FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Trakimaite v Aubertin [2024] FedCFamC2G 1150
File number(s): SYG 1114 of 2021 Judgment of: JUDGE CAMERON Date of judgment: 8 November 2024 Catchwords: HUMAN RIGHTS – Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) – sexual harassment – sex discrimination – where applicant was an employee of the second respondent – where applicant and first respondent engaged in a consensual and non-exclusive sexual relationship – where first respondent was principal of second respondent – whether the first respondent sexually harassed the applicant – whether applicant’s employment with second respondent was terminated on the basis of her pregnancy Legislation: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth) ss 46PO, 46PSA
Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s 125
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) ss 5, 7, 14, 28A, 28B, 106
Cases cited: Hughes v Hill (2020) 277 FCR 511
Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (2013) 232 IR 31
Division: General Number of paragraphs: 146 Date of last submission/s: 8 May 2023 Date of hearing: 30 – 31 January 2023 Place: Sydney Counsel for the Applicant: Mr L Finch(Direct Brief) Counsel for the First and Second Respondents: Ms T Wong Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Mills Oakley ORDERS
SYG 1114 of 2021 FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
BETWEEN: SONATA TRAKIMAITE
Applicant
AND: RICHARD DESIRE AUBERTIN
First Respondent
AXE CONSTRUCTION GROUP ACN 631 236 274
Second Respondent
ORDER MADE BY:
JUDGE CAMERON
DATE OF ORDER:
8 NOVEMBER 2024
THE COURT DECLARES THAT:
1.The first respondent sexually harassed the applicant on 31 October 2020.
2.The second respondent is vicariously liable for the first respondent’s sexual harassment of the applicant.
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
3.Judgment for the applicant against the respondents jointly for $25,000.
4.The matter stand over for submissions on costs.
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court’s records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
JUDGE CAMERON
INTRODUCTION
On 21 June 2021, following the termination of a complaint she had made to the Australian Human Rights Commission (Commission), the applicant, Ms Trakimaite, filed the present application. She alleges that during her employment from 20 August 2020 to 29 December 2020 as an office administrator with the second respondent, Axe Construction Group Pty Ltd (Axe Construction), she engaged in a consensual and non-exclusive sexual relationship with the first respondent Mr Aubertin, who was the sole owner and director of Axe Construction, which resulted in her falling pregnant in late 2020. Ms Trakimaite alleged that on one occasion in October 2020, in contravention of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) (SD Act
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- Trakimaite v Aubertin [2024] FedCFamC2G 1150
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- [2024] FedCFamC2G 1150
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to determine two primary legal issues: firstly, whether Mr. Aubertin's conduct on 31 October 2020 amounted to sexual harassment under sections 28A and 28B of the Sex Discrimination Act; and secondly, whether Ms. Trakimaite's employment was terminated due to her pregnancy, in breach of sections 7(1)(a) and 14(2)(c) of the Act. The court examined the nature of the relationship between Ms. Trakimaite and Mr. Aubertin, the circumstances surrounding the alleged harassment, and the subsequent termination of her employment. The court also had to consider whether Axe Construction could be held vicariously liable for Mr. Aubertin's actions under section 106 of the Act.
The court concluded that Mr. Aubertin's conduct on 31 October 2020 did indeed constitute sexual harassment. It found that the demand for sexual intercourse, combined with the threat to terminate her employment if she refused, created an environment where Ms. Trakimaite felt coerced into having sex. The court also determined that Ms. Trakimaite's employment was terminated because of her pregnancy, as evidenced by Mr. Aubertin's explicit demand for an abortion and his subsequent actions to exclude her from the workplace. Consequently, the court found in favour of Ms. Trakimaite and awarded her $25,000 in damages. The matter concerning her costs will be re-listed for further submissions.
Orders
Orders of the court
Full text does not contain this section.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Aubertin’s evidence was that he later paid the $500 abortion fee directly to Ms Trakimaite upon receiving the invoice and did not contact her again until March 2021. CONSIDERATION This case has the following elements:(a)whether, in all the circumstances, Mr Aubertin’s conduct towards Ms Trakimaite on 31 October 2020 amounted to sexual harassment contrary to s.28A of the SD Act; and(b)whether Ms Trakimaite was dismissed from her employment and, if so, whether she was dismissed contrary to s.7 of the SD Act because she was pregnant. Evidence concerning what happened after Ms Trakimaite returned her office keys and security pass, which mark the latest possible point of her employment with Axe Construction, is not particularly helpful in the determination of those questions.Sexual harassmentEvents on 31 October 2020? The terms of s.28A of the SD Act were set out earlier in these reasons. As noted by Perram J in Hughes v Hill (2020) 277 FCR 511: 21 There are essentially three elements to this provision.22 First, the Court is directed by subs (1) to ask itself whether there has been any of three identified forms of conduct: a sexual advance, a request for sexual favours or other conduct of a sexual nature. Each of these concepts involves the application of a defined legal standard to the facts as found. The Court must determine, on those facts, whether there was a sexual advance, a request for sexual favours or other conduct of a sexual nature. It is a question for the Court and it is a question of fact. In determining whether there has been conduct of a sexual nature the Court applies, of course, the definition of that term in s 28A(2). 23 Secondly, if an identified form of conduct is established subs (1) also requires that it must be ‘unwelcome’ to the person allegedly harassed. This is a question of fact which is subjective and which turns only on the allegedly harassed person’s attitude to the conduct at the time. Even if the Court has concluded under the first limb that one person has engaged in conduct of a sexual nature towards another person, this will not constitute sexual harassment under the provision if it was not actually unwelcome in this sense. Ordinarily this will be proved by the person allegedly harassed giving evidence that the conduct was unwelcome but that mode of proof is not dictated by the statute and proof of this fact, like proof of any other fact, may be done by a variety of means. In some cases, I suspect this is one, the unwelcome quality of the conduct will be painfully obvious.24 Thirdly, once it be established that there was conduct of a sexual nature towards another and that the conduct was unwelcome, the provision imposes an objective delimitation on the provision’s ambit. The ‘circumstances’ must be such that a reasonable person would have anticipated the possibility that the person allegedly harassed would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct. The ‘circumstances’ are defined broadly in s 28A(1A) and include, importantly for this case, the relationship between the harasser and the harassed.Was there a sexual advance, a request for sexual favours or other conduct of a sexual nature?