Attard v Valuer General

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Land and Environment Court


of New South Wales


CITATION: Attard v Valuer General [2006] NSWLEC 351
PARTIES:

APPLICANTS
Charles John Attard and Catherine Joy Attard

RESPONDENT
Valuer General
FILE NUMBER(S): 31527 of 2005; 31528 of 2005
CORAM: Jagot J
KEY ISSUES: Valuation of Land :- Construction and Interpretation
LEGISLATION CITED: Conveyancing Act 1919 s 23F, s 23G
Local Government Act 1993
Real Property Act 1900 s 37
Valuation of Land Act 1916 s 4, s 6A, s 14A, s 26, s 26A, s 27, s 27B, s 29, s 34, s 37, s 38, s 39, s 40
CASES CITED: Christies Sands Pty Ltd v City of Tea Tree Gully (1975) 37 LGRA 325;
Colonial Sugar Refining Co Ltd v The Valuer-General (1939) 5 The Valuer 472;
Flemington Properties Pty Ltd v Raine & Horne Commercial Pty Ltd and Another (1998) 83 FCR 411;
Gollan and Another v Randwick Municipal Council (1961) 6 LGRA 275
DATES OF HEARING: 14/06/2006
EX TEMPORE JUDGMENT DATE: 06/14/2006
LEGAL REPRESENTATIVES: APPLICANTS
Mr C Attard (in person)

RESPONDENT
Mr J Maston
SOLICITORS
Crown Solicitor



JUDGMENT:

        THE LAND AND
        ENVIRONMENT COURT
        OF NEW SOUTH WALES

        Jagot J

        14 June 2006

        31527 of 2005
        31528 of 2005

        CHARLES JOHN ATTARD AND CATHERINE JOY ATTARD
        Applicants

        VALUER GENERAL
        Respondent

        JUDGMENT


1 These are appeals under s 37 of the Valuation of Land Act 1916 (“the Act”). The appeals were heard together and evidence in one was taken to be evidence in the other. Section 37 provides that:


            Any person entitled under Part 3 to object to a valuation may appeal to the Land and Environment Court if the person is dissatisfied with the Valuer-General’s determination of any such objection to the valuation concerned (whether or not the person was the objector).

2 Section 38 of the Act provides the time for appeal.

3 Section 39 provides that:


            The appellant’s and respondent’s cases on an appeal are not limited to the grounds of the objection.

4 Section 40, subs (1), provides that:


            On an appeal, the Land and Environment Court may do any one or more of the following:
            (a) confirm or revoke the decision to which the appeal relates,
            (b) make a decision in place of the decision to which the appeal relates,
            (c) remit the matter to the Valuer-General for determination in accordance with the Court’s finding or decision.

5 Subsection (2) provides that:


            On an appeal, the appellant has the onus of proving the appellant’s case.

6 The land is known as 210 Kurmond Road, Freeman’s Reach. Two deposited plans are in evidence. DP 790878 shows that the land at one time was held in three lots - lots 1, 2 and 3. Lot 1 was a small lot, fronting Kurmond Road. On 10 November 2004, a new deposited plan was registered, being DP 1075887. That DP shows that a subdivision of the land had occurred whereby former lot 1 was consolidated into the adjoining lot (former lot 2) and lot 2 was subdivided into…

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Details
Case
[2006] NSWLEC 351
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Charles John Attard and Catherine Joy Attard, the applicants, appealed to the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales against the Valuer General, the respondent, regarding the valuation of land in Freeman's Reach. The applicants contested the valuation of their property, which had been re-ascertained after a subdivision of the land, resulting in two valuation notices for different parts of lot 101. The applicants argued that the land should have been valued as a single parcel due to its indivisibility and that separate valuations led to inequitable rate implications. The respondent defended the separate valuations, asserting that the land could be dealt with in the market under certain conditions and that the valuations were accurate and conservative.

The court examined the statutory provisions and case law to determine whether the land should be valued as one parcel or separately. The court concluded that the land could indeed be dealt with in the market under specific conditions, and thus, the fee simple value was appropriately considered. The court further held that the land comprised two parcels for valuation purposes, aligning with the title arrangements and use of the land. Consequently, the court dismissed the applicants' objections, finding the Valuer General's approach to be correct and preferable, despite the applicants' concerns about the rate implications. The court ordered that the appeal be dismissed, the exhibits returned, and each party to bear their own costs.

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