Uy v St Vincent's Private Hospital Northside - [2025] QIRC 44

QUEENSLAND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION

CITATION:	Uy v St Vincent's Private Hospital Northside [2025] QIRC 044
PARTIES:	Uy, Angelica (Applicant) v *St Vincent's Private Hospital Northside* (Respondent)
CASE NO:	EC/2025/68
PROCEEDING:	Application for payment instead of taking long service leave
DELIVERED ON:	7 February 2025
HEARING DATE:	7 February 2025
MEMBER: HEARD AT:	O’Neill IC Brisbane
ORDERS:	*1. Pursuant to s 484(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016* (Qld), leave is granted to the Applicant to re-open the application for payment instead of taking long service leave. 2. Pursuant to s 484(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the order of the Commission made on 30 January 2025 be revoked. 3. The application for payment instead of taking long service leave is dismissed.**
CATCHWORDS:	INDUSTRIAL LAW – APPEAL – payment for long service leave instead of taking long service leave – s 110 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) – order for payment made by the Commission –applicant no longer seeks payment – whether applicant should have leave to re-open the application – whether order should be revoked – leave granted – order revoked – application dismissed
LEGISLATION: CASES:	Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) s 110, s 484 EB v CT (No 2) [2008] QSC 306 Fowler v Workers' Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 149
APPEARANCES:	Ms A Uy, the Applicant in person. Mr D Evans for the Respondent.

Reasons for Decision
Delivered ex tempore, revised from transcript

Introduction

The Applicant lodged an application for payment instead of long service leave pursuant to section 110 of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld) ('the IR Act') on 24 January 2025.
The Commission issued directions to the employer in the usual terms for an 'Employer Statement' regarding the application.
The response from the Employer was filed in the Industrial Registry on 30 January 2025. Upon review of the application, the employer response and the application being compliant in all respects with the requirements of s 110 of the IR Act, the Commission issued an Order dated 30 January 2025 for the payment of long service leave entitlements to the Applicant.
On Monday, 3 February 2025, the Industrial Registry received email communication from the Applicant which indicated that she no longer wished to receive payment of the long service leave because of the tax implications, of which she was apparently not aware.
The Respondent, St Vincent's Hospital, was contacted by email the same day by the Commission to ascertain whether payment had been processed and paid to the Applicant. By email dated 3 February 2025, the Respondent confirmed that the payment had not been made, and it had been removed from the pay run which was to be processed on 4 February 2025.
Legislation
Section 484(1) and (2) of the IR Act relevantly provide:
484 Power to reopen proceedings
(1) On application by a person mentioned in section 485, proceedings may be reopened by—
(a)for proceedings taken before the full bench — the full bench; or
(b)otherwise —…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Uy v St Vincent's Private Hospital Northside

Details

AGLC: Uy v St Vincent's Private Hospital Northside [2025] QIRC 44
Case: [2025] QIRC 44
Decision Date: 7 February 2025

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Uy v St Vincent's Private Hospital Northside involved Ms. Uy seeking leave to reopen an application regarding the payment of long service leave instead of taking the leave itself. The proceedings took place in the Industrial Commission of Queensland under the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld). The primary legal issue was whether Ms. Uy should be granted leave to reopen her application and subsequently whether the order made by the Commission on 30 January 2025 should be revoked, given that Ms. Uy no longer wished to proceed with the application.

The court considered several principles and precedents in deciding the matter. Firstly, the guiding principle for granting leave to reopen an application is whether the interests of justice are better served by allowing or rejecting the application. This principle was reinforced by the High Court's consideration in Smith v New South Wales Bar Association, which highlighted the importance of avoiding embarrassment or prejudice to the other side when a hearing is complete. Additionally, the court referred to Reid v Brett, which outlined criteria for reopening a case to admit further evidence, including the materiality of the evidence and the absence of prejudice to the opposing party. The court also acknowledged the strain litigation imposes on personal litigants and the importance of finality in litigation.

After considering these principles and the lack of opposition from the employer, the court determined that the interests of justice were better served by allowing Ms. Uy to reopen her application. Consequently, the court granted leave to reopen the application, revoked the order made by the Commission, and dismissed the application for payment instead of taking long service leave. The decision was made pursuant to sections 484(1) and 484(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld).

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to s 484(1) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), leave is granted to the Applicant to re-open the application for payment instead of taking long service leave.

2. Pursuant to s 484(2) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 (Qld), the order of the Commission made on 30 January 2025 be revoked.

3. The application for payment instead of taking long service leave is dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 541 of the IR Act provides:541 Decisions generallyThe court or commission may, in an industrial cause do any of the following – (a) make a decision it considers just, and include provision for preventing or settling the industrial dispute or dealing with the industrial matter to which the cause relates, without being restricted to any specific relief claimed by the parties to the cause;… Section 9 of the IR Act provides:9 What is an industrial matter(1) An "industrial matter" is a matter that affects or relates to - (a) work done or to be done; or(b) the privileges, rights or functions of - (i) employers or employees; or…(Emphasis added)Proceedings in the Commission In light of the email from the Applicant received in the Industrial Registry on 3 February 2024, the application was called on for mention before me on 7 February 2025. I am satisfied that Ms Uy's application is an 'industrial cause' as contemplated by s 541 of the IR Act.[1] [1] See Sch.5 and s 9 of the IR Act. During the course of the mention, the Applicant made an oral application to reopen the application. In light of the power provided in s 539(c) of the IR Act, I considered it appropriate to hear and decide the application. I waived the requirement for a formal application to be filed by the Applicant pursuant to s 539(e) and (k) of the IR Act. The application for reopening was not opposed by the Employer. Consideration I have considered the relevant principles identified by Deputy President Merrell in the decision of Fowler v Workers Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 149 at paragraph 41:(a) first, the guiding principle in deciding whether to grant leave to reopen is whether or not the interests of justice are better served by allowing or rejecting the application;(b) second, in Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256 the High Court stated that different considerations may apply depending upon whether the case is simply one in which the hearing is complete, or one in which reasons for judgement have been delivered and that as to the former situation, the Court said it was difficult to see why the primary consideration should not be that of embarrassment or prejudice to the other side;(c) third, in Reid v Brett [2005] VSC 18 , the criteria governing the exercise of the discretionary power to reopen the case to admit further evidence where a hearing has concluded, but judgement has not been delivered, was said to be: (i)the further evidence is so material that the interests of justice require its admission;(ii)the further evidence, if accepted, would most probably affect the result of the case;(iii)the further evidence could not by reasonable diligence have been discovered earlier; and(iv)no prejudice would ensue to the other party by reason of the late admission of the further evidence; (d) fourth, the reference by the High Court in Smith v New South Wales Bar Association to prejudice to the other party, and the guiding principle of the interests of justice, require account to be taken of the strain litigation imposes on personal litigants; and the prejudice caused by delay in the delivery of an expected judgement at the end of stressful litigation cannot always be measured in terms of money or cured by an order for costs; and (e) finally, the interests of justice are served by finality in litigation, particularly where prolonged litigation imposes a strain on personal litigants.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

During the course of the mention, the Applicant made an oral application to reopen the application. In light of the power provided in s 539(c) of the IR Act, I considered it appropriate to hear and decide the application. I waived the requirement for a formal application to be filed by the Applicant pursuant to s 539(e) and (k) of the IR Act. The application for reopening was not opposed by the Employer. Consideration I have considered the relevant principles identified by Deputy President Merrell in the decision of Fowler v Workers Compensation Regulator [2019] QIRC 149 at paragraph 41:(a) first, the guiding principle in deciding whether to grant leave to reopen is whether or not the interests of justice are better served by allowing or rejecting the application;(b) second, in Smith v New South Wales Bar Association (1992) 176 CLR 256 the High Court stated that different considerations may apply depending upon whether the case is simply one in which the hearing is complete, or one in which reasons for judgement have been delivered and that as to the former situation, the Court said it was difficult to see why the primary consideration should not be that of embarrassment or prejudice to the other side;(c) third, in Reid v Brett [2005] VSC 18 , the criteria governing the exercise of the discretionary power to reopen the case to admit further evidence where a hearing has concluded, but judgement has not been delivered, was said to be: (i)the further evidence is so material that the interests of justice require its admission;(ii)the further evidence, if accepted, would most probably affect the result of the case;(iii)the further evidence could not by reasonable diligence have been discovered earlier; and(iv)no prejudice would ensue to the other party by reason of the late admission of the further evidence; (d) fourth, the reference by the High Court in Smith v New South Wales Bar Association to prejudice to the other party, and the guiding principle of the interests of justice, require account to be taken of the strain litigation imposes on personal litigants; and the prejudice caused by delay in the delivery of an expected judgement at the end of stressful litigation cannot always be measured in terms of money or cured by an order for costs; and (e) finally, the interests of justice are served by finality in litigation, particularly where prolonged litigation imposes a strain on personal litigants. I consider that the interests of justice are better served by allowing the application to reopen, particularly in circumstances where there is no objection to this course of action from the Respondent. I therefore grant leave to the Applicant to reopen her application. The Applicant then sought the revocation of the order made by the Commission on 30 January 2025 on the ground that she no longer wished to proceed with the application. The Respondent also consented to the revocation of the order. Finally, the Applicant sought that the application be dismissed. This was also consented to by the Respondent.