Vakiloroaya v HVPS Holdings Pty Limited

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Vakiloroaya v HVPS Holdings Pty Limited [2022] FCA 1192

File number(s): NSD 179 of 2022
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 15 September 2022
Catchwords:

CONTRACTS – election – where inventor assignor allegedly induced by fraudulent representation to assign rights to intellectual property in consideration of monthly payments – where assignor became aware of fraud and continued to demand and received part payments of outstanding consideration from assignee – where assignor knew of fraud and right to avoid assignments – where assignor issued statutory demand to assignee under s 459E of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – where court set aside statutory demand - whether assignor elected to affirm assignments

CORPORATIONS – insolvency – whether leave to proceed in appeal under s 36(5) of Patents Act 1990 (Cth) against company in creditors voluntary liquidation should be granted under s 500(2) of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – summary dismissal – where applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting appeal under s 31A of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – Held: leave refused

PATENTS – where assignor applied under s 36 of Patents Act 1990 (Cth) for declaration that assignee not an eligible person – where Commissioner found no power to make declaration under s 36 where assignor allegedly induced by fraud to allow assignee to apply for patent – where assignor appealed to court under s 36(5) of Patents Act – whether any reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting appeal

Legislation:

Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 (Australian Consumer Law) s 243

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 459E, 500(2)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(1)

Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 36, 160

Cases cited:

Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305

Immer (No 145) Pty Limited v Unity Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) (1993) 182 CLR 26

Matthews v Smallwood [1910] 1 Ch 777

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Intellectual Property
Sub-area: Patents and associated Statutes
Number of paragraphs: 60
Date of hearing: 15 September 2022
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H P T Bevan SC with Mr R J Boadle
Solicitor for the Applicant: Corporate Legal
Counsel for the Respondent: Ms E Whitby
Solicitor for the Respondent:  Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick Lawyers

ORDERS

NSD 179 of 2022
BETWEEN:

VAHID VAKILOROAYA

Applicant

AND:

HVPS HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

15 SEPTEMBER 2022

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The interlocutory application filed on 7 June 2022 be dismissed. 

2.The appeal be dismissed. 

3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs. 

4.The parties bring in draft orders as to any alternative costs order and in respect of any application for assessment in a lump sum. 

THE COURT NOTES THAT:

5.The interlocutory application was argued on the basis of the amended notice of appeal (intellectual property) and statement of facts and contentions annexed to the affidavit of Zohra Ali sworn 1 June 2022. 

Note:   Entry of orders…

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Details
Case
[2022] FCA 1192
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Vakiloroaya v HVPS Holdings Pty Limited was heard in the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. Dr Vakiloroaya brought an appeal against the decision of the Federal Circuit Court, which dismissed his application for leave to appeal from the decision of the Federal Circuit Court that dismissed his action against HVPS. Dr Vakiloroaya sought a declaration that the 2016 deed and the 2018 memorandum of understanding were void, an order for the return of a patent application, an order for damages for the failure to prosecute other patent applications, and an order for payment of interest and costs.

The legal issues before the court were whether Dr Vakiloroaya could maintain an appeal against HVPS in liquidation and whether there was a reasonable prospect of success in the appeal. The court had to consider whether Dr Vakiloroaya could blow hot and cold, that is, approbate and reprobate, by simultaneously seeking to enforce the 2016 deed and challenging its validity.

The court held that Dr Vakiloroaya could not blow hot and cold or approbate and reprobate. The court found that Dr Vakiloroaya had indicated that he was prepared to enforce the 2016 deed by serving a statutory demand on HVPS, but at the same time, he had expressed his intention to challenge the validity of the 2016 deed. The court concluded that Dr Vakiloroaya could not successfully prosecute his appeal because there was no reasonable prospect of success. The court found that the evidence did not support Dr Vakiloroaya's claim that HVPS had induced him to enter into the 2016 deed by fraudulent misrepresentations.

The court refused leave to proceed under s 500(2) against HVPS in liquidation with costs. The court found that the strong likelihood that Dr Vakiloroaya could not successfully prosecute his appeal was sufficient to refuse leave to proceed. The court noted that the trial would be likely to last three or four days and that Dr Vakiloroaya was an individual who owned property with his wife. The court considered that it would have been appropriate to order Dr Vakiloroaya to pay security for costs in the region of $120,000, but it was not necessary to decide that matter. The court found that Dr Vakiloroaya had not made a binding election to affirm the 2016 deed by serving a statutory demand on HVPS. The court concluded that Dr Vakiloroaya had not acted on the basis that the contract remained on foot, but rather, he had expressed his intention to challenge its validity.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

On 4 October 2018, Dr Vakiloroaya wrote to Mr Turnidge, following an earlier exchange of emails with Mr Turnidge and other members of the company’s board in which he was seeking payment, saying: I spoke to my lawyer together with a barrister that I can now challenge [the 2016 deed] that I have signed based on fake facts provided to me and challenge the ownership of patent (I am not going to do that unless I think it is essential).I have really been screwed on signing [the 2016 deed] and even that agreement has never been followed respectfully. So if we are insolvent let’s consider we are and if we are not I shall be paid.My lawyer will mail the breach of agreement and payment notice by next week sometimes [sic] for my Sep dept [sic] which is 138666 AUD as the company didn’t provide me any payment plan by today (based on my last email). (emphasis added) At around this time, Mr Calvin began writing letters of demand to HVPS. On 5 October 2018, Mr Calvin, on the letterhead of his then firm, Ash Street Partners Pty Limited, wrote to HVPS, noting that it was indebted to Dr Vakiloroaya for the $138,666.67 under the 2016 deed. Mr Calvin informed HVPS that his client intended, on about 9 October 2018, to serve a statutory demand under s 459E of the Corporations Act on HVPS for all moneys owing to him. On 9 October 2018, Mr Calvin wrote to the solicitors for HVPS, Wisewould Mahoney. He referred to their letter of 8 October 2018, and in particular denied the assertion that HVPS was not obliged to make any payments to Dr Vakiloroaya under the 2016 deed or the 2018 memorandum. The letter stated that, rather, the position was that HVPS “is in breach of the [2016 deed] by its regular and long standing failures to pay monies owing to our client under the [2016 deed]”. The letter referred to Dr Vakiloroaya’s 4 October 2018 email saying:The company has repeatedly since about May 2017 (within 8 months of the date of the [2016 deed]) failed to pay to our client amounts owing under the [2016 deed] and now, despite his many good faith accommodations and even a stand-still under [the 2018 memorandum], it is apparent that HVPS has no intention of acting as if it was bound by the [2016 deed] except when it suits its own ends.(emphasis added) Mr Calvin reasserted Dr Vakiloroaya’s entitlement to payment of the debt due to him. It asserted that Wisewould’s letter of 8 October 2018: may be a repudiation of [the 2016 deed] and [the 2018 memorandum]. Our client may be required to consider whether to elect to affirm one or both of these documents and sue for damages, or elect to accept the repudiation, terminate and sue for damages. Our client is considering his position. (emphasis added) The letter referred to Dr Vakiloroaya’s position that Mr Heaton had induced him to enter into the 2016 deed and transfer three patent applications to HVPS by his fraudulent misrepresentations. It said that Dr Vakiloroaya:…is entitled to certain declarations including setting aside the [2016 deed], return of the (remaining) third patent [viz: the 880 application] to him, an order for damages for the failure of HVPS to prosecute the first and second patent applications and payment of interest and costs. Our client is considering his position on these matters.ResolutionIf you [sic] client fails to pay to our client the amounts your client has acknowledged is owing to him by 5pm on 12 October 2018 then our client will take such action as advised.The statutory demand

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In my opinion, Dr Vakiloroaya cannot blow hot and cold or, as Isaacs J had put it, approbate and reprobate: Craine 28 CLR at 326. Were I to grant leave to proceed against HVPS under s 500(2) of the Corporations Act, I am satisfied that, on the basis of the test in s 31A(1) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) there is no reasonable prospect of Dr Vakiloroaya successfully prosecuting this appeal and it would be summarily dismissed. Conclusion I am of opinion that leave to proceed under s 500(2) against HVPS in liquidation should be refused with costs. That is because of the strong likelihood that Dr Vakiloroaya could not successfully prosecute his appeal. I will give the parties an opportunity to make submissions about any alternative order for costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

HVPS is in liquidation and, on the evidence, it is unclear if Dr Vakiloroaya will be able to meet the not insubstantial costs of the appeal, were he to lose, as I consider would occur. The trial would be likely to last three or four days. Were I to have had to decide on an amount for security for costs, my impression based on the evidence of the solicitors, is that an amount in the region of $120,000 would be appropriate. I would have ordered that any security be paid in tranches. However, Dr Vakiloroaya is an individual who owns property with his wife. There would have been a serious issue as to whether his right to pursue the appeal should be inhibited by an order for security, notwithstanding his potential inability to meet those costs. However, it is not necessary to decide that matter. Consideration In Immer 182 CLR at 41–42, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said: The true nature of election is brought out in this sentence from the seminal work of Spencer Bower and Turner, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation [3rd ed. (1977), p. 313]: “It is of the essence of election that the party electing shall be 'confronted' with two mutually exclusive courses of action between which he must, in fairness to the other party, make his choice.”…As Spencer Bower and Turner point out in the passage quoted earlier, at the heart of election is the idea of confrontation which in turn produces the necessity of making a choice. But in a case such as the present one, the choice is not merely one of affirming the agreement; it involves as well the abandonment of the right to rescind. Abandonment is more readily inferred in some circumstances, for instance where the choice arises once and for all…. The point is that where the right to rescind is a continuing one, it is not so readily concluded that the party entitled to rescind has abandoned that right completely as opposed to taking no action to exercise the right at the time in question.(emphasis added) Their Honours also said (at 42–43):In Tropical Traders Ltd. v. Goonan [(1964) 111 CLR 41 at 55] Kitto J. commented:“Not that election is a matter of intention. It is an effect which the law annexes to conduct which would be justifiable only if an election had been made one way or the other.”On the other hand, in Sargent v. A.S.L. Developments Ltd. [(1974) 131 CLR 634 at 656] Mason J. said of the elements essential to the making of a binding election:“The question is complicated because in some instances election may take place as a matter of conscious choice with knowledge of the existence of the alternative right and in other cases it may occur when the law attributes the character of an election to the conduct of a party.”But, in drawing this distinction, Mason J. was focusing on the dichotomy between awareness of the right to rescind and awareness of the facts giving rise to the right. We do not read that passage from his Honour's judgment as implying that a party to a contract who is aware either of the right to rescind or of facts giving rise to a right to rescind will necessarily be held to have elected to affIrm a contract if he or she acts on the basis that the contract remains on foot. Such an implication is at odds with the notion of being confronted with the necessity of making a choice.(emphasis added)