FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Unilever Australia Ltd v Revlon Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2015] FCA 137
Citation: Unilever Australia Ltd v Revlon Australia Pty Ltd (No 7) [2015] FCA 137 Parties: UNILEVER AUSTRALIA LTD ACN 004 050 828 v REVLON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 095 360 731 File number: NSD 508 of 2014 Judge: GLEESON J Date of judgment: 3 March 2015 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application to amend particulars – leave granted Legislation: Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 16.51 Cases cited: AON Risk Services Australia Limited v Australian National University [2009] HCA 27; 239 CLR 175
Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao [2014] FCA 1410
Franklin v GHF Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1414
Thomson v STX Pan Ocean Co Ltd [2012] FCAFC 15 Unilever v Revlon (No 6) [2014] FCA 1409Date of hearing: 23 February 2015 Date of orders: 23 February 2015
3 March 2015Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 52 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr R Cobden SC with Mr N Furlan Solicitor for the Applicant: Baker & McKenzie Counsel for the Respondent: Mr M Hall SC with Dr B Kremer Solicitor for the Respondent: King & Wood Mallesons IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 508 of 2014
BETWEEN: UNILEVER AUSTRALIA LTD ACN 004 050 828
ApplicantAND: REVLON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 095 360 731
Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 FEBRUARY 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Leave be granted to the applicant to amend the particulars of the Further Amended Statement of Claim in the terms set out in annexure “A” to the affidavit of Andrew Salgo sworn 19 February 2015.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 508 of 2014
BETWEEN: UNILEVER AUSTRALIA LTD ACN 004 050 828
ApplicantAND: REVLON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 095 360 731
Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 MARCH 2015
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The applicant pay the costs thrown away by reason of the amendment.
2.The respondent pay the costs of the hearing of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 508 of 2014
BETWEEN: UNILEVER AUSTRALIA LTD ACN 004 050 828
ApplicantAND: REVLON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD ACN 095 360 731
Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE:
3 MARCH 2015
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
On 23 February 2015, I made an order granting leave to the applicant (“Unilever”) to amend its particulars of paragraphs 26, 27, 41 and 46 of the Further Amended Statement of Claim (“statement of claim”) to include particulars to the effect that no hydrogen peroxide is present in the Mitchum Clinical products when applied to…
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- Case
- [2015] FCA 137
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court included whether the amendment would cause undue delay and prejudice to the respondent, and if the amendment was necessary to achieve justice between the parties. The court also considered the relevance of good faith on the part of the applicant and the potential impact of the amendment on the proceedings. The court examined the evidence presented by both parties and the extent to which the amendment was necessary to address the central issues of the case.
The court found that the amendment was not unduly prejudicial to Revlon and could be accommodated with reasonable time for Revlon to prepare further evidence. The court accepted that the presence or absence of hydrogen peroxide in Mitchum Clinical was a matter that Revlon should have been aware of and that the amendment did not stem from any lack of good faith. The court also noted that the amendment was not materially delayed and that the overall pursuit of justice would benefit from hearing the expert evidence. The court concluded that the potential prejudice could be sufficiently mitigated by allowing Revlon a reasonable opportunity to respond to the amended particulars.
The court granted leave to amend the particulars, ordered the applicant to pay the costs thrown away by the amendment, and directed the respondent to pay the costs of the hearing of the application. The detailed terms of the amendment were set out in the annexure to the affidavit of Andrew Salgo sworn on 19 February 2015.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Leave be granted to the applicant to amend the particulars of the Further Amended Statement of Claim in the terms set out in annexure “A” to the affidavit of Andrew Salgo sworn 19 February 2015.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
1. The applicant pay the costs thrown away by reason of the amendment.
2. The respondent pay the costs of the hearing of the application.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The question of delay is a relevant factor to be taken into account: Caason Investments Pty Ltd v Cao [2014] FCA 1410 at [33]; Franklin v GHF Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1414 at [21].Consideration The application was made at a late stage in the trial. Ten days of hearing had already been completed and the independent experts (Professor Perlmutter and Professor Easton) were expected to commence their concurrent evidence on the morning of Unilever’s application for leave to amend its particulars. One of the agreed issues for concurrent evidence was what is revealed by Dr Cai’s various experiments. In my view, the following matters warranted the grant of leave:(1)The composition of the Mitchum Clinical products and the presence or otherwise of the hydrogen peroxide at the time of application to the armpit is a matter that is, or should be, within the knowledge of Revlon; (2)Revlon should not be taken by surprise by the introduction of the proposed amended particulars because it has served evidence of several experiments intended to demonstrate the presence of hydrogen peroxide in the Mitchum Clinical products over time. Putting aside the Intertek analysis, it is obvious that if those experiments are contested (as they are) and do not demonstrate the presence of hydrogen peroxide in the products over time, there is an issue as to whether any hydrogen peroxide will be present in the products at all when it is applied to the armpit;(3)There is no suggestion of any lack of good faith on the part of Unilever in seeking to amend at this stage;(4)I accept Mr Salgo’s evidence recorded in paragraph 9 above and therefore am satisfied that there has been no material delay on the part of Unilever in seeking to amend. In particular, I do not accept that Professor Easton ought to have formed the opinion that he has now reached in September 2014: it was not unreasonable for him to have formed the more cautious conclusion that is set out in paragraph 28 above, in the absence of a consideration of Dr Cai’s further experimental evidence served in November 2014 and the patent application received in December 2014. It follows that I also do not accept the contention that Professor Easton was armed from July 2014 with all the information he needed to reach the conclusions he has arrived at in February 2015;(5)There is no currently no evidence that the Intertek analysis is conclusive as to the presence of hydrogen peroxide in the products. To the contrary, Dr Cai’s evidence raises a question about the reliability of the analysis (although he seems to suggest that it is reliable as to presence but not quantity);(6)Although the application is made late in the proceedings, in my view, the attainment of justice would not be served by refusing the application. If the amendment were refused, then the Court would determine the question whether Revlon has engaged in misleading conduct, or conduct likely to mislead, in its advertising to consumers on the basis of what would appear to be incomplete evidence about a matter that is, or should be, within Revlon’s knowledge; (7)The issue has been raised as the result of efforts by an independent expert to test the experiments performed by both Dr Cai and Professor Perlmutter (each without inviting Professor Easton to attend) to test the stability of the hydrogen peroxide included in the Mitchum products. In my view, the attainment of justice would not be served by declining to hear from Professor Easton as to matters that he has identified as of importance for the purpose of giving independent expert evidence. That view is fortified by the fact that his evidence is given in response to experiments put forward by Revlon which go to establishing that Mitchum will release hydrogen peroxide in the presence of sweat.(8)In my view, the prejudice identified on behalf of Revlon, arising from the proposed amendments, can be sufficiently prevented or ameliorated by permitting Revlon a reasonable time to adduce further evidence of the presence of hydrogen peroxide in the Mitchum Clinical products at the time of application to the underarm. That permission addresses the first item of prejudice identified by Ms Rathie. As to the second item, I am not satisfied that it is important for Professor Thornthwaite to be questioned on the reliability of the Intertek results. There is no evidence that he participated in or observed the Intertek analysis. As to the third item, before the application was argued I said that I would require evidence from Professor Perlmutter himself about what extra time, if any, he needed to address the Purported response to PP-9. No such evidence was tendered and, in fact, I received evidence that appears to address the Purported response to PP-9 and which does not identify any further work that he wishes to do to address the Purported response.