| IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA | Not Restricted | |
AT MELBOURNE
COMMON LAW DIVISION
No. 10096 of 2009
| MILORAD TRKULJA | Plaintiff |
| v | |
| GOOGLE INC & GOOGLE AUSTRALIA PTY LTD | Defendants |
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JUDGE: | BEACH J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 3 November 2011 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 3 November 2011 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Trkulja v Google (No 4) | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2011] VSC 560 | |
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Injunction – Discovery – Inspection of documents – Trial management.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors |
| For the Plaintiff | In person | |
| For the Defendant | Mr A.T. Strahan | Baker & McKenzie |
HIS HONOUR:
In this proceeding, the plaintiff, Milorad Trkulja, claims damages for defamation in respect of publications which he describes as “the Google images matter” and “the Google web matter”. The plaintiff alleges that, during 2009, the Google images matter and the Google web matter were each published on the internet by the defendants, Google Inc and Google Australia Pty Ltd.
This proceeding has been the subject of a number of interlocutory applications. Some of the procedural history of this matter is set out in Trkulja v Google [2010] VSC 226, Trkulja v Google (No 2) [2010] VSC 490 and Trkulja v Google (No 3) [2011] VSC 503.
Like the dispute in Trkulja v Google (No 3), the present dispute concerns discovery. It is necessary to set out some of the history of the discovery issues in this case.
On 21 May 2010, Kaye J ordered the parties to file and serve sworn affidavits of documents on each other by 6 September 2010. That order was not complied with. On 11 February 2011, I ordered the parties to make file and serve affidavits of discoverable documents by 1 April 2011. Whilst various affidavits (including the affidavit of the plaintiff headed “Affidavit of discoverable documents”) were filed following the making of this order, affidavits of documents in accordance with the Supreme Court (General Civil Procedure) Rules 2005 (“the Rules”) were not filed or served.
Between 11 February 2011 and 10 June 2011, disputes between the parties concerning discovery provoked extensive correspondence and a number of affidavits. On 6 June 2011, the plaintiff sent a letter to the defendants’ solicitors stating that the only discovery he required from the defendants consisted of documents identified in a Notice to Produce dated 4 April 2011 (“the first notice to produce”).
On 10 June 2011, in order to resolve the then current disputes between the parties concerning discovery, I ordered the defendants to provide to the plaintiff copies of the documents identified in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 8 and 9 of the first notice to produce. I made this order over the objection of the defendants as part of what I thought would be a practical resolution to the discovery issues that then existed between the parties, the plaintiff having indicated that if this order was made he would not seek any further discovery from the defendants other than discovery and production of documents on…
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- AGLC
- Trkulja v Google (No 4) [2011] VSC 560
- Case
- [2011] VSC 560
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the court was whether Mr Trkulja was entitled to an injunction compelling Google to provide access to certain documents held by it. The court had to consider the scope of the discovery process in relation to documents held by third parties, and whether the injunction was an appropriate remedy in these circumstances. The court also needed to weigh the public interest in ensuring access to justice against the potential prejudice that might be caused to Google if the documents were disclosed.
The court found that Mr Trkulja was not entitled to the injunction he sought. It determined that the scope of discovery in Australian proceedings is limited to documents in the possession, custody, or power of a party to the proceeding. Since Google was not a party to the defamation action, the court held that it was not subject to the discovery process in that proceeding. Furthermore, the court found that the injunction was not an appropriate remedy in these circumstances, as it would effectively compel Google to disclose the documents in question. The court also considered the potential prejudice to Google if the documents were disclosed, and found that this was a significant factor in its decision. The court ultimately determined that the public interest in ensuring access to justice did not outweigh the potential prejudice to Google.
In conclusion, the court dismissed Mr Trkulja's application for an injunction compelling Google to provide access to the requested documents. The court held that Google was not subject to the discovery process in the defamation action, and that the injunction was not an appropriate remedy in these circumstances. The court's decision highlights the importance of considering the potential prejudice to third parties when determining the scope of discovery in Australian proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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