Toodayan v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner Queensland

The appeal in Toodayan v Anti-Discrimination Commissioner Queensland involved two appellants who had worked as interns at the Princess Alexandra Hospital and had made complaints to the Anti-Discrimination Commissioner alleging discrimination arising out of a police investigation and the related conduct of hospital staff. The Commissioner's delegate rejected the complaints under section 139(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), finding them to be misconceived or lacking in substance. The appellants subsequently sought judicial review of this decision, which was dismissed. They then appealed to the court, challenging the primary judge's decision.

The legal issues before the court were whether the primary judge erred in failing to find that the delegate applied the wrong test when rejecting the complaint under section 139(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) and whether the primary judge was correct in finding that the evidence before the delegate did not establish a contravention of the Act. The court held that the appellants' contention that the delegate applied the wrong test when rejecting their complaint was correct. However, the primary judge did not err in finding that the evidence before the delegate did not establish a contravention of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld). The court found that the primary judge had correctly identified that the statutory test was not to be glossed in the ways contended by the appellants but had not directed sufficient attention to all the evidence before the Commission to support an inference of discrimination.

The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the delegate rejecting the appellants' complaint was set aside. The court held that the statutory test under section 139(b) required the commissioner to form an opinion based on the reasonably sufficient details provided in the complaint, if proved, to indicate a contravention that was neither misconceived nor lacking in substance. The court found that the primary judge's error was in not sufficiently considering all the evidence before the Commission. As the respondent took no active part in the appeal, there was no order as to costs.