Tsiang & Wu
[2021] FamCA 482
•7 July 2021
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Tsiang & Wu [2021] FamCA 482
File number(s): SYC 1529 of 2016 Judgment of: ALTOBELLI J Date of judgment: 7 July 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – PROPERTY – practice and procedure – whether the matter be set down for a discrete hearing in relation to third party interests – application to bifurcate proceedings – complex property matters involving overseas entities, corporations and trusts – application to review consent orders pursuant to s 37A(10) of the Family Law Act 1975 – application for a discrete hearing refused – application dismissed – no order as to costs. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 37A(10), 75, 79
Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) rr 1.04, 1.12, 1.14, 10.13
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 r 28.2
Cases cited: Bevan & Bevan (2013) FLC 93-545; [2013] FamCAFC 116
Hickey & Hickey (2003) FLC 93-143; [2003] FamCA 395
Marley & Ormonde [2020] FamCA 1046
Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSWSC 1372
Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108; [2012] HCA 52
Number of paragraphs: 33 Date of last submission/s: 21 April 2021 Date of hearing: 21 April 2021 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Mr Richardson SC Solicitor for the Applicant: Mills Oakley Lawyers Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr Todd Solicitor for the First Respondent: Broaden Legal Solicitor advocate for the Second and Third Respondents: Mr Yang Solicitor for the Second and Third Respondents: Juris Cor Legal Solicitor advocate for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Mr Whelan Solicitor for the Independent Children’s Lawyer: Mark Whelan Lawyer ORDERS
SYC 1529 of 2016 BETWEEN: MR TSIANG
Applicant
AND: MS WU
First Respondent
MR CAO
Second Respondent
MR WU
Third RespondentINDEPENDENT CHILDREN'S LAWYER
ORDER MADE BY:
ALTOBELLI J
DATE OF ORDER:
7 JULY 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Applicant’s application to list the relief sought in orders 1, 2 and 3 of the orders sought in his Second Further Amended Initiating Application filed 24 May 2019 for a discrete hearing, separately to the substantive proceedings, is dismissed.
2.The matter be listed for Final Hearing on 16 May 2022, with an estimated hearing time of 8 days.
3.The matter be listed for Mention on 17 August 2021 at 9.30am for the purpose of case management and making trial directions.
4.Within 28 days of the date of this order, the parties exchange and provide to my Associate by way of email a minute of proposed trial directions.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.02A(b) of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to 17.02 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Tsiang & Wu has been approved by the Chief Justice pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALTOBELLI J:
INTRODUCTION
This matter came into my docket on 21 April 2021 as a First Day Less Adversarial Trial (‘LAT’). It is unquestionably a complex matter. The litigation arises out of consent orders entered into between the Applicant husband and First Respondent wife on 23 March 2016. In effect, and by different routes, the husband seeks to set aside those consent orders. The wife opposes this. The Second and Third Respondents were joined to the case by the husband as necessary parties.
The specific issue that requires determination is whether some discrete issues should be severed from the rest of the case, and dealt with on a preliminary basis. The minute of order proposed by the husband is reproduced in the first schedule to these reasons. At order 1, he asks that the relief sought in orders 1 – 3 of the orders contained in his Second Further Amended Initiating Application filed 24 May 2019 be listed for a discrete hearing, separately to the substantive proceedings. The orders in question are reproduced below:
1. That pursuant to Section 37A(10) Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the Court review, of its own motion, the exercise of power by a Registrar in Chambers constituted by the Order made in these proceedings on 23 March 2016 ("the Consent Orders") and thereupon the Consent Orders shall be discharged.
2. That in the alternative to Order 1 hereof. in the event only that the relief sought in Order 1 hereof is refused, then pursuant to Rule 1.14 Family Law Rules, the time in which to seek a review of the Consent Orders be extended and such review be heard instanter with the Consent Orders to be discharged.
3. That in the event only that the relief sought in each of Orders 1 and 2 hereof is refused, then pursuant to Rule 1.12 Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth), the Applicant be excused from compliance with all rules as to a time limit for filing an application for review of Consent Orders and such review be heard instanter with the Consent Orders to be discharged.
In effect, the husband seeks to set aside the consent orders without having to rely on s 79A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (‘Act’). He contends, firstly, that under s 37A(10) of the Act the Court is entitled to review, of its own motion, the exercise of power by a Registrar in Chambers constituted by the consent order made, and thereupon the consent order would be discharged. In the alternative, he contends that pursuant to r 1.14 of the Family Law Rules 2004 (Cth) (‘Rules’), the time in which to seek a review of the consent orders be extended, and that such review be heard instanter with the consent orders to be discharged. Finally, and once again in the alternative, he contends that under r 1.12 he should be excused from compliance with all rules as to time limits for the filing of an application for review of consent orders, with such review to be heard instanter and with the consent orders to be discharged.
The question for the Court, therefore, is whether pursuant to r 10.13 this relief should be listed for a discrete hearing, separately to the substantive proceedings which, in accordance with the husband’s Second Further Amended Initiating Application filed 24 May 2019, is an application under s 79A of the Act, with consequential declarations and orders against the Second and Third Respondents.
BACKGROUND
It is relatively uncontentious that at the time the consent orders were made on 22 March 2016, the parties were seeking to divide assets the net value of which was approximately $38.8 million. The husband contends that the intention was that he received 46 per cent, or $17.9 million, and the wife $20.9 million, or 54 per cent. The property pool included a series of commercial interests in China consisting of partnerships and corporations, as well as substantial real estate holdings in Australia and China. In short, the wife retained the real estate in Australia and in China, and the husband was to receive the commercial interests in China.
It is common ground that the consent orders were prepared by the husband’s solicitors, on his instructions. A number of definitions used in the orders become highly relevant. At definition A.35 the parties agreed:
A.35 "The BB companies" means the company BB Co. Ltd and includes the following companies:
A.35.1 R Ltd;
A.35.2 U Ltd;
A.35.3 S Ltd;
A.35.4 T Ltd;
A.35.5 G Partnership;
A.35.6 V Partnership;
A.35.7 W Ltd partnership.
At order 18 of the consent orders the parties agreed:
18. That in relation to the BB companies:
18.1 The Wife forthwith transfer to the Husband all of her interest in the BB companies and resign from any office that she holds in the BB companies;
18.2 That the Husband indemnify the Wife and keep her indemnified against all liability of the Wife arising as a consequence of the holding by her of any interest in the BB companies or the holding by her of any office in the BB companies excluding liability for personal income tax;
and for the purpose of this Order:
18,3 The Wife agrees to surrender any and all interest she may have in the BB companies and upon entering these Orders the Husband shall be absolutely entitled to the whole interest in the BB companies;
18.4 The Husband shall forthwith indemnify the Wife and keep the Wife forever indemnified with respect to any or all liability of the Wife arising with respect to the BB companies;
18.5 It is noted that in the event of the Husband requiring the Wife's consent to sell any or all of the BB companies the Wife will execute all such documents as may be necessary to give effect to such transaction and for the Husband to retain the entirety of the net proceeds of sale of the BB companies.
For ease of reference in these reasons, the assets covered by the above orders will be described as the BB Companies, abbreviated to “BBC”.
The Court notes that at order 18.1 the wife agreed to transfer to the husband ‘all of her interest in’ BBC.
The husband contends that the BBC assets were to be received by him at an agreed value of $8.6 million.
The husband’s case is that, in reality, the BBC assets referred to at A35.5 of the consent orders were held by third parties and, specifically, the wife’s father (the Second Respondent) as to 95%, and the wife’s uncle (the Third Respondent) as to 5%. He says he did not become aware of this until after the consent orders were made. He contends that at all relevant times he believed that the husband and the wife were the beneficial owners of all the BBC assets. The wife maintains that, at all relevant times, the assets were held by her father and uncle, as described above. In response to this, the husband contends that the commercial interests referred to at A35.6 and A35.7 were in fact entities held by other family members, but were nonetheless transferred to him pursuant to the consent orders.
Clearly, a substantial issue in this case is about the ownership of the asset referred to in definition A35.5, and whether it can be transferred to the husband.
On behalf the husband it was submitted that there was clearly a misdescription of the asset referred to at A35.5 and, indeed A35.6 and A35.7. The orders require the wife to transfer her interests in these entities back to the husband, but she now contends that they were not hers to transfer to him. Thus the orders were ineffective, plainly erroneous and must be reviewed, particularly as they were made under delegated authority.
On behalf of the husband, his senior counsel submitted that this part of the case can be dealt with separately, over only two days of evidence. Proceeding in this fashion would avoid the substantial cost of obtaining valuations that would otherwise be necessary if the matter proceeded as a single consolidated application.
The wife’s counsel conceded that the asset referred to in A35.5 was held by third parties. Nonetheless, the husband, whose solicitors drafted the orders, received exactly what he intended. The separation of the discrete issue was opposed on the basis that, primarily, the factual issue that needs to be determined is substantially the same as that which needs to be determined on the s 79A application.
THE APPLICABLE LAW
Section 37A(10) of the Act states:
(10) The Court may, on application under subsection (9) or of its own motion, review an exercise of power by a Registrar pursuant to a delegation under this section and may make such order or orders as it considers appropriate with respect to the matter with respect to which the power was exercised
This Court believes that in the context of an application to review the exercise of a power by a registrar to make an order pursuant to s 79 of the Act, it must be satisfied as to the well-known matters set out in ss 75 and 79 of the Act.
The Court must follow a well-trodden path established by the authorities. In Bevan & Bevan [2013] FamCAFC 116 (‘Bevan’), the Full Court of the Family Court of Australia considered the High Court’s decision in Stanford & Stanford [2012] HCA 52, which provided guidance on how s 79 was to be interpreted and implemented. Bevan endorsed the continuing application of the four-step approach articulated by the Full Court in Hickey & Hickey [2003] FamCA 395, but on the basis that it is a shorthand distillation of the words of s 79, as opposed to being a statutory edict. The four steps articulated in Hickey at [39] are:
•Identify and value the property, liabilities and financial resources of the parties; and
•Identify and assess the contributions of the parties and express them as a percentage of the net value of the property; and
•Identify and assess the other facts relevant under s.79(4)(d)-(g) including s.75(2) and determine the adjustment (if any) to be made to the contribution entitlements at step two; and
•Consider the effect of the above and resolve what order is just and equitable in all the circumstances.
The decisions in Stanford and Bevan also emphasise the importance of making findings that any order is just and equitable for the purposes of s 79(2), independent of the s 79(4) process. Both decisions also emphasise the importance of identifying, according to ordinary common law and equitable principles, the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in the property. This is not inconsistent with step one in Hickey.
Given the issues raised by the parties as to the beneficial ownership of the asset referred to in A35.5, it is very hard to see how this could be contained as a discrete issue.
Rule 10.13 of the Rules states:
10.13 Application for separate decision
A party may apply for a decision on any issue, if the decision may:
(a) dispose of all or part of the case;
(b) make a trial unnecessary;
(c) make a trial substantially shorter; or
(d) save substantial costs.
The Applicant would need to satisfy the Court that making the separate decision proposed by him would achieve the matters set out in this rule.
The Court was referred to a number of useful authorities, commencing with the decision of Associate Justice Hallan in the New South Wales Supreme Court in Southwell v Bennett [2010] NSWSC 1372. His Honour was determining the case pursuant to the provisions of r 28.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) which, the Court notes, are similar to but not identical to r 10.13 of the Family Law Rules 2004 which is much more specific as to the criteria to be applied in determining an application for a separate decision. At [14] – [17], his Honour sets out the relevant legal principles as follows:
[14] Rule 28.2 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 states:
28.2 Order for decision
The court may make orders for the decision of any question separately from any other question, whether before, at, or after, any trial or further trial in the proceedings.
[15] I take the principles that apply in determining whether to make an order for the separate determination of a question under the rule to be:
(a) The rule speaks of “questions” and not “issues” and does not differentiate between questions of fact, or law, or partly of fact and partly of law.
(b) The judicial determination of a “question” must involve a conclusive, or final, decision based on concrete and established, or agreed, facts, for the purpose of quelling a controversy between the parties: Bass v Permanent Trustee Co Ltd [1999] HCA 9 ; (1999) 198 CLR 334, at [45] and [51].
(c) The rule permits the court to hear and determine the separate question at any point before, at, or after, any trial or further trial in the proceedings, rather than only as a preliminary question.
(d) Whether such an order should be made is a matter for the court’s discretion, which discretion must be exercised judicially, but cannot otherwise be fettered: Dunstan v Simmie & Co Pty Ltd [1978] VR 669, at 670; Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215 at [7].
(e) As a general rule, the discretionary power to order separate determination of a question should be approached with caution: Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36 ; (1999) 198 CLR 180 at [436], per Callinan J; Tepko Pty Ltd v Water Board [2001] HCA 19 ; (2001) 206 CLR 1, at [168]–[170] per Kirby and Callinan JJ: Commonwealth Bank v Clune [2008] NSWSC 1125 at [6], per Johnson J; Bailey and Bailey v Director-General Department of Energy Climate Change and Water [2010] NSWSC 979 at [4] per Studdert AJ.
(f) In exercising its discretion, the overriding purpose of the Civil Procedure Act 2005, namely the just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings (s 56) must be given effect.
(g) Generally, all questions of fact and law should be determined at the one time: Tallglen Pty Ltd v Pay TV Holdings Pty Ltd (1996) 22 ACSR 130 at 141–42; SPI Spirits (Cyprus) Ltd v Diageo Australia Ltd [2006] FCA 14. If the court is to depart from that position, the party seeking the separate determination of a question must satisfy the court that it would be “just and convenient” for that order to be made: Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society [1999] FCA 718 at [8]–[9], see also Energy Australia v Australian Energy Ltd [2001] FCA 1049.
(h) While it may appear attractive, superficially, to order the trial of a separate question, experience often shows that it will not be so, for example, because of the complications that can arise in relation to appeals, or to overlapping factual issues, or to questions of credit, if the same witnesses have to give evidence in relation to a question that is separated and those questions that are not: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd [2000] NSWSC 1215 at [7(6)] per Einstein J.; Owners Corporation Sp 70672 v Trustees of Roman Catholic Church [2010] NSWSC 946 at [16] per Ball J.
(i) The experience of courts suggests that the separation of proceedings often does not result in the quicker and cheaper resolution of proceedings, but often has the reverse effect. It sometimes happens that it turns out to be productive of the disadvantages of delay, extra expense, appeals and uncertainty of outcome which it is intended to avoid: Idoport Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd; Tepko Pty Ltd v The Water Board at [168].
(j) Before a question is to be separately determined, it must be possible to clearly see that it will facilitate the quicker and cheaper resolution of the proceedings: Tallglen v Pay TV Pty Ltd at 142, per Giles CJ in Comm D; Parramatta Stadium Trust v Civil and Civic Pty Ltd; Century Medical v THLD (NSWSC, 27 August 1996, unreported).
(k) Where findings as to the credit of a witness is, or of witnesses are, or may be, involved in the consideration of the evidence relevant to the question, it is inappropriate to order a separate trial: ABB v Freight Rail [1999] NSWSC 1037.
(l) Often, a separate question is heard on the basis of:
(i) agreed statements of fact;
(ii) a narrow point to be determined; and
(iii) a hearing that is able to be conducted within a short time (or a short time relative to the total length if the hearing of the separate question were not to be dealt with).
(m) Factors that tend to support the making of an order, include that the separate determination of the question may:
(i) contribute to the saving of time and cost by substantially narrowing the issues for trial, or even lead to disposal of the proceedings: Tallglen v Pay TV Holdings;
(ii) contribute to the settlement of the litigation (CBS Productions Pty Ltd v O’Neill (1985) 1 NSWLR 602 per Kirby P at 607).
(n) It may be appropriate to determine a separate question, even if it will not resolve all the issues, provided that there is a strong prospect that the parties will agree upon the result when the core of the dispute has been decided, or if the decision will obviate unnecessary and expensive hearings of other questions: City of Swan v Lehman Brothers Australia Ltd [2009] FCA 784 ; (2009) 73 ACSR 86 at [27] per Rares J. The determination of the one question should enable a sensible reassessment of litigation risks, which is generally likely to encourage some form of settlement discussions.
(o) Relevantly, one factor that may tell against the making of an order would be where there is likely to be a significant overlap between the evidence adduced on the hearing of the separate question and at trial — possibly involving the calling of the same witnesses at both stages of the hearing of the proceeding: Reading Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Mutual Provident Society at [8]. There is always a risk of inconsistent findings arising from determination of separate questions.
(p) Whilst the decision is ultimately one for the court to determine, it will have regard to the attitude of the parties: TVW Enterprises Ltd v Duffy (Federal Court of Australia, 28 March 1985, unreported) Toohey J.
(q) It is a relevant consideration to weigh the time likely to be taken in the hearing of a separate question and the availability of hearing dates for that purpose, against the time and expense of a substantive hearing and the length of time likely to elapse before such a hearing will take place: TVW Enterprises Ltd v Duffy at pp 4–5.
(r) Each case will have its own dynamics that dictate the relative importance of various factors to be considered in exercising the discretion conferred.
(s) It is necessary that there be precision, both in formulating the question, and in specifying the facts upon which it is to be decided: Jacobson v Ross [1995] 1 VR 337 at 341
[16] Finally, I should refer to Allen v Gulf Oil [1981] AC 1001, which seems to me, in the circumstances of the present case, to be not only sensible, but essential, to remember. Lord Wilberforce said, at p 1010H:
… My Lords, I and other of your Lordships have often protested against the procedure of bringing, except in clear and simple cases, points of law for preliminary decision. The procedure indeed exists and is sometimes useful. In other cases, and this is frequently so where they reach this House, they do not serve the cause of justice. The present is such an example. The question as originally framed was clearly inept. It was recast by Kerr J. into an improved form. But both judges in the Court of Appeal found it either unintelligible or unanswerable: so I believe do some at least of your Lordships. The fact is that the result of the case must depend upon the impact of detailed and complex findings of fact upon principles of law which are themselves flexible. There are too many variables to admit of a clear-cut solution in advance.
[17] Lord Roskill said at p 1022A:
… The preliminary point procedure can in certain classes of case be invoked to achieve the desirable aim both of economy and simplicity. But cases in which such invocation is desirable are few. Sometimes a single issue of law can be isolated from the other issues in a particular case whether of fact or of law, and its decision may be finally determinative of the case as a whole. Sometimes facts can be agreed and the sole issue is one of law. But the present is not a case in which this procedure ought ever to have been adopted for the reasons stated by my noble and learned friend …
… But I hope that your Lordships’ agreement so to treat it will not encourage others to invoke the preliminary point procedure in unsuitable cases, or lead those whose task it is to decide whether or not the trial of preliminary points should be ordered, to be other than extremely cautious before acceding to pleas for the making of such orders as a result of attractively advanced submissions founded upon pleas of supposed economy.
These principles have been adopted in a number of decisions in this Court including Marley & Ormonde [2020] FamCA 1046. The Court will adopt these principles in the present case.
DISCUSSION
The Court has a wide discretion here, the exercise of which should be approached with caution. The Court is asked to exercise its power under the Rules. In this regard it is important to consider the main purpose of the Rules, articulated at r 1.04:
The main purpose of these Rules is to ensure that each case is resolved in a just and timely manner at a cost to the parties and the court that is reasonable in the circumstances of the case.
As a general proposition, the Court accepts that all questions of fact and law should be determined at the one time. This avoids the potential issues foreshadowed by counsel for the wife in relation to credit findings, overlapping findings on factual issues, recusal applications, appeals, issues of estoppel and so forth.
Once again, as a general proposition the Court accepts that it must be possible to clearly see that it will facilitate the timelier and cheaper resolution of the proceedings, if an issue were to be separately determined.
This case does not present as one where the issue to be determined is narrow, or where there is much, if any, agreement as to the facts. The course proposed by the Applicant avoids the s 79A aspect of the case, if successful, but potentially duplicates the four-step process involved in the assessment of the relevant ss 79 and 75 considerations. It is highly likely, therefore, that the evidence will overlap. The Court’s early impression of the case is that credit issues will arise, whether the proceeding is split, or remains intact. This accentuates the difficulties foreshadowed by counsel for the wife.
From a very practical perspective, now that the case is in my docket, the hearing date that could be allocated to the discrete issue would be at the same time that the entire matter could be listed for final hearing.
CONCLUSION
I am not satisfied that it is just and convenient, and that in all the circumstances of this case, there should be a departure from the general principle that all questions in an action should be tried at the same time. Indeed, this Court’s concern is that to grant the application made by the husband might prolong, rather than shorten, the litigation. I exercise the discretion I have by declining to make the orders sought.
Future conduct of this case
The Applicant husband in a minute of order provided to the Court on 21 April 2021 went on to suggest that if the discrete hearing was declined by the Court then directions for hearing should be made. Whilst the document is a useful template, it may not be an adequate framework for determining the dispute between five parties including the Independent Children’s Lawyer, and both as to parenting and property. The Court notes that the Applicant husband agreed to provide detailed points of claim in relation to the Second and Third Respondents within 28 days. That document may lead to further issues. A better course is to require all parties to consult about agreed directions for trial and for this matter to be re-mentioned in one month’s time to further consider the question of trial directions.
The Court has considered the question of attempting to sever the parenting proceedings from the property proceedings. Regrettably, I have no capacity in my docket to allocate separate time for the parenting part of the case before the dates proposed for this matter. Consideration will need to be undertaken by the parties about an update to the existing expert report. The Court notes that the mother sees no need for a further report. The parents are encouraged to reality test their dispute about their daughter given that she will be over 16 years old by the time this matter is heard.
The parties have indicated that if the matter remained intact in its present form it would require eight hearing days. Given the perceived complexity of the property part of the case, this is a reasonable estimate. When these reasons for judgment are published, hearing dates will be allocated. In the unusual circumstances of this case, i.e. the age of the child, it may be possible to limit all evidence about parenting matters to the first two days of the hearing. The trial directions should reflect this.
I certify that the preceding thirty-three (33) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Altobelli. Associate:
Dated: 7 July 2021
SCHEDULE A
APPLICANT HUSBAND’S MINUTE OF ORDER
21 April 2021
1. That pursuant to rule 10.13 Family Law Rules the relief sought in Orders 1, 2 and 3 of the Orders sought by the Applicant Husband in his Second Further Amended Initiating Application filed 24 May 2019 be listed for a discrete Hearing, separately to the substantive proceedings.
2. That in the event the discrete hearing is allocated pursuant to Order 1 hereof, then the parties shall file and serve all material upon which they seek to rely, at least twenty-eight (28) days prior to the allocated hearing date and file and serve a written outline of argument not less than 7 days before the hearing.
3. That further directions as to the financial and parenting proceedings be adjourned for consideration when the hearing in paragraph 1 has been determined.
4. That in the event that the relief sought in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 is refused then in the alternative, the substantive proceedings, as to both financial matters and parenting matters, be allocated an eight (8) day final hearing on dates to be fixed by the Court and in relation to that hearing the directions below shall apply.
5. That the parties file and serve all material upon which they seek to rely for the purpose of the substantive proceedings at least six (6) weeks prior to the first day of the final hearing allocated in accordance with Order 3 hereof.
6. That:
6.1 Within twenty-one (21) days the Husband and the Wife shall agree upon a joint Balance Sheet of the respective assets, liabilities, financial resources and superannuation of the Husband and the Wife as at each of 23 March 2016 and the current date;
6.2 In the event of any dispute as to value of corporate interests or real property identified by the Balance Sheets referred to in Order 6.1 hereof, within seven (7) days thereafter the Husband shall nominate three proposed single experts to undertake a valuation of each asset identified in dispute;
6.3 Within seven (7) days thereafter the Wife shall select one of the valuer(s) nominated by the Husband;
6.4 Within twenty-one (21) days thereafter the parties shall cause joint letter of instruction/s to be sent to the valuer/s;
6.5 That each of the parties shall comply with all requests of the appointed valuer/s to provide information and documents in a timely manner and in any event within fourteen (14) days of any such request;
6.6 That the Husband and the Wife shall meet the costs of the expert/s appointed pursuant to this Order in equal shares.
7. That the parties be granted a liberty to relist the proceedings before the Trial Judge on seven (7) days’ notice in the event of any dispute arising in respect of these Orders and trial directions.
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