FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Unilever Australia Limited v Revlon Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2014] FCA 1074
Citation: Unilever Australia Limited v Revlon Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) [2014] FCA 1074 Parties: UNILEVER AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ACN 004 050 828) v REVLON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 095 360 731) File number(s): NSD 508 of 2014 Judge(s): GLEESON J Date of judgment: 3 October 2014 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – expert witnesses – application for evidence to be given by video-link – where application opposed – application refused Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) ss 47(6), 47A Cases cited: ACCC v Pirovic Enterprises Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 544
Blackrock Asset Management Australia Services Ltd v Waked (No 2) [2011] FCA 479
Campaign Master (UK) Ltd v Forty Two International Pty Ltd (No 3) (2009) 181 FCR 152
Commissioner of Taxation v Arnold [2014] FCA 959
Kirby v Centro Properties Ltd [2012] FCA 60
Rossiter v Core Mining Limited [2014] NSWSC 969
Stuke v ROST Capital Group Pty Ltd [2012] FCA 1097
Walker Charlotte Street v Rio Tinto Services [2014] NSWSC 535Date of hearing: 2 October 2014 Date of last submissions: 3 October 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 27 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr N Furlan Solicitor for the Applicant: Mr A Salgo (Baker & McKenzie) Counsel for the Respondent: Dr B Kremer Solicitor for the Respondent: King + Wood Mallesons
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 508 of 2014
BETWEEN: UNILEVER AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ACN 004 050 828)
ApplicantAND: REVLON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 095 360 731)
Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE OF ORDER:
3 OCTOBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.Pursuant to s 47A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, the testimony of Ann-Marie Carvell be given from the United Kingdom by video link.
2.The application for the Court to allow the testimony of Professor Thornthwaite to be given from the United Kingdom by video link be refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 508 of 2014
BETWEEN: UNILEVER AUSTRALIA LIMITED (ACN 004 050 828)
ApplicantAND: REVLON AUSTRALIA PTY LTD (ACN 095 360 731)
Respondent
JUDGE:
GLEESON J
DATE:
3 OCTOBER 2014
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
The applicant/cross-respondent (“Unilever”) has applied for the testimony of two of its witnesses, Professor David William Thornthwaite and Ms Ann-Marie Carvell, to be given from the United Kingdom by video link in accordance with s 47A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (“Federal Court Act”).
The respondent/cross-claimant (“Revlon”) does not oppose the application in relation to the testimony of Ms Carvell. However, it opposes the application in relation to the testimony of Professor Thornthwaite.
In support of its application, Unilever relied on an affidavit of Mr Andrew Salgo, Unilever’s solicitor, made…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Unilever Australia Ltd v Revlon Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2014] FCA 1074
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to weigh the convenience of allowing Professor Thornthwaite to testify remotely against the potential prejudice to Revlon's rights to cross-examine him effectively. Revlon opposed the application on several grounds, including the complexity of Professor Thornthwaite's evidence, the volume of documents to be reviewed, and the anticipated length of the cross-examination. Revlon argued that the central nature of Professor Thornthwaite's evidence and the likelihood of credit issues further underscored the necessity of his physical presence in court. The court acknowledged that Professor Thornthwaite's evidence was likely to be pivotal and that Revlon would be significantly disadvantaged by cross-examining him via video link, especially considering the logistical challenges and the potential for lengthy and detailed questioning. Ultimately, the court determined that the reasons provided for Professor Thornthwaite's absence were insufficient to warrant the use of video link testimony.
The court refused Unilever's application for Professor Thornthwaite to give evidence by video link, while permitting another witness, Ann-Marie Carvell, to testify from the United Kingdom via video link. This decision underscores the court's cautious approach to allowing expert testimony via video link, particularly when the evidence is central to the case and the cross-examination is expected to be extensive.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Pursuant to s 47A of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, the testimony of Ann-Marie Carvell be given from the United Kingdom by video link.
2. The application for the Court to allow the testimony of Professor Thornthwaite to be given from the United Kingdom by video link be refused.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Revlon gives the following reasons for opposing the application:(1)Professor Thornthwaite will be giving highly contested opinions as well as direct but contested evidence of some facts;(2)It is not agreed that his evidence can be fairly tested by video-link. In particular, appearance by video-link would frustrate or delay the management of documents needed in cross-examination. Those documents presently comprise a little more than one lever arch file of documents;(3)His evidence is central to the case and is the foundation of the scientific claims made by Unilever;(4)Revlon’s ability to cross-examine Professor Thornthwaite will be significantly inhibited by not having him present in Court;(5)The cross-examination will be extensive and detailed, and will take longer than one normal sitting day in Court. Due to time differences between the United Kingdom and Australia, the cross-examination would have to be done at the end of the usual sitting day, in three to four blocks, with a 24 hour delay between each block;(6)The reasons proffered for Professor Thornthwaite’s absence are not sufficient to ground the order sought by Unilever;(7)The evidence does not demonstrate any real practical impediment to Unilever in requiring Professor Thornthwaite to travel to Sydney to be cross-examined;(8)Unilever has had since January 2014 (when the Mitchum Clinical products were launched in the Australian market) to locate suitable witnesses. The reasons advanced for Professor Thornthwaite’s absence were in existence before he swore his first affidavit. If Unilever was aware that Professor Thornthwaite could not travel to Australia, he should not have been called as a witness;(9)Professor Thornthwaite’s credit is “likely” to be in issue. In oral submissions, counsel for Revlon, Dr Kremer, said that there was a “strong likelihood” of a submission reflecting adversely on Professor Thornthwaite’s professed independence;(10)Performing Professor Thornthwaite’s cross-examination by video-link would result in his evidence still being taken during and after a number of Revlon’s witnesses are due to give and complete their evidence.Consideration In my assessment, as the issues in the case have emerged, Professor Thornthwaite’s evidence is likely to be of central importance. Further, I consider that Revlon would be significantly disadvantaged by being required to cross-examine Professor Thornthwaite by video-link. This disadvantage will arise from the complexity of the subject matter of Professor Thornthwaite’s evidence, the logistical difficulties of cross-examining him on a large volume of documentary material and the expected length of the cross-examination. It may be exacerbated by the possibility that issues of credit will arise, although I do not consider that to be a decisive factor. Even if the cross-examination was still estimated to take four hours, I would consider Revlon to be significantly disadvantaged in attempting to cross-examinate Professor Thornthwaite for that duration by video-link: cf Rossiter at [21] and [22]). Generally speaking, in the absence of a very compelling case, I would have only been willing to allow Professor Thornthwaite to give testimony by video-link for that length of time on subject matter of the complexity of Professor Thornthwaite’s evidence if Revlon agreed to that course.