CLR 123

Medical Board of Australia v Arukalaivanan [2023] WASCA 117

Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (2013) 249 CLR 332

Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98

Moleirinho v Talbot & Olivier Lawyers Pty Ltd [2014] WASCA 65

Neil v Nott [1994] HCA 23; (1994) 68 ALJR 509; (1994) 121 ALR 148

Nobarani v Mariconte [2018] HCA 36

Reid v City of Gosnells [2023] WASC 48

Sethi v Bhavsar [2020] WASCA 52

Silkchime Pty Ltd v Valuer-General [2023] WASCA 114

Smart v Prisoner Review Board (WA) [2012] WASC 48

Waite v Hennah [2021] WASCA 69

Wentworth v Rogers (No 5) (1986) 6 NSWLR 534

Woodley v Woodley [2018] WASCA 149

Zaghloul v Bayly [2021] WASCA 125

Zerjavic v Chevron Australia Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 40

GETHING J:

  1. Introduction

  1. On the morning of 4 May 2025 a dog by the name of Ollie was seized by rangers from the City of Perth (City).  Ollie's owner is Anna van der Berg.  Ms van der Berg asserts that the seizure and subsequent detention of Ollie was unlawful. 

  2. By application dated 7 May 2025, Ms van der Berg sought judicial review of the decision of the City to seize and detain Ollie.  She filed an amended application on 8 May 2025, which is the one before me for determination (Application).  Ms van der Berg asserts that Ollie could only have been lawfully seized pursuant to a warrant issued under Dog Act 1976 (WA) (Dog Act) s 29(5a). In the Application, her primary ground is that judicial review by way of prerogative relief is justified as:

    The seizure and detention of the dog named Ollie, microchip number xxx is void ab initio, as it was and is unlawful.

    She goes…

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Details
Case
[2025] WASC 197
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Van Der Berg v City of Perth, the applicant, Ms van der Berg, sought judicial review of the decision by a City of Perth Ranger, Mr Carney, to seize and detain her dog, Ollie, following an alleged dog attack. The City of Perth, represented by Mr Carney, defended the decision on the basis of the powers granted under the Dog Act. The application was heard and determined by the Supreme Court of Western Australia. The central legal issue before the court was whether the statutory language of Dog Act s 29(3) required the seizure of a dog to occur on the same day as the alleged attack, and whether the authorised person had to be present at the time of the attack or soon after. Ms van der Berg argued that the word "appears" in the statute necessitated both contemporaneity and proximity, requiring the seizure to happen on the same day and with the authorised person witnessing the event. Conversely, the City contended that the word "appears" should not be interpreted literally but as a common legal device to confer decision-making power, implying only that there must be some factual basis for the decision.

The court considered the principles of statutory interpretation, particularly focusing on the text, context, and purpose of s 29. It held that determining the limits of a decision-maker's statutory powers is a matter of statutory construction, as elucidated by the High Court in Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection. The court rejected Ms van der Berg's interpretation, finding that the word "appears" does not necessarily require the seizure to occur on the same day as the attack or that the authorised person must witness it. Instead, the court adopted the City's interpretation, aligning with the reasoning in Australian Securities Commission v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, where the Full Court of the Federal Court found that "appears" requires a factual basis for the decision-maker's opinion, without the need for strict contemporaneity or proximity. This interpretation aligns with the purpose of the statute, which is to ensure dogs that pose a risk to public safety are controlled.

The court ultimately found in favour of the City of Perth, dismissing Ms van der Berg's application for judicial review. The decision underscored the importance of statutory interpretation in determining the scope of decision-making powers under the Dog Act. The court's ruling clarified that the statutory language does not impose the stringent requirements of contemporaneity and proximity posited by Ms van der Berg, thereby upholding the Ranger's authority to seize and detain the dog based on the available evidence and reasonable grounds.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Background facts The facts relevant to the determination of the Application are largely not in dispute. They are evident from the Carney Affidavit and the BWC Footage. The evidence in the three affidavits sworn by Ms van der Berg is largely consistent with this evidence, though adds information from her perspective. Where this is a significant factual issue, I have either specifically addressed it or identified where I address it later in these reasons. I find the following facts proven on the balance of probabilities. Mr Carney is employed as a Safe City Ranger at the City. He has been employed by the City since 4 December 2024. Mr Carney's evidence is that he is an authorised person for the purposes of the Dog Act. This is disputed by Ms van der Berg. I address this issue in Part 5. On the afternoon of 2 May 2025, Mr Carney was patrolling the city in the course of his employment duties. During that time, he was approached by two members of the public, who advised him of an alleged dog attack on their daughter which occurred at Forrest Place earlier that day (Complainants). He received photographs from the Complainants of the injuries sustained by their daughter on 2 May 2025. Copies of these photographs are attached to the Carney Affidavit as Attachment 4. The photographs show a single cut of about 1 cm in length. It appears to be on the outside thigh. Mr Carney then contacted City Watch and queried whether there were cameras in a position that may have recorded footage of the reported incident. After being advised that there were cameras in the area, he submitted a footage request. On 4 May 2025, Mr Carney received and reviewed the footage of the incident area, Forrest Place, and adjacent bus stand (CCTV Footage). Mr Carney's evidence was that the CCTV Footage showed the dog with Ms van der Berg (now identified as Ollie) lunging approximately over 15 times at various members of the public, including the daughter of the Complainants. After the incident, Ms van der Berg and her dog are seen boarding a bus at bus stand number 26768, William Street, Perth. The City sought to tender a USB containing the CCTV footage. Ms van der Berg objected on the ground of relevance. Having clarified the scope of the Application identified at [13] I upheld this objection. This was because there was no challenge to the decision of the City to seize and detain Ollie on the ground that there was no factual basis for it or that it was not justified or not reasonable. On 4 May 2025, at approximately 9:30 am, Mr Carney attended the Perth Bus Port, along with two of his colleagues, to enquire about obtaining bus footage or knowledge of where the Ms van der Berg and her dog departed the bus they boarded, as shown in the CCTV footage. Mr Carney then returned to the incident area near Forrest Place in efforts to gather further information regarding Ms van der Berg's frequency in the area. He was patrolling the malls in the incident area and observed Ms van der Berg walking along Hay Street Mall near the traffic lights on William Street while pushing her dog in a pram. He followed Ms van der Berg into the Enex building on Hay Street in order to obtain her details in accordance with Dog Act s 43(a).

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Full text does not contain this section.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Ms van der Berg relied on what she described as the common law of seizure along with various international instruments. In my view, none of these principles have any application to the present case. Rather, as set out by the High Court in Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, determining the limits of a decision-maker's functions and powers is a question of statutory construction.[15][15] Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] HCA 34; (2018) 264 CLR 123 [23], [27] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler and Keane JJ). The task of construing Dog Act s 29 'begins and ends with the statutory text, [though] throughout the process the text is construed in its context'.[16] So it is necessary to consider the text, context and purpose of s 29 and determine the construction that, according to the established rules of interpretation, serves the relevant statutory purpose. In doing so, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying s 29 is to be preferred to a construction that would not promote that purpose or object.[17] [16] Mohammadi v Bethune [2018] WASCA 98 [31] (Judgment of the court); Waite v Hennah[2021] WASCA 69 [84] (judgment of the court) (Waite).[17] Waite [84]. Ms van der Berg contends that the language of Dog Act s 29(3), in particular the use of the word 'appears', connotes a requirement of contemporaneity and proximity. More specifically, she asserts that the power in s 29(3)(a) and (d) requires the seizure to occur on the same day on which the alleged attack occurred. She also asserts that the power in s 29(3)(a) and (d) requires a ranger to be present at the time of the attack or soon after. In coming to that conclusion, she invites the court to place weight on the language of s 29(3), which she says connotes the required contemporaneity and proximity. The word 'appears' is asserted to have, in effect, a literal meaning of it must be seen by the authorised person. In this sense it must appear to an authorised person that an attack by a dog has occurred or, for example, an attack by a dog is likely to occur. The City, on the other hand, invites the court to find that the language, in particular the word 'appear', does not import any requirement of contemporaneity or proximity. The word 'appear' is not used in a literal sense, rather, it is a commonly used device for conveying power to a decision-maker. And in that regard, counsel referred to the decision in Australian Securities Commission v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, where the Full Court of the Federal Court construed a similar phrase, 'it appears'; in the context of Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 1989 (C'th) s 50.[18] The theme that is drawn from the various authorities considered by the Full Court in that case is that the word 'appears' requires there to be at least some factual basis for the decision-maker to form the requisite opinion.[18] Australian Securities Commission v Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu (1996) 138 ALR 655, 679 - 691 (Beaumont, Drummond and Sundberg JJ) (Deloitte).