FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Uddin v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 90
CITIZENSHIP AND MIGRATION – whether trial judge erred in exercise of discretion to refuse stay to obtain further evidence – whether “no evidence” before the Tribunal – whether further evidence should be admitted.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 476(1)(g), (4)(b).
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976, s 27.Maxwell v Keun [1928] 1 KB 645, referred to.
Bloch v Bloch (1981) 180 CLR 390, referred to.
Sali v SPC Ltd and anor (1993) 116 ALR 625, referred to.
Wilson v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] FCA 304, cited.NIZAM UDDIN v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N1161 of 2000
NORTH, MANSFIELD, KATZ JJ
SYDNEY
22 FEBRUARY 2001
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIAN1161 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
NIZAM UDDIN
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
NORTH, MANSFIELD AND KATZ JJ
DATE OF ORDER:
22 FEBRUARY 2001
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be dismissed.
2.The appellant is to pay the respondent’s cost of and incidental to the appeal.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
ON APPEAL FROM A SINGLE JUDGE OF THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIAN1161 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
NIZAM UDDIN
APPELLANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION & MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
NORTH, MANSFIELD AND KATZ JJ
DATE:
22 FEBRUARY 2001
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Before the Court is an appeal against orders made by Emmett J on 4 September 2000. The orders included an order dismissing the application of Mr Nizam Uddin (the appellant) for review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (the Tribunal).
The decision of the Tribunal was made on 27 April 2000. It affirmed the decision of the delegate of the respondent, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (the Minister) to refuse the appellant a protection visa.
DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL
The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh who was born in December 1970. He arrived in Australia on the 8 November 1996.
Before the Tribunal he claimed to have been an active member of the Freedom Party from its inception in 1987. The Freedom Party was founded by military figures who had participated in a 1975 coup against the government of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Bangladesh’s founding father. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family were killed during the coup. The appellant claimed that his involvement with the Freedom Party led him to being detained by the authorities in 1987 and 1988. The appellant said that in the early 1990’s he had held office in the Freedom Party. In 1995, he claimed, he was injured in a political rally by supporters of the Awami League, a political party which was hostile to the Freedom Party because of…
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 90
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The legal issues before the court were whether the Tribunal’s decision was unreasonable or unjust, and whether the appellant had been denied natural justice. The court held that the Tribunal’s decision was not unreasonable or unjust, and that the appellant had not been denied natural justice. The court found that the Tribunal’s conclusion that the appellant had been untruthful about his whereabouts and activities in 1996 was supported by the evidence before it. The court also found that the appellant had not been denied natural justice, as he had been given an opportunity to adduce evidence to demonstrate that it would have been possible for a visa to be issued in his name in Athens without his personal presence, but had not done so.
The court dismissed the appeal and ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of and incidental to the appeal. The court held that there was no utility in granting any further extension of the stay of the Minister’s decision to refuse the appellant a protection visa. The court concluded that the Tribunal’s decision was based on a finding that the appellant had been untruthful about his whereabouts and activities in 1996, and that this finding was supported by the evidence before it. The court also held that the appellant had not been denied natural justice, as he had been given an opportunity to adduce evidence to demonstrate that it would have been possible for a visa to be issued in his name in Athens without his personal presence, but had not done so.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be dismissed.
2. The appellant is to pay the respondent’s cost of and incidental to the appeal.
Background
Background to the litigation
Full text does not contain this section.
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Full text does not contain this section.
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by:
In those circumstances his Honour said in separate reasons given on 18 October in pars 8-13: “8.Thus the only further evidence that is foreshadowed at present is evidence as to the existence or non existence of a passenger card for the entry of the applicant into Greece. It was accepted on behalf of the applicant that if a card was produced indicating that the applicant had travelled to Greece that would be an end to the matter so far as the applicant was concerned. On the other hand it was hoped by the applicant that the Greek authorities would either respond that there was no card for entry of the applicant or would produce a card that did not bear the applicant’s signature. 9Even if those documents were produced it would not take the matter any further in the light of the finding that was made by the Tribunal. The assumption that the Tribunal has made is that the Australian Mission in Greece would not issue a visa without sighting the applicant. It is for that reason that the Tribunal concluded that, even assuming the stamps for the visa to Greece and Dhaka were bogus, it would be necessary for there to have been an accomplice within the Australian Mission in Athens. Thus, even if the additional material now sought from the authorities in Greece were produced it would not affect the conclusion upon which the Tribunal based its decision. That is to say, the Tribunal was prepared to accept that the stamps for the visa to Greece and for Dhaka Airport were bogus. 10There has been no suggestion of any attempt having been made to obtain evidence to demonstrate that a genuine visa could be issued by the Australian Mission in Greece without the applicant being seen personally. In the circumstances there does not appear to me to be any utility in granting any further adjournment of the hearing of the motion. 11In order to establish the ground in s 476(1)(g) it is necessary not only to establish that a fact upon which the Tribunal based its decision did not exist. It is also necessary to show that there was no evidence before the Tribunal of that fact. There clearly was evidence before the Tribunal that the applicant was in Greece. It would have been open for the applicant to adduce evidence before the Tribunal of the nature now sought to be adduced. Whether that would have had any effect on the Tribunal’s decision is doubtful in the light of the passage that I have cited.12It may have been possible for the applicant to adduce evidence to demonstrate that it would have been possible for a visa to be issued in the name of the applicant in Athens without the applicant being personally present in Athens. However, there has been no attempt made up until now to adduce such evidence and there was certainly no such evidence before the Tribunal.13As I have said in the circumstances I do not see any utility in granting any further extension of the stay. Accordingly I consider that the motion should be dismissed with costs. It would follow that there should be no further extension of the stay that I ordered on 4 September 2000 and extended from 6 October up to and including today.”CONSIDERATION