Triguboff v Valuer General

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Reported Decision: 166 LGERA 128; 71 ATR 819

Land and Environment Court


of New South Wales


CITATION: Triguboff v Valuer General [2009] NSWLEC 9
This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.
PARTIES:

APPLICANTS:
Harry Oscar Triguboff and Rhonda Eileen Triguboff

RESPONDENT:
Valuer General
FILE NUMBER(S): 30875 of 2008
CORAM: Biscoe J
KEY ISSUES: VALUATION OF LAND :- whether land on one title but formerly on two titles comprises and should be valued as one parcel or two - meaning of "parcel" - whether unity of title, physical unity and unity of use and occupation.
LEGISLATION CITED: Land Tax Management Act 1956
Valuation of Land Act 1916, ss 14A(1), 26(1), 26A, 27B, 37, 40
CASES CITED: Attard v Valuer-General (NSW) [2006] NSWLEC 351, (2006) 146 LGERA 384
Christies Sands Pty Ltd v City of Tea Tree Gully (1975) 11 SASR 255, (1975) 37 LGRA 325
McMillan v Commissioner of Land Tax [1972] 1 NSWLR 545
DATES OF HEARING: 4 February 2009
 
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 

13 February 2009
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES:

APPLICANTS:
D Russell QC and M Seymour
SOLICITORS
Meriton Apartments Pty Ltd

RESPONDENT:
J Atkin
SOLICITORS
Crown Solicitor's Office (NSW)


JUDGMENT:

      THE LAND AND
      ENVIRONMENT COURT
      OF NEW SOUTH WALES

      BISCOE J

      13 February 2009

      30875 of 2008

      HARRY OSCAR TRIGUBOFF AND RHONDA EILEEN TRIGUBOFF v VALUER GENERAL

      JUDGMENT

1 HIS HONOUR: This is an appeal under s 37(1) of the Valuation of Land Act 1916, which provides that:

          “Any person entitled under Part 3 to object to a valuation may appeal to the Land and Environment Court if the person is dissatisfied with the Valuer-General’s determination of any such objection to the valuation concerned (whether or not the person was the objector).”

2 Section 40 of the Act provides:


          “ 40 Powers of Land and Environment Court on appeal

          (1) On an appeal, the Land and Environment Court may do any one or more of the following:


              (a) confirm or revoke the decision to which the appeal relates,

              (b) make a decision in place of the decision to which the appeal relates,

              (c) remit the matter to the Valuer-General for determination in accordance with the Court’s finding or decision.

          (2) On an appeal, the appellant has the onus of proving the appellant’s case.”

3 The applicants, Harry Oscar Triguboff and his wife Rhonda Eileen Triguboff, are owners as joint tenants of the property situated at 62 – 64 Wentworth Road, Vaucluse, NSW, described in Folio Identifier 1/1111079 being Lot 1 in Deposited Plan 1111079 (the Property). The Property has an area of 5,217 square metres.

4 Immediately prior to its consolidation under one title by a plan of consolidation registered in May 2007, the Property comprised adjoining blocks known as 62 Wentworth Road and 64 Wentworth Road, Vaucluse. These blocks were respectively described in Certificate of Title Volume 7285 Folio 209 and in Lot 13 of Section 2 in Deposited Plan 4527. No 62 comprised…

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Details
Case
[2009] NSWLEC 9
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants, Harry Oscar Triguboff and Rhonda Eileen Triguboff, appealed against the Valuer General's decision to assess the land value of their property at Vaucluse, NSW, as comprising two parcels rather than one. The respondents, the Valuer General, argued that the property should be valued as two separate parcels due to its previous division into two titles, 62 and 64 Wentworth Road. The applicants contended that the land should be valued as a single parcel, considering its physical unity, shared use, and occupation.

The key issue before the court was whether the property should be valued as one parcel or two parcels, and if the latter, whether section 26(1) of the Valuation of Land Act 1916 applied to require a single valuation. The court had to determine the meaning of the term "parcel of land" as used in the Act and assess whether the physical and functional unity of the property warranted a single valuation.

The court considered the applicants' extensive renovations and the physical connections between the two houses, as well as their unified use and occupation of the property. The court found that the property should be considered a single parcel for valuation purposes due to the unity of title, physical unity, and unity of use and occupation. The court rejected the Valuer General's argument that the property should be valued as two parcels based on its previous division into two titles. The court concluded that the property was a single parcel of land as at the base date of 1 July 2007.

Accordingly, the court allowed the appeal, revoked the Valuer General's decisions dated 13 August 2008, and remitted the matter to the Valuer General for determination in accordance with the court's decision. The court ordered that the matter be remitted to the Valuer General for determination in accordance with the court's decision and that the exhibits be returned.

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