Vai v Forgie

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VAI v Forgie [2003] FCA 87

VAI v DEPUTY PRESIDENT FORGIE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL and THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

V 741 OF 2002

NORTH J
18 FEBRUARY 2003
MELBOURNE


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 741 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

VAI
APPLICANT

AND:

DEPUTY PRESIDENT FORGIE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
FIRST RESPONDENT

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE OF ORDER:

18 FEBRUARY 2003

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The application is dismissed.

2.The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Note:   Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V 741 OF 2002

BETWEEN:

VAI
APPLICANT

AND:

DEPUTY PRESIDENT FORGIE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL
FIRST RESPONDENT

THE COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
SECOND RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

NORTH J

DATE:

18 FEBRUARY 2003

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 23 September 2002, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (the Tribunal) constituted by Deputy President Forgie, who is the first respondent in these proceedings, refused an application by the applicant for further and better particulars of allegations of evasion and/or fraud made against him by the second respondent, the Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia (the Commissioner).

  2. The application presently before the Court, which was filed on 24 October 2002, seeks orders under s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The effect of the orders sought would be to restrain the Tribunal from proceeding with the hearing until the Commissioner provides the applicant with the particulars sought.

  3. The applicant requested the Tribunal that the proceeding be in private. As a result, pursuant to s 14ZZE of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (Taxation Administration Act), he was entitled to have the hearing in private. In order to give practical effect to that statutory entitlement before the Tribunal, on 9 December 2002, I ordered that the publication of the name of the applicant and of any material tending to identify the applicant be restricted to members and staff of the Court, the parties and their representatives and the staff of any transcript provider. This explains why the applicant is referred to in these reasons as VAI, and why certain otherwise identifying facts have been referred to in a way which does not identify the applicant.

  4. The first respondent did not take part in the hearing, but entered a submitting appearance. 

    BACKGROUND

  5. On 1 September 1999, the Commissioner issued three notices of amended assessment of income tax in respect of the applicant, one for each of the financial years ended 30 June 1993, 30 June 1994 and 30 June 1995.

  6. On or about 29 October 1999, the applicant lodged notices of objection against the amended assessments for the 1993 and 1994 financial years, and on about 3 November 1999, he lodged a notice of…

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Details
Case
[2003] FCA 87
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Vai v Forgie, the applicant sought a review of the disallowance of objections against amended income tax assessments. The applicant, who was a professional footballer, had entered into an arrangement with a football club and a construction company to receive payments outside of his contract, which were misclassified to avoid tax liability. The Commissioner disallowed the applicant’s objections to the amended assessments, finding that the applicant’s conduct constituted deliberate evasion or fraud under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936.

The Tribunal considered whether the Commissioner was required to provide additional information to support the disallowance decision. The Tribunal noted that section 37(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 required the Commissioner to provide certain documents relevant to the review of the decision, including a statement of reasons. The Tribunal also noted that section 14ZZF(1)(a) of the Taxation Administration Act modified the operation of section 37(1) for the disallowance of taxation objections, requiring the Commissioner to provide additional documents, including a list of documents being lodged under section 14ZZF(1)(a)(v). The Tribunal found that the Commissioner had not provided adequate particulars of the findings on material questions of fact or the evidence or other material on which those findings were based. The Tribunal ordered the Commissioner to provide additional information to support the disallowance decision.

The Tribunal also considered whether the Commissioner’s reasons for the disallowance decision constituted a statement of reasons within the meaning of section 37(1) of the AAT Act. The Tribunal found that the Commissioner’s reasons did not adequately refer to the evidence or other material on which the findings were based or adequately particularise the reasons for the decision. The Tribunal noted that the Commissioner had not provided the additional information required under section 37(1) of the AAT Act, despite being ordered to do so by the Tribunal.

The Tribunal ultimately dismissed the applicant’s application for review, finding that the Commissioner’s reasons for the disallowance decision were inadequate. The Tribunal ordered the applicant to pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant is to pay the respondents’ costs of the application.

Background

Background to the litigation

The first respondent did not take part in the hearing, but entered a submitting appearance. BACKGROUND On 1 September 1999, the Commissioner issued three notices of amended assessment of income tax in respect of the applicant, one for each of the financial years ended 30 June 1993, 30 June 1994 and 30 June 1995. On or about 29 October 1999, the applicant lodged notices of objection against the amended assessments for the 1993 and 1994 financial years, and on about 3 November 1999, he lodged a notice of objection against the amended assessment for the 1995 financial year. By letters dated 14 March 2002, the Commissioner disallowed the objections for each of the financial years 1993, 1994, and 1995. Attached to each letter was a document entitled “Reasons for Decision”, the details of which will be referred to later in this judgment. On 14 May 2002, the applicant lodged in the Tribunal an application for review of each of the disallowance decisions. THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE TRIBUNAL Section 37(1) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (the AAT Act) provides for the decision-maker to lodge with the tribunal certain specified documents relevant to the proceeding before the tribunal. That section provides:“(1) Subject to this section, a person who has made a decision that is the subject of an application for a review by the Tribunal must, within 28 days after receiving notice of the application (or within such further period as the Tribunal allows), lodge with the Tribunal 2 copies of:(a)a statement setting out the findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based and giving the reasons for the decision; and(b)every other document or part of a document that is in the person’s possession or under the person’s control and is considered by the person to be relevant to the review of the decision by the Tribunal.” Section 14ZZF(1)(a) of the Taxation Administration Act modifies the operation of s 37(1) of the AAT Act for the purpose of certain decisions, including a decision of the Commissioner to disallow a taxation objection, as was made in this case. That section provides:“(1) Section 37 of the AAT Act applies in relation to an application for review of a reviewable objection decision as if:(a) the requirement in subsection (1) of that section to lodge with the Tribunal such numbers of copies as is prescribed of statements or other documents were instead a requirement to lodge with the Tribunal such numbers of copies as is prescribed of:(i)a statement giving the reasons for the decision; and(ii)the notice of the taxation decision concerned; and (iii)the taxation objection concerned; and (iv)the notice of the objection decision; and (v)every other document that is in the Commissioner’s possession or under the Commissioner’s control and is considered by the Commissioner to be necessary to the review of the objection decision concerned; and (vi)a list of the documents (if any) being lodged under subparagraph (v);”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

NORTH J
Shortly after 20 August 2002, the solicitor for the applicant began to pursue further information from the Commissioner. In an affidavit filed on behalf of the applicant on 24 October 2002, Leigh Damien Baring, the solicitor for the applicant, described the events thus: “14.The T – documents, although containing a number of findings on purportedly material questions of fact set out at paragraphs 1 to 15 [of the statement of reasons] inclusive thereof under the heading “Why we have made this decision” and at paragraphs 1 to 13 inclusive thereof under the heading “We considered these to be the relevant facts” do not refer or do not refer adequately to the evidence or other material on which the Second Respondent based those findings. Further, the T – documents only include copy documentation in relation to some of the payments referred to in paragraph 6 thereof under the heading “We consider these to be the relevant facts” and all of which are subject to the applications to the AAT for review of the Decisions made by the Applicant referred to in paragraph 9 hereof.15.In view of the matters detailed in paragraph 14 hereof, on 23 August 2002, I sent a letter by way of facsimile transmission to the Australian Government Solicitor (AGS), the solicitors representing the Second Respondent, which stated in part:“Pursuant to section 37(1)(b) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1974 (Act) please provide us with the following documents:a) with reference to the Respondent’s reasons for decision at paragraphs 11 and 12 of the “relevant facts”, all notes and other records pertaining to conversations between ATO officers and representatives of … [the football club] on 18 and 22 December 1998;b) all documents concerning investigations made by ATO staff into the financial records of the Applicant, including all notes and correspondence; andc) all records including all notes and correspondence concerning the audit of tax returns submitted by the Applicant. On 3 September 2002, Mr Baring wrote to the Tribunal seeking a direction under s 38 of the AAT Act. That section provides:“38 (1) Where the Tribunal considers that a statement referred to in paragraph 37(1)(a) that is lodged by a person with the Tribunal does not contain adequate particulars of findings on material questions of fact, an adequate reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based or adequate particulars of the reasons for a decision, the Tribunal may order that person to lodge with the Tribunal, within a time specified in the order, an additional statement or additional statements containing further and better particulars in relation to matters specified in the order with respect to those findings, that evidence or other material or those reasons.” During argument I expressed some doubt as to whether this section applied where the obligation to provide reasons and documents arose from s 14ZZF(1)(a) of the Taxation Administration Act. However, the Commissioner accepted that this section applied in the circumstances of this application. It is appropriate to proceed on this basis because, even if the wording of s 38 is not apt to cover the situation, the requirements of procedural fairness would oblige the Commissioner to particularise allegations of fraud or evasion.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: NORTH J

The next four paragraphs of the section headed “Why have we made this decision” read as follows:12. The taxpayer was aware that he was being paid the disputed sums in respect of his personal services as a professional footballer. The means adopted by the taxpayer and … [the applicant’s adviser] to conceal the true character of the payments constitutes deliberate evasion if not fraud in terms of paragraph 170(2)(b) of the ITAA 1936.13. It is well established that fraud exists where a person makes a false statement or representation either believing it false, or is recklessly careless whether it is true or false: Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337 per Herschell LJ at 374. Derry v Peek was followed by the High Court in Krakowski v Eurolynx Properties Ltd (1995) 130 ALR 1.14. Evasion connotes something less than fraud. In Denver Chemical Manufacturing Co v C of T (NSW)(1949) 8 ATD 411, Dixon J said of evasion: ,, … it means more than avoid and also more than a mere withholding of information or the mere furnishing of misleading information. It is probably safe to say that some blameworthy act or omission on the part of the taxpayer or those for whom he is responsible is contemplated. An intention to withhold information least the Commissioner should consider the taxpayer liable to a greater extent than the taxpayer is prepared to concede, is conduct which if the result is to avoid tax would justify finding evasion.15. The taxpayer’s conduct, either alone or together with … [the applicant’s adviser], with respect to the relevant years of income, constitutes deliberate evasion if not fraud in terms of paragraph 170(2)(a) of the ITAA 1936.(a)The taxpayer, together with … [the applicant’s adviser] knowingly entered into the arrangement with … [the football club] whereby part of the taxpayer’s remuneration from … [the football club] in respect of his services to … [the football club] as a professional footballer was intentionally misclassified to conceal its true character as salary and wages. (b)Invoices in respect to the taxpayer’s “off contract” payments were prepared and sent by … [the construction company] to … [the football club] on behalf of the taxpayer, in order to give the appearance that … [the construction company] performed services for … [the football club].(c)[The football club] … classified the payments in the accounts as “repairs and maintenance”.(d)The taxpayer has admitted that:(i)he knew the arrangement was structured to allow him to receive “off contract” payments;(ii)he performed no service for … [the football club] pursuant to any contract with … [the construction company], in respect to the “off contract” payments; and(iii)[The construction company] … provided no service to … [the football club] in respect to the “off contract” payments.(e)[The football club] … has confirmed that the “off contract” payments made to the taxpayer have always had the character of salary or wage income of the taxpayer, as they were negotiated as income of the taxpayer.(f)[The football club] … has admitted that by misclassifying the payments the intention was to conceal the payments from … [the football regulatory authority] investigators to avoid the salary cap.(g)[The football club] … has admitted that the arrangement was struck to allow “off contract” payments to be made to the taxpayer and there was no expectation of services to be provided by … [the construction company] in respect of these payments.(h)Even after being formally advised by his employer in the letter dated 23 September 1997 that the payments were salary and wages, the taxpayer made no further enquiries to establish the correct tax treatment for the payments.”CONSIDERATION