FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Vakiloroaya v HVPS Holdings Pty Limited [2022] FCA 1192
File number(s): NSD 179 of 2022 Judgment of: RARES J Date of judgment: 15 September 2022 Catchwords: CONTRACTS – election – where inventor assignor allegedly induced by fraudulent representation to assign rights to intellectual property in consideration of monthly payments – where assignor became aware of fraud and continued to demand and received part payments of outstanding consideration from assignee – where assignor knew of fraud and right to avoid assignments – where assignor issued statutory demand to assignee under s 459E of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – where court set aside statutory demand - whether assignor elected to affirm assignments
CORPORATIONS – insolvency – whether leave to proceed in appeal under s 36(5) of Patents Act 1990 (Cth) against company in creditors voluntary liquidation should be granted under s 500(2) of Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) – summary dismissal – where applicant has no reasonable prospect of successfully prosecuting appeal under s 31A of Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) – Held: leave refused
PATENTS – where assignor applied under s 36 of Patents Act 1990 (Cth) for declaration that assignee not an eligible person – where Commissioner found no power to make declaration under s 36 where assignor allegedly induced by fraud to allow assignee to apply for patent – where assignor appealed to court under s 36(5) of Patents Act – whether any reasonable prospects of successfully prosecuting appeal
Legislation: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) Sch 2 (Australian Consumer Law) s 243
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 459E, 500(2)
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 31A(1)
Patents Act 1990 (Cth) ss 36, 160
Cases cited: Craine v Colonial Mutual Fire Insurance Co Ltd (1920) 28 CLR 305
Immer (No 145) Pty Limited v Unity Church in Australia Property Trust (NSW) (1993) 182 CLR 26
Matthews v Smallwood [1910] 1 Ch 777
Division: General Division Registry: New South Wales National Practice Area: Intellectual Property Sub-area: Patents and associated Statutes Number of paragraphs: 60 Date of hearing: 15 September 2022 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr H P T Bevan SC with Mr R J Boadle Solicitor for the Applicant: Corporate Legal Counsel for the Respondent: Ms E Whitby Solicitor for the Respondent: Phillips Ormonde Fitzpatrick Lawyers ORDERS
NSD 179 of 2022 BETWEEN: VAHID VAKILOROAYA
Applicant
AND: HVPS HOLDINGS PTY LIMITED
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
RARES J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 SEPTEMBER 2022
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The interlocutory application filed on 7 June 2022 be dismissed.
2.The appeal be dismissed.
3.The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
4.The parties bring in draft orders as to any alternative costs order and in respect of any application for assessment in a lump sum.
THE COURT NOTES THAT:
5.The interlocutory application was argued on the basis of the amended notice of appeal (intellectual property) and statement of facts and contentions annexed to the affidavit of Zohra Ali sworn 1 June 2022.
Note: Entry of orders…
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- Case
- [2022] FCA 1192
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether Dr Vakiloroaya could maintain an appeal against HVPS in liquidation and whether there was a reasonable prospect of success in the appeal. The court had to consider whether Dr Vakiloroaya could blow hot and cold, that is, approbate and reprobate, by simultaneously seeking to enforce the 2016 deed and challenging its validity.
The court held that Dr Vakiloroaya could not blow hot and cold or approbate and reprobate. The court found that Dr Vakiloroaya had indicated that he was prepared to enforce the 2016 deed by serving a statutory demand on HVPS, but at the same time, he had expressed his intention to challenge the validity of the 2016 deed. The court concluded that Dr Vakiloroaya could not successfully prosecute his appeal because there was no reasonable prospect of success. The court found that the evidence did not support Dr Vakiloroaya's claim that HVPS had induced him to enter into the 2016 deed by fraudulent misrepresentations.
The court refused leave to proceed under s 500(2) against HVPS in liquidation with costs. The court found that the strong likelihood that Dr Vakiloroaya could not successfully prosecute his appeal was sufficient to refuse leave to proceed. The court noted that the trial would be likely to last three or four days and that Dr Vakiloroaya was an individual who owned property with his wife. The court considered that it would have been appropriate to order Dr Vakiloroaya to pay security for costs in the region of $120,000, but it was not necessary to decide that matter. The court found that Dr Vakiloroaya had not made a binding election to affirm the 2016 deed by serving a statutory demand on HVPS. The court concluded that Dr Vakiloroaya had not acted on the basis that the contract remained on foot, but rather, he had expressed his intention to challenge its validity.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
HVPS is in liquidation and, on the evidence, it is unclear if Dr Vakiloroaya will be able to meet the not insubstantial costs of the appeal, were he to lose, as I consider would occur. The trial would be likely to last three or four days. Were I to have had to decide on an amount for security for costs, my impression based on the evidence of the solicitors, is that an amount in the region of $120,000 would be appropriate. I would have ordered that any security be paid in tranches. However, Dr Vakiloroaya is an individual who owns property with his wife. There would have been a serious issue as to whether his right to pursue the appeal should be inhibited by an order for security, notwithstanding his potential inability to meet those costs. However, it is not necessary to decide that matter. Consideration In Immer 182 CLR at 41–42, Deane, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said: The true nature of election is brought out in this sentence from the seminal work of Spencer Bower and Turner, The Law Relating to Estoppel by Representation [3rd ed. (1977), p. 313]: “It is of the essence of election that the party electing shall be 'confronted' with two mutually exclusive courses of action between which he must, in fairness to the other party, make his choice.”…As Spencer Bower and Turner point out in the passage quoted earlier, at the heart of election is the idea of confrontation which in turn produces the necessity of making a choice. But in a case such as the present one, the choice is not merely one of affirming the agreement; it involves as well the abandonment of the right to rescind. Abandonment is more readily inferred in some circumstances, for instance where the choice arises once and for all…. The point is that where the right to rescind is a continuing one, it is not so readily concluded that the party entitled to rescind has abandoned that right completely as opposed to taking no action to exercise the right at the time in question.(emphasis added) Their Honours also said (at 42–43):In Tropical Traders Ltd. v. Goonan [(1964) 111 CLR 41 at 55] Kitto J. commented:“Not that election is a matter of intention. It is an effect which the law annexes to conduct which would be justifiable only if an election had been made one way or the other.”On the other hand, in Sargent v. A.S.L. Developments Ltd. [(1974) 131 CLR 634 at 656] Mason J. said of the elements essential to the making of a binding election:“The question is complicated because in some instances election may take place as a matter of conscious choice with knowledge of the existence of the alternative right and in other cases it may occur when the law attributes the character of an election to the conduct of a party.”But, in drawing this distinction, Mason J. was focusing on the dichotomy between awareness of the right to rescind and awareness of the facts giving rise to the right. We do not read that passage from his Honour's judgment as implying that a party to a contract who is aware either of the right to rescind or of facts giving rise to a right to rescind will necessarily be held to have elected to affIrm a contract if he or she acts on the basis that the contract remains on foot. Such an implication is at odds with the notion of being confronted with the necessity of making a choice.(emphasis added)