Truss and Child Support Registrar - [2016] FCCA 2747

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT OF AUSTRALIA

TRUSS & CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR

[2016] FCCA 2747

Catchwords:
CHILD SUPPORT – Application for stay of operation of departure prohibition order pending appeal to the court – statutory criteria to be satisfied before departure prohibition order made – jurisdiction to grant stay – merits of application – balance of convenience.

Legislation:

Child Support (Registration & Collection) Act 1988: ss.12; 13; 17; 30; 72D; 72G; 72H; 72K; 72M; 111C; 113C; 111(2); 116(2)

Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989

Cases cited:
South Australia v Totani [2010] HCA 39
Newell v Child Support Registrar [2015] FCCA 2815
Jones v Child Support Registrar [2007] FCA 1732
Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCA 43

Applicant:

MR TRUSS

Respondent:

CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR

File Number:

ADG 338 of 2016

Judgment of:

Judge Brown

Hearing date:

20 October 2016

Date of Last Submission:

20 October 2016

Delivered at:

Adelaide

Delivered on:

26 October 2016

REPRESENTATION

Counsel for the Applicant:

In person

Solicitors for the Applicant:

Not Applicable

Counsel for the Respondent:

Ms B Rayment

Solicitors for the Respondent:

Mills Oakley

ORDERS

The application in a case filed on 18 October 2016 be dismissed.
The applicant pay the respondent’s costs fixed in an amount of $3,000.00.
The appeal be set down for hearing on 17 November 2016 at 2:15pm in Adelaide.
Both parties file and serve any further affidavit material by no later than 4:00pm on 1 November 2016.
The applicant file and serve written submissions by no later than 4:00pm on 7 November 2016.
The Child Support Registrar file and serve written submissions by no later than 4:00pm on 14 November 2016.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment under the pseudonym Truss & Child Support Registrar is approved pursuant to s.121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT
OF AUSTRALIA
AT ADELAIDE

ADG 338 of 2016

MR TRUSS

Applicant

And

CHILD SUPPORT REGISTRAR

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Introduction

This application arises as a consequence of provisions contained in Part VA of the Child Support (Registration & Collection) Act 1988 (“the Registration & Collection Act”). Part VA authorises the Child Support Registrar to make what is known as a departure prohibition order (“DPO”).
A DPO is an instrument, which prohibits a person leaving Australia for overseas, if he or she has an outstanding child support liability. It authorises officers of the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service to prevent a person leaving the country.
On 10 October 2016, Mr Truss (“the applicant”) attempted to depart Australia, at Sydney Airport, on a commercial airliner bound for (country omitted). At check-in, he was advised that there was a DPO applicable to him, as a consequence of a child support liability in an amount of $20,496.36.
On 20 October 2016, the applicant commenced proceedings, in this Court, seeking an order that the DPO, made in respect of him, be set aside. The grounds of his Application are as follows:
“i.The DPO was not served on him;
ii.The Applicant was denied natural justice because he was not given an opportunity to object prior to the making of the order, which is manifestly unjust;
iii.In the circumstances, the imposition of the DPO upon him is vexatious, negligent and unlawful.”
At the request of the applicant, this application was listed urgently, on 20 October 2016. The Child Support Registrar (“the Registrar”) was named as the respondent to the application. Mr Truss has represented himself in these proceedings. The Registrar by Ms Rayment.
More recently again, on 18 October 2016, the applicant has filed an application in a case, in which he seeks what is described as an interim order to set aside the DPO, until such time as his appeal is heard. By necessary implication, this would enable Mr Truss to travel overseas, if he so wishes.
The Registrar has not had time to formally respond to either the appeal or the interlocutory application, which in my view is more properly characterised as a stay application. The Registrar has, however, filed an affidavit of Mr S, who is a delegate of the respondent and authorised to make DPOs pursuant to the Registration & Collection Act. It was Mr S, who in fact issued the relevant DPO affecting Mr Truss, which he did on 5 June 2015.
The Registrar opposes the granting of any stay of the relevant DPO affecting Mr Truss. Ms Rayment, submits that the court has no jurisdiction to make such a stay and, even if it did, the applicant’s grounds of appeal disclose no serious issues to be tried and therefore the balance of convenience favours the maintenance of the order in question, pending trial.
There is no controversy that this court has jurisdiction to deal with Mr Truss’ application. Pursuant to section 72Q(1) of the Registration & Collection Act:
“A person aggrieved by the making of a departure prohibition order may appeal to the Federal Court of Australia or the Federal Circuit Court of Australia against the making of the order.”
Clearly, Mr Truss is aggrieved by the making of the order, which is the subject of these proceedings. As a consequence, he is entitled to appeal to this court. As previously indicated, it is his position that the making of the DPO was vitiated because it violated principles of procedural fairness and natural justice.
Mr Totani also contends that the relevant provisions of the Registration & Collection Act are void because they breach constitutional principles regarding the separation of executive and judicial powers outlined by the High Court in cases such as South Australia v Totani.[1]
[1] South Australia v Totani [2010] HCA 39
In general terms, the Registration & Collection Act and its associated legislation the Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (“the Assessment Act”) provides a statutorily based scheme for the formulaic calculation of child support; the formal registration of the amounts due according to the relevant formulae; and significantly, in the context of these proceedings, an administrative system for the collection and disbursement of the amounts of child support so calculated.
One of the statutory responsibilities of the Registrar is to keep a register of all maintenance liabilities, which arise under the legislation. A liability is a registrable maintenance liability, if it arises under a child support assessment [see Registration & Collection Act at sections 12, 13 and 17]. The Applicant is father of four children, who were born between 1985 and 1993.
The mother of these children applied to the Registrar for an administrative assessment of child support. Subsequently, she registered the applicable assessments, with the Registrar, for collection, on 12 July 2006. The relevant assessments ceased, on 27 May 2011, when the youngest child turned 18 years of age and so passed out of the ambit of the system.
The objects of the Registration & Collection Act include the following:
·Children receive financial support from their parents, which their parents are liable to provide;
·That periodic amounts payable by parents towards the maintenance of their children are paid on a regular and timely basis.
As a consequence of section 30 of the Registration & Collection Act, upon registration, amounts payable, under a child support assessment, are debts due to the Commonwealth by the payer concerned, in accordance with the particulars entered in the Child Support Register. Pursuant to section 111(2) the payer of any enforceable maintenance liability must inform the Registrar of any change in his or her address.
As at 14 October 2016, the Registrar calculates, by reference to the Child Support Register, that the Applicant owed maintenance in the sum of $12,208.46, together with late payment penalty fees of $8,287.90. The legislation authorises the Registrar to calculate penalties in cases where child support is not paid on time.
In the context of the calculation of the amount of the enforceable child support debt, applicable to Mr Truss, section 116(2) of the Registration & Collection Act is relevant. It reads as follows:
“The mere production of a certificate in writing signed by the Registrar, certifying that an amount specified in the certificate was, on the date of the certificate, due and payable by a specified person to the Commonwealth in relation to a specified registrable maintenance liability or under a specified provision of Part IV, is prima facie evidence of the matters stated in the certificate.
Mr S has deposed that he has had produced to him a certificate of the child support currently owed by Mr Truss, pursuant to the provisions of section 116(2). In these circumstances, I am satisfied that the Registrar has established that Mr Truss has a registrable maintenance liability, in respect of unpaid child support and late penalty fees in an amount of $20,496.36, which is a debt to the Commonwealth of Australia. As such, the Registrar has a statutory obligation, pursuant to the provisions of the Registration & Collection Act to collect this sum.

Legal provisions applicable to departure prohibition orders

Pursuant to section 72D of the Registration & Collection Act the Registrar has a discretion to make a department prohibition order if satisfied of the following matters:
·The person proposed to be subject to the order has a child support liability;
·That person has not made satisfactory arrangements, with the Registrar, to wholly discharge the child support liability;
·The Registrar is satisfied that the person concerned has persistently and without reasonable grounds failed to pay the applicable child support liability;
·The Registrar believes on reasonable grounds that it is desirable to make such an order to ensure that the person proposed to be affected by it does not depart from Australia without either wholly discharging the child support liability or making satisfactory arrangements, with the Registrar, for the liability to be wholly discharged.
Pursuant to section 72G, the Registrar must notify the person concerned that a DPO has been made, in a prescribed form as soon as is practicable after the making of the order.
Pursuant to section 72H a department prohibition order comes into force as soon as it is made and continues in force until it is either revoked or set aside by an appropriate court.
Pursuant to section 72K the Registrar may authorise the temporary departure of a person, who is otherwise subject to a DPO.
As a consequence of the provisions contained in section 72M, the Registrar is empowered to impose security as a condition of any such temporary departure certificate.

The Applicant’s case

Mr Truss complains that he was not formally notified of the Registrar’s decision to impose a DPO upon him prior to his arrival at Sydney Airport on 10 October 2016. Accordingly, he contends that he has been deprived of the right to make submissions to the Registrar, in respect of the issue, in breach of the principles of natural justice and procedural fairness.
Essentially, Mr Truss contends that, if he had known of the controversy, he would have made arrangements with the Registrar to sort out the issue and it is fundamentally unfair to him that he has not been given the opportunity to do so.
In addition, he disputes the quantum of the liability of the child support sought from him by the Registrar. In this context, Mr Truss points to the fact that he has been previously the subject of a DPO, which was made on 3 July 2012.
In December 2014, this order was revoked and Mr Truss was granted a departure authorisation certificate on 19 December 2014, which allowed him to travel to (country omitted). It is Mr Truss’ assertion that, at this stage, he had made appropriate arrangements, with the Registrar, to discharge the liability, which included the filing by him of tax returns for the years ending 30 June 1996 onwards.
Mr Truss asserts that he has done so and that this action will have the automatic consequence of discharging his child support liability, as it will indicate that his child support income was either nil or minimal and therefore the default statutory formulae, which is applied by the Registrar when child support payers do not lodge their tax returns, will be shown to have been inappropriately applied.
In support of this assertion, the applicant has provided limited evidence. Attached to his affidavit are two notices of assessment, issued to him in respect of the tax years ending 30 June 2007 and 2008 respectively, which indicate a taxable income of $6,500 for the former and nil for the latter.
In addition, the applicant has provided a letter, dated 11 October 2016, addressed to Mr Truss at (omitted), from the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation, which indicates that on the information provided to the Tax Office by Mr Truss, he did not need to lodge an income tax return for the years between 2001 and 2015.
In his oral submissions to the court, Mr Truss asserts that he has in fact lodged these income tax returns, which he believes the ATO have either misplaced or failed to process. It is his case that he has date stamped documents to prove this but these were not available to him on the day of hearing.
In his most recent affidavit, filed on 18 October 2016, Mr Truss provides an address in (omitted) but confirms that previously he had lived at (omitted), in the period prior to August 2016. He provides corporate adviser as his occupation.

The Registrar’s case

Mr S has deposed that he was the delegate of the Registrar who determined that each element of section 72D of the Registration & Collection Act had been met in respect of Mr Truss and therefore it was desirable to make the relevant DPO in respect of him.
Firstly, Mr S deposes that he was satisfied that Mr Truss had an enforceable and registered child support liability in respect of his four children and the child support register indicated a debt in excess of $20,000. Given the provision to him of the certificate pursuant to section 116(2) of the Registration & Collection Act I accept that this was so.
Secondly, Mr S deposes that he considered that Mr Truss had not made satisfactory arrangements to discharge the liability. In this context, he deposed that since the case had been registered for collection, in mid-2006, Mr Truss had never paid moneys relating to child support voluntarily.
He conceded that there had been discussions between the Registrar and the Applicant, in 2014, when the previous DPO had been revoked. Part of this discussion included the Applicant’s undertaking to lodge fourteen years of his tax returns. It is Mr S’s evidence, in marked contrast to that of Mr Truss that the Applicant has failed to lodge these tax returns, apart from the two for 2007 and 2008, to which reference has been already made. This is an issue of fact, which I cannot determine in the context of these interlocutory proceedings.
However, in this context, on 9 February 2015, the Registrar wrote to Mr Truss, at his (omitted) address.[2] In this letter, Mr Truss was advised of the Registrar’s view that Mr Truss had not completed his tax returns, as he had indicated he would do. The letter included the following statement:
“The department has a duty to collect child support for the benefit of the children. The department encourages voluntary payments of child support where possible. Where the department is unable to obtain voluntary child support payments, it will take administrative action to deduct payments from various income sources, bank accounts and tax refunds. If the department is aware a parent who owes a debt is likely to travel overseas, it may issue a DPO (DPL), where certain criteria are met, to prevent overseas travel until a suitable payment arrangement is made.”
[2] See Annexure SB-6 to the Affidavit of Mr S filed 19 October 2016
It is Mr S’s evidence that Mr Truss did not respond formally to this letter. He has provided a chain of emails, which passed between the Registrar’s delegate and Mr Truss, in May 2015. In this electronic correspondence, Mr Truss was informed that the Registrar might take enforcement action, against Mr Truss, including placing a second DPO on his passport.
To this correspondence, the Applicant responded stating “Who are you and what do you want???” It is Ms Rayment’s submission that this comment was disingenuous because given the multiplicity of his correspondence, with the Registrar, over many years, Mr Truss must have been aware from whom the electronic correspondence emanated.
It is further Mr S’s evidence that, between 10 July 2006 and 3 June 2015, there have been 108 occasions on which Mr Truss has failed to pay his assessed rate of child support, as it has become due and payable. It is the Registrar’s view that this course of conduct demonstrates a persistent failure, on Mr Truss’ part, to pay his outstanding child support liability.
From the Registrar’s perspective, the postal address for Mr Truss was the (omitted) address to which transaction statements were regularly forwarded indicating payment was required. These were not responded to but were returned as unclaimed mail. No evidence has been provided that Mr Truss informed the Registrar of any change of his address. It is Mr S’s evidence that Mr Truss has been singularly unco‑operative with the Registrar, in respect of child support issues over many years.
Between 18 December and 11 May 2015, AUSTRAC records available to the Registrar indicate that Mr Truss has made international transfers of funds, to individuals in (country omitted), which amount to a sum in excess of $12,000.00.
The quantum of these payments have caused the Registrar to consider that the applicant may have the means to satisfy the child support debt. These payments have also led the Registrar to be dubious that Mr Truss’ only source of income is social security, particularly given that he has described himself as a corporate adviser.
In these circumstances, Mr S was of the view that it was desirable to make a further DPO in respect of Mr Truss, as he believed that he had the capacity to discharge the arrears, which were substantial.
In addition, immigration records available to him indicated that Mr Truss had travelled to (country omitted) in October 2009, declaring on his outgoing passenger card that he was departing Australia for a period of three months, however, he did not return to this country for two years. In these circumstances, the Registrar was concerned that, in the absence of a DPO, there was a possibility that Mr Truss may leave Australia indefinitely.

Legal provisions applicable to stay applications

Section 111C of the Registration & Collection Act provides as follows:
“(1) This section applies if a proceeding has been instituted:
(a) in a court having jurisdiction under this Act; or
(b) before the Registrar under Part VII; or
(c) before the AAT for an AAT first review; or
(d) under Part 6A or 7 of the Assessment Act.
(2) A party to the proceeding may, subject to the Family Law Act 1975:
(a) in the case of a proceeding instituted in a court—apply to that court for an order under this section; or
(b) otherwise—apply to a court having jurisdiction under this Act for an order under this section.
(3) Pending the hearing and final determination of the proceeding, the court may make such orders as the court considers appropriate staying or otherwise affecting the operation or implementation of the Assessment Act and this Act if the court considers that it is desirable to do so, taking into account the interests of the persons who may be affected by the outcome of the proceeding.
(4) The court may, by order, vary or revoke an order made under subsection (3).
(5) An order under subsection (3):
(a) is subject to such terms and conditions as are specified in the order; and
(b) operates for:
(i) such period as is specified in the order; or
(ii) if no period is specified—until a decision of the court, the Registrar or the AAT determining the proceeding becomes final.”

It is clear that the provisions contained in section 111C(1)(b), (c) and (d) do not apply to the factual situation arising in this Act. These are not proceedings before the Registrar concerning an objection to an existing child support assessment or proceedings before the Administrative Appeals Tribunal nor are they an application for a departure, from a child support assessment, pursuant to the provisions of the Assessment Act.
Mr Truss has suggested that he may institute such proceedings, seeking some form of departure in future, but as yet there are no such proceedings on foot. Accordingly, the issue for the court is whether Mr Truss’ application, brought pursuant to section 72Q of the Registration & Collection Act, fall within the rubric of section 111C(1)(a), which appears to confer a broad jurisdiction.
The expression court exercising jurisdiction under this Act is defined in section 4 of the Registration & Collection Act. The expression “does not include a court that has jurisdiction under this Act only in relation to the recovery of amounts of child support.”
It specifically does not apply to a court exercising jurisdiction, pursuant to section 113C(c)(i) of the Act, which authorises the Registrar to sue for and recover child support debts, in a court of appropriate jurisdiction.
Mr Truss has indicated that he does not accept the quantum of the child support against him. However, he has not formally commenced any proceedings to challenge the debt in any way. Rather, he asserts that he has filed tax returns, which will result in his child support debt being reduced to zero. However, the Registrar disputes the accuracy of this assertion and no records have been provided, by Mr Truss, that the returns have actually been filed, other than the two notices of assessment.
It is also the case that Mr Truss has launched this collateral attack on the child support debt, only when he has become aware of the DPO applicable to him. In these circumstances, the question arising is whether these proceedings are ones, which relate only to the recovery of amounts of child support and are therefore excluded from the application of section 111C.
In essence, a DPO is an instrument designed to secure the payment of a child support debt. Pursuant to section 72Q of the Registration & Collection Act a person aggrieved by such an order may appeal to the court, which is authorised either to set it aside or dismiss the application. As such, the court has no power, pursuant to this statutory provision, to vary or discharge the child support debt, which founds the DPO.
This was the view taken by Judge Cassidy in Newell v Child Support Registrar.[3] Her Honour said as follows:
“I accept that the departure prohibition regime is in recovery of the amounts of child support and, in this matter, where the Federal Circuit Court’s jurisdiction is enlivened pursuant to section 72Q the applicant’s notice of appeal did not institute a proceeding falling within the meaning of section 111C(1)(a) of the Collection Act. The applicant does not dispute anything in relation to the debt owed or the quantum of the debt. I accept, therefore, that I have no jurisdiction to make a stay order.”
[3] Newell v Child Support Registrar [2015] FCCA 2815 at [11]
In the event that this formulation is incorrect, it is clear that the usual considerations, which relate to the granting of a stay should also be considered. In Jones v Child Support Registrar[4] Emmett J considered that, before granting such a stay, the court needed to be satisfied firstly that there was a serious question to be tried on appeal and secondly the balance of convenience favoured the granting of the stay. His Honour said as follows:
“It appears to me that, before a stay could be granted, I would have to be satisfied that there is a serious question to be tried on the appeal or, putting it another way, that there is at least some arguable basis for suggesting that the appeal might succeed. Secondly, it would be necessary for the court to have regard to the balance of convenience.”
[4] Jones v Child Support Registrar [2007] FCA 1732
In this context, it is the submission of Ms Rayment that the appeal is both destined to fail and the balance of convenience, between the Registrar and Mr Truss, favours the former rather than the latter. Accordingly, even if the court does have the jurisdiction to grant a stay of proceedings, it should not do so.
As previously indicated, it is a major element of Mr Truss’ appeal that he is aggrieved that he was not formally served with the prohibition order. Mr S’s evidence indicates that the order was provided to Mr Truss, on 5 June 2015, when it was forwarded to the (omitted) address.[5] Mr Truss disputes that he received this correspondence, although he accepts that the (omitted) address was formerly his place of residence.
[5] See Annexure SB3 to Mr S’s affidavit filed 19 October 2016
In Whittaker v Child Support Registrar[6] Lindgren J did not accept that it constitute a breach of the principles of natural justice or procedural fairness that a person affected by a DPO was not provided with a copy of such an order as soon as was practicable after it had been made. He rejected the submission that the failure to notify the person affected by the DPO could amount to a jurisdictional error voiding the order in question.
[6] Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCA 43 at [262] – [265]
Specifically, Lingren J considered that the statutory regime, created by Part VA of the Registration & Collection Act, impliedly excluded any requirements for the Registrar to comply with procedural aspects of the rules of natural justice before making a DPO. His Honour said as follows:
“In my opinion the Registrar was not subject to a duty to comply with procedural fairness aspects of natural justice before making the DPO. It may be accepted, as pleaded, that a DPO would affect the liberty and legitimate interests of Mr Whittaker, so that in general terms one might expect such a duty to arise. However, the duty will not arise if the statutory context, by necessary implication, excludes it:
In my opinion Pt VA of the Collection Act establishes a régime, both the general object and the detail of which are inconsistent with the existence of the duty.
It will be recalled that the principal objects of the Collection Act are, inter alia, to ensure that children receive from their parents the financial support that the parents are liable to provide, and that periodic amounts payable by parents towards the maintenance of their children are paid on a regular and timely basis: s 3(1)(a) and (b) of the Collection Act. The connection between a departure from Australia of the parent liable and discharge of his or her child support liability is obvious: enforcement of the obligation to pay is likely to be more difficult if the person liable is out of Australia. Yet notification to the person of a proposal to make a DPO in sufficient time to allow him or her to be heard in opposition to the proposal, will allow the person to defeat the object of the proposed DPO by departing from Australia immediately. That is to say, it would be antithetical to the object and purpose of a DPO to offer the person an opportunity to be heard in opposition.
I turn now to the matters of detail. Part VA provides several remedies to a person in respect of whom a DPO has been made, suggesting a legislative intention that these rather than general law notions of natural justice and procedural fairness should be the remedies available to an aggrieved liable parent.[7]
[7] Ibid at [248] – [251]
In this context, Lindgren J applied a number of taxation decisions, which indicated that it would defeat the efficacy of orders broadly similar to DPOs, if their intended recipients were given advanced notice of them being made, as it would enable them to leave the country, prior to any order being made, without making satisfactory arrangements either to pay the child support debt in question or the tax as assessed.
This is axiomatically the case. A DPO is a mechanism to enforce payment of child support by applying a restriction upon a debtor’s entitlement to travel. To be effective, the restriction must be in place prior to travel, otherwise it will not achieve its objective.
However, Lindgren J also pointed out that the mechanism encompassed by the DPO could not be regarded as wholly draconian, as the provisions of section 72Q enabled a person who was aggrieved, following the making of such an order, to appeal to the court in respect of it, which of course is what Mr Truss has done, as he is entitled to. Essentially, if Mr Truss is able to establish that the Registrar has not made out each of the elements contained in section 72D, the DPO will fall.
It is Ms Rayment’s submission that the Registrar, although bearing no onus to do so, has established satisfactorily that each of the criteria stipulated in section 72D(1) of the Registration & Collection Act have been satisfied. Firstly, it has been established that Mr Truss has a child support liability, as a consequence of the certificate issued under section 116(2).
Secondly, given the numerous demands for payment, made by the Registrar, it is apparent that Mr Truss has not made satisfactory arrangements to discharge the child support liability, which also evidence a persistent failure to pay child support due.
Finally, it is Mr S’s evidence that it is his view that it was desirable that the DPO be made because the records of funds sent by Mr Truss to (country omitted), which are available to the Registrar, indicated a capacity to pay the relevant child support debt, which had been outstanding for a significant period of time.
It is likely to be the case that Mr Truss does not accept the validity of these matters. However, as is clear, the onus is on Mr Truss, not the Registrar, to establish them. In this regard, Ms Rayment relies on the following passages from Jones v Child Support Registrar[8]
“In an appeal under s 72Q of the Act, the person aggrieved must establish that the order was wrongly made. That may be done by satisfying the Court that any one of the essential elements of s 72D is absent. However, the Registrar bears no onus of establishing the validity of the order.
An appeal may involve questions of fact or law or both. An appeal would ordinarily involve the determination by the Court of at least three principal questions. The first is whether the affected person has a child support liability. The second is whether the Registrar was satisfied as to the matters, and had the belief, referred to in s 72D. The third is whether reasonable grounds existed for the Registrar to be satisfied as to those matters and for the formation by the Registrar of the requisite belief.
The issue of whether a person has a relevant liability would be readily ascertainable. That question is not in issue in the present proceeding. In some cases, an appeal could involve the examination of the Registrar’s state of mind if there were a suggestion that the Registrar were not bona fide satisfied or that a belief was not held bona fide. That may or may not be an issue in the present proceeding. The question that is most likely to be involved in an appeal under s 72Q is whether reasonable grounds existed for the Registrar to be satisfied as to the relevant matters or for the holding of the requisite belief.”
[8] Ibid at [5] – [7]
At this stage, it is Ms Rayment’s submission that Mr Truss cannot establish that the order was wrongly made. On the basis of the evidence currently available to me, I agree with this submission. It is clearly the case that Mr Truss does have a child support debt and, in my view, in all the circumstances, it was reasonable for the Registrar to believe that the considerations delineated in section 72D were triggered in Mr Truss’ case.
I acknowledge that it is potentially greatly inconvenient for Mr Truss to be restrained from leaving Australia. However, at this stage, he has not indicated why he wished to travel to (country omitted). The travel documents provided by him, indicate that he was scheduled to return to Australia on 7 November 2016.
In assessing the balance of convenience, I note the Registrar’s submission that Mr Truss has, on a past occasion, indicated his intention to return to Australia, after a few weeks, then remained overseas for a number of years. I also note the AUSTRAC records, which indicate the transfer of significant sums of money to (country omitted).
In all these circumstances, I am not persuaded that the balance of convenience favours the granting of the stay sought by Mr Truss, even if I was persuaded that I had the jurisdiction to grant it. Accordingly, I propose to dismiss the application in a case filed by the applicant.
The Registrar seeks the payment of costs of these proceedings fixed in the sum of $3,000.00. I propose to make an order for costs in this sum.
I will also make an order fixing the substantive appeal for hearing and make the necessary procedural orders which are required to prepare it for hearing, including the filing of affidavits of evidence.
For all these reasons, the orders of the court will be as set out at the commencement of these reasons for judgment.

I certify that the preceding seventy four (74) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of Judge Brown

Date: 26 October 2016