Trewitt & Brock
[2021] FedCFamC1A 9
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 1) APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Trewitt & Brock [2021] FedCFamC1A 9
Appeal from: Trewitt & Brock [2021] FCCA 1255 Appeal number(s): EAA 52 of 2021 File number(s): NCC 770 of 2011 Judgment of: ALDRIDGE J Date of judgment: 15 September 2021 Catchwords: FAMILY LAW – APPEAL – PARENTING – Where the appellant sought to vary final parenting orders – Change in circumstances – Whether the primary judge incorrectly applied Rice and Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 – Whether the primary judge failed to have regard to considerations in s 60CC of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) – Sufficient weight – Order dismissing an application is not a parenting order – Proper weight afforded to evidence of change in circumstances – Test was not misapplied – No error demonstrated – Appeal dismissed – Appellant to pay respondent’s costs in a fixed sum. Legislation: Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ss 60CA, 60CC, 64B, 94AAA(3) Cases cited: Carriel & Lendrum (2015) FLC 93-640; [2015] FamCAFC 43
CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172; [1998] HCA 67
Elmi & Munro (2019) FLC 93-912; [2019] FamCAFC 138
Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513; [1979] HCA 63
House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499; [1936] HCA 40
Langmeil & Grange [2013] FamCAFC 31Marsden v Winch (2009) 42 Fam LR 1; [2009] FamCAFC 152
Poisat & Poisat (2014) FLC 93-597; [2014] FamCAFC 128
Rice and Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725; [1978] FamCA 84
SPS and PLS (2008) FLC 93-363; [2008] FamCAFC 16
Number of paragraphs: 64 Date of hearing: 19 August 2021 Place: Sydney (via video link) Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Bithrey Solicitor for the Appellant: Burke Mead Lawyers Counsel for the Appellant: Mr Boyd Solicitor for the Appellant: Foat Roberts Lawyers ORDERS
EAA 52 of 2021
NCC 770 of 2011FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
DIVISION 1 APPELLATE JURISDICTIONBETWEEN: MR TREWITT
Appellant
AND: MS BROCK
Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
ALDRIDGE J
DATE OF ORDER:
15 SEPTEMBER 2021
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal is dismissed.
2.The appellant pay the respondent’s costs fixed in the sum of $4,356.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: This copy of the Court’s Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Trewitt & Brock has been approved pursuant to s 121(9)(g) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
ALDRIDGE J:
INTRODUCTION
Mr Trewitt (“the father”) and Ms Brock (“the mother”), have one child (“the child”) who was born in 2009. She has autism spectrum disorder. On 5 May 2021, a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia dismissed the father’s application to vary parenting orders made on 26 July 2019 (“the 2019 orders”). He has now appealed that decision.
The primary judge did so because her Honour was not satisfied “that it [was] in the best interests of this 12-year-old to be embroiled in another round of extensive litigation” (at [64]). This was an application of the well-known principle in Rice and Asplund (1979) FLC 90-725 (“Rice and Asplund ”) which is that, generally speaking, the court should not embark on a reconsideration of existing parenting orders unless there has been a material change in circumstances which justifies such a reconsideration.
This appeal is being heard by a single judge pursuant to a direction given by the Chief Justice under s 94AAA(3) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) (“the Act”) on 16 July 2021.
BACKGROUND
In order to understand the appeal it is necessary to set out some relevant facts.
The parties commenced a relationship in 1999 and married in 2004. They separated in December 2010, just over a year after the child was born.
The father commenced parenting proceedings in March 2011. Ultimately, on 19 May 2014, orders were made by consent which provided for the child to live with the mother and spend time with the father. From the commencement of the school term in 2015 the child was to spend Friday to Monday and Wednesday to Thursday on alternate weeks with the father, with block time during the school holidays.
The orders were complied with but, according to the primary judge, significant underlying issues remained unresolved (at [17]).
On 21 March 2019, the mother attended at the father’s home to collect the child in accordance with the orders, but the father refused to allow the child to return to the mother. The police were called but they were not able to persuade the father to return the child.
The mother filed an application for a recovery order on 26 March 2019 which came before the Court on 3 April 2019. By this time the father had filed an application seeking orders that the child live with him and spend five days a fortnight with the mother.
The father was required to return the child and an order was made requiring the father’s time with the child be supervised.
In June 2019, the father attended C Hospital and later his general practitioner and clinical psychologist. He was diagnosed with chronic stress and post-traumatic stress disorder.
The father filed an Amended Application for Final Orders on 23 July 2019 which sought the following orders:
(1)The mother have sole parental responsibility for the child;
(2)The child live with and “spend 100% time” with the mother; and
(3)The father to provide, where possible, financial support for the child’s education and autism support.
In the words of the primary judge, the father decided to step out of the child’s life. In his affidavit filed on 23 July 2019, the father explained why he was seeking these orders as follows:
14.The number and continuing allegations of abuse throughout [the child’s] life has caused considerable stress for myself…
…
19.I believe there is little value in embroiling [the child] in court action for the majority of her childhood, especially considering [the child’s] autism and the trauma identified by her psychologist.
Orders along the lines of those proposed by the father were made on 26 July 2019 save that an order was also made providing for the father to spend supervised time with the child as agreed between parties. The father sent the child a letter explaining that he would not be seeing her for the foreseeable future.
Some eight months later, in March 2020, the father wrote to the mother asking if he could spend regular time with the child. The mother agreed provided that the time was supervised by B Contact Centre, a contact supervision agency. Supervised visits for two hours once a month commenced in October 2020.
On 18 December 2020, less than a year and a half after he sought orders effectively removing himself from the child’s life, the father filed an Initiating Application seeking to vary the 26 July 2019 orders. The father sought orders that there be equal shared parental responsibility and that the child live with both parents on a week about arrangement.
The matter came on for hearing on 4 May 2021, as a threshold hearing, to whether there should be a reconsideration of the orders at a later hearing or whether the father’s application should be dismissed at that early stage. As we have seen, the primary judge took the view that the latter course was in the child’s best interests.
THE APPEAL
This is an appeal from a discretionary order and is governed by the principles set out in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499. In applying those principles it must be recognised that courts are afforded a wide range of discretion in determining what parenting orders are in the best interests of a child. Error is not established by showing that another judge would have weighed the relevant considerations differently (Gronow v Gronow (1979) 144 CLR 513 at 519–520; CDJ v VAJ (1998) 197 CLR 172 at [40]). A discretionary decision based on value judgments, such as the best interests of a child, can be set aside only on strictly limited grounds.
Ground 4 was abandoned at the hearing of the appeal.
Did the primary judge fail to have any, or in the alternative, proper regard to the relevant considerations raised by s 60CC(2) and (3) of the Act (Ground 1) and did the primary judge fail to give sufficient weight to s 60CC(2)(a) of the Act? (Ground 2)
It is convenient to deal with these grounds together.
The main submission of the father is that the primary judge was obliged expressly to consider and give weight to the benefit of the child having a meaningful relationship with the father (s 60CC(2)(a) of the Act) as well as to the other considerations raised by s 60CC(3) of the Act. It is asserted that her Honour instead focused on the deleterious effects on the child of further litigation and thereby erred. The submission continued that this was so because the determination before the Court was of a parenting order within the meaning of s 64B of the Act and that therefore, the terms of s 60CC of the Act had to be applied in determining what was in the child’s best interests.
Counsel for the father very properly accepted that if the order the subject of the appeal was not a parenting order as defined, the arguments on appeal would lose much of their force.
The first issue to be determined is whether an order dismissing an application to vary parenting orders made at a threshold Rice and Asplund hearing is indeed a parenting order, as defined in s 64B of the Act. If it is such an order, then the court must regard the child’s best interests as the paramount consideration (s 60CA of the Act) and in determining that question, must therefore consider the matters set out in s 60CC(2) and (3) of the Act (s 60CC(1) of the Act) that are relevant to the matter before the court.
Section 64B(1) of the Act provides:
(1) A parenting order is:
(a)an order under this Part (including an order until further order) dealing with a matter mentioned in subsection (2); or
(b)an order under this Part discharging, varying, suspending or reviving an order, or part of an order, described in paragraph (a).
However, a declaration or order under Subdivision E of Division 12 is not a parenting order.
None of the matters listed in s 64B(2) of the Act is a dismissal of an application to vary existing parenting orders.
It is important to note that s 64B of the Act refers in terms to the making of an order and not to the nature of the application that led to the order itself. Attention must be given to the nature of the order itself and not the application that led to the order being made.
Here the father sought to vary the existing orders so that there was to be equal shared parental responsibility and the imposition of an equal time arrangement. If those orders were made they would unquestionably be parenting orders as defined by s 64B of the Act. They were not the orders made and the application was simply dismissed. Such an order of dismissal, however, does not discharge, vary, suspend or revive an order made under s 64B(2) of the Act. Therefore there is some difficulty in describing the order of dismissal as a parenting order.
In Poisat & Poisat (2014) FLC 93-597 (“Poisat”) the Full Court said:
52.Some suggestions made by counsel for the father seemed to imply that the order dismissing the father’s application was a “parenting order” within the meaning of s 64B(1) of the Act. That submission, too, can be answered, in our view, by reference to what was said by Warnick J in SPS:
77.An order simply dismissing an application to vary or discharge an earlier parenting order may not neatly fit within the definition of “Parenting Order” as set out in s 64B, although a variation or discharge of the earlier order would. However, the paramountcy principle still applies to the decision to dismiss an application to vary, because of the terms of s 60CA which are:
Child’s best interests paramount consideration in making a parenting order
In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.
78.Authority supports this view. Speaking of the rule in Rice and Asplund, Nygh J with whom Barblett and Fogarty JJ agreed, said in In the Marriage of Newling and Mole (1987) FLC 91-856 at 76,467 [quoted earlier in these reasons]…
(Emphasis in original).
53.The application by the father is an application for a parenting order and, thus, the Act mandates that such matters as are relevant pursuant to s 60CC must be taken into account in determining the relevant child’s best interests.
54.Her Honour did so. However, we have considerable doubts as to whether the order dismissing the father’s application is a “parenting order” as defined in the Act. The (wide) definition in s 64B does not include dismissal of an application. Seen in the context of Part VII as a whole, the omission seems plainly intentional. For example, if an order dismissing an application was a “parenting order” the court would be obliged to apply the presumption in s 61DA and to consider the matters in s 65DAA in circumstances where the court was determining that no parenting order should be made.
A differently constituted Full Court returned to this question in Carriel & Lendrum (2015) FLC 93-640. After referring to [52] of Poisat, the Full Court continued:
54.We consider that that statement fits neatly with what Warnick J also said in SPS & PLS set out above at [30], and with what Nygh J, with whom Barblett and Fogarty JJ agreed, said in the Full Court decision of Newling & Newling; Mole (Applicant) (1987) FLC 91-856 at 76,467:
Since the principle that the welfare of the child is the paramount consideration applies in all matters affecting children, it is, in my view, not appropriate to speak of cause of action estoppel. What this rule really illustrates is that it is, generally speaking, not in the interests of the child to have repeated applications concerning its custody and access before the Court…
55.This approach is also consistent with the recent pronouncement by the Full Court in SCVG & KLD (2014) FLC 93-582 to the effect that the nature and extent of the consideration of the mandatory statutory considerations must, of course, depend upon the circumstances of the case, including the nature and breadth of the issues the subject of the proceedings.
56.This analysis leads us to the view that where the principle in Rice & Asplund is being considered, it will not be appropriate or necessary to discretely address many of the factors in s 60CC of the Act in determining where the best interests of the child might lie.
57.In a case where the principle in Rice & Asplund arises for consideration, there are two circumstances which are central to the decision. First, there will already exist a parenting order and, axiomatically, the terms of that order will reflect the best interests of the child/ren at the time of its making. Second, the fact that an order has been made reflects that disputation between parties to a parenting dispute, such dispute being inherently contrary to the best interests of the child/ren whilst it exists, has been brought to an end by a curial order. Those twin circumstances dictate the conclusion that it cannot logically be in the best interests of the child/ren to embark upon further litigation enquiring as to the child/ren’s best interests unless it is first demonstrated that a sufficient change in circumstances has occurred since the parenting order was made.
58.Thus, it is entirely understandable, and in our view, not erroneous, for his Honour to address the issue of “best interests” by reference to whether it is in the interests of the child for there to be the further litigation proposed by the mother. Indeed, we note that this was how the issue was framed in the mother’s outline of argument presented to his Honour at the commencement of the hearing. She said this (at paragraph 3):
The central question for consideration by the Court was encapsulated by Warnick J in the following terms (para 81, at page 310):
“… Though sometimes unstated, the underlying conclusion will or ought to be that the interests of the child in not being the subject of further litigation is more powerfully in the child’s welfare than to allow the application to continue.”
59.This approach, when the principle in Rice & Asplund is in play, can also perhaps be seen as a product of the related question of whether an order dismissing an application on the basis of the principle in Rice & Asplund is a parenting order or not. If it is a parenting order then the Act requires a consideration of all of the factors that bear upon the best interests of the child. This has been touched on in several cases. For example in SPS & PLS Warnick J said this:
77.An order simply dismissing an application to vary or discharge an earlier parenting order may not neatly fit within the definition of “Parenting Order” as set out in s 64B, although a variation or discharge of the earlier order would. However, the paramountcy principle still applies to the decision to dismiss an application to vary, because of the terms of s 60CA which are:
Child’s best interests paramount consideration in making a parenting order
In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.
78.Authority supports this view. Speaking of the rule in Rice and Asplund, Nygh J with whom Barblett and Fogarty JJ agreed, said in In the Marriage of Newling and Mole (1987) FLC 91-856 at 76,467 [quoted earlier in these reasons]…
(Emphasis in original)
60.This issue was taken up by the Full Court in Poisat where their Honours said this:
53.The application by the father is an application for a parenting order and, thus, the Act mandates that such matters as are relevant pursuant to s 60CC must be taken into account in determining the relevant child’s best interests.
54.Her Honour did so. However, we have considerable doubts as to whether the order dismissing the father’s application is a “parenting order” as defined in the Act. The (wide) definition in s 64B does not include dismissal of an application. Seen in the context of Part VII as a whole, the omission seems plainly intentional. For example, if an order dismissing an application was a “parenting order” the court would be obliged to apply the presumption in s 61DA and to consider the matters in s 65DAA in circumstances where the court was determining that no parenting order should be made.
61.For our part, we agree with the comments of Warnick J in SPS & PLS and the Full Court in Poisat, and we seriously doubt whether an order dismissing an application such as the mother’s here is a parenting order. We are not able to come to a concluded view though because we have not heard any argument directed to this issue.
The weight of authority and the terms of s 64B of the Act itself point to the order dismissing the father’s application made by her Honour as not being a parenting order within that section. That being so, the court is not obliged to have regard to the mandatory terms of s 60CC of the Act.
Nonetheless, as the authorities make clear, the determination of whether there should be a reconsideration of existing parenting orders, is one that must be made in the best interests of the child. Often that determination will focus on the nature of the change in circumstances, if any, and the detriment to the child of further litigation. Considerations raised by s 60CC of the Act may also, obviously, be relevant.
The nature of the proceeding was aptly described by Warnick J in SPS and PLS (2008) FLC 93-363 (“SPS ”) (which explanation was approved in Marsden & Winch (2009) 42 Fam LR 1 (“Marsden”) at [41]–[47]; Langmeil & Grange [2013] FamCAFC 31 at [46] and Poisat at [40]) as follows:
81.… [W]hen the threshold question described in Rice and Asplund is determined as a preliminary matter, it remains a determination “on the merits”. Where an application is dismissed at a preliminary stage, it is not dismissed for some technical reason, such as the failure of a party to appear or some lack of compliance with form and procedure but rather because, assuming the evidence of the applicant is accepted, there is an insufficient change of circumstance shown to justify embarking on a hearing. Though sometimes unstated, the underlying conclusion will or ought be that the interests of the child in not being the subject of further litigation is more powerfully in the child’s welfare than to allow the application to continue.
The submission that the primary judge erred by failing expressly to consider s 60CC(2) and (3) of the Act does not succeed.
Nonetheless, the father submitted in his Summary of Argument filed on 5 August 2021 at paragraph 16, that the primary judge was required to engage with the benefit of the child having a meaningful relationship with the father, because:
(1)The child historically spent significant and substantial time with the father;
(2)The rupture to that time did not seem to involve questions of unacceptable risk;
(3)The 2019 orders came about with the consent of the father in complex circumstances;
(4)The 2019 orders leave the question of whether and how the child’s time with the father is to take place within the sole discretion of the mother;
(5)The only time the child was currently spending with the father was two hours a month under supervision;
(6)There was evidence that there were difficulties with the mother implementing time; and
(7)There was no guarantee that the father’s time with the child would continue or increase.
At the outset, with due respect to counsel, it is necessary to say that these points are not necessarily a full or accurate statement of the position.
For example, the proposition that the “rupture” to the significant and substantial time the child spent with the father “did not seem to involve questions of unacceptable risk” overlooks that the time ceased because the father improperly retained the child and later decided to walk away from the child’s life entirely. I would not assume that these acts would have no impact on a severely autistic child, who is very sensitive to changes in routine. Indeed, they might be said to involve a risk of psychological harm.
As a second example, the 2019 orders did not “leave the question of whether and how the child’s time with the father is to take place” because, contrary to the orders proposed by the father, the issue of what time there would be, if any, was left open to the mother entirely.
As to the asserted difficulties with implementing time, it is undoubtedly the case that the mother has facilitated time after an agreed period of reintroduction which involved the father and the child exchanging letters.
Nonetheless, the primary judge was well aware of these matters, including the time the child had previously spent with the father, because they form part of the history of the matter discussed at [6]–[32].
At [28], speaking of the 2019 orders, her Honour said:
28.It was noted on the order that the child was currently spending time with the father at B Contact Centre and was enjoying that time, and that the court hoped that the child would continue to spend time with the father in the future.
The primary judge also recorded the father’s contention that the supervised time with the child was going well and that she would benefit from spending more time with him (at [38]), which the child wanted to do (at [40]).
These are considerations that speak to the nature of the relationship between the father and the child, and the benefit to the child of it. Thus, in any event, the consideration in s 60CC(2) of the Act was undertaken.
It appears from the summary of the mother’s position recorded at [41] that this was not the primary focus of her case which did not deny that relationship or its benefits. Rather the mother contended that the child “had [autism spectrum disorder] and faced many personal challenges and that it was not in [the child’s] best interests to allow litigation about her to be reopened”.
Her Honour was acutely aware that the father had deliberately stepped out of the child’s life in July 2019 and was concerned it might happen again saying:
55.It is apparent from the father’s affidavit and the specious version of events he gives in various paragraphs in it that he accepts no responsibility for his role in the time ceasing.
56.There is a high risk that if this litigation is allowed to proceed the parties may find themselves embroiled in another lengthy round of litigation such as happened between 2011 and 2014. It gives me absolutely no comfort to know that the father now feels he is able to robustly handle litigation, in fact it is quite a frightening comment to hear from the father.
57.The father’s application that [the child] spend equal time with him is also concerning, as on the history he gives of the parties’ relationship it has no prospects of success and other snippets in the evidence suggest that he may not easily back away from it.
That is a discussion of the risks involved with attempting to develop a meaningful relationship with the child and an indication that whatever the benefits of such a relationship were, it would not lead to equal time.
This led to the following conclusion:
62.If the father’s application is not allowed to proceed his time with [the child] may not progress and it may even stop, but when that risk is weighed against the risk that if the matter is allowed to continue the parties will be involved in years of litigation and placed under significant stress and financial stress, the balance is in favour of not allowing the father to continue with his litigation.
63.Enough is enough. [The child] knows the father. She can seek him out when she is older. He is not a stranger to her. But I am not going to allow this matter to proceed through the court system and I am going to make an order that the father’s application be dismissed.
It is plain that the primary judge here acknowledged the relationship between the child and the father and implicitly its benefits.
Thus, the primary judge did not ignore the considerations in s 60CC(2)(a) of the Act.
Given the way the matter proceeded and the approach to cases such as the present identified in SPS, which I have quoted earlier, it is not surprising her Honour focused on whether there had been a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant the proceedings going forward and the adverse effects on the child of such litigation.
It is apparent that the primary judge was not satisfied of a sufficient change in circumstances (at [50]–[58]) or that any significant change in the orders was likely (at [58]–[60]) having regard to any change in circumstances. The litigation would however place the mother and child “under extreme stress” (at [61]) so her Honour could not “consider that it is in the best interests of this 12-year-old to be embroiled in another round of extensive litigation between her parents simply because the father now has a mental health diagnosis and considers that he is robust enough to endure that” (at [64]).
No error arises simply because the primary judge gave these considerations greater weight than the benefit of a meaningful relationship.
The father submitted that the primary judge failed to resolve whether there was a prima facie change in circumstances “because she was satisfied that the second limb of her formulation [whether it is in the child’s best interests for the litigation to continue] was not met” (Father’s Summary of Argument filed on 5 August 2021, paragraph 42).
First, as already explained above, the primary judge did make findings as to the change in circumstances.
Secondly, as her Honour was entitled to do so, having referred to the change in circumstances, found that they were outweighed by the deleterious effects of litigation on the child. That is an entirely unremarkable way to proceed and does not demonstrate error.
These grounds do not succeed.
Did the primary judge apply an incorrect formulation of the rule in Rice and Asplund? (Ground 3)
The father submitted that the primary judge erred by not clearly following the two step approach set out in Marsden at [58] which states:
58.That question might be better formulated in another way in the following proposition, namely that there is a requirement:
(1)for a prima facie case of changed circumstances to have been established; and
(2)for a consideration as to whether that case is a sufficient change of circumstances to justify embarking on a hearing.
In addition, the father submits that this test must be applied in the overarching requirement to act in the best interests of the child as mandated by s 60CC(2) and (3) of the Act. I will not repeat what I have said earlier about this submission.
As to the test itself, the rule in Rice and Asplund is not a statutory provision to be construed according to its terms, but it is rather a general principle of law, first identified in Rice and Asplund itself, and subsequently discussed and explained in many cases, some of which have been mentioned above. The nature of that discussion varies in response to the particular facts and submissions before the court in each case. It is an error therefore to identify the particular words taken from just one of those cases and to treat that statement as if it was, indeed, a statutory requirement.
In Elmi & Munro (2019) FLC 93-912, and as has been said many times:
38.The essence of the issue to be determined is whether there has been a material change in circumstances which indicate that it would be in the best interests of the child for there to be a reconsideration of the parenting orders…
It is clear from her Honour’s reasons taken as a whole and at [64] in particular that her Honour did not consider the change in circumstances, being that “the father now has a mental health diagnosis and considers that he is robust enough to endure [another round of extensive litigation]”, was sufficient to persuade her that it was in the best interests of the child for the existing orders to be reconsidered. That finding proceeds on the basis there was a change in circumstances, or at least a prima facie change.
The premise inherent in this ground of appeal, that the primary judge did not consider whether there had been a change in circumstances, has not been established.
The primary judge was clearly sceptical about the asserted change in circumstances. The father was described as giving a “specious version” of events and history of the matter (at [51], [53] and [55]). However the primary judge did not dismiss the application on that basis, but rather, taking the asserted changes at their highest, they did not justify a reconsideration of the orders.
The primary judge did not misapply the relevant test.
CONCLUSION AND COSTS
No error has been established.
It follows that the appeal will be dismissed.
The appeal has been wholly unsuccessful. There will be an order that the father pay the mother’s costs fixed in the sum of $4,356.
I certify that the preceding sixty-four (64) numbered paragraph is a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Aldridge. Associate:
Dated: 15 September 2021
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