FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VAI v Forgie [2003] FCA 87
VAI v DEPUTY PRESIDENT FORGIE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL and THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
V 741 OF 2002
NORTH J
18 FEBRUARY 2003
MELBOURNE
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 741 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
VAI
APPLICANTAND:
DEPUTY PRESIDENT FORGIE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
FIRST RESPONDENTTHE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENTJUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE OF ORDER:
18 FEBRUARY 2003
WHERE MADE:
MELBOURNE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The application is dismissed.
2.The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY
V 741 OF 2002
BETWEEN:
VAI
APPLICANTAND:
DEPUTY PRESIDENT FORGIE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
FIRST RESPONDENTTHE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
NORTH J
DATE:
18 FEBRUARY 2003
PLACE:
MELBOURNE
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 23 September 2002, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) constituted by Deputy President Forgie, who is the first respondent in these proceedings, refused an application by the applicant for further and better particulars of allegations of evasion and/or fraud made against him by the second respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (the Commissioner).
The application presently before the Court, which was filed on 24 October 2002, seeks orders under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The effect of the orders sought would be to restrain the Tribunal from proceeding with the hearing until the Commissioner provides the applicant with the particulars sought.
The applicant requested the Tribunal that the proceeding be in private. As a result, pursuant to s 14ZZE of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (Taxation Administration Act), he was entitled to have the hearing in private. In order to give practical effect to that statutory entitlement before the Tribunal, on 9 December 2002, I ordered that the publication of the name of the applicant and of any material tending to identify the applicant be restricted to members and staff of the Court, the parties and their representatives and the staff of any transcript provider. This explains why the applicant is referred to in these reasons as VAI, and why certain otherwise identifying facts have been referred to in a way which does not identify the applicant.
The first respondent did not take part in the hearing, but entered a submitting appearance.
BACKGROUND
On 1 September 1999, the Commissioner issued three notices of amended assessment of income tax in respect of the applicant, one for each of the financial years ended 30 June 1993, 30 June 1994 and 30 June 1995.
On or about 29 October 1999, the applicant lodged notices of objection against the amended assessments for the 1993 and 1994 financial years, and on about 3 November 1999, he lodged a notice of…
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- Case
- [2003] FCA 87
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The Tribunal considered whether the Commissioner was required to provide additional information to support the disallowance decision. The Tribunal noted that section 37(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 required the Commissioner to provide certain documents relevant to the review of the decision, including a statement of reasons. The Tribunal also noted that section 14ZZF(1)(a) of the Taxation Administration Act modified the operation of section 37(1) for the disallowance of taxation objections, requiring the Commissioner to provide additional documents, including a list of documents being lodged under section 14ZZF(1)(a)(v). The Tribunal found that the Commissioner had not provided adequate particulars of the findings on material questions of fact or the evidence or other material on which those findings were based. The Tribunal ordered the Commissioner to provide additional information to support the disallowance decision.
The Tribunal also considered whether the Commissioner’s reasons for the disallowance decision constituted a statement of reasons within the meaning of section 37(1) of the AAT Act. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner’s reasons did not adequately refer to the evidence or other material on which the findings were based or adequately particularise the reasons for the decision. The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner had not provided the additional information required under section 37(1) of the AAT Act, despite being ordered to do so by the Tribunal.
The Tribunal ultimately dismissed the applicant’s application for review, finding that the Commissioner’s reasons for the disallowance decision were inadequate. The Tribunal ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the application.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: NORTH J
The next four paragraphs of the section headed “Why have we made this decision” read as follows:12. The taxpayer was aware that he was being paid the disputed sums in respect of his personal services as a professional footballer. The means adopted by the taxpayer and … [the applicant’s adviser] to conceal the true character of the payments constitutes deliberate evasion if not fraud in terms of paragraph 170(2)(b) of the ITAA 1936.13. It is well established that fraud exists where a person makes a false statement or representation either believing it false, or is recklessly careless whether it is true or false: Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337 per Herschell LJ at 374. Derry v Peek was followed by the High Court in Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 130 ALR 1.14. Evasion connotes something less than fraud. In Denver Chemical Manufacturing Co v C of T (NSW)(1949) 8 ATD 411, Dixon J said of evasion: ,, … it means more than avoid and also more than a mere withholding of information or the mere furnishing of misleading information. It is probably safe to say that some blameworthy act or omission on the part of the taxpayer or those for whom he is responsible is contemplated. An intention to withhold information least the Commissioner should consider the taxpayer liable to a greater extent than the taxpayer is prepared to concede, is conduct which if the result is to avoid tax would justify finding evasion.15. The taxpayer’s conduct, either alone or together with … [the applicant’s adviser], with respect to the relevant years of income, constitutes deliberate evasion if not fraud in terms of paragraph 170(2)(a) of the ITAA 1936.(a)The taxpayer, together with … [the applicant’s adviser] knowingly entered into the arrangement with … [the football club] whereby part of the taxpayer’s remuneration from … [the football club] in respect of his services to … [the football club] as a professional footballer was intentionally misclassified to conceal its true character as salary and wages. (b)Invoices in respect to the taxpayer’s “off contract” payments were prepared and sent by … [the construction company] to … [the football club] on behalf of the taxpayer, in order to give the appearance that … [the construction company] performed services for … [the football club].(c)[The football club] … classified the payments in the accounts as “repairs and maintenance”.(d)The taxpayer has admitted that:(i)he knew the arrangement was structured to allow him to receive “off contract” payments;(ii)he performed no service for … [the football club] pursuant to any contract with … [the construction company], in respect to the “off contract” payments; and(iii)[The construction company] … provided no service to … [the football club] in respect to the “off contract” payments.(e)[The football club] … has confirmed that the “off contract” payments made to the taxpayer have always had the character of salary or wage income of the taxpayer, as they were negotiated as income of the taxpayer.(f)[The football club] … has admitted that by misclassifying the payments the intention was to conceal the payments from … [the football regulatory authority] investigators to avoid the salary cap.(g)[The football club] … has admitted that the arrangement was struck to allow “off contract” payments to be made to the taxpayer and there was no expectation of services to be provided by … [the construction company] in respect of these payments.(h)Even after being formally advised by his employer in the letter dated 23 September 1997 that the payments were salary and wages, the taxpayer made no further enquiries to establish the correct tax treatment for the payments.”CONSIDERATION