Trade Practices Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2) - [1980] FCA 36

T r a d e

P r a c t i c e s

Act d e f e n d a n t s

1 9 7 4

submiss ion

c a s e

t o

answer

w h e t h e r

t h e

s h o u l d

b e

r e q u i t e d

t o

elect

n o t t o

c a l l

e v i d e n c e

p r a c t i c e

t o

b e

a d o p t e d

a n d

m a t t e r s t o b e t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t

T r a d e

P r a c t i c e s

C o m m i s s i o n

v .

G e o r g e

W e s t o n

Foods

Limi ted

No. G.16 of 1978

Dav ies ,	J.
Canberra

11 March 1980

I N THE	FEDERAL	COURT OF	AUSTRALIA	)
1

AUSTRALIAN

CAPITAL

TERRITORY

No.

6 .16

of 1 9 7 8

D I S T R I C T

R E G I S T R Y

GENERAL

D I V I S I O N

I n t h e matter of -

THE

TRADE

PRACTICES

ACT

1 9 7 4

B e t w e e n :

TRADE PRACTICES

COMMISSION

P l a i n t i f f

And

: GEORGE

WESTON

FOODS LIMITED

F i r s t

Defendan t

And	: ALLIED r . m L s INDUSTRIES PTY. LIMITED

Second D e f e n d a n t

And	: L .A. COGGAN & SON PTY . LIMITED

T h i r d

Defendant

And

JAElES

MUREWY

O G I L V I E

F o u r t h

D e f e n d a n t

And

ISABEL

MARGARET

O G I L V I E

F i f t h Defendan t

And

: JOHN

FREDERICK

DALLAS

S i x t h D e f e n d a n t

RULING

11 March 1 9 8 0

DAVIES,

I .

The

fo l lowing

r easons

were

d e l i v e r e d o r a l l y o n

March

1980

The

d e f e n d a n t s ,

b y

t h e i r

c o u n s e l ,

seek

t o move

fo r

j udgmen t

t h e g r o u n d s e n i o r

t h a t

t h e r e

is no case t o answer.

Mr.

Masterman,

c o…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Trade Practices Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2)

Details

AGLC: Trade Practices Commission v George Weston Foods Ltd (No 2) [1980] FCA 36
Case: [1980] FCA 36
Decision Date: 11 Mar 1980

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Court of Australia, the Trade Practices Commission brought an action against George Weston Foods Limited and several other defendants, alleging breaches of the Trade Practices Act 1974. The defendants sought judgment on the grounds that there was no case to answer. The plaintiff argued that the defendants should not be allowed to make the submission unless they elected not to call evidence in the trial. The court considered the legal issues and concluded that it was not bound by the practice of the South Australian Supreme Court. Instead, the court followed the established practice in other jurisdictions that a decision should not be given on a submission of no case to answer unless the defendant announced that they call no evidence. The court also took into account the discretionary power of the presiding judge to determine the case at an early stage when appropriate.

In this case, the defendants were alleged to have engaged in price-fixing arrangements for the sale of bread in the Australian Capital Territory. The plaintiff's case relied on evidence of parallel conduct and press releases issued by one of the defendants. However, the evidence was sparse and called for explanations. The court considered the discretionary power of the presiding judge to determine the case at an early stage when appropriate. The court also took into account the probable length and expense of the proceedings if they ran their full course, as well as the fact that the alleged breach of the Trade Practices Act called for a standard of proof consistent with the seriousness of the allegation.

The court held that it would be unsatisfactory to determine the issues involved in this case upon the evidence which was presently before the court. To come to a conclusion at the present time would involve the drawing of inferences from meagre facts, facts which arguably called for an explanation and which had not been explained. However, the court was of the view that, if the facts alleged in the statement of claim were established, the plaintiff would have an arguable case on the law.

The court decided to exercise its discretion and require the defendants to elect whether or not they would adduce evidence in the trial. The court took into account the probable length and expense of the proceedings if they ran their full course, as well as the fact that the alleged breach of the Trade Practices Act called for a standard of proof consistent with the seriousness of the allegation. The court also considered the provisions of section 155 of the Trade Practices Act, which provided a means by which the Trade Practices Commission could obtain evidence of relevant facts. However, the court did not form any particular view as to its significance in that respect.

The court ordered that the defendants were required to elect whether or not they would adduce evidence in the trial. The court held that justice would be best done if the defendants were required to make that election at that stage. The court also held that it would be undesirable for one or more of the defendants to be dismissed from the action prior to the reception of all the evidence, as the strength of the evidence against a particular defendant might well alter if further evidence was given.

Orders