SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Appeal from a Master: Civil)
TSCHIRN & ANOR v AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES LTD
[2015] SASC 58
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker
13 April 2015
PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - SUMMARY JUDGMENT
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - GENERAL PRINCIPLES - INTERFERENCE WITH DISCRETION OF COURT BELOW - IN GENERAL
Appeal from a decision of a Master dismissing an interlocutory application by the defendants (appellants) for summary judgment. The plaintiff (respondent), as executor of an estate, brought proceedings against the defendants alleging that they unlawfully took advantage of their relationship with the deceased thereby diminishing the estate for their own benefit and gain. The statement of claim alleged that in the deceased’s final years over 1,900 transactions had been conducted on her savings account totalling in excess of $700,000. The defendants sought summary judgment under Rule 232 on the basis that the statement of claim did not identify which of the transactions were said to be utilised for the defendants’ benefit and to what extent. The Master held that the claim was reasonably arguable and refused the application for summary judgment.
Whether the Master erred in not finding that there was no reasonable basis for the claim against the defendants. Whether the Master erred in not making an order for summary judgment.
Held (Parker J):
Appeal dismissed. There are real questions of fact and law to be decided at trial. The Master did not err in not finding that there was no reasonable basis for the claim against the defendants. The requirement of Rule 232(2) not having been satisfied, it is not necessary to determine whether the Master erred in not making an order for summary judgment.
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 r 232, referred to.
Royal Bank of Scotland v Etridge [2002] 2 AC 773; Johnson v Buttress (1936) 56 CLR 113; House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin (2008) 106 SASR 1; Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118; Proude v Visic (No 4) (2013) 117 SASR 560; Three Rivers District Council v Bank of England [No 3] [2003] 2 AC 1, considered.
WORDS AND PHRASES CONSIDERED/DEFINED
"no reasonable basis for the claim"
TSCHIRN & ANOR v AUSTRALIAN EXECUTOR TRUSTEES LTD
[2015] SASC 58Appeal from a Master: Civil
PARKER J: This is an appeal from a decision of a Master of this Court dismissing an interlocutory application by the appellants (defendants) seeking an order for summary judgment, or in the alternative, strike out or further and better particulars.[1]
[1] The Master in fact made an order for further and better particulars in respect of paragraph 24 of the second statement of claim, but otherwise refused all other aspects of the application.
The notice of appeal referred to each of the preceding three issues. However, at the hearing of the appeal, counsel for the defendants abandoned the strike out…
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CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the plaintiff's claim had a reasonable prospect of success both legally and factually. Legally, the court considered whether the plaintiff's approach to establishing undue influence was arguable. The court found that it was reasonably arguable that the plaintiff could establish undue influence and that the burden would then shift to the defendants to show that the transactions were not influenced by undue pressure. Factually, the court assessed whether there was a real question of fact to be determined at trial. The court concluded that there was a real question of fact regarding whether the defendants had improperly benefited from the transactions with Mrs Atkinson.
The court determined that the plaintiff's claim had a reasonable prospect of success both legally and factually. Consequently, the court denied the defendants' application for summary judgment. The case was to proceed to trial to determine the issues of undue influence and the propriety of the transactions between Mrs Atkinson and the defendants. The court's decision upheld the plaintiff's right to pursue its claim, allowing the case to proceed to trial.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The principles referred to in Spencer v Commonwealth must be applied in the present case. Consideration The first question to be determined is whether the plaintiff’s claim as pleaded has, as a matter of law, any reasonable prospect of success. As I have noted at [35] the defendants have relied upon Johnson v Buttress,[21] to support the contention that the evidentiary burden does not shift to the defendants until it is established that they have obtained a substantial benefit from each of the impugned transactions. [21] [1936] HCA 41; (1936) 56 CLR 113 at 134 (Dixon J). The alternative proposition advanced by the plaintiff is that it merely needs to prove as a matter of fact that there has been undue influence and that transactions have occurred which call for explanation. Once those requirements are met the defendants will be required to provide a satisfactory explanation for the transactions. That approach was said to be supported by the passage from the judgment of Lord Nicholls in Etridge set out at [31] above. I consider it to be reasonably arguable that the legal position expressed by Lord Nicholls in Etridge is correct. If that approach were to be applied at trial, should the plaintiff be able to prove as a matter of fact a relationship of undue influence and that there had been transactions which called for explanation, the evidential onus would fall upon the defendants to establish that the transactions were not tainted by undue influence. I consider that the Master did not err in finding it to be reasonably arguable that this was the correct approach. The adoption of such an approach would not require the plaintiff to identify specifically in the statement of claim each of those transactions that were said to be used improperly for the benefit of the defendants and to what extent they were so used. It would be sufficient to plead that all withdrawals benefitted the defendants. For that reason I accept the plaintiff’s contention that it is of no moment that the statement of claim merely asserts that the withdrawals were used primarily for the benefit of the defendants. I consider that the Master did not err in holding that it was likely that the first step in the trial will be to determine liability by reference to Mrs Atkinson’s legal capacity and the influence, if any, exercised over her by the defendants. Upon those issues being resolved, it can be determined whether the defendants should be ordered to account. I also consider that the Master did not err in rejecting the defendants’ contention that there was no reasonable basis as a matter of law for the plaintiff’s claim. The second question is whether the plaintiff had a reasonable prospect of success in proving its claim as a matter of fact, ie was there a reasonable basis for the plaintiff to allege that all withdrawals made during the relevant period were to the benefit of the defendants. It is clear that in deciding a strike out application the court need not conduct a mini trial nor should it make a final determination of the disputed facts. The task of the court is to critically examine the evidentiary material before the Master to determine whether there is a real question of fact to be determined at trial.