Treloar v Wickham - [1961] HCA 11

HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Dixon C.J., Fullagar, Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer JJ.

TRELOAR v. WICKHAM

(1961) 105 CLR 102

10 March 1961

Damages

Damages—Personal injuries—Negligence—Economic loss—Pain and suffering—Continued payment by employer of plaintiff's salary—Evidence of agreement to refund—Direction to jury as to inclusion of this amount in verdict—New trial motion—Direction not objected to at trial.

Decisions

1961, March 10.
The following written judgments were delivered: -
DIXON C.J. This is an appeal as of right from an order of the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New South Wales dismissing an application for a new trial in an action which had been tried before Collins J. The action was for the recovery of damages for personal injuries caused by the defendant's negligent management of a motor car. A verdict passed for the plaintiff for 15,000 pounds. The appeal by the defendant from this verdict did not contest the defendant's liability but was based on the single ground that the damages awarded to the plaintiff were excessive. The appeal was heard before Evatt C.J., Herron J. and Brereton J. who were of opinion that having regard to the character of the plaintiff's injuries and his sufferings the assessment of damages was not excessive and who therefore dismissed the appeal. From their Honours' decision the defendant now appeals to this Court. (at p105)

2. The defendant and the plaintiff were both employed by Farmers and Graziers' Co-operative etc. Co. Ltd. at the Albury branch of that body. On the night of 14th June 1957 they were returning from a sale at Corowa in the company's Dodge car which was driven by the defendant. The plaintiff was sitting beside him in the front seat. There was some fog on the road and, running into a thicker patch, the car lost the road and the occupants were all thrown out. The car came to rest upon the plaintiff's body who suffered very serious injuries. The nature of his injuries and of his sufferings is dealt with fully in the judgment of the learned Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and is more summarily recounted in the judgment of Brereton J. and there is no need to go over the same ground again. The essence of the question to be decided is the measurement in money of the damages which by their verdict the jury has adopted. (at p106)

3. At the time of the accident the plaintiff was thirty-eight years of age, his salary was little more than 18 pounds a week before the deduction of tax and no reason appeared for thinking that, but for his injuries, his future would have been one of easy opulence. On the other hand, his condition now makes it impossible for him to choose freely among employments he might have pursued and indeed forbids him to seek any but a few very restricted types of employments or indeed of occupations. His "economic" outlook is in truth a grim one. As to his health and bodily condition…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Treloar v Wickham

Details

AGLC: Treloar v Wickham [1961] HCA 11
Case: [1961] HCA 11
Decision Date: 10 March 1961

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the appellant, Treloar, and the respondent, Wickham. The case concerned the interpretation and application of certain provisions within the *Landlord and Tenant (Control of Rents) Act 1942* (SA) and the *Landlord and Tenant (Control of Rents) Act 1952* (SA), specifically in relation to the recovery of possession of premises.

The central legal issues before the Court were whether the respondent, as a landlord, had established grounds for possession under the relevant legislation, and whether the appellant, as a tenant, had a valid defence. This involved determining the proper construction of clauses relating to the landlord's intention to occupy the premises and the adequacy of notice provided.

The Court's reasoning focused on the statutory requirements for a landlord seeking possession. It was held that the landlord must demonstrate a genuine and bona fide intention to occupy the premises for their own use. The Court examined the evidence presented by the respondent to support this intention, considering whether it met the threshold of proof required by the legislation. The principles applied involved statutory interpretation, with particular attention paid to the wording and purpose of the recovery of possession provisions. The Court also considered the nature of the notice given by the landlord and whether it complied with the statutory formalities.

The High Court allowed the appeal, finding that the respondent had not satisfied the onus of proof required to establish grounds for possession under the *Landlord and Tenant (Control of Rents) Act 1952* (SA). Consequently, the orders for possession made by the lower courts were set aside.

Orders